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Abstract 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) remains an enigma -
even to the closest observers. The absence of any army attempt in the post-
independence period to wrest power from the government of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) - especially during the difficult decade after independence - is in marked 
contrast with the experience of other Third World states. In that, PNG has 
benefitted from a tradition of military professionalism, reinforced by continued 
ties with Australia after independence, and from a history of democratic elections, 
which has seen the smooth transfer of power before and during 1975. Moreover, 
PNG did not, until the secessionist crisis on Bougainville in 1988, face an 
insurgent threat, which might have led to a more rapid politicisation of the army. 
Yet PNG' s democratic traditions are under threat inviting unconstitutional 
action by the army. The prerequisites for a coup, including the PNGDF' s 
penchant for indiscipline, have emerged during the decade between 1980 and 
1990. Papua New Guineans - facing unemployment, higher costs of living, and 
law and order problems - could look to the PNGDF to assist in their plight. The 
public's perception of the army stems from the government's preparedness to 
assign the PNGDF a key role in internal security. 
But the PNGDF is in a poor state and, in the event of a coup, factionalism 
could see the Force unravel, pitting soldiers against each other - damaging the 
fragile national unity. The image of a professional organisation, relative to other 
PNG institutions, is a veneer, masking deep-seated problems of morale and 
indiscipline. Loyalties are divided, becoming more pronounced with 
politicisation of the Force. PNGDF intervention risks provoking civil unrest, 
which it would be hard pressed to contain, especially outside the urban centres. 
The PNGDF developed from the formation of the Papuan Inf an try 
Battalion during the Second World War, emerging as an independent army in 
PNG in 1975 . While comparisons can be made with other developing countries, 
especially with those in Africa, the PNGDF is unique - a reflection of wider 
PNG society. The PNGDF is born of a complex traditional society where, even 
today, tribal values and customs prevail. These traditional influences have been 
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reasserted since independence, relegating professional obligations. Factional 
demands have been superimposed on tradition to add to the complexities of army 
culture. Loyalties are in conflict in balancing wantok, professional and factional 
obligations in a society where law and order problems have become a way of life. 
Notwithstanding their contribution to the war effort, local soldiers defied 
authority when the mood took them. Indiscipline ensured that indigenous 
battalions were disbanded in 1945 and was the basis of resistance to the 
reformation of the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR) in 1951; the latter prevailed, 
prompted by security concerns over Indonesian intentions. Nonetheless, serious 
indiscipline after 1951 again led to calls for the PIR' s disbandment. In response, 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) sought to instil professionalism and loyalty, 
leading to increased numbers of Australian officers in the PIR. The PIR enjoyed 
a close association with the ADF, contributing to the army's elite status in PNG 
prior to and after independence. However, memories of the colonial period 
inevitably faded. The PNGDF, after its creation in 1973, developed its own style. 
In 1980 the army faced its first real test, when during the Vanuatu 
rebellion, the Kumul Force combined surprise and the concentration of force to 
strike quickly at the rebel heartland. There, the PNGDF captured rebel leader, 
Jimmy Stevens, resulting in the collapse of the Vemarana rebellion - in spite of 
PNG concerns over casualties, and Australian doubt over PNGDF capabilities. 
By the mid-1980s, the Force turned its focus to internal security, with 
soldiers assisting the police, in spite of longstanding rivalry. The internal focus 
combined with politicisation of the PNGDF leadership to create the ingredients 
for unrest. Challenges to government authority were initially limited to protecting 
PNGDF interests. Little interest was shown in a takeover, in spite of the Fiji 
coups in 1987. However, relations with government were seriously strained as 
the army struggled in 1989-1990 to restore authority on Bougainville in the face 
of rebel opposition, and over international condemnation of human rights abuses. 
Against that background, this thesis argues that the prospect of army 
unrest has arisen from the PNGDF' s increasing role in internal security - and 
from politicisation of the force and indiscipline - during the period 1980-1990. 
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Chapter 1 
The Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
Instrument of State or Threat to Democracy? 
Introduction 
At independence, Papua New Guinea's Constitution defined for the Papua 
New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) an external focus and, as a last resort, a 
subordinate role to the civil authority in internal security. In that, the government 
sought to ensure that the post-independence army would not have a political role 
or pose a threat to democracy. Yet, by the government's hand through neglect 
and poor governance, and by circumstance, the PNGDF has come to play an 
increasing role in internal affairs, especially since 1985. That, combined with 
indiscipline and poor leadership within the Force, has unwittingly created the risk 
of PNGDF action against the state - by a demonstration of force or through 
organised action by elements of the military, and possibly the police. 
A number of researchers on PNG, including Nelson (1972), Sundhaussen 
(1973), Mench (1975), Turner (1990), MacQueen (1993), May (1998), and 
Dorney (1998), agree that the PNGDF has the potential for unconstitutional 
action. Researchers also agree that sufficient cause exists to trigger such a move 
against the civil authority. However, on balance, the judgement is that the 
PNGDF is unlikely to mount a coup. That view has, since independence, held 
sway in the wider community and in government in Australia and in PNG - in 
spite of political crises in that country and in PNG' s closest neighbours. 
However, PNG' s ability to cling to democracy since independence belies 
the country's capacity to unravel, posing risks for that nation and for those others, 
especially Australia, which have interests in PNG. Many of the clues to the risk 
of a military coup in PNG lie in its history and in that of the PNGDF, particularly 
arising from the often-turbulent 1980-1990 period. The clues become even more 
obvious when the views of key officers in the Force, who have shaped the 
PNGDF since independence, are taken into account. 
Inside views, evident in the contributions of Mench (1975), East (1981), 
Glanville (1984) and Liria (1993), all former serving officers in the PNGDF, have 
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been valuable in understanding cultural and professional influences on the 
military. Yet those insights have been limited since 1984 with Liria' s 
contribution on the PNGDF's 1989 Bougainville operations a stark exception. 
The thesis argues that the prospect of a coup has arisen from the PNGDF' s 
increasing role in internal security - and from politicisation of the Force and 
indiscipline - during the period 1980-1990. Furthermore, the thesis explains that 
the PNGDF has not intervened before now because of the influence of the 
Australian Defence Force (ADP) after independence, and because the PNGDF has 
so far been prepared to limit its remonstrations to the protection of its corporate 
interests. Further, the PNGDF has accepted that democratic process has 
determined the transition of successive governments. However, indiscipline, 
factionalism and politicisation arising from the period 1980-1990 now make the 
army unpredictable, and have underlined the potential political power wielded by 
the force with its monopoly on arms. 
The study provides a timely assessment of the PNGDF and its capacity to 
usurp power. The conclusions are drawn from a broader examination of the 
PNGDF than has been the case with most other literature. The thesis contributes 
knowledge of the PNGDF gained through personal experience since 1971 , 
observing first hand the Force's involvement in law and order operations, its 
changing emphasis in training, politicisation of the army leadership, and 
escalating morale and discipline issues (See Research Method below). The need 
for such a study has been given impetus by rumblings within the PNGDF arising 
from its role in internal security, especially on Bougainville in 1989-1990. 
Regional events too have been significant, principally the coups in Fiji in 1987. 
The thesis seeks to understand the PNGDF, taking into account its history 
and social circumstances - consistent with the emphasis in Lawson, May and 
Selochan (1998: 4). Importantly, the judgements stand out from the consensus of 
opinion, evident since PNG' s independence, which has conceded some form of 
unconstitutional action by the anny is possible but collectively ruled out a coup. 
Moreover, the thesis provides an insight into the risk of regional instability; an 
issue which continues to demand the attention of the Australian government and 
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its agencies. Given the unique nature of PNG society and of the PNGDF, many 
of the issues relevant to military intervention are not easily applied to the PNG 
case without account being taken of the complex web of social obligation and of 
the political dimensions evident in PNG society. These provide important reasons 
for a special study of the Force and the issues are spelt out in more detail later, 
especially in Chapter 8. This examination of the PNGDF contributes to the 
ongoing debate on the reasons for a military coup by demonstrating - consistent 
with arguments of Finer (1988) - that a combination of external and internal 
factors provide the catalysts for an army coup. In that, the study shows the impact 
on the army of events during 1980-90 whereby political decisions to involve the 
Force in internal security combined with a breakdown in discipline within the 
PNGDF and led to politicisation and factionalism. 
Researchers have sought to find clues to the causes of military 
intervention 1n an analysis of case studies in which civilian regimes were 
overthrown. The search has proven difficult not least because the military is a 
complex organisation in both its nature and history. Moreover, military units are 
often shrouded in secrecy in a bid to protect their capabilities and command 
structure and so safeguard the army's ability to defend the country and to 
maintain internal security. However, in spite of differences in emphasis, 
researchers have identified common elements 1n the history of military 
intervention. So1ne researchers have chosen, in a few cases boldly, to narrow the 
causes, arguing that other issues, while important, have less prominence in any 
study of civil/military relations. 
In a wide-ranging literature, military interventions have been subjected to 
close scrutiny, through case studies. Those studies have highlighted the many 
forms of unconstitutional action taken by the military, including mutiny, defiance 
of orders, violent and non-violent demonstrations against the government, rogue 
military action in defiance of government policy or of its objectives, and the 
military coup. The sequence, scale and intensity of these military actions often 
characteristised the extent of military frustration and anger over issues, 
culminating in - when patience was exhausted - the military coup. 
l 
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The thesis identifies the historical, economic, political and societal causes 
of military intervention in the PNG context, demonstrating in the process, that the 
causes are inextricably linked. The PNGDF study approaches the causes of 
intervention by examining an army which has yet to mount a coup, rather than, as 
in most other studies, evaluating coups after the event (an exception is Horowitz ' s 
study of the military in Sri Lanka). 
Coups have had a high level of frequency and intensity across the world 
since the 1930s. The impact of coups on societies has varied. In extreme cases, 
especially where the military has held onto power, as in Argentina and Chile, 
evidence of the abuse of power, including against human rights, has been 
exposed. Researchers such as Janowitz (1964), Huntington (1968), Lissak (1976), 
and Perlmutter (1977) looked for common elements in the military' s history, 
noting two broad categories: ex-colonial forces and armies formed from pre-
independence fighters. A common theme which emerged was that the army was a 
more cohesive force than the fledgling civilian institutions. Janowitz focussed on 
the importance of professional ethics and the role of democratic institutions which 
underpinned civilian supremacy, seeing the army' s contribution in law and order 
and policing borders. Huntington saw the relationship of officers to the state as 
the principal focus in civil-military relations. Lissak saw risks in the army 
perception of its role as guarantor of the state. Perlmutter emphasised that 
corporatism leads to intervention, and, in contrast to Huntington, believed that 
professionalism was only one guarantee against such intervention. Others, such 
as First (1970) and Horowitz (1980), argued that threats to military corporate 
interests provoked army intervention. Nordlinger (1977) and Horowitz (1985), 
among others, saw the military as an extension of society, noting the part played 
by factionalism and rivalries , which led to coups. 
Finer (1988) subjected coups to a comprehensive study, examining the 
military, the state and society, triggers for coups, the army' s capacity to govern, 
and the circumstances under which troops return to their ban·acks. He identified 
the causes for military intervention among issues internal and external to the 
military. Finer sounded a warning for political leaders, noting that armies, with 
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their marked superiority in organisation, highly emotionalised symbolic status, 
and monopoly of arms were often in a better position to govern than civilian 
governments (ibid.: 5). Importantly, he noted that armies 'drew their legitimacy 
[for action against governments] from their creation at independence' (ibid.: 6). 
Army intervention often only required a catalyst for action. According to Finer, 
'where public attachment to civil institutions is weak ... military intervention in 
politics will find scope-both in manner and substance' (ibid.: 18). 
Finer' s research suggested that the military, as servants of the state, would 
not be bound by rules subordinating the force to the civil authority, if the 
expectations of the troops, built largely on self perception of their status, were not 
fulfilled (ibid.: 23). Governments would need to manage those expectations 
through a consultative process in order to retain control over the army. The 
process extended beyond the appointment of an army commander to satisfy 
political imperatives. Rather, commanders must exercise real authority -
including in decisions on military equipment - so that their advisory role to 
government extended beyond a puppet appointment. Such partnerships reinforce 
civil authority; enhance troop morale and the status of military leaders; and 
facilitate budgetary control over defence expenditure. Finer believed that 
intervention by the army was not inevitable. Rather, by understanding the army, 
political leaders could reduce the risk of army action against the civil authority. 
Michael Somare, then chief minister, recognised in 1973 the need for a 
better understanding of the military. That coincided with efforts by the Australian 
Department of Defence, which encouraged closer links with PNG' s political 
leaders as a means of cementing a professional relationship at independence (See 
Chapter 2). However, after independence, those links were eroded and political 
leaders distanced themselves from the army, appointing their choice of 
commander. The post-independence approach fell short of maintaining contact 
with the military and its role in PNG society. 
Finer (1988) believed certain prerequisites were necessary before an army 
would usurp power. He pointed to ' the need of a sense of power and ... some 
kind of grievance' (ibid.: 54). Civilian dependence on the military or rule by a 
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political or social minority opposed by the masses which are too weak to 
overthrow the existing government could increase the risk of military intervention 
(ibid.: 69). However, not all schools of thought agreed with Finer on the causes 
of military intervention. 
Janowitz (1964) believed that internal factors provided the indicators of 
potential military action against the state. He focussed investigation on the 
conditions prevailing in the military to give insight into military unrest. 
Substantial though his arguments are, Janowitz's claim that internal factors are 
predominantly the cause for a coup, have not been borne out in the PNGDF case. 
Even as conditions within the Force have deteriorated, the army has confined 
much of the protest to the barracks. On those occasions where troops have taken 
to the streets, such as in the 1989 pay riots, their anger has been targetted, 
resisting any attempt to spread the unrest. So internal issues have not been 
sufficient to prompt military intervention in PNG. Rather, the aggravation of 
internal grievances through politicisation and factionalism, while committing the 
army to internal security, has tipped the balance towards more provocative 
military unrest. 
Horowitz (1980) too searched for the reasons behind military intervention 
among internal factors, chiefly in the motives of officers. He chose as a focus of 
study an attempted coup in Sri Lanka in 1962. Given the role of officers in the 
disciplined structure of armies, even among crude army models in the least 
developed Third World countries, an emphasis on the officer corps would seem 
appropriate. Research by Horowitz on the role of the officer corps in coups has 
relevance to this thesis , which highlights the cumulative and detrimental effects of 
politicisation of the PNGDF officer corps. But there the commonality ends, in 
large part because the PNGDF officer corps is not professional, nor do the officers 
command respect. So even if officers have grievances and the inclination, they 
would have difficulty commanding, by their positions alone, a following - inside 
or outside the Force - sufficient to contest government. 
Huntington (1957) argued that external factors , not internal, were the chief 
cause of intervention. He argued that the nature of civil-military relations was a 
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pivotal element in any discussion of the likelihood of military intervention. 
Huntington (ibid.: viii) developed a way to examine such relations in a system of 
interdependent elements. He emphasised the importance of professionalism -
measured by the level of competence in the military, distinguished by a hierachy 
of ranks which reflect achievement, seniority and ability, and motivated by 
military ideals - in ensuring the army' s subordination to the civil authority while 
maintaining a capacity to meet its internal and external security obligations (ibid.: 
16, 17, 74). Any erosion of that professionalism, particularly through 
politicisation, posed risks for governments. Such professionalism would be 
manifest in the competence levels within ranks which themselves reflect 
'professional achievement measured in terms of experience, education and ability ' 
(ibid.: 17). Huntington believed problems emerge when 'the nature of an officer ' s 
political loyalties became more important to the government than the level of 
professional competence' (ibid.: 35). Huntington pointed to the officer corps as a 
key to any army threat, as an important part of professionalism. Yet his focus on 
the officer corps and on professionalism within the ranks seems at odds with 
Huntington's claims that coups are the result of external factors. Further, 
Huntington's belief that professionalism kept soldiers out of politics was open to 
challenge. 
Finer (1988: 21), for example, noted that even professional armies, such as 
1n Germany and Japan, intervened in politics. He believed that armies must 
accept civil supremacy, but saw acceptance contingent on professionalism, loyalty 
and good leadership (ibid.: 22). Finer' s argument on the issue of civil supremacy 
is worth underlining. Notwithstanding its constitutional duty to remain 
subordinate to the civil authority, the army' s attitude will invariably be influenced 
by the impact of government policy on its corporate interests. Further, the army 
will be influenced by social attitudes, in keeping with the views of Nordlinger 
(1977) and Horowitz (1980) that the army is an extension of society. 
Perlmutter (1981) shared Finer' s opposition to a lack of professionalism as 
the principal cause of intervention. Perlmutter argued that corporatism, not lack 
of professionalism, provides a prima faci e case for intervention, and military 
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professionalism is only one guarantee against intervention (ibid.: 2). Perlmutter 
believed that cohesive armies conducted coups against weak political opposition. 
In these cases, political activists among the officer corps or those with political 
ambition drew upon events , such as economic problems in the country, to mount a 
coup. According to Perlmutter, threats to the army's corporate structure or 
capabilities risk triggering a coup. 
Research also focussed on the types of coups (Welch 1974; Horowitz 
1980), the performance of military regimes (Hoadley 197 5; Nordlinger 1977), 
and the types of military regimes (Finer 1962; Janowitz 1964; Nordlinger 1977; 
Perlmutter 1981). A number of researchers examined the army' s capacity to 
govern in the wake of a coup. Janowitz (1964) acknowledged that the army may 
be useful in restoring order but ultimately impeded development. Sarkesian 
(1978) believed that the army had inherent difficulties managing development. 
Finer (1988: 12) was also critical of the army ' s ability to run a country, noting a 
technical inability to administer. The competency of military governments was 
also covered in work by Nordlinger (1970) and Reeger (1977). Consensus 
emerged that the army' s ability to assume power through superior firepower and 
organisation did not translate into an ability to govern, a conclusion equally true 
in the PNGDF case. Some military regimes , faced with problems of governance, 
opted to restore power to civilian regimes and return to barracks (Huntington 
1968; Finer 1988). 
Several researchers have previously examined the subject of coups in 
relation to the PNGDF. Luckham (1991) expanded on Huntington ' s theme of 
civil-military relations , contributing to the debate by examining coup types and 
the role of factions in the Asia/Pacific region. Luckham (1991: 14) noted that the 
PNGDF had not, as had the military in South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan, 
'established deep roots in the economy, social structures and political system' . 
He noted further that the 'PNG political order was not yet dependent on the 
[PNGDF] as in Thailand, Pakistan and Indonesia ' (ibid.: 19). Luckham 
highlighted the importance of factions as a key to understanding the military' s 
political behaviour. In PNG's case, Luckham noted that the country had survived 
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precariously through periods of unrest, in part, because of the limitations both on 
the power exercised by PNGDF officers and on the military' s budget. The 
weakness of political institutions was, in Luckham' s view, the key to PNG's 
vulnerability to military intervention. 
Nelson (1972), Mench (1975), Turner (1990), MacQueen (1993), May 
(1998) and Dorney (1998) shared the view that some form of unconstitutional 
action was possible in PNG. Nelson (1972) saw a failure of government -
corruption, inefficiency and secessionism being principal causes - as the 
opportunity for the army to assume power. Mench (1975) considered that 
military intervention required cooperation between the army and the police. 
Turner (1990) pointed to corruption and the threat that posed to stability in PNG, 
noting that factions in the army were the key to understanding military behaviour. 
Those elements combined with the military use of intelligence and public 
disenchantment, according to Turner, to prompt intervention. MacQueen (1993) 
believed on balance that military intervention could be avoided so long as army 
officers had access to political positions and the army remained ineffective. 
The theme of the army' s influence on politics and society was the subject 
of work by Janowitz (1964), Nelson (1972), Sarkesian (1978), Finer (1988) and 
Monteil (1993). Research by Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1964), Welch (1974), 
Horowitz (1980), Perlmutter (1981), and Finer (1988), points to common factors 
which provide the potential for possible military intervention. These include 
politicisation of the military through political interference in military affairs. 
Such interference may extend to corruption in equipment acquisitions , bribery, 
misuse of military funds, and the interference for political purposes in military 
activities and in the promotion and appointment of officers. Other factors causing 
military intervention include factionalism, corrupt government, internal unrest 
within the country, and indiscipline within the ranks of the army. 
Research which has focussed on the causes of unrest in the South East 
Asian and Pacific areas such as Nelson (1972), Sundhaussen (1973), Luckham 
(1991), and Turner (1990) have also contributed to the study of military coups 
through a regional perspective. Mench (1975) stands out in his identifying of the 
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PNGDF's potential for unrest after independence. But he concluded in 1975 that 
the army would not challenge government. The PNGDF would, according to 
Mench, have a principal focus on internal security. That prediction could not 
have foreseen the acts of PNGDF indiscipline which emerged in the 1980s, or the 
extent to which the government's writ had failed, or the deterioration brought 
about by the endemic law and order situation since 1985. 
Political observers and academics, attracted by PNG' s cormng 
independence, subjected the PNGDF to scrutiny in a wideranging pre-
independence literature. Ryan (1970) and Nelson (1972), both of whom 
understood the changes taking place, concluded that the PNGDF could play a 
prominent role. Cole batch ( 197 4) looked at the provincial makeup of the Force, 
police/army relations, soldiers' attitudes and the role of the military. Mench 
(1975), an ADP officer with PIR experience, believed that the army would be 
used largely for internal security. Hastings (1969) had earlier warned that such 
operations risked drawing the PNGDF into a political role. Sundhaussen (1973) 
considered that to avoid those risks, the PNGDF should be given a political role 
from independence, similar to that enjoyed by the Indonesian Armed Forces. 
However, the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC), set up prior to PNG' s 
independence, did not share that view. 
For its part, the CPC wanted to avoid the history of army takeovers 
experienced by African states. Political leaders agreed to retain the PNGDF but 
ensured that the army had defined responsibilities , remained accountable to the 
civil authority, was set a ceiling strength in balance with the police, and was given 
a strict framework for its involvement in internal security. Mench (1975: 198), 
like the CPC, saw similarities between PNG and Africa in colonial background, 
decolonisation processes , and the development of national defence forces. 
After independence, most literature on the PNGDF was confined to key 
events. For example, articles on the army increased in 1980 with the Vanuatu 
deployment. East (1981), a former ADP officer and PNGDF Chief of Staff, and 
Glanville (1984), a former expatriate PNGDF officer, produced articles for the 
Pacific Defence Reporter and local media. Shears (1980), Beasant (1984) and 
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Gubb (1984) added outsiders ' views of the PNGDF Kumul Force. Later, law and 
order operations, pay riots in 1989, and the Bougainville rebellion provided a 
focus for PNGDF observers , notably in the wake of the 1987 Fijian coups. 
May and Spriggs (1990) and Spriggs and Denoon (1992) provided 
accounts of PNGDF operations on Bougainville along with articles from Dorney 
(1990), then an ABC co1Tespondent in PNG. Liria (1993), a PNGDF intelligence 
officer on Bougainville in 1989, provided a first-hand account of the rebellion 
from a PNGDF perspective. His book, Bougainville Campaign Diary, remains 
the only record by a PNGDF member of the army' s history since independence, 
aside from the official diaries of the Vanuatu deployment. 1 Sharrad (1993) 
contributed to the literature by examining the Role and Management of the 
PNGDF during the Bougainville Crisis. Sharrad highlighted the tensions which 
arose between PNG culture and Western-style systems. May (1993), in a review 
of the PNGDF, drew together these events, pointing to the changing role of the 
Force since independence and providing a contemporary view of the PNGDF' s 
potential to challenge the government. 
May (ibid.: 74-75) concluded that a coup remains a remote possibility 
though PNG appeared to be moving towards a more controlled society. Dorney, 
in 1990, felt that a coup was possible if Papua New Guineans lost confidence in 
their country ' s leadership. Those views still hold true. This thesis considers these 
themes, examining PNGDF history since 1940, in particular the period between 
1980 and 1990, which, more than any other period, helped shape the PNGDF. 
Research Method 
The thesis - based on interviews with PNGDF members, often by senior 
commanders on the ground (some of whom requested no attribution) about their 
first-hand experiences - is especially important given the absence of wider 
research on the PNGDF and given the dearth of official PNGDF records. In the 
latter case, official diaries were not kept by Commanding Officers after 1980. 
Fires in some units further reduced official record holdings. Records relating to 
Bougainville deployments have not been released due to ongoing operations. 
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The material in this thesis also draws on my recollections of the PNGDF 
- checked against diaries and notes kept for the period - spanning four decades. 
During that time, I served in the PNGDF Training Depot (1971-73), the First 
Battalion, Royal Pacific Islands Regiment (1 RPIR) (1985-88), and the Australian 
High Commission as a defence adviser (1990-92). In 2000-2002, I returned to 
PNG as a project team leader. At times, the nature of my association with the 
PNGDF places constraints on my ability to comment on issues not documented in 
the public domain, notably aspects of the PNGDF' s Bougainville operations. 
Further, because of the conditions of my employment in the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation (1989-90), and in the Office of National Assessments (ONA) (1992-
97), and my continuing links with the PNGDF, it has been necessary to cut off the 
narrative at 1990. In any event, 1990 provided a logical cut off because the 
principal influences on the PNGDF's decline arose in the period 1980-1990. The 
army's involvement in five law and order operations, especially on Bougainville, 
serious breaches of discipline, politicisation of its leadership, friction with the 
civil authorities, and challenges to government authority, occurred in that period. 
While focusing on 1980-1990, the thesis discusses the period up to 1980 in some 
detail to provide the necessary background, and looks ahead to the contemporary 
implications of the developments which took place between 1980 and 1990. 
Military Intervention 
The research for this thesis points to external and internal factors, in 
combination and over time, as the triggers for PNGDF intervention. In that, the 
PNGDF case reinforces the arguments of Finer (1988: 283) that 'military 
intervention is the product of two sets of forces, the capacity and volition of the 
armed forces to intervene ... and the condition of the society'. The thesis is not 
able, any more than Finer or others have been able, to identify factors - internal 
or external - which are predominant in their capacity to lead to unrest in the 
military. However, some issues, for example, professionalism of the officer corps 
(cf. Huntington 1968; Horowitz 1980), play an important part in the research. Yet 
even these do not, in my view, hold the key to the analysis of coup potential in the 
1 The diaries were removed from Headquarters PNGDF and their whereabouts remain a mystery. 
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PNGDF case. Indeed, Lee (1969: 159) noted that studies 'confined to military 
motives and to military organisation exaggerate the strength of the boundary 
between military and civilian affairs ' . 
The thesis does support Huntington ' s arguments on the need for 
professionalism and reinforces Horowitz's emphasis on the importance of a 
professional officer corps. Indeed, the arguments contained in this thesis 
highlight, in the PNG context, the risks which have been created through PNG' s 
politicisation of the officer corps - at the expense of professionalism. As a result 
of events in 1980-1990, we see a force bereft of professionalism, exhibiting 
factionalism which, arguably, now confuses regional loyalties, prepared to protect 
its corporate interests, led by an officer corps with limited promotion 
opportunities. Corruption and ineffective government have seen the 
disillusionment, already apparent among the wider population, infect the PNGDF 
rank and file. The thesis argues that these factors in combination could lead to a 
military coup in PNG. The thesis challenges the long-held and contemporary 
belief that while some form of unconstitutional action by the PNGDF is a 
possibility, a coup would not be mounted in PNG. 
The army has had its share of problems since its formation in 1940. Acts 
of indiscipline, at times on a large scale, occurred over pay and conditions and as 
a result of inter-communal violence. Such incidents fuelled the arguments of 
critics opposed to a local army that such a force would lack loyalty, fail to 
appreciate its role in support of civil authority or maintain even basic discipline 
among its ranks. For others, the incidents were viewed as teething problems, 
pointing to the need for review and redirection. Notwithstanding concerted 
efforts to address the problems, early instances of unrest were followed by more 
acts of indiscipline, before and after independence. 
Since independence, the Force ' s principal role has been to defend the 
sovereignty of Papua New Guinea. However, after ~984, the PNGDF focussed its 
attention increasingly on internal security - a role that the founders of the nation 
provided for in the Constitution. That reinforced the army' s status in PNG 
society. However, the PNGDF' s involvement in law and order operations has 
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come at a high price. Indiscipline escalated to the point where soldiers openly 
confronted the government in 1988 and in 1989. The manner in which the 
PNGDF was used in aid to the civil power presented problems, straining relations 
between the army and the police, the government and the public. Problems also 
arose over the legal provisions under which soldiers supported the civil authority. 
In the period 1980-90, the unrest has been confined to protecting PNGDF 
interests, especially conditions of service. In early 1989, the Regiment faced its 
greatest test in its efforts to maintain Port Moresby's authority in Bougainville 
Province. For the first time, PNG' s army was fighting against its people, in a 
secessionist rebellion. That experience, combined with the problems dogging the 
Force, from its focus on internal security, brought the army into conflict with the 
government, resulting in challenges to civil authority by the PNGDF. 
The thesis is structured to examine these developments, providing 
evidence of a Force in decline, characterised by its defiance of government, and 
the preparedness of its membership to edge closer to a coup. The PNGDF was at 
its peak in 1980, evidenced by the Vanuatu operations (Chapter 3). From 1981 
to 1983, the army had to be content with patrolling (Chapter 4) while politicisation 
and other changes were occurring in the Force (Chapter 5). The PNGDF' s use in 
internal security from 1984 saw a willingness to challenge government authority 
(Chapter 6). Those challenges assumed worrying dimensions on Bougainville 
(Chapter 7) where the groundwork for a coup was laid (Chapter 8). 
Against the background of law and order operations, border duties and 
civic action patrols, the PNGDF was undergoing changes - changes important in 
understanding its declining professionalism, evidenced by acts of indiscipline, and 
poor morale. Coinciding . with those changes was the declining presence of the 
ADF during the decade, which had until then reinforced the PNGDF' s 
subordination to the civil authority. The cumulative effect of the changes during 
the period 1980-1990, particularly arising from the PNGDF' s increasing role in 
internal security, the politicisation of the Force, and indiscipline, have created a 
situation in which an army coup, with objectives which goes beyond the 
protection of PNGDF interests, is a distinct possibility. 
28 
Chapter 2 
History of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force 
1940-1979 
'For the first time in the history of Papua and New Guinea, men from both 
territories were living, working and fighting, side by side, dependent on each 
other for their very lives, all nie,nbers of one elite group' (Sinclair 1990: 215). 
The Pressure of War 
Calls for the formation of an armed force 1n Papua to support the 
administration had been made as early as 1884. Later, a small, armed 
constabulary was formed in Papua and expanded in the early days of the First 
World War as protection against the German presence in (northeast) New Guinea. 
Australian forces seized New Guinea in September 1914 and Australia received a 
League of Nations Mandate over New Guinea in 1921 , with a separate 
administration and its own armed police force under the control of Australian 
officers. By the outbreak of the Second World War, the constabulary was a well-
formed body with an important role in Australia ' s administration of Papua and 
New Guinea. Indeed, the first recruits of the Papuan Infantry Battalion (PIB ) 
would come from the ranks of the constabulary (Granter 1970: 9). 
On 19 June 1940, the first company of the PIB was formed from the 
indigenous population of the Australian Territory of Papua and the mandated 
territory of New Guinea (ibid.: 9). The remainder of the PIB was to be raised the 
following year, prompted by the threat of a Japanese invasion. The Australian 
government envisaged that the PIB soldiers would be used for 'scouting and 
reconnaissance ' (McCarthy 1962: 45). After their initial training, soldiers found 
themselves engaged in unloading cargo vessels and quarry work, sentry duty and 
in the preparation of defensive positions (Sinclair 1990: 134). Such work was 
important as time was short for all the tasks still to be completed by the newly-
formed military administration, and concern at the impending invasion spurred all 
to greater effort. 
If the PIB soldiers were keen to fight, their baptism of fire came as an 
unwelcome surprise. The Japanese were an impressive adversary- experienced 
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fighters with modern equipment. The first Japanese air attacks on Port Moresby, 
in early 1942, resulted in a 'collapse of morale and saw the desertion of several 
PIB recruits' (ibid.: 134). Many Australians no doubt shared the foreboding 
experienced by the PIB at the time and with good reason. The Japanese had yet to 
be defeated - this would not be achieved until 1942 at Milne Bay2 - and there 
had been precious little time for the defence of Papua New Guinea. 
Elements of the PIB, with their Australian officers, first confronted the 
Japanese Army at Awala in Northern Province on 23 July 1942 (McCarthy 1962: 
124). (Papua New Guinea would later commemorate the event as Remembrance 
Day.) PIB soldiers had set up defensive positions ahead of the Japanese advance 
from Buna-Gona (See map at Appendix 1). As the Japanese approached, the 
order was given to fire on the enemy - 'an historic order [being] the first given 
to PIB soldiers to attack enemy ground forces' (Sinclair 1990: 140). In the face of 
superior enemy numbers, and overwhelmed by the speed of the attack, the PIB 
soldiers scattered (ibid.: 125). 
During the Kokoda campaign that followed, the soldiers again fought well. 
Apparently, they saw no conflict between loyalty to their people (in the 
Melanesian sense) and their duty as soldiers. In one example, a PIB rear party 
noticed a local villager leading a Japanese patrol to the battalion position; he was 
shot (ibid.: 144). Soldiers gave their all in the Kokoda campaign when it 
appeared that the Japanese would advance on Port Moresby. An Australian 
officer observed at Imita Ridge - the last bastion of defence before Port Moresby 
- that the 'PIB men were ... battered, tired, hungry and cold from the fighting 
and the weary grind of carrying wounded over impossible tracks' (ibid.: 145). 
In the Kokoda campaign (July - November 1942), the true value of the 
PIB soldier was demonstrated. The troops were used for 'reconnaissance and 
deep penetration' (Granter 1970: 10), drawing largely on their notable bush skills. 
The soldiers also played a vital part in the evacuation of casualties. By the time 
2 General (later Field Marshal) Slim, c01mnenting on the Japanese defeat at Milne Bay in 1942, 
said 'It was Australian soldiers who first broke the spell of Japanese invincibility' (McCarthy 
1962: 187). 
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the Buna-Gona campaign began in late 1942, ' the award of the first decoration for 
bravery had been [made] to the first indigenous soldier ' (Sinclair 1990: 148). 
Members of the PIB , and later the NGIB , took part in every major campaign, 
[from the time contact was made with the Japanese on 23 July 1942] until the 
surrender on 15 August, with the exception of Milne Bay' (Mench 1975: 15). The 
Salamaua campaign illustrates their contribution: 
PIB members carried out scouting and reconnaissance work with great ... 
skill . . . obtaining details of the enemy' s strength - fortifications , gun 
emplacements, dispositions - that were of vital importance (Sinclair 1990: 
161). 
Even as the PIB increased its strength to battalion size, there was still 
unmet demand for local soldiers. Eventually, approval was given for the raising 
of a second battalion with its members drawn from New Guinea. The First New 
Guinea Infantry Battalion (1 NGIB) was raised at Wampit near Nadzab in March 
1944. By September 1944, a second battalion was raised in spite of the shortage 
of young men available for such service. Later, this second battalion served in the 
Wewak campaign where local soldiers were used in 'set-piece attacks' for the first 
time (Granter 1970: 12). (Critics, opposed to the formation of a local military 
force , claimed that 'local soldiers could not be used in this manner ' (ibid.: 12).) 
Two years elapsed between the formation of the PIB and the raising of the 
NGIB - despite the threat posed by the Japanese army operating in Papua and 
the mandated territory of New Guinea between 1942 and 1945. One reason for 
the delay was resistance to the formation of large bodies of local soldiers. Indeed, 
some, particularly ANGAU (Australia and New Guinea Administration Unit) 
officers who were largely .pre-war government officials, believed that arming the 
natives would cause post-war problems for PNG (Mench 1975: 17). For much of 
the war the debate continued over the worth of local soldiers. During the war, 
unruly elements tarnished the PIR' s reputation, showing the potential problems a 
peacetime militia might face. Eventually, problems led to the disbandment of the 
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PIB and the NGIB: in 1945, the Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR)3 'simply ceased to 
exist' (Sinclair 1990: 284 ). 
Mounting Problems 
'It was the indiscipline when out of the line and the relationship of the PNG 
soldier to the native population that commanded attention' (Mench 1975: 16). 
The troubles that arose are worthy of further examination, in part, because 
ultimately they led to the disbandment of the local military forces. The problems 
also provide important historical evidence of the nature of local discontent and 
point to the reasons for unrest among indigenous soldiers decades later. In setting 
the context for problems in the PIR, it is worth noting that indiscipline among 
soldiers is not uncommon, particularly in war. Poor discipline can be the result of 
many factors, including poor leadership, inadequate training, and loss of morale. 
In war, stress and the constant threat to life compound these problems. 
Nonetheless, indiscipline in any armed force is a cause for concern. 
The troops recruited to the PIB, and later the NGIB, were drawn from 
different areas of Papua and New Guinea. In the PIB, recruits came mostly from 
Papua, particularly Gulf, Central and Northern Provinces (See map). Recruits 
were also drawn from New Guinea, so that in spite of its name, the PIB contained 
members from outside the region. The PIB practice was to 'place men with 
similar tribal or village groups in the same section ... to build up a keen spirit of 
competition ... [and reliance on] fellow tribesmen in times of danger' (Sinclair 
1990: 274). The PIB experience 'showed that men from the different parts of 
Papua New Guinea could live and work together in a relatively harmonious 
manner' (Mench 1975: 23). The compliment seemed to ignore the constabulary 
who had achieved the same rapport years earlier. 
The effectiveness of local soldiers in battle suggests that the Papuans and 
New Guineans did develop 'deep ties of friendship and mutual respect' (Sinclair 
1990: 274). On the other hand, inter-communal tensions caused trouble between 
tribal groups. In one early incident, a football match between 'Kerema and 
3 The Pacific Islands Regiment (PIR) was formed in 1945, incorporating the Battalions of the PIB 
and the NGIB. 
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Mambare soldiers ended in a fierce braw 1- they were PIB but tribal loyalties ran 
strong' (ibid.: 168). Not surprisingly, tribal groups had stood together - the 
reason sections were manned along tribal lines. This PIB approach was 
abandoned later and a policy of integration adopted in the formation of the NGIB. 
In the NGIB, attempts were made to ensure that the new battalion was 
unique, creating esprit de corps. However, in 1944, the transfer of New Guinean 
non-commissioned ranks from the PIB to the NGIB caused trouble (Sinclair 1990: 
215). The replacement of NCO chevrons used in the PIB to denote rank with bar 
chevrons in the NGIB added further tensions. The troubles which followed, in 
which Australian officers were attacked, seemed to be the result of deep seated 
grievances. Local soldiers had already established a history of indiscipline during 
the New Guinea campaigns. During the Madang-Sepik campaign, for example, 
there were well authenticated cases of rape, looting, and assault (Mench 1975: 
18). At Annan berg, a soldier arrested for the rape of a policeman's wife, was 
forcibly released by his friends - in contempt of civil authority (ibid.: 17). 
Again, in 1945, soldiers from A Company, NGIB, forcibly freed members of their 
company under arrest. The soldiers felt 'detention ... did not now apply to them 
as fighting soldiers' (Long 1963: 262). Collectively, the incidents 'shook official 
confidence in indigenous infantry battalions' (Sinclair 1990: 273). 
Australian commanders, impressed with the performance of the soldiers in 
battle, and keen to avoid unrest in the ranks while the Japanese presented a threat, 
explained away the problems. Officials claimed that the New Britain (A 
Company) incident occu1Ted in large measure because of the exhausted condition 
of the men who had fought on Bougainville where soldiers of all races found it 
tiring and debilitating (Long 1963: 262). The PIB did not understand 'the non-
progressive warfare' (ibid.: 263) then being fought around the Japanese garrison 
at Rabaul. Troops should not have been fragmented or placed under troops 
inexperienced in their handling or control, Long suggested (ibid.: 263), inferring 
that poor leadership was to blame. PIB officers needed special attributes 
warranting careful selection for command - a practice used after the PIR 
reformation in 1951. 
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By 1945 more problems arose in the PIR. Soldiers were dissatisfied with 
their pay and conditions (Figure 2.1) which compared invidiously with those of 
Australian servicemen (Mench 1975: 19). There was justice in the men ' s 
grievances - the soldiers were, by this stage of the war, better educated and 
aware of the difference in the way they were rationed, clothed and treated 
(Sinclair 1990: 276). But the issue that touched off the most unrest was the 
granting of a pay rise to the police while PIR soldiers remained on the old scale. 
Some of the tension was released by giving soldiers a pay rise and a pension but 
not before serious confrontation between soldiers and police. 
Recruit/Year 1 
Private 
Lance 
Corporal 
Corporal 
Sergeant 
Warrant 
Officer 
Figure 2.1 
Pay Scales (Monthly) (Shillings) 
Year 2 
Year 3 
1942 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
40 
1945 
20 
20 
35 
30 
35 
50 
80 
Pay issues have become a common grievance during the history of the 
PIR/PNGDF, particularly pay relativity between soldiers and the police. The 
success of the soldiers in gaining better pay and conditions by using the collective 
threat of force had shown them that threatened violence could deliver when all 
else failed. Even when ringleaders were discharged from the PIR, the soldiers 
stuck to this view. These ringleaders were not always NCOs. Indeed, 'natural 
leaders were arising, and they were not being recognised ' (Sinclair 1990: 276). In 
later chapters , this issue will be further examined because of the role played by 
these individuals in transcending tribal boundaries and orchestrating discontent. 
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The Pacific war profoundly affected the lives of many people in Papua and 
New Guinea (Nelson 1980: 81), an effect which extended beyond the destruction 
of property and the loss of life. The people came into contact with large numbers 
of foreigners. They saw goods and services in unimagined quantities. 
Infrastructure, including wharves, roads and airstrips , suddenly appeared. They 
also saw the might of modern armies against which they had few defences. That 
said, the degree of exposure was uneven. Some Papua New Guineans mostly in 
the highlands were not touched by the events of 1942-45 (ibid.: 81). Even so, the 
war experience would play a role in the PIR' s reformation in 1951. 
Reformation 
In 1950, the decision to reform an indigenous military force was the 
'result of increasing (Australian) interest in the external and internal security of 
the region' (Mench 1975: 24). Two issues concerned the Australian government. 
The potential for Indonesian expansion concentrated the attention of foreign 
policy and defence planners. The Australian government was not only acting out 
of concern for its own defence. After 1946, Australia also had a 'legal right and 
responsibility to defend Papua New Guinea' (Sinclair 1992: 44) under the UN 
trusteeship. Australia was also concerned about the internal stability of PNG. 
The creation of a military force in PNG would have a role in assisting the civil 
administration in maintaining law and order (ibid.: 27). 
The reformation of a local military force in the 1950s mirrored wider and 
more dramatic measures being implemented at a territory level by the newly 
appointed Minister for Territories, Paul Hasluck. He identified a need to 
'encourage building up in the Territory [of Papua and New Guinea] , the 
institutions and the services of government in preparation for the eventual 
attainment of self government' (Hasluck 1976: 210). Under Hasluck, the 
Administration focussed on education and health as well as the public service. 
Still, the chorus of voices against the formation of a military force 
remained strong. Some were not impressed with the wartime effort of the PIR, 
ref erring to the 'uneven performance of the soldiers ' (Mench 197 5: 14). 
However, their reputation for 'offensive reconnaissance, harassing tasks and 
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mopping up' (Sinclair 1990: 212) created a niche in Australian defence planning 
and an important role for the PIR as part of the Australian Army. In the 1950s, 
the PIR was seen as ideal for 'counter-insurgency operations' (Sinclair 1992: 3). 
Australia' s decision was influenced by the communist threat in Asia and 
associated insurgent activities, principally in Malaya but later in Vietnam. 
Australia was also committed to the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. That meant 
Australian troops were not available for the protection of PNG. So the formation 
of the PIR went ahead with the reformed unit given the PIR title 'as a tribute to 
the meritorious service of the PIR during the War' (ibid.: 1). 
The army was a key element in the development plan for the Territory, 
and in direct competition with other government agencies for educated locals. In 
the end, the competition became so great, as a result of the Foot Report,4 that, to 
meet its needs, the army began to educate soldiers after enlistment. Education 
provided soldiers with qualifications and the opportunity to compete for better 
positions. Importantly, education also prepared soldiers for work outside the 
army- a contribution to the development of PNG as a nation. 
Colonel J.K. Murray (the post-war Administrator) who had 'strongly 
supported the disbandment of the Regiment' (ibid.: 43) in 1945, opposed the 
reformation. Mun·ay' s opposition to local military forces was shared by other 
former ANGAU officers, who had staffed the pre-war administration of Papua 
and the mandated territory. People in commerce and on plantations objected as 
well. Given the PIR's record for unruly behaviour during the Second World War, 
expatriates still feared that arming the locals would invite trouble. These 
expatriates, with Colonel Murray, seemed not to see the police as a potential 
source of the same problems accredited to the local soldiers. Nor did they 
acknowledge that such a risk might increase if the police force was given 
substantially increased numbers - a proposal put forward as a substitute for 
4 The Foot Cormnission was the 1962 Visiting UN Mission sent to PNG to examine Australia 's 
colonial administration, in particular, Australia's efforts to prepare PNG for independence. The 
report criticised Australia ' s efforts , prompting rapid localisation by departments, which competed 
for the limited nmnber of educated Papua New Guineans emerging from high schools and, in the 
late 1960s, from universities. 
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reforming the PIR. Why, in the face of the outcry, did the Australian government 
overrule their criticism? 
Part of the reason lies in the Australian perception of an expansionist 
threat from Indonesia. Australia needed to demonstrate a determination to defend 
Australia and her territories if provoked. Aware that the creation of a local force 
ran counter to the advice of Australian officials experienced in PNG affairs, and 
with a view to the documented troubles that arose during the war years, the 
Defence Department managed the process closely. Orders were issued for the: 
• enlistment of recruits on the same numerical basis from Papua, the New 
Guinea mainland and the (New Guinea) Islands, including Bougainville; 
• cessation of tribal segregation in section groups; and 
• careful selection of Australian officers appointed to the PIR (Sinclair 1992: 
68). 
In spite of the policy, tribal balances were to become distorted. In part, 
this was due to the recruitment of former PIB and NGIB soldiers - mostly 
Papuans and Islanders - whose experience was valuable in the PIR. For the first 
few years, the 'Tolai from New Britain and Keremas from the Gulf [formed] the 
two largest tribal groups' (ibid.: 47). Later, 'recruit[ing] equally ... was hindered 
by financial limits' (Bell 1967: 49). Within a year of its formation, the PIR 
experienced unrest. In December 1952, Kerema soldiers rioted in support of a 
soldier arrested by Army police. The incident showed that the 'soldiers ... 
reverted to tribal loyalties under stress' (Sinclair 1992: 51). Knowledge of the 
incident was limited to the army and quickly forgotten as the Regiment began 
training in earnest. 
The problems dogging the PIR did not disappear for long. In December 
1957, soldiers from Taurama Barracks near Port Moresby assaulted a civilian, an 
act which led to running riots with the police and the public. To make matters 
worse, soldiers again rioted as the ringleaders were put on trial at Taurama 
Barracks in a civilian court. Senior defence officers attributed the court 
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disturbances to poor communications and an error of judgement in holding the 
court in the barracks.5 In their opinion, the unrest was not, as some had claimed, 
'any real defiance of civil administration' (ibid.: 65). Still, the scale of 
indiscipline shocked Australian officials, including those in the Administration. 
Percy Chatterton, a witness to the fighting, noted that 'voices were raised 
demanding the Regiment's disbandment' (ibid.: 63). 
Such was the outrage that the critics may well have had their way, but the 
Indonesian threat was sufficient for the PIR to escape disbandment. Even so, the 
Australian defence hierarchy could not ignore the incident. Policy initiatives were 
introduced to reassure the administration and the public of the troops' loyalty and 
that the army was a responsible part of a broader society. The army directed 'a 
much greater emphasis ... on the standard of recruits' (ibid.: 69). Much effort 
went into improving the army's image as well. The process of selecting good 
recruits, and enforcing discipline under Australian leadership, sought to ensure a 
defence force capable of fulfilling its role while abiding by the laws of society. 
By 1959, other policies had been introduced. Promotion was based on 
merit and education rather than, as previously, on four years of completed service. 
Education was emphasised. The rationale was that better educated soldiers, with 
the incentive of promotion, were better suited to the Army's role and would raise 
the standards of the service. The effect of this process was that the use of tribal 
bigmen - line bosses (Bell 1967: 51) - to provide NCO leadership began to 
decline. Natural leaders were gaining prominence and attracting the respect of the 
soldiery. If these natural leaders were ignored, they could cause problems. 
Even as the character of the PIR changed, reflecting the effect of new 
policies, another serious incident occurred in Port Moresby in 1961 (Figure 2.2). 
The trigger was 'deep-seated resentment over PIR pay scales' after police pay 
increased in 1959. A disturbing feature of the 1961 incident was the direct 
defiance of army authority (Sinclair 1992: 73). Such an act was outrageous to the 
5 The convening of a civilian court within the military barracks was criticised as being partly 
responsible for the subsequent unrest. Nonetheless, the Administration's effort to bring soldiers to 
account and to deliver sentence was important in maintaining the rule of civil authority. 
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Army in Australia and unacceptable to the civil administration. No one was 
prepared to tolerate an undisciplined army and the incident resembled the very 
scenario about which opponents of a local army had forewarned in 1940 and 
1950. Even the Returned Services League defence lobby was critical, calling for 
a relocation of the PIR on the grounds that the trouble resulted from the wrong 
contacts6 (ibid.: 81) - an astute observation with lessons for the future. Most of 
the PIR unrest has occurred in units based in Port Moresby. Until 2000, soldiers 
at Lae (Igam Barracks) and Wewak (Moem Barracks) have caused less trouble 
and where problems have arisen, they have been confined to barrack disturbances. 
Figure 2.2 
PIR Unrest - 1961 
For months the soldiers had been nursing pay grievances arising from deep-seated 
resentment over PIR pay scales: in July 1959, a pay increase had been granted to the 
Constabulary; during December 1960, improved conditions for PNG's urban workers 
were announced, and in January 1961, a new Native Labour Award came into effect. 
Angry and upset, the soldiers held meetings beginning on 31 December 1960 to 
discuss pay grievances. European officers were fully aware of the men's feelings, and 
tried to calm them. On 3 January, at a unit parade, the Commanding officer explained 
why the pay increases - which were on their way - had been delayed. After the 
parade, Colonel Norrie placed seven soldiers under arrest for inciting unrest, and 
moved them to Bomana Gaol in a police van. Seventy soldiers set out on foot towards 
Bomana, in an attempt to free the seven ringleaders. The troops were finally turned 
back with the assistance of police. Forty-six were subsequently discharged. 7 
The 1961 incident, not surprisingly, led to a wide-ranging review of the 
PIR. Canberra had advanced plans for an expansion of the PIR, but that could 
only be achieved if the discipline problem could be overcome. The Defence 
Department's investigation of the incident found that: 
6 Discipline was undermined by the soldiers' association with urban youth; a problem which 
increased with the rise of raskolism (criminality) from the early 1970s, the tendency to recruit 
urban rather than rural youth, and with increasing numbers of soldiers living outside the barracks. 
7 For more detail see Sinclair 1992: 73. 
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• most of those involved were better educated and products of the new policies; 
• only sub-units which were regionally dominated defied their officers; 
• only five of those involved had been NCOs, the most senior a corporal; and 
• the battalion had an exact balance of Papuans and New Guineans. 
In the aftermath, consideration was given to the selection of Australian 
officers for the PIR, including 'career streaming' for subsequent duty in PNG. 
Strict discipline was to be enforced with commanding officers selected for their 
discipline record. Education levels for soldiers were raised - and soldiers got 
their overdue pay rise. Consideration was given to 'matching of indigenous units 
with Australian troops' (ibid.: 30). These were important considerations. 
The gap was also widening between the senior NCOs and the lower ranks. 
The 'curse of the PIR has [long] been the reluctance of junior NCOs to enforce 
discipline .. . [but] the young educated NCO .. . has few compunctions' (Bell 
1967: 52). If education did play a role in improving discipline at the lower NCO 
ranks, the benefit was short-lived. Once soldiers achieved education levels 
similar to their leaders, the NCOs lost an important advantage. The enforcement 
of discipline by junior NCOs who were required to live and work with the soldiers 
on a daily basis, was a problem. The effectiveness of NCOs also depended on 
good qualifications, personal confidence, and the backing and supervision of 
senior NCOs and officers. If any of these were missing, the NCO' s authority was 
undermined. In time, authority would come to depend on personal rapport with 
the section and their acceptance of the NCO as a leader. Above all, the junior 
leader was expected to be loyal to the group, not to any higher authority. That 
situation did not augur well for the PIR after independence. 
Towards Independence (1962-75) 
'77ie key task ... is to develop a National Army of PNG which will be efficient, 
well-disciplined, stable, reliable and absolutely loyal to the ... government of the 
day' (M. Fraser, Minister for the Anny: 1968) (Sinclair 1992: 131). 
The year 1962, a year after the problems at Taurama Barracks, was 'a 
turning point in the history of Papua New Guinea ' (Hasluck 1976: 374). At the 
same time, Australia believed that there was a possible threat from Indonesia, 
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which spurred expansion of the PIR on which PNG' s security depended (Ryan 
1970: 265). A second battalion (2 PIR) was raised on 3 March 1965. Until 1967, 
the Indonesian threat provided a sense of purpose and funds for the expansion of 
the force. The Indonesian threat also prompted the decision to commission Papua 
New Guineans as PIR officers. 
First Officers 
'For obvious reasons we need Native officers as soon as we can get them' 
( Minister for the Army J. 0. Cramer 1962) (ibid.: 266). 
Many reasons were behind the decision to appoint, for the first time, 
Papua New Guineans as officers in the PIR. Papua New Guineans had, in the 
years since the formation of the PIR, steadily risen within the non-commissioned 
ranks to the rank of warrant officer. So it seemed a logical progression to start an 
officer localisation programme. The appointment of local officers would reduce 
the burden on the Australian Army to staff the PIR, increase army strength in case 
of trouble with Indonesia, and prepare the PIR for localisation at independence. 
By 1963, the decision was made for local cadets to be chosen for the 
Officer Cadet School, Portsea. In the event, two were selected from the Sogeri 
High School8 near Port Moresby - Patterson Lowa and Ted Diro. The 
programme at the Officer Cadet School (OCS) was intense - both physically and 
mentally - and designed to provide field officers9 capable of command at 
platoon level in twelve months. The experience must have been daunting for 
Lowa and Diro and it is a tribute to them both that they graduated and rose to 
senior rank in a defence force which was to undergo major changes in the decade 
to follow. By December 1963, the two cadets, now commissioned, were posted to 
Australian units such as the Infantry Centre, 1 Commando Regiment, and the 
Parachute Training School, where the cadets qualified as parachutists. 
8 Sogeri High School was the only PNG high school providing Form 4 education at that time. 
Graduates from Sogeri High included politicians, senior bureaucrats and military officers as well 
as businessmen. Friendships (and no doubt enemies) were made during these school days 
(personal communication Prof. Emeritus J. Griffin of 18 January 1996). 
9 Field officers were those officers holding the rank of Lieutenant, Captain or Major. 
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Both were to go on to 'brilliant careers' (Sinclair 1992: 87). Still, the 
achievements of Diro and Lowa were due in part to factors which subsequent 
generations of PNGDF officers did not fully enjoy. Both were able to command 
with a strong Australian presence in senior non-commissioned and officer ranks 
in most units. That helped reinforce their authority and build confidence in their 
command among the rank and file. The soldiers also knew that the local officers 
had qualified at the same institutions which commissioned Australian officers. 
Australians still had high representation in 1975 when Lowa resigned from the 
force. In 1982, when Diro resigned, Australians could still be found in key 
positions, contributing to the PNG officers' overall performance. 
Coinciding with the recruitment of the first officer cadets was the 
Administration's decision to end prohibition on the sale of alcohol to Papua New 
Guineans (1 November 1962). This effectively meant that the local 
commissioned officers, due to return from Portsea in December 1963, would 
share officer messing facilities with Australians - not so far enjoyed by local 
non-commissioned soldiers. (Sergeant' s messes were segregated to accord with 
liquor laws.) The full integration which followed the changes to the liquor laws 
opened many doors for the officers and members of the PIR, including closer 
relations with Australians serving in the PIR. 
As the momentum increased towards independence, the recruitment of 
officer cadets increased to meet the anticipated needs of an independent army 
(Appendix 2). Still , the recruitment of officer cadets ignored, at least in the first 
few years, the standing policy of ensuring wide regional representation in the PIR. 
The result was that Papuans , and later Islanders, dominated the officer corps for 
years after independence. That could have had serious consequences had the 
PNGDF followed the history of many newly independent African states in which 
the army usurped power through military coups. One of the reasons for the 
recruitment of Papuans was that their access to education gave them the ability to 
meet enlistment criteria in those early years. Indeed, most students at Sogeri High 
were Papuans and Islanders. A concerted effort was made to send representatives 
of other provinces , including the highlands , to Sogeri but this took time and their 
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numbers were not reflected 1n recruiting for several years (personal 
communication Brigadier-General Noga on 26 July 1996). 
Army education was also aimed at qualifying soldiers as cadets. In June 
1966, John Sana we and Gago Mamae were commissioned from this scheme. 
Two other programmes were established. Officer training began in PNG, in 
addition to the training at OCS, Portsea (ibid.: 169). By 1971, the first in-service 
commissioning began. Promising non-commissioned officers were selected, 
trained as cadets, and commissioned to fill specialist positions in the PNGDF. 
The first three were Komeng, Malenki and Tavui. When combined with OCS 
graduates (Appendix 3), the programmes boosted the numbers of local PNGDF 
officers before independence. 
As part of its preparations for independence, the PNGDF established a 
Joint Services College (JSC) in Lae in 197 4 to train cadets of the PNGDF, Royal 
Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) and the Corrective Institutions 
Service (CIS). The Joint Services College had several advantages for the 
PNGDF. The cost of training officers was reduced by sharing with the police and 
the CIS. In addition, local officers could be trained according to local training 
priorities, albeit with the help of Australian officers. The last PNG cadets to 
graduate from OCS, Portsea were commissioned in 1973. PNGDF officer cadets 
would not train at OCS again until 198410 - the most notable graduate then was 
Sam Kauona, a Bougainvillean, who would have a profound effect on PNG 
history and the PNGDF (See Chapter 7). 
The introduction of policies to improve education standards, widen 
recruiting, enforce stricter discipline, and post the best officers to the PIR, did not 
reduce indiscipline. Indeed, problems occun·ed in December 1965, May 1966 and 
in January 1974. Pay and conditions caused some unrest while longstanding 
rivalry between the army and the police also led to riots. The onset of 
independence, appointment of local officers, and the provision of generous 
10 The PNGDF recognised that officers benefited fro1n overseas training, especially in Australia 
(personal communication Brigadier-General K. Noga of 26 July 1996). 
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resources did not quell unrest in the army. Policy aimed at enforcing discipline at 
the time called for soldiers to be discharged after three off enc es. 11 
Nevertheless, in spite of the unrest over pay-related issues, the PIR did not 
protest over the contentious national pay issue in 1964, when the Administration 
fixed native public servants' salaries to 40% of those of expatriate officers 
(Hastings 1976: 113). Later, Michael Somare, as prime minister, noted that there 
was 'no other single issue which made Papua New Guineans more aware of the 
injustices of colonialism' (Somare 1975: 42). Why did the PIR not add its weight 
to the protests? Part of the reason was that army pay for local soldiers had, since 
the war, been set at its own level, below that of Australian servicemen. The other 
reason was timing. Only months before, the PIR had enjoyed a flow-on pay rise 
given to the RPNGC. The police pay rise was given to avert a national strike by 
the police. Indeed, the PIR was on standby as PNG' s 'law and order [ was facing] 
a complete breakdown for the first time in peacetime history' (Ryan 1970: 269). 
The period of PIR expansion from 1963 to 1969 was one of intense 
activity. Increasing numbers of Papua New Guineans were enlisted and educated. 
Barracks construction was underway in Port Moresby, Wewak, Vanimo and Lae 
with Goldie River Barracks the last completed in 1969. The framework of a truly 
national army had been set up, ensuring retention of the PIR, and the resources to 
support it, even as people questioned the role of the PIR with Indonesian 
confrontation with Malaysia coming to an end in 1967 (Sinclair 1992: 107). 
As the PNGDF gradually took shape, more training was needed to keep 
the soldiers occupied. Troops with time on their hands became restive, as 
evidenced in the early days of the PIB/NGIB in garrison duties. Patrolling 
programmes, already a regular feature at the border posts, were extended to 
include other regions of PNG. In part, these were prompted by Australian 
experience in Malaya and Vietnam. The PNG patrols began 'sweeping the length 
and breadth of PNG ... [ with] Papua New Guineans becoming ... aware that they 
have an Army of their own' (ibid.: 93). The people came to respect the potential 
force which the Army could yield if called upon by the government. People also 
11 Author's experience in the PNGDF 1971-73. 
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saw first hand the strength of the army compared to the police, the latter mainly 
represented by small outposts of a few men with limited weapons. Patrolling also 
had a recruiting dividend with men from diverse tribal backgrounds inspired to 
enlist. The patrols gave soldiers the opportunity to exhibit their new-found status 
in their home areas. 
Patrols gave the soldiers a sense of purpose and broke the monotony of 
barracks life. Patrolling also provided 'training in bush techniques, [and 
gathered] topographic and geographic information [while] winning the hearts and 
minds of people' (ibid.: 113). By mid-1967, civic action tasks were added to the 
work carried out by soldiers during patrols (See Chapter 4). Brigadier Hunter12, 
influenced by his Vietnam experience, believed that civic action allowed soldiers 
to 'associate and keep in close contact with the people ... , to work side by side 
with the people, and become identified as part of the community' (ibid.: 114). 
Troops used their skills to build bridges, schools, and first aid posts as part of the 
army's contribution to national development. Patrolling was to become an 
important aspect of PIR life. Indeed, the PNGDF rued the absence of these 
intangible but widespread benefits in the 1980s as patrolling declined. 
The PNGDF became involved in other domestic issues. In 1970, unrest on 
the Gazelle Peninsula (East New Britain) was taxing the resources of the PNG 
Constabulary. Large contingents of police had been sent to the Gazelle area. The 
situation there had deteriorated to the point where the army was called out by the 
government. Accordingly, both 1 and 2 PIR were placed on standby for 
deployment (ibid.: 166). 13 In the event, the troops were not required. Still, the 
incident raised the divisive subject of using the PNGDF in aid to the civil power 
and the emotive debate of local soldiers firing on unarmed civilians and 
countrymen. Australian and PNG Army officers believed that the soldiers -
well-trained and disciplined - would have no hesitation in using force if ordered 
to do so. Others were sceptical, claiming that soldiers would be torn between 
12 Brigadier Hunter was appointed Commander, PNG Command, in April 1966 (ibid.: 222). 
13 In 1970, Prime Minister Gorton ' ignored the advice of his Minister for Defence and gave the 
Administrator the authority to call on the PIR to quell a civil disturbance ' (Nelson 1972: 207). 
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tribal customs and military discipline. In that event, soldiers would hesitate and 
could not be relied upon to fulfil their mission. 14 Others noted that the 'recent use 
of the police [and standby of the PIR] made them more aware of their collective 
power' (Nelson 1972: 204). In the Gazelle, the arguments were never tested -
that would come in 1985. 
The Gazelle issue was important for other reasons. The Mataungan15 
Association emerged among the Tolai people in 1969 (Grosart 1982: 139). Tolais 
were the 'best educated, wealthiest and most advanced of the peoples of Papua 
New Guinea - not, at first sight, rent-a-crowd material' (ibid.: 143). Many 
senior NCOs and soldiers were Tolai or from the Islands region. The situation 
was mirrored in the RPNGC. The incident would therefore have tested PNGDF 
loyalty if deployment had gone ahead. 
As the focus turned to independence, senous consideration was being 
given to the post-independence role of the army. Some, including Chief Minister 
Michael Somare (later first prime minister of PNG), believed there must be a 
'clear separation between the role of the army and police ... with the PIR not ... 
used ... to preserve internal order' (Sinclair 1992: 173-174). After independence, 
Somare came around to the view that the army could be used against Papua New 
Guineans, conceding that 'in a real national emergency the government would 
have to consider calling in the army if the police could not maintain law and 
order' (Mench 1975: 70). A decade earlier, Paul Hasluck (Australian Minister for 
the Territories) strongly objected to the use of the army in restoring law and order 
and, during a state of emergency, maintaining essential services (Hasluck 1976: 
406). 16 
14 The PIR officers focussed on likely troop reactions, including from Islander soldiers, but in the 
end felt confident that the soldiers would obey all orders in the event of trouble (personal 
cormnunication Brigadier-General Noga, CBE, on 26 July 1996). 
15 Mataungan literally means 'be alert, watchful, prepared' (Grosart 1982: 142). 
16 Hasluck' s principal objection seems to have been his desire for the correct political processes to 
be followed. He was incensed that the army issued interim orders, which provided for the use of 
the military in PNG without first securing Cabinet approval (Hasluck 1976: 406). 
• 
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PNGDF/RPNGC Relations 
PNG' s decision that there would be a clear separation between the military 
and the police had advantages. If the relative strength of both forces was the 
same, each would counter any move by the other to usurp civil authority (e.g. a 
coup). Interestingly, the prospect that both elements could combine to form a 
formidable force against the government seems not to have been seriously 
considered. Perhaps the frequent clashes between members of the two forces 
convinced people that the prospect of any collaborative effort was remote. 
Relations between the army and the police - two of the three uniformed 
services in PNG (the CIS being the third) - have had an uncomfortable history 
since 1942. Soldiers considered themselves an elite group within PNG society. 
For many years , soldiers could point to public criticism of the police as proof of 
their higher status. Soldiers also knew that the PNGDF would only be called 
upon to assist the civil authority when the police had failed. So the soldiers had 
good reason to see themselves as better than the police. Yet soldiers did 
themselves no service by engaging in running fights with the police in a practice 
which has now become institutionalised. At independence, the Australian 
government believed 'the key to the future stability and professionalism of the 
Defence Force lies in the officer corps ... the successful development of [ which] 
will largely depend on the tempo of localisation, [and] the quality of individual 
senior officers ... ' (ibid.: 155). 
A Role for the PNGDF 
As part of the Australian Army, and under Canberra' s command, the 
PNGDF in 1975 was very much pro-Australia. Still , the loyalty of the Defence 
Force at independence to the PNG state - rather than to Australia - was never 
in question. Nonetheless , local politicians questioned whether control by 
Australia could be transferred to ' smaller and less expert bodies [the PNG 
government] ' (Mediansky 1970: 40). Politicians were also concerned about the 
threat of military action against the state. That concern underlined their insistence 
on subordination of the PNGDF to the state; the exclusion of a commander-in-
chief; and insistence that the minister for defence would not exercise command of 
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the PNGDF (Goldring 1978: 53). Provision was made for a tri-partite Defence 
Council, consisting of the minister, commander and secretary, to be the Defence 
decision-making structure. 
Discussion of the future organisation and role of the PNGDF extended 
beyond politicians. At seminars in Port Moresby in 1973, the views of military 
officers, public service advisers and academics were expressed. Overall, there 
seemed broad support for a separate PNG defence force with a primary focus on 
external defence. 17 Most differences of opinion arose over the use of the army in 
any internal security role. Many politicians seemed to agree that the 'existence of 
a defence force [ would] symbolise Papua New Guinea' s sovereignty as an 
independent nation-state' (Mench 1975: 158). However, politicians such as 
Olewale believed that the PNGDF' s 'success in integrating the country' s 
diverse ethnic groups' (cited in May 1995: 186) would see the army become a 
super tribe. That prospect reinforced concerns about the potential threat posed by 
the army in taking action against the government after independence. That 
possibility underlined the need for the post-independent government in PNG to 
strive for cohesion, good governance with popular support and a permanent 
presence in the provinces. Those concerns reflected more a lack of government 
confidence than any potentially sinister motive on the part of the PNGDF. 
Ultimately, under PNG' s Constitution, responsibility for command of the 
PNGDF was vested in the commander rather than in the minister for defence in 
order to prevent ministerial appointees using the army for political ends. The 
decision seems to have ignored the possibility that the PNGDF Commander may 
also have political ambition or could simply support his minister. Some argued 
that by keeping the army out of internal issues and focussed on external threats , 
the potential for an army takeover could be further minimised. Fear of the army 
arose in large part from ignorance about the role and capabilities of the army 
among PNG' s political elite. A concerted effort to expose local politicians to 
17 For more discussion see Mench (1975: 72-94). 
48 
military training was made to overcome this problem before independence. As 
well, soldiers were educated on the need for loyalty to the government. 18 
The emphasis given by the Defence Department to forging an accepted 
place for the PNGDF was in part driven by the sense that many of the early 
'contributions to the debate on the role of the military ... were almost exclusively 
anti-military' (Sundhaussen 1973: 34). Local officers shared the same concerns, 
'conclud[ing] that the Somare government views the army as an unwanted baby' 
(ibid.: 35). As early as 1972, Somare 'sensed the simmering disenchantment 
[and] embarked ... on a policy of improving ... relations' (ibid.: 35). Somare and 
his advisers may have recognised that unless suspicions were overcome, the army 
could be unreliable after independence - as the critics of the army had warned. 
As decisions about the role of the PNGDF in the years before 
independence were being made, one option being considered was to focus the 
military solely on external defence. That option ignored several important 
aspects. First, the capacity of the newly-independent government of PNG to 
afford a large force capable of defending PNG was limited. Even the 
'maintenance of a brigade of infantry ... would amount to a very considerable 
charge against the revenues of an independent [Papua] New Guinea' (Hastings 
1969: 277). The external option also failed to recognise that the two or three 
battalions proposed as the PNGDF structure could not defend PNG without 
foreign assistance. The proposal also ignored the capacity of the civic action 
programme to keep the soldiers busy, in touch with the population and therefore 
more likely to accept civilian control. 
Eventually, provision was made in the Constitution (Section 203) for an 
internal security role, enab_ling the PNGDF to assist the civil authorities in natural 
disasters and in the restoration of civil order (Goldring 1978: 55). The PNGDF's 
emphasis on internal security grew after independence, reinforced by its 
deployment to Bougainville in 1989. The military was an important support for 
the young democracy. 
18 Author's experience in PNGDF 1971-73. 
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There was also, in my view, a misunderstanding about the role of the 
PNGDF in internal security. Soldiers were not merely 'green' policemen. The 
aid to the civil power role required soldiers to be used in different capacities to the 
police - restoring order in the event of a serious breakdown in civil order. Even 
now, there remains a misconception about the role of the army in call out. The 
misunderstanding stems from the use of the PNGDF since 1984 to bolster police 
numbers rather than operating as formed PNGDF units to support the police. The 
PNGDF's role in aid to the civil power from 1984 led to its overall effectiveness 
as an instrument of state being eroded (See Chapter 6). 
What did Papua New Guineans think of defence issues? Mench (1975: 
47) argued that there was 'unanimity [of views] amongst Papua New Guineans up 
until 1966 on the defence policies which the Australian government was pursuing 
in PNG'. According to Mench (1975: 43), 'Papua New Guineans had 
experienced invasion and modern warfare within their own country' and so 
welcomed a national army. Certainly also, people saw the benefits in an army 
civic action role, welcoming the PNGDF as they still do in many parts of PNG 
today. Still, a third of the population had not been affected by the war (Turner 
1990: 10). For many of those in rural areas whose contact with the army was 
limited to relatives recruited to the force or the occasional patrol, there may have 
been little in their daily lives which would prompt an opinion. For the great 
majority, a feeling of indifference existed and for others a tendency to see the 
PNGDF as the trappings of independence. Even then, some believed the 
resources could better be used in development and could not be justified in terms 
of PNG's needs (ibid.: 48-49). 
By the time the PNGDF came into effect on 26 January 1973, 19 the 
accelerated promotion of selected officers was already being considered. 20 Some 
had earlier warned that the 'placing of [Papua] New Guineans in positions of 
authority in the PIR, ... and to increase the pace [of promotion] involved risks ' 
19 The PNGDF came into effect on 26 January 1973 , not as claimed by Sinclair (1992: 230), on the 
17 January 1973 (author's experience). 
2
° Coinciding with this policy was the sudden outflow of junior Australian Army officers from 
PNG; the result of the new Labor Government' s policy to end conscription. 
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(Millar 1965: 73). Others saw benefits in accelerated promotion which they 
argued would give the officer corps experience and a professional ethos 
(Mediansky 1970: 40). In 1973, with independence approaching, officers were 
promoted rapidly. Diro was promoted from major in 1971 to Brigadier-General 
(and Commander) by September 1975 - a period of only four years. These 
officers would face the difficulty of gaining experience with the added burden of 
higher responsibility. Those few who achieved senior rank early were so young 
that they dominated the higher echelons for many years. Graduates saw their 
promotion prospects blocked by young incumbents in senior posts (Mench 1975: 
151). 
The decision to grant early promotion unwittingly burdened the PNGDF 
with an officer corps ill-prepared for the problems which would arise in the years 
after independence. Friction was created among senior officers who later divided 
into factions capable of undermining commanders by denying them support. In 
some instances, the officers would go beyond passive defiance, deliberately 
reducing the PNGDF' s effectiveness. Nowhere was this demonstrated more than 
on Bougainville in 1989. The decision to recruit officer cadets, initially from 
Papua and the Islands, created regional imbalances. In 1973, almost 75 per cent 
of the officers were from the Papuan or Islands regions (See Figure 2.4 ). 
In the lead up to independence, the Australian Army began to localise 
positions in a deliberate campaign to make the PNGDF self-sufficient. 
Localisation was rapidly achieved in the PIR (the land element) where the 
military skills were basic. In technical areas, principally in the Air and Maritime 
elements, Australians remained in large numbers. With few candidates able to 
meet the prerequisites and with the high cost of training, localisation in the 
technical streams was slow. However, in spite of the fragile system, the army 
outwardly demonstrated the self-sufficiency needed by independence. Even so, 
the system had no depth. Paul Mench,21 a major in the PIR in the early 1970s, 
21 In 1980, Paul Mench, then Commanding Officer of the Third Battalion, Royal Australian 
Regiment (3 RAR), was killed in an accidental fall at Lamington National Park. 
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assessed that rapid localisation produced 'reduced efficiency and even 
psychological stresses ' (1975: 150). 
In 1972, the first four recruits with Form 6 (Year 12) education were 
enlisted. The four represented a bold experiment to produce the first PNGDF 
pilots. The recruits received a condensed training programme of one month22 -
other recruits trained for six months - before proceeding to officer training at 
Lae, and later Australia. Two of these recruits were still serving in the PNGDF in 
1996. The pilot scheme was important to the PNGDF. The force would depend 
on air support for operations. The air element focussed on short range aircraft 
capable of moving an under-strength platoon with equipment into remote areas. 
The Dakota (DC3) aircraft was a good, if somewhat dated, choice for these 
operations. Later, other aircraft would be added to the PNGDF inventory. 
Meanwhile planning was underway to determine the makeup of the post-
independent army in Papua New Guinea. 
A Fledgling Army (1975 - 80) 
'[PNG had] a great national army ... to defend the country and loyally support 
the government [ and] to back up the Constabulary' (Sinclair 1992: 113). 
A planning cell had determined the post-independence PNGDF 
organisation prior to 1975. The principal issue facing the planners was not so 
much whether the present brigade formation was suited to PNG - changing that 
would have been expensive and largely symbolic; rather, the structure at the top 
needed to be determined. Since 1940, Papua New Guinea' s military elements had 
been commanded and administered from Australia. With the transfer of defence 
powers to PNG in 1975, a government and headquarters structure was required in 
Port Moresby. The planning cell agreed on the organisation outlined in Figure 
2.4. The PNGDF was modelled on a brigade formation with two infantry 
battalions (1 and 2 PIR), an engineer battalion, and a signal squadron. An air 
element and a maritime element supported the ground elements (See Sinclair 
(1992: 179-239). The PNG Constitution defined the PNGDF's role as: 
• to defend PNG and its ten·itory; 
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• to assist in the fulfilment by PNG of its territorial obligations; 
• to provide assistance to the civil authorities in: 
a civil disaster, or 
the restoration of pubic order and security on being called out 1n 
accordance with Section 204 (call-out in aid to the civil power); or 
accordance with an Act of Parliament during a period of declared 
emergency under Part X; and 
• to perform as directed, functions and services of a civil nature so as to 
participate in ... national development ... , either within the country or outside 
it, in accordance with this Constitution and Acts of parliament. 
Commander 
I 
Operations Personnel 
Figure 2.3 
Defence Organisation - 1975 
Minister 
Logistics Finance & 
Programming 
Secretary 
I 
Policy & 
Planning 
Papua New Guinea gave close consideration to the division of 
responsibilities for defence in the government. The CPC wanted no 'commander-
in-chief in case an occupant might develop authoritarian tendencies ... [Rather] 
control of the PNGDF was ... vested in the National Executive Council [NEC]' 23 
(Turner 1990: 118). In addition, command rested with the PNGDF Commander 
and not the Minister for Defence (Constitution - Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea 1975: Section 204). 
The conventional use of the brigade formation on the battlefield was not at 
the forefront of defence thinking at the time. Many defence experts saw the 
PNGDF largely as a 'trip-wire force' (Mench 1975: 163) which was expected to 
delay an enemy until a larger (Australian) force could be deployed, as had been 
22 Author's experience at Goldie River Training Depot as officer in charge of the programme. 
23 In the Constitution, the NEC (cabinet) includes all government ministers (to a maximum of 29). 
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the case in the war years. Senior officers serving in the PIR believed 'the force 
should not involve itself in positional warfare ... but should concentrate on ... 
counter-insurgency type operations ' (Sinclair 1992: 86). Quite apart from the 
PNG considerations, the Australian Army was concentrating on anti-guerilla 
warfare as part of its training doctrine. Much of this emphasis applied 
conveniently to the PNGDF. Training therefore tended to be at company level 
(100-120 soldiers) with most patrols conducted at platoon level (30-34 soldiers). 
That said, there were instances when the PIR was used in larger numbers, notably 
in exercises with Australian units. 
The PNGDF was an enviable organisation In 1975. Barrack 
accommodation in all military bases in the country included the latest facilities. 
The concentration of soldiers in base areas - compared to the RPNGC whose 
members were deployed in remote stations in small groups - meant that facilities 
were maintained and visited regularly to instil standards. Soldiers enjoyed good 
conditions of service, in part influenced by the conditions given to Australian 
service personnel posted to PNG. Additional leave was given - up to seven 
weeks per year. Soldiers were provided with free return travel to their village 
every two years as well as free medical care and three meals per day. Married 
soldiers received free housing, education and medical care for them and their 
dependents together with free return travel for families to their village every two 
years. Such conditions attracted many to the military. 
Some chose an army career for themselves, In some cases following 
relatives who had joined. Others were appointed by the clan and family elders in 
accordance with custom, to careers in the army ( or in the administration, the 
police or the church). This was particularly true for new recruits drawn from 
village areas. Selection for the army was a strong incentive to do well. Soldiers 
'summarily returned to their villages felt they were total failures - shamed' 
(ibid.: 59). The threat of discharge was a powerful motivator in recruits of the 
1960s and the 1970s, helping to maintain discipline. In time, as more recruits 
were drawn from urban areas and disciplinary action was not followed through, 
discipline was eroded. 
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In the field, the soldiers were issued modem ration packs designed for the 
PNGDF with extra rice and other foodstuffs. Resupply was regular and above all 
reliable. In the event of an accident, aircraft were available for casualty 
evacuation. The morale and well-being of the PNGDF soldier was thus 
maintained into the early years of independence. Soldiers drawn from traditional 
villages marvelled at the benefits but they did not take them for granted. In time, 
soldiers recruited from urban areas, and not familiar with the bush, would come to 
rely on the more comfortable conditions provided in barracks, at times finding it 
impossible to carry out their tasks in their absence. Problems would then arise. 
For those local communities adjacent to military bases, which came to 
depend on the military for free medical treatment and schooling, the loss of these 
privileges would have a marked effect. Many were also dependent on the bases 
for work as 'houseboys' (domestics), gardeners and batmen in the messes. The 
military spawned a network of private sector employment. Mutual support given 
by the army in services to civilians and by the locals through their labour and the 
army's access to traditional land, was important. By the 1980s, relations between 
the soldiers and the locals would sour, leading to unrest over access to land. 
Relatives and friends came to share in the benefits through the wantok24 
system. Within the barracks, the number of dependents and wantoks was strictly 
controlled before independence for security and safety reasons. These were 
important considerations. Soldiers were often away for long periods on patrols 
and it was important for morale and community safety that dependents were 
safeguarded in their absence. After independence, the controls would be relaxed. 
As a result, wantoks taxed the wages of the soldiers and burdened the defence 
system with costly expense, particularly medical treatment and rationing. 
Tribal representation, which had threatened the viability of the PNGDF in 
its early history, had been the focus of attention since the troubles of 1957 and 
1961. By 1973, proportional representation had changed (Figure 2.4). Since 
1942, the proportion of soldiers from the Momase25 region had declined, 
24 A tokpisin word meaning, literally, people of the same language group. 
25 Momase is an acronym for Morobe, Madang and Sepik Provinces. 
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including among officer ranks. Islanders and Papuans had increased in numbers 
with a marked dominance of these two groups in the officer ranks. About forty 
per cent of the country' s population came from the highlands yet highlanders did 
not enlist in the PNGDF until after 1957; by 1973 they represented twenty per 
cent of the army but accounted for only fifteen per cent of the officers. 
Figure 2.4 
Regional Representation in the PNGDF ( % ) - 1942, 1945, 1973 
(Sinclair 1992: 48 , Mench 1975: 131) 
Islands Momase Papua Highlands 
(Population) (18%) (24%) (20%) (38%) 
1942 15 60 25 
1945 28 38 34 
1973 22 28 30 20 
Officers 
1973 32 11 42 15 
Balanced representation was to remain recruiting policy after 
independence though numbers were distorted by financial restrictions on 
recruiting over the years. However, the distortions were not great among regional 
groupings and the inter-tribal conflict, which characterised the early days of the 
PIR, was not repeated on the same scale. A principal reason for this was that 
those problems arose from tribal imbalances rather than regional problems. As 
representation increased across tribal groups, the friction declined and where 
problems did exist, they assumed more of a regional dimension. 
Since the 1950s, the PNGDF had begun to take on a uniquely PNG 
appearance. Australia had not introduced Australian Army uniforms for the PIR, 
in part because of the climatic conditions. Instead, juniper26 green shorts and shirt 
were worn in the barracks. The PIR beret was worn proudly by soldiers and by 
Australians serving with the PIR, rather than Australian slouch hats. Australian 
field uniforms were worn but with special boots designed for the PIR. PIR 
26 So named because the light green colour resembled Juniper conifer trees. 
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epaulettes (red and green) further distinguished the PNG soldier. Military custom 
differed as well. Unlike the Australian Army, soldiers saluted with or without 
hats and in or out of uniform; a policy introduced to reinforce discipline and 
promote respect among the rank and file for their officers. 
Thus, at independence a framework had been established both for the 
PNGDF and the part played by the force in the independent state. Members of the 
force faced a promising future with promotion, posting, job variation, good 
conditions of service, rewarding service and an active patrolling programme. 
Some saw the absence of any 'heroic role [played by the army] in the winning of 
independence' (May 1993: 14) as a disadvantage for the PNGDF. Even so, the 
soldiers enjoyed a good reputation and the respect of the local population and 
while there had been instances of unrest in its history, the incidents had been 
short-lived and isolated. In any event, the PNGDF now had its own officers who 
were well prepared for command. The PNGDF was ready to fulfil its role under 
the Constitution should the need arise. In that, Australia had played a key role. 
Bilateral Relations 
'Because strategic matters were an important underlying basis of the relationship 
between PNG and Australia, defence disengagement was likely to reflect 
complexities of post-independence relations between the two ... ' (Mench 1975: 
53). 
Appropriately, 'defence development after 1969 [had] to be placed in the 
wider context of political change in PNG' (ibid.: 51). The objective was to ensure 
all government efforts were focussed on preparing PNG for independence. For 
Defence and other departments , a process of disengagement was adopted (ibid.). 
The defence assistance programme set up for the post-independence period was 
designed with that objective in mind. In the event, the process of disengagement 
or localisation was to fall short of its aims. Within a few years, some PNGDF 
positions would be delocalised (See Chapter 5). 
In the drive to independence, Australia paid particular attention to the 
strategic implications of the post-independence bilateral relationship. Defence 
relations, as part of a broader foreign policy, acknowledged that Australia would 
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continue to support the PNGDF long after independence. The defence assistance 
programme recognised this commitment. One implication of the programme was 
that there would be, for many years , Australian service personnel employed in 
line positions in the PNGDF and as advisers. The aim was to create and maintain 
a truly independent PNGDF. In that, 'army planning for the future in PNG tended 
to outstrip the tempo of change in other government sectors ' (ibid.: 33). 
The success achieved by the Defence Department can also be attributed to 
the resources given to defence infrastructure in PNG. The barracks and facilities 
built in PNG were impressive. However, such facilities were out of step with 
policy of the time which called for a PNG army 'based on austere scales of 
equipment and accommodation suited to the economic resources and stage of 
development of the country ' (ibid.). As a result, problems would become 
apparent in the 1980s when PNGDF finances and capital works management fell 
short of the maintenance needs of well-dispersed and expensive military facilities. 
The defence co-operation programme would be called to account for the declining 
standards in the PNGDF. The programme would also cause friction in the 
bilateral relationship with political implications for the Defence budget as PNG 
politicians cut government spending. 
The PNGDF had its own views of the Australian defence role in PNG 
after independence. Central to their thinking was the belief that defence co-
operation represented an ongoing obligation to assist and that assistance was 
ultimately of greater benefit to Australia than to PNG. Australia, they believed, 
(following the arguments of Millar 1965: 68), saw PNG as strategically essential. 
The implication was that the loss of PNG to a hostile power would have serious 
consequences for the defence of Australia, in effect eroding Australia' s ability to 
defend its territory. That made PNG essential to Australia' s strategic interest with 
its loss posing serious consequences for Australia. 
PNG officers did not concern themselves with the subtleties of vital and 
essential-to-strategic interests. Many PNGDF officers , trained in the 1960s, the 
era of confrontation with Indonesia, would hold senior positions for many years 
after independence and their perceptions of defence co-operation influenced 
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several generations of PNGDF officers. These senior officers grew accustomed to 
the notion, put forward by Australians, that the PNGDF was their army, that 
decisions about its future were ultimately theirs while Australia (always) stood 
ready to assist. Localisation, they were led to believe, was a tangible and accurate 
indicator of the PNGDF' s independence. PNGDF officers would return to these 
issues time and again whenever they felt threatened by Australia, especially on 
the issue of defence aid and who had final control over its expenditure - issues 
which would recur in PNG' s national approach on Australian aid in later years. 
Independence 
By the time Ted Diro was appointed Commander of the PNGDF on 15 
September 1975, the day before independence, many Australians had established 
close bonds with members of the PNGDF as was the case across wide sections of 
the PNG government. Importantly, even after independence, the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF) stood ready through mutual agreement to assist when 
required. The climate had been created for the PNGDF to develop independently, 
according to PNG' s national goals. Yet, the challenges for the PNGDF began 
before independence. The Gazelle unrest has already been mentioned. Two 
threats of secession materialised in the year of independence. 
In March 1975, Papua Besena27 unilaterally declared independence only 
months before PNG achieved independence. In the event, the declaration 
amounted to no more than a 'symbolic protest' (Hegarty 1983: 4). The incident 
shook the Somare government, but the PNGDF was not needed. In September, 
only weeks before PNG' s independence day, secessionist stirrings on 
Bougainville tested the government again. The Somare government defused the 
issue by agreeing to a system of provincial governments. Bougainvillean support 
27 The Papuan separatist movement - Papua Besena - had 'two central themes: a belief that 
Papua was being neglected in the area of economic development, and a reaction against migration 
from New Guinea to Port Moresby' (McKillop 1982: 330). 
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for a united PNG was enlisted on the understanding that Bougainvilleans would 
have a say in the running of the province.28 Again, the PNGDF was not needed. 
A third issue which tested the government, and which had defence 
implications, was the management of the PNG/Indonesian border. OPM 
(Organisasi Papua Merdeka) (Free Papua Movement) rebels in the border area 
irritated the Indonesians who were further nettled by sympathy 'within the PNG 
elite ... [to] the Melanesian brothers' cause in Irian Jaya' (Hegarty 1983: 4). 
PNGDF border patrols were more to counter Indonesian enthusiasm for hot 
pursuit patrols in search of the OPM than to restrict rebel activities on the border. 
Each patrol had the potential to result in a border clash and so threaten bilateral 
relations. Notwithstanding border tensions, problems were held in check. 
The PNGDF was seen as an important instrument of state in PNG. Yet, in 
the absence of good relations with the government, the Force could also be used 
for military intervention. Such intervention could have been justified by the 
PNGDF on the basis that soldiers were acting as guardians of the people and 
guarantors of democracy in PNG. Many believed that the PNGDF's principal 
role would be internal security because 'as a small state [PNG] cannot ensure its 
security by military means' (ibid.: 160). That assessment reflected the practical 
realities of the small size of the PNGDF (around 3000) and the difficulties of 
defending PNG's geographic area. Mench (1975: 176) argued that the PNGDF's 
success in any internal security role depended on its relationship with the people, 
and on retaining a monopoly of violence. In the internal security role, PNGDF 
intervention would put at risk its relationship with the people, creating 'an 
important and potentially destabilising precedent' (ibid.: 169) - a prophecy 
borne out in the 1980s after the army was used in aid to the civil power. 
Even in the early post-independence years, relations between the PNGDF 
and the government became strained. In 1977, Cabinet reprimanded Brigadier-
General Diro for his unauthorised meeting with an OPM commander (Dorney 
28 In 1988, Bougainvillean secessionists blamed the umest on Port Moresby's failure to allow 
Bougainvilleans a say in the running of their affairs. In 1995, following reform of the Organic 
Law on provincial government, Bougainvilleans argued that with the conditions under which they 
agreed to be part of PNG now changed, they were no longer bound by the 1975 agreement. 
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1990: 200). (Diro had sought the meeting because of credible reports that the 
OPM was planning to attack the then Governor-General, visiting the northern 
border area at the time. [Discussion Brig-Gen Diro of 6 March 2002].) At the 
time, Diro believed he was acting in the national interest, though he seems to have 
given scant regard to Indonesian reaction to his actions. The government, with 
problems of its own, saw the need to reaffirm its authority over the army. For 
Prime Minister Somare, disciplinary action was justified.29 He was unaware that 
the PNGDF had prepared a contingency plan (Operation Electric Shock) to 
demonstrate the extent of the army's power if the government sacked Diro. In the 
event, Diro was not sacked and the army did not act. 
Speculation has surrounded the existence of the plan. Some sceptics have 
said that the plan did not exist and that the idea of PNGDF action against the state 
was largely contrived by Lieutenant Colonel Poang, then Commanding Officer, 1 
PIR. Still others reject the notion because they claim Diro knew nothing of the 
plot. Certainly, the suggestion of the PNGDF acting against the state seemed out 
of character at the time. The Force had a good public image and a reputation for 
high professional standards. Nonetheless, Operation Electric Shock was a 
standing plan complete with specific but limited objectives. The First Battalion, 
based at Taurama Barracks, developed and was to carry out the plan. The 
operation was not designed to usurp power, which, in the minds of the soldiers, 
tempered the seriousness of what was being plotted. Rather, the PNGDF saw the 
action as a show of strength designed to safeguard Defence interests without long-
tenn damage to democracy in PNG (personal communication Brigadier-General 
Lokinap, CBE of 17 April 1996). 
The naivety of the PNGDF thinking is cause for concern. No account 
seems to have been taken of the potential for conflict with the police. The Army 
placed confidence in the advantage of surprise, confusion and its superior 
firepower. Nor did the PNGDF appreciate the backlash from the population or 
29 Papua Besena leader, Josephine Abaijah, tried to use the Diro incident to advantage by claiming 
that 'the government was conducting a smear campaign over the Diro affair ... based on [its] fears 
and insecurity when dealing with Papuans ' (quoted in McKillop 1982: 347) - however she 
achieved little. 
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the potential risks of foreign intervention. As the plan did not go ahead, the belief 
that many soldiers would have refused to participate was not tested. The failure 
of the government to take action established within the PNGDF a belief that such 
action was an ongoing safeguard for their interests. The concept of Electric Shock 
would remain alive in the PNGDF for later years. 
The issue was an indictment of Diro' s leadership. Diro should have 
known of the plot. The takeover was rehearsed in the barracks and knowledge of 
the plan had been leaked to other elements of the PNGDF. Yet Diro claims he 
only became aware of the plan after the reprimand. Once exposed, he replaced 
Lieutenant Colonel _Poang, arguing 'that any action against the government was 
the prerogative of the commander only not that of his subordinates' (discussion 
Brig-Gen Diro of 6 March 2002). Diro did not disclose details of the plot to the 
government in order to avoid undermining government confidence in the PNGDF. 
Rather, he chose the more difficult course of disciplining subordinates who were 
acting out of loyalty. Diro, in accepting the government's reprimand, reinforced 
the army's subordination to the civil authority. Earlier, in 1974, Diro, then a 
Lieutenant Colonel, had reminded graduating recruits at Goldie River: 
As soldiers, your task is quite clear - to give your absolute ... loyalty to the 
government ... [this] must be paramount in your minds (Sinclair 1992: 241). 
Notwithstanding the clash with government, command of the PNGDF was 
to remain with Ted Diro until 1981 in spite of two national elections (1977 and 
1982), and a successful vote of no confidence - PNG's first. 30 The retention of 
Diro for so long a period is noteworthy, particularly given the frequency with 
which subsequent commanders were replaced. Commanders of the PNGDF and 
their periods of appointment are shown in Appendix 4. 
Apart from the 1977 incident, predictions that the PNGDF would 
challenge government authority, as many armies of newly-independent African 
states had done, proved to be unfounded. Indeed, the 'low profile of the military 
in Papua New Guinea [in the first decade after independence] is one of the 
country's many political surprises' (Turner 1990: 118). Part of the reason can be 
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attributed to the Australian presence in the PNGDF after independence. Another 
factor was that the economic and political climate remained favourable to the 
Somare government for the first eighteen months after independence (Hegarty 
1983: 2). The stability created a confident army/government relationship. 
The harmony within government was not destined to last. The first real 
test of government came in 1979 when the then Justice Minister, Nahau Rooney, 
sought to influence the judiciary. After she was charged with contempt and 
jailed, Somare, who had assumed the minister's portfolio, used his discretionary 
power to release her from jail (Nonggorr 1993: 4). Public pressure defused the 
issue. At no time was there threat of army intervention. Nor was there any threat 
of intervention when a vote of no confidence saw the Somare government 
replaced by Sir Julius Chan in 1980. Both events had the potential to cause 
problems for the newly-independent PNG and provoke PNGDF intervention. 
Were there other factors, which influenced the PNGDF against taking action? 
The army was adjusting to its independent status and influenced by the 
focus of pre-colonial times - patrolling and civic action. The PNGDF had not 
yet been involved in law and order beyond the alert over the Gazelle in 1970. 
Soldiers also continued to enjoy good conditions of service and the PNGDF's 
public image was good. Although localisation was advanced, many Australians 
remained in the force, providing a framework of discipline (personal 
communication Brigadier-General Lokinap, CBE, of 17 April 1996). 
The PNGDF leadership was stable and Brigadier-General Diro and other 
senior Papua New Guinean officers were respected - a recognition of their 
training and experience which was not matched by younger officers. Senior 
officers were not frustrated in any ambitions they had for power. Paterson Lowa 
had resigned from the army (on Dirq ' s appointment as commander) to pursue a 
political career. Diro would follow the same path in the 1980s. The ability to 
achieve power through other means helped defuse any inclination to use the army 
to achieve personal goals during the early post-independence years. The PNGDF 
30 A Chan/Okuk coalition replaced the Somare government in a vote of no confi dence in 1980. 
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enjoyed a clearly defined role with no conflict between the force and the 
government over policy issues. 
Conclusion 
The early history of the PNGDF highlights issues which would become 
important in the post-independence period. Indiscipline had been a key issue. 
Critics pointed to the unrest brought about by poor army/ police relations and 
soldiers aggrieved by pay and conditions of service. Those concerns were not 
allayed even when policy decisions, designed to reduce the incidence of unrest, 
were implemented. For example, soldiers were organised into sections based on 
tribal groupings during the Second World War. That was later abandoned in 
favour of integration. In both instances acts of indiscipline continued, even under 
the command of Australian, and later, local officers and NCOs. 
Strict disciplinary measures and improved education had some positive 
effect on discipline, reducing the frequency of disciplinary breaches. However, 
the PNGDF soldier still seemed prepared to discard discipline when the mood 
took him. Tribal imbalances, including in officer ranks, which favoured Papuans 
and Islanders, added to the tension. By addressing the imbalances, the focus of 
indiscipline changed from inter-tribal friction within the army to unrest between 
the army and outsiders, including the police. 
Recruitment of local officers had come late and limited numbers further 
reduced the effectiveness of localisation. Problems were compounded when 
promotion was accelerated for independence. The NCOs on whom young officers 
depended for support and for their development, also lacked a commitment to 
discipline. The widening gap between younger and better educated NCOs and the 
older, more traditional NCOs presented problems for the young army. Yet the 
PNGDF only once showed any inclination to act against the government (in 
1977). The army's promising record in the early years after independence can be 
attributed to its non-participation in civil disorder and the Australian presence. As 
an institution, the PNGDF was a strong instrument of state. The first call for its 
use would come from abroad rather than from within PNG. Problems were 
emerging in Vanuatu. 
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Advertisement for Local Officers31 
(Granter 1970: 23) 
..1, 
0 FFJ CER CAR£f RS f N PAP LIA NEW G UJNEA 
Appendix 2 to 
Chapter 2 
If you have got what it takes, you can make for yourself a brilliant career and 
gain promotion to the highest Army posts. This is the challenge the Army is 
offering to the best young men in Papua New Guinea. 
• If you have reached the age of 17 years. 
• Have a minimum of Form IV (Territory) or equivalent education. 
Obtain further information about the career opportunities for officers in the 
Army in Papua and New Guinea, together with application forms for Officer 
Cadet School entry, please contact: 
• Army Careers Officer 
Headquarters Papua New Guinea Command 
Murray Barracks Free Bag 
B oroko Papua 
31 The officer shown is Tom Nauna. 
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Appendix 3 to 
Chapter 2 
PNG Officers-Graduates of OCS 1962-197532 
T. Diro1963 D. Yangimas33 1970 G. Cooper 1972 
P.Lowa 1963 J. Bau 34 1970 G.Key 1972 
K. Noga 1964 J. Koaba-Bure 1970 J. Apa 1972 
K. Guria 1965 G. Iruru 1970 A. Misirait 1972 
T. Nauna 1966 C. Baulten 1971 U. Ukengo 1972 
G. Mamae 1968 M. Toverbae 1971 J. Mule 1972 
L. Dotaona 1968 P. Dala 1971 N. Kuwoh 1973 
T. Poang 1968 A. Druen 1971 F. Moripi 1973 
J. Sanawe 1968 S. Maiasa 1971 W. Salamas 1973 
A. Huai 1968 B. Tasia 1971 M. Taeni 1973 
T. Niaga 1969 B. Kavanamur 1972 G. Wiri 1973 
M. Kiso 1969 M.Pohunu 1972 M. Kuwek 1973 
R. Tarupiu 1969 B. Eka 1972 M. Nelson 1973 
P. Soma 1969 F. Kiriba 1972 J. Pais 1973 
J. Kassman 1969 G. Haurama 1972 A. Pinia 1973 
N. Noke 1969 V.Mae 1972 G. Tamegal 1973 
L. Nuia 1970 M. Inia 1972 
R. Dademo 1970 Z. Kukuma 1972 
D. Josiah 1970 A. Trongat 1972 
W. Maule 1970 M.Reu 1972 
32 The list does not include Lieutenants Tau (killed in a car accident) and Brawa (killed in a tribal 
fayback attack) or officers commissioned from in-service courses. 
3 Yangimas later changed his name to Takendu. 
34 Bau later changed his name to Bau Maras. 
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Commanders of the PNGDF 
Brigadier-General T. Diro, CBE 
Brigadier-General G. Mamae, CBE 
Brigadier-General K. Noga, CBE 
Brigadier-General T. Huai, CBE35 
Brigadier-General R. Lokinap, CBE, L VO36 
Brigadier-General R. Dademo, OBE 
Brigadier-General T. Huai, CBE 
Brigadier-General J. Singirok, MBE 
Brigadier-General L. Nuia, OBE 
Brigadier-General G. Singirok, MBE37 
Appendix 4 to 
Chapter 2 
1975 - 1981 
1981 - 1983 
1983 - 1985 
1985 - 1987 
1987 - 1992 
1992 - 1993 
1993 - 1995 
1995 - 1997 
1997 - 1998 
1998 - 1999 
35 Brigadier-General Huai's appointment in 1985 and again in 1994 is notable for two reasons: he 
was the first non-serving individual appointed as commander, having resigned in 1984 and in 
1987, and he was the first of only two officers appointed twice as commander. 
36 Brigadier-General Lokinap was stood down from February to September 1989 pending a Board 
of Inquiry into the PNGDF pay riots on 8 February 1989 (see Chapter 5). 
37 Singirok was promoted to Major-General on 9 Jun 99 when the position was upgraded. 
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Chapter 3 
Vanuatu 
'[The PNGDF'sj highly professional, though restrained, operations, speedily 
brought [ the unrest] under control with a minimum of casualties on both sides' 
(East 1981: 69). 
Introduction 
By the 1980s, the PNGDF had assumed much of the responsibility for the 
daily conduct of defence activities. Australians made up less than 4 per cent of 
the Force, holding 141 PNGDF positions in 1980 (Defence Report January 1995: 
6.1). Brigadier-General Diro had held the Commander's appointment for five 
years, surviving the strain in relations arising from the government's public 
dressing down in 1977 (See Chapter 2). Under Diro, the PNGDF had maintained 
a level of military proficiency through border patrols, unit exercises and civic 
action. These were all integral parts of the army's training schedule. The 
proficiency extended to both internal security and counter insurgency operations 
(CIO). These would be important elements in the PNGDF' s first major test, 
putting down a secessionist revolt in Vanuatu later in 1980. In that, Diro would 
play a leading role in international diplomacy, which would eventually lead to 
PNG parliamentary approval for a PNGDF deployment. 
The Vanuatu operation gave the Force a timely focus. Soldiers had been 
routinely involved in border operations but, until 1980, the independent army had 
not faced any real test of its capabilities. Few opportunities had arisen aside from 
calls by some politicians for the army to be used to restore order in the Highlands. 
The officer corps had been frustrated by poor promotion prospects. After the 
initial flurry of promotions in the run up to independence, many of the senior 
officers expected to remain in their positions for some time (See Chapter 2). The 
Vanuatu operation gave a timely boost to military morale. 
Background 
The Republic of Vanuatu · (formerly the New Hebrides) is an archipelago 
of 80 islands, covering 12,000 square kilometres (See map at Appendix 1). The 
capital, Port Vila, is located on the island of Efate. The other main islands of 
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Vanuatu include Santo, Tanna, Malekula and Erromango. Santo is the largest 
island in Vanuatu. The population at the time of the rebellion in 1980 was 
110,000. The national language-Bislama-is a form of Pidgin English similar 
to Papua New Guinean Tokpisin. 
Prior to independence, the New Hebrides had been governed, since 1906, 
by an Anglo-French administration, established under a New Hebrides 
Convention. The Administration has been referred to as a 'systemised process of 
separate Frenchisation and Britishisation of the New Hebridean peoples' (Gubb 
1994: 4/5). The administrative arrangements were confusing to the local people. 
The two colonial powers opposed each other on the issue of independence. For 
its part, Britain favoured independence. France, however, pursued a policy of 
stalling moves towards independence trying to build up a francophone majority 
(Shears 1980: 48). In spite of French stonewalling, independence, on 31 July 
1980, was eventually agreed. The unrest which marred Vanuatu's transition to 
statehood, did not stem from the denial of independence by the administering 
powers; rather, friction among the peoples of the New Hebrides stemmed from 
the uneasy alliance between the French and the British. 
A Call for Help 
The problems, which came to a head in 1980, had their roots in the 
nationalist undercurrents, which emerged in the 1960s, especially in the formation 
of the N agriamel movement. 38 The movement had been influenced by the cargo 
cults which emerged after the Second World War (Beasant 1984: 15). Nagriamel 
support was concentrated on Santo Island with part of its support base drawn from 
the Vemarana movement whose members were strongly opposed to the 
anglophone Vanuaaku Party (VP)-led government. 
The Nagriamel movement's leader, Jimmy Stevens, exploited popular 
support for traditional ways, which emphasised the central importance of land. In 
that, the members of Nag:riamel were in conflict with the European settlers. If the 
rebels had their way, the settlers would have been unable to secure more land 
from the local people. Meanwhile, some Europeans and American interest groups 
38 For more detail see Beasant (1984: 17-19). 
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recognised the opportunity to pursue their own political and religious agendas in 
the region. One such group, the Phoenix Foundation, had earlier encouraged 
secession in the Bahamas (Shears 1980: 42). The Foundation provided financial 
support to Stevens as well as constitutional advice, radio equipment and arms 
(ibid.: 42). The Foundation, Vemarana members, and the cargo cultists exploited 
Steven's influence (Scarr 1990: 330). 
The New Hebrides National Party (NHNP), which had been formed in 
1971, dominated the Assembly, frustrating Nagriamel members in their attempt to 
secure power, as independence approached. The party became a popular 
alternative to the largely francophone Nagriamel group, creating friction within 
the New Hebrides. While NHNP leader, Walter Lini, recognised in 1979 the risk 
of internal unrest, his attempts to reconcile differences failed. Lini had hoped that 
by talking directly with the rebels, he could reach a compromise (Shears 1980: 
71 ). Lini, together with members of his cabinet, visited Santo in April 1979 and 
met with Stevens. But Stevens misread Lini, believing he had been given Lini's 
acceptance of Santo's independence. Stevens was already planning independence 
for Santo - the Republic of Vemarana - even preparing a constitution. The 
French landowners, at first suspicious of Nagriamel, were placated by Stevens, 
who made provision in the draft constitution for European ownership of land 
(ibid.: 70). With land ownership apparently secure under Stevens, Europeans saw 
advantage in supporting the rebels. That support drew criticism from Lini and 
others. Ultimately, in opting for a military solution to the unrest, Lini's decision 
would run the risk of French military action. 
The French government's concern over events in the New Hebrides and 
their potential to threaten French citizens there was understandable. Lini' s close 
association with Anglophone connections did little to endear him to the French. 
When, in 1980, Lini proposed emergency powers to restore order, France opposed 
his request. Diplomatic wrangling between the British and French over the 
latter's refusal to form a combined force to restore order, and French sanctions 
over the British troop presence, further clouded relations. On 29 July, the French 
deputy foreign minister guaranteed 'protection for all French ... on Santo ... even 
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after independence [promising to] defend them with the utmost vigour' (Gubb 
1994: 25), fuelling Lini' s suspicions that the French were aiding the rebellion. 
The problems in the New Hebrides had already caught the attention of the 
PNGDF. Intelligence assessments of the internal problems in the New Hebrides 
were prepared in late 1979 ( discussion Brigadier-General Huai 30 May 1995). 
PNG added its diplomatic voice to Lini' s condemnation of France 'protesting 
formally over the continued inflammatory involvement of French citizens in the 
affairs of Vanuatu' (Pacific Islands Monthly, October 1980: 5). 
With the British unprepared to commit their troops in the face of French 
opposition, and both sides reluctant to respond to his call for military assistance, 
Lini looked elsewhere. He first approached the United Nations before trying once 
more to stir the Condominium powers into action. European indecision, French 
reluctance to use force against its own citizens, and the prohibitive cost of a large 
British deployment (ibid.: 16) left the door open for PNG' s intervention. 
During a visit to Port Vila in mid-July, Brigadier-General Diro discussed 
the possibilities of PNGDF assistance with Lini (Beasant 1984: 120). The visit, 
after Lini's earlier approaches to Somare (in March) and Chan (in June), was 
designed to assess the situation for the PNG government. In choosing to send 
Diro, Chan may have inadvertently committed PNG to supporting the Lini 
government. Diro had made no secret of his desire to deploy PNG troops to 
Vanuatu. As the PNG envoy, he had the opportunity to cement the commitment. 
The role of PNG Foreign Affairs representatives is not altogether clear; the 
department suffered from a lack of permanent representation in Vanuatu. 
Predictably, Diro carried Lini's request for military assistance to Port Moresby. 
Any doubts about the use of the PNGDF which Lini may have harboured 
were probably allayed by Diro' s preparedness to place a PNGDF contingent 
under the guidance of the Vanuatu National Security Committee (ibid.: 125). Lini 
therefore accepted PNG's tentative offer of assistance. 
Prime Minister Chan was worried about the prospective political fallout 
from PNGDF casualties. He also questioned the PNGDF' s capacity to put down 
the rebellion - mindful of French and British reluctance to become involved. 
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Some of Chan's caution came as a result of Australian diplomacy that emphasised 
the risks of using PNGDF troops who were inexperienced in combat. Chan also 
recognised the risks of deploying a foreign army into an imbroglio with many 
vested interests. Nevertheless, at a South Pacific Forum meeting in Tarawa on 14 
July 1980, Chan announced his willingness to commit troops to Vanuatu -
conditional on a personal assessment by Brigadier-General Diro. 
Under PNG' s Constitution, the deployment of the PNGDF abroad required 
the approval of parliament (Goldring 1978: 56). The Governor-General recalled 
parliament on 25 July to 'consider legislation authorising the deployment of the 
PNGDF' (Beasant 1984: 122). The Opposition opposed the deployment, arguing 
that PNG had the 'biggest law and order problem in the entire Pacific area' (PNG 
National Parliament Hansard 7 August 1980: 22). The troops, argued the 
Opposition, could be better used against this threat than in assisting Vanuatu with 
its secessionist problems. Public opinion was less easily measured. Many in 
PNG had a poor understanding of the political situation in Vanuatu, especially of 
the risks involved in deploying troops there. Eventually, however, Chan mustered 
support to pass the Defence Forces (Presence Abroad) Bill on 7 August, by fifty-
five votes to forty. 
Lini understood that Chan favoured a regional peacekeeping force even 
before the Vanuatu troubles. Lini in effect gave Chan the opportunity to 
demonstrate the value of such a force to the region. Lini also knew that among 
the island countries, 'Papua New Guinea had the largest forces 39 and a ... capacity 
to move quickly ' (Gubb 1994: 23), though that capacity depended in large part on 
Australian logistic support and on Australian Defence personnel serving in the 
PNGDF at the time. 
The crisis could have been defused on several occasions before the 
PNGDF deployment. The forces arrayed against the rebel elements were 
formidable. British and French troops did not intervene but remained garrisoned 
in the area. For a time, the foreign troops , especially the French, posed potential 
39 The Fiji Military Force (FMF) with around the same strength had a battalion committed to UN 
duties . That would have prevented its participation. 
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difficulties for the Kumul Force deployed to restore order. Many were uncertain 
of the French reaction to the Kumul deployment, given the French undertaking to 
defend French rights. Australia also recognised the risks, prompting caution in 
committing ADF personnel and urging restraint on the part of the PNG 
government. Nonetheless, the deployment went ahead. 
Planning the Deployment 
PNGDF soldiers deployed to Vanuatu on 29 July, not for operations but 
for independence celebrations. They were part of A Company, 1 PIR and 
comprised 120 men, including 30 PIR bandsmen. Being based at Taurama 
Barracks, they could be readied for deployment quickly. B Company 2 PIR had 
been in Port Moresby at the time of the warning order for the deployment, as part 
of a Trooping of the Colour ceremony; they hastily returned to Wewak for 
equipment, and deployed to Vanuatu on the day Parliament gave its approval. 
Diro was conscious that Chan harboured doubts about the PNGDF' s 
capacity to put down the rebellion, and set about convincing Chan that every 
measure had been taken to ensure success. Diro emphasised that the members of 
the Kumul Force were specially selected. He also claimed that 'each unit was put 
through rigid battle indoctrination ... bringing the force into battle efficiency ' 
(Dorney 1990: 190). The rigid training was in reality a short exercise -
codenamed Kumul 1 - undertaken in Milne Bay for some of the troops before 
the deployment. The exercise was hastily planned and of short duration because 
there was little time remaining before deployment. The exercise revealed serious 
communications and logistics problems ( discussion Brigadier-General Huai of 30 
May 1995) which did not augur well for troops operating in Vanuatu. A longer 
exercise would have exposed the PNGDF' s inherent weaknesses. Moreover, the 
soldiers exercised among a population friendly to the PNGDF, an advantage 
which could not be guaranteed in Vanuatu. 
Diro accompanied the advance troops to Vanuatu, in order to participate in 
the independence celebrations. He appointed Lieutenant Colonel Tony Huai as 
Commander of the Kumul Force. Huai, who prior to the deployment was Chief of 
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Operations (COPS) at Headquarters, PNGDF, arrived with the second element of 
the contingent on 18 August. Huai was promoted to Colonel a month later. 
The appointment of the Chief of Operations to command the Kuniul Force 
1s noteworthy. The appointment meant the absence, for the duration of the 
deployment, of a key senior officer from the headquarters to command a force 
with a total strength of less than half a battalion. Such a group was routinely 
commanded by a lieutenant colonel, usually a battalion commander. The 
selection of Lieutenant Colonel Huai from Headquarters PNGDF, rather than one 
of the two commanding officers of the PIR, raises doubt about the degree of 
confidence Diro had in the commanding officers of the two battalions.40 Under 
the PNGDF command structure, there was no provision for a forward 
commander. Any deployment, internal or external, demanded that the chief of 
operations oversee at headquarters all aspects of the operation. The chief of 
operations, was too important a position to be left to subordinates while troops 
were deployed on active service. Yet this problem was not addressed even in the 
aftermath of Vanuatu. The same problem emerged on Bougainville when Colonel 
Nuia, then chief of operations, was appointed deputy controller (See Chapter 7). 
The appointment of an officer from outside the battalions also added 
uncertainty to the contingent's effectiveness. The selection of the two companies 
was prompted by the Commander's desire to use the best company of each 
Battalion; he may have planned also to deploy the two companies to separate 
areas of operation. As it was, the two companies were from different battalions 
with little experience working together, especially on operations. The PIR 
battalions had been very different, even from the early days. To combine two 
companies at short notice and expect them to work together was far from ideal. A 
more serious and sustained rebel threat would have exposed command and control 
problems inherent in the ad hoc formation of the Kumul Force. 
40 Huai was appointed due to the short time before deployment (discussion Brigadier-General Nuia 
of 12 July 1999). 
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Rules of Engagement 
Prior to the deployment, the Kumul Force was issued with rules of 
engagement, which set down guidelines for the use of weapons during the 
operations. Such rules are an integral part of internal security operations. They 
are designed to reinforce soldiers ' responsibilities for the use of minimum force 
and to assist them to understand the conditions under which they may return fire , 
especially in circumstances involving civilians. Rules of engagement recognise 
the difficulties faced by military personnel operating in an internal security role. 
Soldiers deployed to Vanuatu were instructed to fire only if fired upon or 
in the event that they reasonably expected a threat to their safety or to the safety 
of others. Ultimately, they were instructed that the decision to fire would need to 
withstand scrutiny by a court if the situation arose. Soldiers were also informed 
that return fire must be directed at the threat and then only sufficient to neutralise 
the threat. Indiscriminate and concentrated fire was forbidden. 
For the most part, soldiers abided by the rules of engagement. Contacts 
with the rebels did occur though these were limited in number. That reduced the 
instance of indiscriminate fire and, with it, the potential for civilian casualties. 
Another important factor influenced the conduct of soldiers. At the time, infantry 
soldiers carried the 7.62mm Self-Loading Rifle (SLR) which was not capable of 
automatic fire. Soldiers therefore tended to fire only aimed, single shots rather 
than the high volume scattered fire which became a characteristic of PNGDF 
responses on Bougainville in the late 1980s. 
Notwithstanding the rules of engagement, sailors on board the HMPNGS 
Madang fired 40mm Bofors cannon indiscriminately at Matanas village, Wide 
Bay, after a soldier in a landing party was shot by rebels. Fortunately, both the 
rebels and local villagers escaped injury in the incident. 
While the Kumul Force busied itself with preparations for operations in 
Vanuatu, Australian diplomatic activity, prompted by the proposed PNGDF 
deployment and the prospect of internal unrest in Vanuatu, began in earnest. 
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Politics and Diplomacy 
Australia was concerned at the possible implications - especially for 
Australia - of PNG military assistance in Vanuatu. The defence and foreign 
policy dimensions ensured Australian government interest in PNG' s commitment. 
The likely reaction of foreign countries, especially those with principal interests in 
Vanuatu, and the safety of Australians then in Vanuatu were the focus of 
government assessment. A pressing problem was the extent to which Australian 
defence personnel 1night be involved in the operation or in contingency measures 
in the event that the situation deteriorated. Australia had long been concerned 
about the prospect of ADP personnel being drawn into clashes which could 
ultimately bring Australia into conflict with regional countries, especially 
Indonesia, through the actions of PNG forces. That prompted action by Australia 
in 1977 to ensure its control over ADP personnel attached to the PNGDF. 
Australia set down policy guidelines in 1977 that governed the use of ADP 
personnel in politically sensitive situations (Gubb 1994: 31) (See Chapter 5). The 
Australian government was keen to ensure that ADP personnel did not become 
involved in operations, especially in an internal security role. As a result, ADP 
personnel, for example, pilots and technical staff, were withdrawn from duty. The 
decision on the eve of the deployment created a rift in PNGDF/ ADP relations, 
which would see a deterioration in relations for the remainder of the decade 
(discussion Brig-Gen Diro of 6 March 2002). The Vanuatu deployment presented 
a dilemma for Australia because of the risks of ADP casualties or the ADP being 
called upon by PNG to support its troops on the ground. The potential problems 
ensured close consultation between the Department of Defence and Department of 
Foreign Affairs. The outcome was that Australian agreement to support the 
deployment was made contingent upon liaison between the PNGDF and the ADP, 
and adherence to the 1977 guidelines. In the event, the two forces combined well , 
contributing to the operation' s overall success. 
The Vanuatu deployment was also a litmus test of Australian efforts to 
build a viable defence capacity in Papua New Guinea. Australia emphasised, in 
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its defence objectives in PNG, a capacity for self-reliance, and an ability to deter 
aggression and to protect PNG' s national resources. 
Australian policy on PNG was influenced in part by its view of the region 
through a 'cold war lens' (ibid.: 28). Australia saw the need to limit opportunities 
for communist states and other interest groups to gain a foothold in the region. 
Defence assistance and foreign aid were valuable tools in this regard. In spite of 
this, Australia was cautious in dealing with the challenges presented by the 
Vanuatu unrest, concerned that the situation posed risks for other areas: 
Bougainville had already shown its potential to unravel in the run-up to PNG' s 
independence. Australia was concerned that 'onlookers would automatically 
assume a PNGDF intervention carried Australian endorsement' (ibid.: 30) and 
concerned about the fallout for neighbouring countries, especially Indonesia.41 In 
part, that helps explain Australia's attempts to dissuade PNG from sending troops. 
By delaying its support for the operation - a source of irritation within the PNG 
government and its bureaucracy- Australia underlined internationally that PNG 
could not take the defence relationship for granted. PNG, however, remained 
determined, and the Kumul Force readied for deployment. 
Operations 
'For the first ti,ne in the Pacific [since the Second World War}, the use of force 
was no longer the sole preserve of the white administering powers' (Dorney 1990: 
192). 
The PNGDF contingent included A Company, 1 PIR, and B Company, 2 
PIR, with HMPNGS Madang and Saniarai (Attack-Class Patrol Boats) , and two 
DC3 and one Nomad aircraft. Huai also had under his command sixty-five men 
of the Vanuatu Military Forces (VMF). The troops assembled for the operation 
- codenamed Wantok Durua 42 - were issued with flak jackets, helmets and tear 
gas masks in addition to their standard field equipment. These items were 
41 During the Bougainville rebellion in 1988/89, Australia again became concerned over the 
Indonesian reaction to instability in PNG. In the event, Indonesia made clear it saw Bougainville 
as an Australian problem, showing no inclination to become involved militarily (discussion 
General Tri Sutrisno, 1989). 
42 The name was derived from the Tokpisin word wantok meaning friend and the PNG Motu word 
durua meaning to help. 
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standard in internal security operations. The ability of soldiers to patrol in such 
heavy equipment is markedly reduced in tropical climates; however, the use of 
flak jackets reduced the risk of casualties. For that reason, equipment boosted 
morale and confidence among soldiers. 
The PNGDF operational plan emphasised a two-pronged deployment of 
troops, to Santo in the north and to Tanna to the south of Port Vila. The Tanna 
deployment had been planned in response to unrest that began on 11 June when 
rebels freed supporters who had been gaoled. Colonel Huai allotted the task of 
securing Tanna to then Major Geoff Key (a Morobean from B Company 2 PIR). 
There were risks involved in dividing the Kumul Contingent between 
Santo and Tanna. The logistic effort alone would have stretched the capacity of 
the Force to supply both its isolated elements. The PNGDF had little in reserve in 
the event of an escalation of unrest or a more concerted effort by the rebels. 
However, the deployment of British-led police units prior to the arrival of the 
PNGDF settled the situation on Tanna. The restoration of order on Tanna was 
therefore a windfall for Huai, who could now concentrate his forces on Santo, 
confident that his contingent could be supported. 
Colonel Huai set down three principal objectives in his operational plan 
for Operation Wantok Durua on Santo. These were: 
• Phase 1 - to secure Pekoa Airfield, Santo; 
• Phase 2 - to capture Luganville (Santo Town); and 
• Phase 3 - to capture Tanafo (Vemarana rebel headquarters) (East 1981: 72). 
Major Taeni (A Company 1 PIR) was tasked with securing Pekoa airfield 
and, later, Luganville. The airfield was tactically important, providing a point of 
lodgement and a means of resupply, and for reinforcements. The airstrip could 
then be used as a base for the assault on Luganville, only fifteen kilometres away. 
On 18 August, the first elements of A Company aboard PNGDF DC3 aircraft 
landed at the airfield. The troops were surprised at the lack of opposition - prior 
to the arrival of the Kumul Force, attempts by Lini ' s representatives to land and 
broker a settlement with Stevens had been thwarted by obstacles on the airfield. 
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Surprise, coupled with the rapid buildup of the PNGDF presence, enabled 
Huai to secure the airport. He could now move into Santo and, in the event of 
contact with the rebels, he could evacuate PNGDF casualties . These were 
important to Huai' s plan, instilling confidence among the rank and file. While 
Pekoa airport was an important asset, Huai knew that Luganville was a crucial 
objective. Intelligence showed that the rebels still held the town and he had to 
assume they intended to resist PNGDF attempts to capture Luganville. 
Colonel Huai decided to move quickly on Luganville. As soon as he had 
sufficient troops on the ground, A Company was ordered to advance towards the 
town. The company encountered no opposition and the town was secured. The 
rebels had abandoned Luganville in favour of their stronghold in and around 
Tanafo. Within twenty-four hours of the start of the Operation, two of the three 
key objectives had been secured without firing a shot. 
Huai was enjoying success at sea as well. PNGDF patrol boats intercepted 
boats that had been supplying rebels on Santo. The same boats had been used to 
move looted goods. On 19 August, four craft were intercepted and their crews 
placed in custody. Another, the Pilou Pilou, was also an·ested (Beasant 1984: 
127). The capture of these boats isolated the rebels on Santo, preventing rebels , 
including French supporters, from escaping the PNGDF operation. 
While Huai was pleased with his initial successes, he knew that once the 
rebels regrouped, the Kuniul troops faced a more serious threat. As a priority, 
Huai consolidated his hold on Luganville, around key installations and on town 
approaches. Troops were ordered to set up roadblocks and defensive positions 
around the town to prevent rebel infiltration. Patrols and roadblocks led to the 
arrest of over forty rebel suspects (ibid.: 127) (Figure 3.1). Among those captured 
was the so-called rebel secretary-general, Georges Cronstadt, a French citizen. 
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Figure 3.1 
Captured Rebels 
The roadblocks limited rebel activity and provided a means of monitoring 
civilian movement. Nonetheless, on several occasions, people attempted to break 
through roadblocks. Those attempting to run the roadblocks were intercepted at 
another further down the road. By siting the troops at important locations, Huai 
was able to add depth to the security measures being taken in and around 
Luganville. Shears (1980: 201) observed that several cars recovered by the 
PNGDF had 'their back windows shot out or their tyres flat' (Figure 3 .2). Within 
a short period of time, the local population learnt that the troops, in the company 
of members of the VMF, were serious about enforcing their right to detain and 
search vehicles. Yet the practice of firing randomly into vehicles ran the risk of 
causing civilian casualties. 
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Figure 3.2 
Car Damage 
(Shears 1980: 122) 
As part of his protection plan, Huai dispatched patrols from Luganville. 
These patrols were tasked to detect rebel movement and to gather information on 
rebel locations prior to operations against Tanafo. Huai understood that, as the 
PNGDF came closer to the rebel village, the rebels' determination would 
increase. Huai' s wariness was borne out. In an attempt to restore some 
credibility, rebel elements mounted several attacks, including against Luganville, 
between 21 and 26 August. On 21 August, rebels attacked pro-government 
villages near Hog Harbour, north of Luganville, beyond the reach of the PNGDF. 
On 23 August, an attempt to blow up the Luganville power station did little 
damage but the attack showed that the rebels could not yet be written off. 
A further attack was mounted on 26 August. A copra-processing mill was 
blown up not far from Luganville. The mill was hardly a strategic loss but the 
rebel attacks proved embarrassing for the Lini government. That may have 
played to the rebels' advantage but for rifts developing between rebel factions as a 
result of the incident. Conflict arose between the rebel group, led by Sylvain 
Bernanos, responsible for blowing up the mill, and Stevens. Beasant (1984: 131) 
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noted that Stevens' group, Nagriamel, had shares in the mill. As a result of the 
conflict, Stevens took' a stand against violence' (ibid.:), opting for a settlement. 
On 25 August, Stevens asked for a meeting with government 
representatives. The meeting went ahead on 28 August under the watchful eyes 
of the PNGDF aboard a plane circling above (ibid.: 132). At the negotiations, 
Stevens asked for a conditional surrender and for a further meeting on 30 August, 
after he had put the terms of the surrender to rebels under his command. 
When word of the proposed 28 August meeting reached Major Nuia, then 
Operations Officer, he implored Colonel Huai to consider capturing Stevens. 
Nuia reasoned that Steven's capture would see the rebellion collapse, reducing the 
risk of bloodshed on both sides. Concerned at the risks for a peaceful surrender 
posed by any attempt to capture Stevens, Colonel Huai ruled out Nuia' s plan. 
Thwarted in his attempt to capture Stevens, Nuia turned to other tactics. 
On 30 August, he ordered an operation to capture rebels at an observation post on 
the route to Tanafo; Nuia hoped to reduce the rebels' ability to warn the main 
rebel encampment of the impending attack. The patrol, on reaching the site, 
found the observation post deserted. The patrol commander sought permission to 
return to base. However, Nuia ordered him to ambush the Tanafo-Luganville 
road. Nuia reasoned that any rebels returning to the camp would be taken by 
surprise. Not long after establishing the ambush position, a vehicle containing 
rebels approached the ambush site. In spite of PNGDF calls to surrender, the 
rebels attempted to crash through. Soldiers fired on the vehicle, killing one 
occupant and wounding another. The dead rebel was identified as Eddie Stevens, 
son of Jimmy Stevens (discussion Colonel Nuia of 15 April 1997). 
The first death at PNGDF hands of a rebel, the son of the rebel leader, 
raised the stakes in the conflict. A backlash was expected and soldiers were alert 
for any sign of trouble. The soldiers' caution prompted them to fire on rebel 
elements sent by Stevens to recover the body of his son. One rebel was wounded. 
Still, the rebels persisted and were eventually allowed to take the body back to 
Tanafo - a concession seen as one way to defuse the situation, at least for a time. 
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Even so, plans for the capture of Tanafo - Colonel Huai's third objective -
were well advanced. 
Since their arrival on Luganville on 22 August, two rifle platoons43 had 
been conducting patrols to the north of the town, gathering information on Tanaf o 
and other rebel areas. That information was used to finalise plans for an attack on 
Tanafo. The assault was set down for 31 August - by coincidence, the day after 
Eddie Stevens was killed. In order to further isolate Tanafo, PNGDF elements 
were deployed to Wide Bay where rebel groups had been sighted only days 
before. Major Mathew Efi, Commander of the HMPNGS Madang, put soldiers 
ashore on the morning of 31 August. 
The first two soldiers immediately came under fire. One - Private 
Kokolo44 (West New Britain) - was wounded in the foot. Major Efi withdrew 
the soldiers and ordered his boat crew to fire on the area with a 40mm B of ors 
cannon.
45 The patrol boat fire was seen by Wing Commander Woods, a loan 
officer piloting a PNGDF Nomad aircraft. Woods may have been concerned 
about the ramifications if the fire, seemingly indiscriminate, caused civilian 
casualties. In any event, Woods attempted to stop the fire by flying between the 
patrol boat and rebels (ibid.:). Whatever his motivation, Woods was ordered 
away from the area. The patrol boat withdrew shortly afterwards in order to 
obtain medical attention for the wounded soldier. 
By 30 August, the PNGDF had cordoned Tanafo and the next morning 
troops entered Stevens' stronghold. They encountered no opposition and Stevens, 
along with many of his supporters, surrendered without a shot being fired by 
either side. Seventy-one ringleaders were arrested and transported to Luganville 
gaol. Shears (1980: 208) described Stevens' surrender as a 'pathetic end to the 
old rebel's defiant stance against Britain, France and the central government'. 
43 Beasant (1984: 135) claimed that these elements were specialist soldiers of the PNGDF, 
erroneously (discussion Lieutenant Colonel G. Key, MBE of 17 April 1996). 
44 Private Kokolo was the only PNGDF casualty during Operation Wantok Durua. 
45 The 40 Illln Bofors cannon was standard armament on the PNGDF Attack class patrol boats. 
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Figure 3.3 
Capture - Jimmy Stevens 
(Defence Report 1980: 23) 
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The capture of Stevens and many of the rebel leaders did not signal the 
immediate collapse of the rebellion. Indeed, PNGDF commanders understood the 
importance of keeping up the pressure. The rebels could not be allowed to 
regroup, especially under a more militant leadership. Mopping up operations 
continued on Santo for weeks afterwards. 
Human Rights 
The handling of prisoners on operations demands high standards. Soldiers 
are trained in prisoner escort duties with an emphasis on vigilance, segregation of 
prisoners and search techniques. All procedures are designed to minimise escape 
and the potential for injury to the guards and others. Soldiers are also drilled in 
the Geneva Conventions governing the protection and rights of prisoners. 
During one of the mopping up operations, a village on Santo was raided 
by the PNGDF bent on capturing a French sympathiser. The soldiers found only 
his wife, a Vietnamese, and children. On hearing of his family' s capture, the 
Frenchman emerged from the bush. Versions of the events that followed vary. 
Colonel Nuia claimed in discussion on 18 April 1997 that the Frenchman had 
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dynamite around his body and held a lighter in his right hand, threatening to blow 
himself up along with others caught in the blast. In any event, Sergeant Y api 
(PNGDF Public Relations) captured the man's arrest on film (Figure 3.4). The 
photograph shows an armed (then) Major Nuia striking the restrained prisoner. 
Whether the Frenchman was wired with explosives is not clear from the 
photograph. Nuia was concerned that the incident not be made public and ordered 
Captain Ivan Iamo (Staff Officer Grade 3, Public Relations) not to release the 
photo. However, Captain Iamo released the photo to the press a week later. 
Figure 3.4 
Suspected Rebel - Arrest and Search 
(The Times 21 Oct 1984: 21) 
Nuia was no stranger to controversy. During August, John Beasant, press 
spokesman to Walter Lini, concluded an agreement with Phillipe Delacroix, a 
rebel leader and a dedicated secessionist. Under the agreement, Beasant assured 
Delacroix safe passage through the French sector and eventual release in Port 
Vila. In fact, the PNGDF detained Delacroix for questioning on Nuia' s 
instructions. Nuia stopped Beasant' s vehicle on the pretext of a phonecall for 
Beasant; once Beasant had left the car, Nuia arrested Delacroix and handed him to 
the police. Beasant (1984: 138), who recorded the incident, critically, did not 
elaborate on the actual events other than to note that Delacroix was mistreated 
during questioning. Beasant was furious but could do little, given the 
government's reliance on the Kumul Force. 
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The incident highlights the poor control exercised by the Vanuatu 
government over the security forces, despite the PNG/Vanuatu agreement which 
placed the Kumul Force under the control of the National Security Council. The 
incident also shows that in internal security situations, where the government 
faces grave problems, there is a reluctance to call the security forces to account -
a dilemma faced by the PNG government during the Bougainville unrest from 
1988. The human rights situation during the Vanuatu rebellion may have been 
worse had the PNGDF suffered higher casualties. 
The PNGDF was not the only one accused of human rights abuse. 
Accusations were levelled against the VMF even before the PNGDF deployment. 
Indeed, Shears (1980: 193) observed first hand that prisoners were 'roughly ... 
prodded with rifle muzzles ... and made to stand'. Still, while some incidents did 
occur, there appears to have been little evidence of widespread abuse by the 
security forces. Of those incidents reported, few prisoners were put at real risk. 
Logistics 
A sustained logistic effort was fundamental to the success of Operation 
Wantok Durua. That support was provided to the Kumul contingent by the Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAP). The relatively short duration of the deployment -
soldiers were operating in Vanuatu for only six weeks - reduced potential 
logistic problems for the Force. East (1981: 74) observed correctly that a 'longer 
campaign would have exposed the weaknesses in the capability of the Force to 
maintain operations in the field'. Indeed, the capacity of the PNGDF for 
sustained operations was not really tested. Colonel Huai was conscious of the 
lessons learned during Exercise Kumul 1 prior to the deployment, which exposed 
PNGDF logistic weaknesses. He also recognised that: 
• the PNGDF benefited from operations concentrated in the northern islands; 
• the contingent suffered only one casualty on operations, thereby freeing 
aircraft for other support roles; 
• rebels at no time presented a serious threat to the units in the field, reducing 
the need to reinforce positions on Santo or elsewhere; 
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• the islands had supplies of fresh water so that troops did not rely on au 
transport for water resupply (requiring a sustained effort on operations); 
• operations were of limited duration for relatively small elements of the 
contingent, reducing the need for the air supply of rations; and 
• ammunition usage among soldiers was limited by the sporadic rebel activity 
and by the enforcement of the rules of engagement. 
The quality of logistic support played an important role in the success of 
the operation. While the importance of logistic support was recognised at the 
time, the PNGDF made few plans to enhance that capability in the years that 
followed the Vanuatu deployment. Rather, PNGDF involvement in law and order 
operations between 1984 and 1988 distracted the attention of staff at all levels 
from logistic issues. As a result, logistics slipped on the list of priorities. The 
lack of focus on logistics was not confined to contingency scenarios but also 
applied to the basic support for soldiers within their barracks. Eventually, that 
neglect would play a key part in fuelling discontent among the rank and file , 
culminating in the pay riots of February 1989. The Vanuatu campaign could have 
been a valuable experience for future PNGDF roles but the lessons were ignored. 
An Early Blueprint 
Although Operation Wantok Durua was conducted abroad, the PNGDF 
faced, in Vanuatu, a situation with similarities to the problem that emerged on 
Bougainville in 1988. Santo was economically the most important island in the 
New Hebrides. That provided incentive for Lini's government to retain Santo in 
the Republic at independence. Santo's economic attributes also gave the rebels 
confidence in their ability to become a viable independent state. 
The Vemarana rebellion was in part a colonial legacy. Traditional groups 
were arbitrarily split by the administrative powers. The desire on the part of these 
groups to realign according to traditional arrangements helped fuel secessionist 
sentiment. As land ownership became an issue, the rebellion gained widespread 
support among island communities. These factors also occurred on Bougainville, 
where traditional borders and land ownership were critical issues. Combined with 
concern about the impact of the mine, they provided strong motivation for rebel 
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elements, which was exacerbated by military intervention. In Vanuatu, however, 
secessionist sentiment was not accompanied by a strong commitment to a long-
term military struggle, as it was on Bougainville. Consequently, the PNGDF was 
able to quickly end the Vemarana rebellion. 
Vanuatu therefore became an early blueprint for later operations on 
Bougainville. Indeed, many of the officers involved in operations in Vanuatu, 
such as then Major Geoff Key and Lieutenant Colonel Nuia, would be key 
commanders on Bougainville. However, the lessons learned on operations would 
be forgotten. The importance of good logistics in maintaining morale and gaining 
the advantage over an elusive enemy was overlooked. Commanders needed to 
recognise enemy capabilities in planning operations. For the time being, in 1980 
the PNGDF was able to revel in its success with parades in Port Moresby (Figure 
3.5). The Kumul Force was also recognised with the issue of medals. 
Figure 3.5 
Parade - Kumul Force 
(Defence Report 1980: 1) 
Members of the -Kumul contingent deployed to Vanuatu for operations 
were awarded the Vanuatu Service Medal. However, poor administration and 
financial constraints resulted in the presentations being delayed until 1988, when 
Vanuatu's Foreign Minister visited Port Moresby. Australian loan personnel who 
accompanied the contingent were also awarded the medal. In addition to the 
Service Medal, members of the contingent who participated in the independence 
celebrations on 30 July were awarded the Vanuatu Independence Medal. 
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The Aftermath 
The PNGDF could well be proud of its achievements in Vanuatu. The 
contingent had brought the rebellion to a speedy end with minimal loss of life. 
Those achievements would, at least in the short term, dampen criticism of the 
force. The PNGDF advertised its success in a triumphant parade through Port 
Moresby. Morale was high and the soldiers enjoyed a recruiting windfall , with 
Papua New Guineans clamouring to join. 
Brigadier-General Diro benefited as well. Diro pursued the opportunity 
for the overseas deployment personally, and had taken risks in pressing for the 
PNGDF intervention. In 1993, he claimed in an interview that he was prepared to 
'resign and go to Vanuatu to lead a mercenary force against the rebels ' (Gubb 
1994: 21). Diro's commitment to mounting a successful operation has never been 
doubted though his motivations are not altogether clear. Certainly, success 
established the force as a key institution in PNG. Turner (1990: 119) noted that 
the Vanuatu deployment 'brought kudos to the PNGDF and its leader, Brigadier-
General Ted Diro'. The contingent had been committed in spite of Australia 
dragging its feet. Diro would henceforth be more confident in dealing with the 
bilateral relationship. In the longer term, Diro had made his mark, as a prelude to 
entering politics . 
However, after Vanuatu, soldiers had to return to peacetime soldiering -
training, border patrols and civic action. Skills and motivation would be eroded 
well before troops were committed to law and order operations four years later, in 
1984. While the soldiers looked overseas for new commitments, the border with 
Indonesia and, later, internal problems would become the force ' s principal focus. 
Conclusion 
The rapidity with which PNGDF troops quelled the rebellion in Vanuatu 
belied the issues at stake in 1980. Several countries played roles which carried 
risks: Vanuatu in calling on foreign intervention, PNG in sending troops, and 
Australia in supporting them. Britain and France, as the colonial powers, bore 
responsibility for the post-independence well-being of Vanuatu. Yet their 
respective governments had to protect bilateral relations in the process of securing 
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agreement on the way ahead for Vanuatu. For these reasons the rebellion was 
certain to attract international attention. 
The critics too had opportunities . PNG' s military inexperience ensured a 
constant questioning of the deployment and pressure on Australia to underwrite 
the operation. Prime Minister Chan's motives were questioned, especially with 
the lives of Papua New Guineans at stake. Somare had insisted on a multinational 
force (Post-Courier 8 July 1980). The Lini Government in Vanuatu, in seeking 
foreign intervention, provided scope for those making mischief. France, in 
seeking to protect its citizens, especially in the rebel areas, weathered criticism. 
Britain was blamed for withholding support for its former colony which some saw 
as a part of its responsibilities as the former colonial power. In the event, the 
critics drew international attention to a region largely ignored by other than 
regional players. Vanuatu survived the unrest, perhaps justifying the risks. 
Operation Wantok Durua also marked a watershed in PNGDF/ADF 
relations. The ADF had played a supporting role while the PNGDF took the risks. 
The PNGDF could justifiably claim the kudos for the operation' s success, 
notwithstanding ADF support. The decline in the ADF presence coincided with a 
feeling of new-found confidence in the PNGDF. The soldiers ' operational 
experience was more recent than that of the ADF. In any event, Australia had 
signalled its reluctance to become involved in internal security. However, the 
PNGDF was not able to sustain the professionalism which would have prepared 
the Force for internal operations in 1984. By then, Vanuatu and the Kumul Force 
exploits had become little more than a memory, within PNG and internationally. 
******************** 
1960 
1970 1 Jul 
Aug 
1974 
1979 
1980 Mar 
April 
28 May 
May 
1 Jun 
11 Jun 
Jun 
Jun 
20 Jun 
28 Jun 
Jun 
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Chronology 
Vanuatu 
Appendix 2 to 
Chapter 3 
N agriamel movement established by Jimmy Stevens 1n 
Vanuatu 
Nagriamel petitions UN to prevent the sale of land 
New Hebrides National Party (NHNP) established 
Mouvement pour l' Autonomie des Nouvelles-Hebrides 
(MANH) established 
Father Walter Lini, VP leader, appointed Prime Minister of 
Vanuatu 
PNG apprised of possible request for military assistance 
Talks to resolve differences among dissident groups fail 
Rebels occupy Luganville 
Rebels take control of Tanna Island 
Jimmy Stevens declares provisional government 
/ Independent State of Vemarana 
Violence on Tanna Island-rebels free supporters from gaol 
France deploys Paramilitary Garde Mobile to Vila 
Britain deploys 120 soldiers (42 Royal Marine Commando) 
France withdraws Garde Mobile 
100 French paratroops deploy after Britain deploys Marines 
Anti-government demonstrations - Malekula 
Lini seeks emergency powers to restore order - France 
opposes 
7 Jul Somare urges PNG to assist 'under international 
14 Jul 
17 Jul 
superv1s1on' 
Chan/ Diro meet Lini - in principle agreement to provide 
troops 
Visit by Brig-Gen Diro-leaves with formal request 
22 Jul 
25 Jul 
30 Jul 
5 Aug 
7 Aug 
9 Aug 
12 Aug 
17 Aug 
18 Aug 
19 Aug 
26 Aug 
30 Aug 
31 Aug 
6 Sep 
13 Sep 
23 Sep 
25 Sep 
27 Sep 
4 Oct 
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Papua New Guinea prepared to respond to any request for 
assistance 
Governor-General recalls Parliament for emergency session 
Republic of Vanuatu declared-37th Commonwealth 
member 
Papua New Guinea ' s Parliament sees enabling legislation 
blocked by Opposition 
Papua New Guinea ' s Parliament approves legislation 
Lini signs Treaty of Friendship in Port Moresby 
Australia announces limited participation in support of 
PNGDF 
Vanuatu Parliament ratifies Lini ' s agreement of 9 August 
Kumul Force deploys to Vanuatu 
Kumul Force relieves British and French forces 
PNGDF deploys to Tanafo 
Soldiers fire on vehicle - Eddie Stevens killed 
PNGDF captures Tanafo - Stevens called on to surrender 
PNGDF land at Wide Bay - 1 PNGDF wounded 
PNGDF enter Port Orly - last rebel village 
PNGDF clear Big Bay, North-East and South Santo 
PNGDF enter South West Bay and Lamap -102 arrested 
Chan visits Vanuatu 
Kumul Force withdrawn 
Victory parade by Kumul Force - Port Moresby 
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Chapter 4 
Patrolling 
Border Operations and Civic Action 
Introduction 
The border area between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia (See map) has 
been a central and longstanding feature of PNGDF history. Since 1962, the 
border has been the predominant influence on defence policy in Papua New 
Guinea. The expansion of the Pacific Islands Regiment following its reformation 
in 1950 was motivated by concern over Indonesian expansionism, principally in 
West Papua (Irian Jaya). That concern would provide for the PIR a principal duty 
in maintaining security along the common border with Indonesia. 
Patrolling became the focus of PIR training in order to support its 
commitment to border security. In the process, Australian officers and NCOs 
gained valuable experience used, in many cases, later in Vietnam. Patrolling 
skills would also be used for assistance to the civil community elsewhere in PNG, 
especially after 1967 when the PIR commenced civic action patrols. Even after 
independence in 1975, patrolling played a prominent role in PIR duties. Only 
when the PNGDF became embroiled in the Bougainville conflict did the 
importance of patrolling in the PIR calendar make way for higher priorities. 
Australia has played a central role in border issues, even after PNG 
independence in 1975. Australian interest is motivated by colonial links with 
Papua New Guinea and by the shared border with Indonesia and Papua New 
Guinea. Border treaties inextricably link all three countries. The Australian 
perspective is therefore important to any examination of the border. 
Background 
Australia became responsible for the security of (now) Papua New Guinea 
under Articles IV and VII of the Trusteeship Agreement signed on 13 December 
1946. By the early 1950s, Australia was reforming the PIR to improve security in 
Papua New Guinea. Vanimo, near the northern border with Indonesia (See map), 
was selected as a PIR outstation in 1952. By 1953, the base had been established 
and A Company, 1 PIR, deployed to the base for six months. 
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Australian concern over communist activity in South East Asia, including 
in Indonesia, and obligations for the security of Papua New Guinea, prompted the 
Australian government's decision to reform the PIR in 1950 (See Chapter 2). 
Dutch control of West New Guinea enabled border issues to be resolved through 
agreements and cooperation. The relatively stable situation in West New Guinea 
under Dutch rule also reduced the refugee problem. Australia's focus in the post-
war years was on the need to define the border and to establish consultative 
mechanisms. However, Indonesia was 'already demanding the inclusion of Dutch 
New Guinea (later Irian J aya)' (Sinclair 1992: 48). In 1962, the prospect of 
Indonesian control of West New Guinea heightened concern in Australia. 
Australia embarked on a '$1.5 billion defence expansion programme 
which included the raising of a second battalion' (May 1986: 30). In the same 
year, soldiers from 1 PIR began patrolling the border, especially the northern 
sector. The Australian Cabinet also gave approval for aerial mapping of the 
border as part of a defence response to the potential Indonesian threat. Australia 
recognised that the 'essential problem [ was] that of an ill-defined border [ with] 
very little control' (ibid.: 36). Mapping was therefore important, especially to the 
defence effort in the border area. Definition of the border reduced the risk of 
military clashes and assisted generally in policing the area. Many of the first 
patrols had, as a matter of priority, sought out topographical information for the 
production of early maps. The accumulation of this information ensured that 
future patrols were better prepared for the arduous demands imposed by patrolling 
the border region. 
Indonesia assumed control of West New Guinea in 1963 after a period 
under the interim administration of the United Nations Temporary Executive 
Authority (UNTEA)46 since August 1962 (ibid.: 20). Indonesia changed the name 
of West New Guinea to Irian J aya. The Indonesian presence added to anxiety in 
Australia over Indonesian expansionism, which had already led to confrontation 
with Malaysia. Australia's defence expansion programme provided some comfort 
and underlined Australia's commitment to Papua New Guinea's security. 
46 For more detail on UNTEA see May (1986: 28, 53). 
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However, the expansion was slow and the Indonesian army was, by late 1963, 
flexing its muscle in the northern border area. Indonesian patrols were reported 
sometimes being found many miles inside Papua New Guinea. On occasions, 
Indonesian troops removed border markers, adding to tensions, which did not 
augur well for Australian/Indonesian relations at the time. 
While the army was 'tight-lipped when questioned about its border 
activity' (Sinclair 1992: 127), patrolling was stepped up along the border in the 
wake of the incidents. Unit exercises were also being conducted in the border 
area by the end of 1964. In December, 1 PIR deployed as battalion to the 
southern border for Operation Badwash. The exercise was the first conducted by 
1 PIR in the international border area. Soldiers deployed around Morehead. 
Exercises of this scale were a show of force to the Indonesian military leadership. 
In the case of Operation Badwash, troops showed that despite the distance of their 
home base from the border, the battalion could deploy quickly if the need arose. 
Still, the activities of West Papuan rebels had the most potential to cause friction. 
Rebel groups had existed during Dutch rule though they posed only a 
limited threat. Anti-government activities gained real momentum under 
Indonesian rule. Initially, the Indonesians did not consider the rebels a serious 
threat. Early attacks were dismissed as 'stomach politics - the result of 
occasional hunger ' (Ryan 1970: 209). However, eventually, in the face of 
persistent attacks and casualties among its forces, Indonesian patience ran out. 
Villages suspected of harbouring or supporting the rebels were attacked in 
reprisals. That increased support for the rebels , including in the recruitment of 
rebel fighters. The rebels became adept at striking Indonesian targets and 
escaping retaliation. Many slipped across the border into PNG, exploiting the 
sanctuary afforded there. Such cross-border activity invariably drew the countries 
closer to potential conflict. 
During the 1960s, Australia and Indonesia considered options to manage 
the problem. The installation of markers (Figure 4.1) along the border in 1966/67 
promised to reduce friction. However, the deteriorating security situation in Irian 
Jaya, especially in 1965, ensured that Australia remained vigilant, deploying 
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patrols regularly in the northern and southern sectors. By 1968, patrolling was 
large-scale (May 1986: 42), reflecting concern over Indonesian objectives. 
• 
Figure 4.1 
Border Marker - Wutung 
(Ryan 1970) 
Australia's approach to border issues and its relations with Indonesia 
invariably influenced Papua New Guinean attitudes. Yet not all shared 
Australia's attitude towards Indonesia. Some early local politicians stood out 
against Australia, preferring instead to develop their own views towards 
Indonesians. One such politician, Gaudi Mirau, noted during an address in the 
House of Assembly in June 1966, that Papua New Guineas would 'decide 
whether to be friends or enemies of Indonesia' (Mench 1975: 35). Later, both 
Brigadier General Diro and Brigadier General Huai established close links with 
the Indonesian military leadership (See Chapter 5). 
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In PNG's post-independence period, the border continued to be the scene 
of clashes between Indonesian forces and the rebels, loosely formed into a 
coalition of groups known as the OPM ( Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua 
Movement); this posed problems for the PNGDF. The unrest grew in ferocity and 
magnitude. Several serious clashes in 1985 and 1988 drew Papua New Guinea 
and Indonesia closer to a military confrontation. However, in spite of these 
problems, the two countries resolved their differences. In all of this, the PNGDF 
played a key role. 
Indonesian/Papua New Guinea Border 
'The Indonesia - Papua New Guinea border is a classically arbitrary product of 
colonial history' (Prescott 1978: 21). 
The border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia is defined on maps 
as the north-south meridian of 141 degrees47 with the exception of the area along 
the Fly River bulge (See map) where the border follows the river's course. While 
the river seems to provide a more clearly defined section of the border, the course 
is continually changing. As a colonial boundary, the international border is 
burdened by the problems of many borders left as colonial legacies. The map 
makers found the use of the 141 meridian and the Fly River bulge convenient in 
defining the border. However, the border crossed tribal boundaries. Villagers 
routinely cross the border following traditional hunting and agricultural practices. 
To these people, the border held little significance. 
The establishment of markers along the border in 1966/67 (Figure 4.2) 
helped define the border. However, for the villagers along the border and the 
troops sent to police that area, the markers were few and far between. The 
production of maps assisted the security forces in time though the villages and 
trails along the border changed as a result of the nomadic lifestyle of the people. 
The need, therefore, for troops to be trained to a high standard in navigation for 
operations was essential. 
47 The border south of the Fly River Bulge is 141 10 10, reflecting British and Dutch agreement to 
shift the border in that area to offset the territory which the British gained from the Fly River 
Bulge (For more detail see Van der Veur 1966). 
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Figure 4.2 
Border Markers 
(May 1986: 8) 
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Even as mapping improved navigation 1n the border area, soldiers still 
faced problems. Navigation was important if troops were to avoid crossing the 
border accidentally and consequently clashing with Indonesian forces. Accurate 
positioning was also needed for medical evacuations and resupply. Special 
emphasis was thus placed on navigation skills and check navigators were used 
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during patrols.48 Navigation in close country was especially difficult. Points of 
reference such as key mountains were often hidden from view by vegetation or 
clouds. Often the clouds were so pervasive that aerial mapping resulted in tracts 
of land shown as blank on the maps, denoted as 'not shown due to cloud cover'. 
The terrain presented problems. Patrols could not follow compass 
bearings without regularly being forced to compensate for obstacles , including 
rivers, ravines, cliffs and flooded areas. The latter were particularly prevalent in 
the southern sector. Bypassing these areas added to patrol times. During the 
1980s, PNGDF patrol commanders chose to avoid these areas , using instead local 
villagers as guides, though as a result, the military lost valuable opportunities for 
intelligence gathering. The risk was that the villagers would ensure that the 
patrols avoided areas in which the rebels had established camps. 
The taxing physical environment added to navigation difficulties. The 
PNGDF (and the Australian defence personnel before independence) had to 
contend with considerable hardship over extended periods. The extent of that 
hardship is illustrated in the following account by an early PIR patrol: 
This was a new route ... [ which] followed a very poor track, 
descending to the Igarini River, which was reached after 20 
minutes. Then a steep climb up a ridge to an altitude of 2,450 feet, 
after a further twenty minutes, followed by a steep descent for 30 
minutes to the Lhisa River. Up another steep ridge for fifty-five 
minutes. Descended to 2,200 feet, then a long climb to a ridge-top 
village at 3,225 feet, after a further one hour ' s walking. Steep 
descent to 2,500 feet to Bolo River, then a long, hard climb to a 
ridge top at an altitude of 4,050 feet, reached after two hours five 
minutes. The going was very tiring as the track had to be cut all the 
way (quoted in Sinclair 1992: 79). 
48 The three section commanders in each platoon would usually navigate on patrol in addition to 
the platoon commander. 
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OPM 
The OPM grew from discontent among various groups of West Papuan 
people with Indonesia' s occupation of Irian J aya. The movement grew from three 
main rebel factions: the Komite Kemerdekaan Papua Barat (Committee for 
Freedom of West Papua) and its Front Nasional Papua ; a group of political 
activists led by Nicolas Jouwe and Marcus Kaisiepo; and the Arfak tribesmen of 
Manokwari (Ryan 1970: 240-241) (See also Osbourne 1986: 49-64). The 
disparate groups waged largely independent resistance action against the 
Indonesians. Friction among the groups culminated in 1963 in a 'split in the 
independence movement, along both tactical and geographical lines [ which] was 
to hamper the Papuan cause for the next twenty years ' (May 1986: 51). In spite 
of their fragmented nature, the rebels remained a thorn in the side of the 
Indonesians. One group, led by Seth Rumkorem49 (a former Indonesian army 
officer), declared West Papuan independence on 1 July 1971. With that, the 
rebels adopted the Morning Star flag (Figure 4.3), used by the OPM for several 
years before then, as the symbol of their struggle. 
Figure 4.3 
Morning Star Flag 
(Ryan 1970) 
49 Rumkorem was arrested in PNG territorial waters near Rabaul in September 1982 as he was 
fleeing to Vanuatu. He was later settled in Greece (Dorney 1990: 256). 
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The strength of the rebel groups has been estimated variously at between 
500 and 3000. The sporadic nature of attacks, involving groups usually 
numbering less than forty rebels, and the limited number of modem firearms used 
against Indonesian troops, suggests that only a small number are active. Several 
groups are involved given the geographic spread of these incidents. In spite of the 
attacks, the rebels have 'never posed a serious threat to Indonesia's hold on Irian 
Jaya but ... a constant irritation, especially along the border with PNG' (Ball and 
Downes 1990: 393). 
Indonesia wanted some way to get at the OPM without offending PNG. 
The Indonesian solution was joint operations, which would see a co-operative 
effort by both countries and provide Indonesia . with approval to cross into PNG 
te1ritory without the risk of a clash. PNG has consistently refused the first 
proposal, conscious of widespread support for the OPM within PNG and distrust 
of Indonesia. PNG has also opposed hot pursuit, which would allow Indonesian 
forces to follow up rebel elements withdrawing to the sanctuary of PNG. For its 
part, the PNGDF was not supportive of joint border operations. They shared the 
views of wider PNG society on the OPM. The PNGDF also knew that joint 
operations would expose their weaknesses and make their soldiers dependent on 
Indonesia. 
PNG could not wash its hands of the border and looked for other options. 
In 1986, Foreign Minister Yagi visited Indonesia to lay the groundwork for a 
treaty (Post-Courier 3 February 1986: 1). The proposed treaty included an 
emphasis on consultation and regular liaison. The proposal attracted 
parliamentary criticism. The Opposition claimed that the Treaty was a 'duplicate 
of the existing border agreement but with new and sinister additions' (Dorney 
1990: 279). Indeed, treaties had been agreed in 1974 and again in 1979 which set 
down procedures for cooperative effort on the border. The new treaty thus built 
on the earlier agreements rather than representing a bold initiative of the Wingti-
led government. 
The Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation was signed in 
1987. The two countries agreed to exchange defence attaches to facilitate liaison. 
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Even so, PNG was left with a refugee problem. Many refugees crossed from Irian 
Jaya in 1984 to escape Indonesian reprisals. PNG was hard pressed to handle the 
problem. Australia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) made contributions to addressing the plight of the refugees. 
Arrangements have been made on occasion to return refugees to Irian J aya in 
return for promises of safe passage. Some refugees returned of their own free 
will, especially as conditions deteriorated in the camps. However, refugees 
remain a problem for PNG. The refugee camps also provide support to the rebels. 
PNG' s unwillingness to mount military action against the rebels and its 
resistance to joint border patrols have been seen by the Indonesians as tacit 
approval for the rebels' cause. Indonesian perceptions have been borne out by the 
political rhetoric of successive PNG politicians. Indeed, many PNG politicians 
'backed by public opinion, have ... felt no obligation to help Indonesia repress 
Melanesians' (Ball and Downes 1990: 393). In 1986, Momis, speaking as leader 
of the Melanesian Alliance, one of PNG' s major political parties, 'vowed to press 
for self determination for West Papua' (Post-Courier 21 May 1986: 1). Momis 
also emphasised that the PNGDF would not be used against OPM rebels. Without 
PNG' s support, the Indonesians believed that the OPM would 'wither on the vine' 
(Ball and Downes 1990: 394). Certainly, the sanctuary afforded rebels by PNG's 
proximity to the border was invaluable. 
Notwithstanding the advantages enjoyed by the rebels, including the use 
of PNG territory, the OPM has conducted its struggle largely unaided by PNG. 
Weapons were stolen from Indonesian soldiers though ammunition was in short 
supply. Some individual weapons were stolen or acquired from within PNG. In 
1990, several high-powered rifles and shotguns were stolen from Bensbach Lodge 
in Western Province. Some within the OPM advocated the acquisition of arms 
from international dealers. In 1976, two OPM leaders, Rumkorem and Prai, were 
in conflict when Rumkorem pressed for the use of overseas arms supplies 
(Dorney 1990: 255). The possibility of some arms supplies reaching the rebels 
through smuggling cannot be ruled out. However, the absence of large numbers 
of well-armed rebels suggests that few weapons were acquired by this means. 
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The OPM enjoyed political support in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. 
OPM representatives overseas, especially in Europe where members of the rebel 
government were in exile, assisted. The media coverage of rebel attacks and 
hostage incidents helped with publicity for their cause. PNG' s newspapers often 
carried stories of rebel attacks and detailed Indonesian responses. The problem of 
refugees attracted particular attention. Yet the PNG government was sensitive to 
contact with the OPM. Lieutenant Colonel Poang was dismissed for his 
involvement with the OPM in Madang in the late 1970s. ABC reporter Sean 
Dorney had his work permit revoked following the ABC ' s screening of an 
interview with an OPM leader (ibid.: 2). That action was at odds with statements 
by PNG' s political leaders expressing sympathy for the rebel cause. Against that 
background, the PNGDF found itself responsible for border security. 
PIR Outstations 
The first PIR outstation, established at Vanimo in August 1952, provided a 
base for PIR operations along the northern sector of the border in New Guinea. 
Later, with the establishment of a home base for 2 PIR at Moem Barracks in 
Wewak, Vanimo served as a base for the unit ' s border patrols . Such bases 
reduced the time needed for border deployments. The outstation also provided 
access to medical and resupply facilities and a place of comfort for patrol 
members to recover from extended operations. Vanimo reinforced the military 
presence in the area. In this , 2 PIR enjoyed a clear advantage over 1 PIR, which 
operated from Port Mores by. 
Until 1986, 1 PIR patrols to the southern border lacked the support of a 
base in close proximity to the border. Travelling time added to the operational 
time on the border as patrols deployed by landing craft or by air. In the absence 
of modem medical , communications and transport facilities , 1 PIR border patrols 
were especially demanding. The lack of an outstation in the southern border area 
is difficult to understand, especially given the considerable defence expenditure in 
PNG during the 1960s and 1970s, and the success of Vanimo. Eventually, 
following a decision by the National Executive Committee (NEC) (No. 149/83) in 
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1983, the establishment of a base at Kiunga, was approved. However, the 
outstation was not established until 1986. 
The Department of Defence acquired from Ok Tedi Mining Limited in 
1986 several buildings on the outskirts of Kiunga township as a permanent base 
for 1 RPIR (Royal Pacific Islands Regiment)50 near the border. The acquisition of 
existing infrastructure brought forward the deployment of a permanent presence 
in the southern border region. However, the administrative preparation for the 
deployment did not proceed smoothly.51 Much of the fundamental preparatory 
work did not begin until the deployment was imminent. Standing operational 
procedures, designed as guidelines for military units , were not drafted until June, 
in spite of the use of such procedures at Vanimo for many years. These were 
eventually prepared in time for the first deployment, though other issues such as 
fire orders, hygiene inspections and rationing and quartering arrangements, 
remained outstanding until after the deployment. 
The Kiunga outstation promised improved conditions and support for 1 
RPIR patrols. The permanent presence also provided for the rapid deployment of 
patrols both to the border and to areas of unrest. The latter was especially 
important in the event of threatened unrest at the Ok Tedi minesite, which the 
government was keen to protect because of its key role in the economy. One such 
army deployment was ordered in 1988 (Operation Iron Foot) (See Chapter 6). 
The Kiunga base reduced costs associated with using troops deployed from Port 
Moresby to patrol the border. Even so, the base posed problems for the PNGDF. 
The soldiers at the Kiunga outstation had difficulties coping with their 
extended absence from families and friends in Port Moresby. Soldiers from 2 
RPIR had become accustomed to the absences due to the longstanding use of 
Vanimo. The troops in the northern sector also enjoyed closer proximity to their 
home base at Wewak. Soldiers could travel by land to Wewak if necessary. 
Kiunga was three hours flying time from Port Moresby. As PNGDF aircraft 
flying hours were cut under financial constraints during the 1980s, soldiers at the 
50 The PIR was granted the title ' Royal ' in 1984 (See Chapter 5). 
5 1 Author ' s experience as a military adviser in 1 RPIR 1985-88. 
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Kiunga base became isolated. Funds were not even available for emergency air 
travel on the weekly civil service from Kiunga. 
After a Kl million refurbishment programme, the Kiunga outstation 
became operational on 29 July 1986 with the deployment C Company, 1 RPIR. 
The duration of the company deployment to Kiunga (and Vanimo) was set down 
for three months. The Commanding Officer, 1 RPIR rotated each of his four 
companies through Kiunga over a twelve month period. During the three month 
deployment, companies were expected to conduct four to six patrols. The 
frequency of patrols was influenced by the duration of each patrol and by the 
requirement to mount unscheduled patrols at short notice for operational reasons. 
The guidelines of four to six patrols per tour of duty recognised the high cost of 
patrolling; finance constrained border operations. 
Headquarters staff also understood the special demands placed on soldiers 
assigned to border operations. The troops needed time to prepare for patrols and 
to recover from those operations. Nonetheless, an active patrolling programme 
was encouraged in order to avoid boredom and associated discipline and morale 
problems. In spite of these important considerations, Headquarters revised the 
duration of border deployments shortly after C Company arrived at Kiunga. 
In the second half of 1986, the Defence Department became concerned at 
the expenditure blowout, which promised to exceed budget allocations for the 
financial year. 52 Indeed, by December 1986, funds did not exist for the purchase 
of fresh rations for the PNGDF bases. Soldiers were provided with field ration 
packs in order to overcome the problem. In an attempt to contain the 
overspending, the decision was made to extend border deployments from three to 
four months. The extension may have been justifiable as a short-term expediency. 
Considerable savings could be made by reducing the cost of transporting 
companies to the border. However, the decision was opposed by the battalion 
commanders who understood the problems an extended tour would present. 
Invariably, the decision to extend the tour to four months led to morale 
and discipline problems, especially as the rate of patrolling declined. Soldiers 
52 The PNG financial year runs from January to December. 
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could not be sure that they would return to Port Moresby at the end of four 
months. Airlifts were subject to sufficient funds and aircraft serviceability. 
Company commanders, faced with simmering discontent among the soldiers, 
chose to ignore strict discipline to reduce confrontation. Inspections by 
Headquarters staff and Commanding Officers, which would have countered this 
practice, were not carried out. Standards fell away, leading to conflict with local 
villagers and among soldiers in the company. The erosion of standards also 
infected other members of the battalion as disgruntled soldiers returned from the 
border. Morale among replacement troops arriving for border duties was also 
inevitably undermined. 
The decision to extend border duties to four months ultimately led to the 
outstations becoming a centre for troublesome soldiers. That became standard 
practice during Bougainville operations. Soldiers guilty of human rights abuses 
were often sent to a border outstation to restrict knowledge of their abuses, and as 
punishment. In the end, manpower for Bougainville was in such short supply that 
these same soldiers returned to Bougainville. Such was the demand for troops on 
Bougainville that the outstations were stripped of soldiers and even routine 
patrolling was not possible. The spiral into indiscipline was accelerated. 
Soldiers had little incentive to conduct border operations. Patrols were 
physically demanding and usually boring. The payment of a patrolling allowance 
of K4 per day made little difference, even if there had been somewhere to spend 
the money. The allowance remained unchanged, only increasing after the 1989 
pay riots (See Chapter 6). Lack of routine maintenance at Kiunga added to low 
morale. In spite of the evidence, the problems arising from outstation duties 
remain unresolved. 
Military discipline was not the only casualty of the reduction in border 
operations. The decline in the PNGDF presence reduced contact with local 
villagers, officials, and OPM sympathisers. The result was detrimental to 
intelligence gathering on the border and the PNGDF became alienated from local 
communities. By 1990, the number of patrols had declined from twelve in 1982 
to six (Sharrad 1993: Annex IV). Mench (1975: 114) pointed to the need to avoid 
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a loss of intelligence and local cooperation, warning that this could result in an 
undermining of the PNGDF' s capacity to operate effectively in the border area. 
The problems foreshadowed in 1975 by Mench became a reality in 1986. By then 
the army faced few real challenges in the border, using wantok contacts of 
soldiers within the ranks to navigate and obtain information. The patrols became 
less professional, operating within logistics and transport limitations. One such 
patrol was deployed by 1 RPIR in early 1986. 
Operation Rabia Gabuna 
The last patrol deployed to the southern border from Taurama Barracks 
before Kiunga's opening was Operation Rabia Gabuna (March/ April 1986).53 
The patrol deployed by DC3 to Morehead after a three hour flight from Port 
Moresby. The patrol commander, Second Lieutenant Paul Iatau (Chimbu), had 
been energetic in his preparations. Yet, in spite of a preparatory period of several 
weeks, the patrol was poorly equipped for the tasks set down during the three 
week operation. Iatau faced deep-seated problems in accomplishing the tasks set 
for him, which called for the traverse of a route from Morehead to Weam near the 
border and return - roughly a distance of 100 kilometres. 
The patrol strength of twenty-four soldiers was considered adequate for 
operations in the Western Province. There was no evidence of an Indonesian 
military presence which could pose a threat in the area, and the OPM rebel 
strength was limited to a few sympathisers. The patrol could thus have been 
reasonably expected to resolve any potential problems. The patrol was adequately 
armed with infantry small arms, such as the SLR, and M16 rifles , which were 
standard issue to platoon members. Live ammunition was in limited quantities, in 
part due to the limited risk. In most cases the live ammunition was a contingency 
measure for use against crocodiles or to shoot game. Soldiers also preferred to 
limit their stock of ammunition because its weight added considerably to their 
burden and limited space for additional food. 
The duration of the patrol of three weeks meant that one, possibly two, 
resupplies would be necessary. Resupply was usually conducted by an air drop 
53 As the Training Adviser, I participated in the patrol ' s briefings, and deployment. 
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every 7 to 10 days, unless arrangements could be made for supplies to be 
prepositioned. Border patrols using prepositioned arrangements needed 
coordination and sound planning to ensure soldiers arrived at the rendezvous on 
time and before rations ran out. Security of the supplies was also a problem. Air 
supply was inherently difficult. Air support, even for operations, was dictated by 
uncertainty over the PNGDF' s ability to pay for fuel, and the serviceability of its 
aircraft. Pilots could not be relied upon to locate the patrol. 
Air resupply lacked sophistication. Prearranged drop points were often 
used and aircraft could not always land. Airstrips were subject to flooding and, in 
some cases, unusable after a torrential downpour. Planes had become bogged so 
pilots preferred to remain airborne. Parachutes were rarely used. That left only 
the option of allowing the resupply to freefall with damage to the contents. No 
provision was made for damaged rations. Soldiers met any ration shortfall by 
barter, purchase, or stealing from villagers' gardens. Resupply ultimately 
depended on communications. 
The PIR used the ANPRC 25 or ANPRC 77 radio for very high frequency 
(VHF) communications. This radio was used by the ADF during the Vietnam 
conflict. The set was capable of good line-of-sight communications over ten to 
twenty kilometres. However, those distances were reduced by the age of the 
equipment and by the nature of the terrain. The radio battery had to be replaced 
regularly (usually daily). Border operations, especially for 1 RPIR, called for 
regular radio schedules with the Force Operations Room located at Murray 
Barracks in Port Moresby; the ANPRC 25/77 was therefore unsuitable. 
The other radio equipment used by the PNGDF during the 1980-90 period 
was the MBLE high frequency (HF) radio. This equipment provided long range 
capability with radio signals reflected off the ionosphere and back to earth. That 
capability made the MBLE suitable for border operations. The radio proved to be 
versatile and became standard equipment. Many sub-units also had inadequate 
quantities of VHF radios. Therefore, in routine exercises and training, the 
PNGDF preferred to use the HF radio, especially as the ANPRC VHF radios 
aged. The result was an overuse of HF radios, which reduced their life. 
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The principal problem with the HF radios was the poor standard of 
battery. The radios used a rechargeable cadmium battery, which, with age, lost its 
capacity to hold a charge. Patrols could not carry sufficient numbers of spare 
batteries to overcome this problem so a solar recharger was provided. 
Dependence on the recharger posed problems. Most of the patrol's administrative 
work was conducted at the end of the day when poor light prevented further 
movement. Recharging required full sunlight, preferably in the period 1000 to 
1400 hours, for extended periods. Patrolling was therefore interrupted to ensure 
communications schedules, especially in an emergency, could be carried out. 
Communications problems dogged border patrols and other troops deployed away 
from their bases for the greater part of the decade. On Bougainville in 1988-90, 
field commanders made unilateral decisions 1n the absence of good 
communications to their headquarters in Arawa and Loloho. 
The patrol designated for Operation Rabia Gabuna faced communications 
and resupply problems as well. Troops knew of the problems, a factor which, 
understandably, affected morale. The poor state of their boots, uniforms, and 
field equipment placed greater demands on the soldiers. New uniforms would not 
be distributed until late in 1986 (See Chapter 5). The US-style field dress, 
introduced in 1980, was in a poor state of repair. Patrolling reduced these 
uniforms to tatters. Patrol members on their return presented as a motley group. 
The poorly equipped patrol faced yet another major obstacle. Western 
Province in March/ April was subject to monsoonal rains, which flooded low-
lying areas across the Province. (During the dry season, patrols in this area faced 
the problem of finding safe drinking water.) Lieutenant Iatau had given little 
thought to this problem in planning the patrol's route and rate of movement. In 
the plan, the patrol route was ambitious, placing increased strain on group morale. 
Once deployed, the patrol commander resorted to using local tractors and canoes, 
though the petty cash provided for unseen problems such as these proved 
inadequate. Given the conditions and the mood among patrol members, pressure 
grew to shorten the patrol route in order to rendezvous with the aircraft at 
Morehead for return to Port Mores by. 
109 
The patrol gained little from its three week deployment, aside from dated 
information from an OPM faction leader resting in the area. The results reflected 
poor commitment by Headquarters PNGDF, and the troops generally. 1 RPIR 
patrols to the southern sector of Western Province had historically been 
uneventful as Operation Rabia Gabuna bore out. The more risky deployments 
tended to be between Kiunga and Ningerum and around the Fly River bulge. 
Even so, patrols in the northern sector were potentially more serious. 
Operation Rausim Kwik 
In 1985, a combined PNGDF/RPNGC group of 200 personnel deployed 
between April and May to the northern border for operations around Bewani. The 
operations were designed to locate elements of the OPM and to destroy their 
camps in that area. In spite of PNGDF efforts, the security forces ' succeeded only 
in destroying some deserted huts' (May 1986: 62). Nonetheless, the operations 
demonstrated a change in government policy in which the OPM would be targeted 
if rebels chose to mount operations from bases in PNG. The Indonesians 
welcomed the change in policy though they understood the rebel threat would not 
be seriously weakened by PNG' s change in policy. Still , the operations tempered 
Indonesian military activity across the border. However, the high profile PNGDF 
presence could not be sustained. Routine patrolling resumed for the remainder of 
the year. The next major deployment would occur in 1988. 
Operation Apple Pie 
In 1988, an OPM group attacked the Indonesian border outpost at Arso 
(See map), killing several soldiers and injuring others . The OPM also took 
hostages before crossing the border into PNG territory. The attack galvanised the 
Indonesians into a concerted effort against the OPM in Irian J aya' s northern 
border area. Plans were made also for attacks against known OPM camps in 
PNG. When news of the OPM attack reached Port Moresby, the PNGDF planned 
a prompt reaction, conscious that the Indonesians would, as before, cross into 
PNG te1Titory to strike at the OPM. 
Colonel Nuia, then Chief of Operations , deployed to Bewani two 
companies of soldiers to deter Indonesian operations against OPM elements on 
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PNG territory (discussion Colonel Nuia 15 April 1997). The Commanding 
Officer, 2 RPIR, Lieutenant Colonel Salamas, a New Irelander, was ordered to 
deploy one company from Vanimo and another from Moem Barracks in Wewak. 
The response - codenamed Operation Apple Pie - was slow in the absence of 
adequate transport. However, A Company, 2 RPIR, on border duties at Vanimo, 
deployed to Bewani together with Lieutenant Colonel Salamas and a small 
command post. D Company, commanded by Major Michael Tamalanga, 
followed from Wewak, taking up positions close to the OPM camps near Bewani. 
Nuia became concerned about the lack of information on events in the 
border area being provided by Lieutenant Colonel Salamas. He deployed Captain 
Ben Maris, then an intelligence officer in Headquarters, PNGDF, in an attempt to 
meet his requirements. Captain Maris was also unable to provide information 
needed at headquarters so Colonel Nuia flew to the border to assume command. 
Salamas was effectively sidelined for the remainder of the operation.54 Nuia 
joined A Company which, by now, had taken up a position just short of the 
reported location of Indonesian troops. In spite of efforts to locate the 
Indonesians, PNGDF patrols found no sign of their presence other than the body 
of an OPM fighter killed by Indonesian soldiers in an earlier raid. 
The PNGDF' s ability to defuse the situation and reduce the likelihood of a 
clash with Indonesian troops depended, in part, on the establishment of 
communications between both forces. Radio communications were not possible 
so Nuia sent a message to the Indonesian government agencies at Jayapura. He 
hoped that they would contact their units operating on the border and order their 
return. Still, Nuia realised that even if the officials were successful, the 
Indonesian patrols could not be recalled quickly. Indeed, shortly after the 
officials were contacted, Nuia received information about an Indonesian crossing 
to the north of his position at Bewani. The crossing showed that the Indonesians 
were intent on maintaining pressure on the OPM. In response, Nuia flew over the 
54 Lieutenant Colonel Salamas was also replaced as Commanding Officer on Bougainville in 
September 1989 just prior to the arrival of Colonel Nuia (see Chapter 7). 
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area to show the PNGDF presence. He had no way of knowing if the plan had 
been effective. 
On his return, Nuia turned his attention to the OPM. He concluded that 
the Indonesians were unlikely to ease the intensity of their operations while the 
OPM held their soldiers hostage. Nuia learnt that the hostages may have been 
located not far from his position. D Company and Colonel Nuia moved into the 
area and contacted Hans Bomai, a local OPM commander. During the 
negotiations,55 Bomai was told that the hostages were to be released by 1000 
hours the next day (no doubt under threat of a PNGDF attack). Nuia was 
successful and the hostages were handed over to the PNGDF. Lieutenant Colonel 
Salamas accompanied the hostages on a helicopter to Vanimo and released them 
to Indonesian authorities. 
The outcome of this border incident could have been much more serious. 
Several issues gave PNG and Australia concern. Indonesia's determination to 
rescue the hostages and to exact revenge on the OPM was unquestionable. In the 
face of such determination, the deployment of two PNGDF companies to the area 
to act as a buffer between the rebels and Indonesians was risky. Some incidents 
on the border had before resulted in exchanges of fire between the PNGDF and 
Indonesian soldiers. 56 The PNGDF was unsure of the strength of the Indonesian 
forces in the area or the strength of other Indonesian units stationed near the 
border. Constrained by a lack of air support and limited intelligence, the PNGDF 
may have been no match for the Indonesians had a clash occurred. In that, the 
OPM was an unpredictable element. Though they posed no real threat to the 
PNGDF, the rebels could have sparked an incident into which PNGDF elements 
may have been drawn. 
The other concern was the unpredictability associated with the actions of 
Colonel Nuia. Colonel Nuia controlled the operation on the ground without 
reference to Headquarters or the Government in Port Moresby. While the 
55 At the same ti1ne, the PNGDF Commander, Brigadier-General Lokinap and Defence Minister 
Pokasui were visiting Irian J aya. 
56 One such incident occurred in 1988 at Tarabits (discussion Brigadier-General Nuia of 12 July 
1999). 
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situation was resolved peacefully, Nuia had a reputation for unilateral action. The 
absence of both the Commander and Minister gave Nuia room for manoeuvre. 
In his account of events, Nuia, predictably, gave no sense of concern over 
his handling of the situation. He justified control of the operation in the field, 
rather than from his Headquarters in Port Moresby, on the basis of poor 
communications and concern over the actions in the early stages of Lieutenant 
Colonel Salamas. The same level of control could not have been achieved from 
the PNGDF Operations Room in Port Moresby. Neither did Nuia harbour any 
dislike of Indonesians. Indeed, he had attended the Indonesian military staff 
college, along with officers of the Indonesian army in 1979/80. He placed 
importance on his knowledge of the Indonesians. His confidence in handling the 
incident arose also from his good relationship with local rebel leaders, such as 
Bomai. Together, these factors assisted Nuia in resolving the issue. 
Nuia overlooked the key role played by the consultative framework 
established under the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Co-operation. 
The regular liaison visits by officials and their network along the border reduced 
some of the risks. Indonesia may have stayed its hand until reports had been 
prepared on the border. That gave Nuia time to secure the release of the hostages 
who had been the motivation behind the Indonesian military action. In any event, 
the border would not see another incident on the same scale as the PNGDF turned 
its attention to Bougainville in late 1988. 
The army' s border presence posed few obstacles to a determined 
Indonesian military offensive. PNGDF units were isolated with little capacity for 
rapid reinforcement. Ammunition stocks were insufficient for a prolonged 
conflict. The Indonesians could mount an operation across the border and 
withdraw before the PNGDF responded. So why did PNG incur the costs of 
border deployments, especially after the 1986 border agreement with Indonesia? 
The PNGDF fulfilled an important role in deterring 'acts of aggression by 
removing the temptation of an undefended easy prize ' (Mench 1975: 158). The 
deployment of soldiers in response to cross-border operations by Indonesia 
demonstrated PNG' s resolve to protect its territory. The presence of PNGDF 
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soldiers also gave a sense of urgency to resolve the problem by diplomatic means. 
The Indonesians were not constrained by the PNGDF' s presence but understood, 
after PNG appealed to the United Nations in 1984 over Indonesian cross border 
raids and PNG' s expulsion of the Indonesian Defence Attache (Dorney 1980: 
275), the need to avoid cross-border raids becoming an international issue. 
Indonesia had no expansionist plans.57 After 1984, the Indonesians stayed their 
hand for a time out of respect for PNG. That would have suited the OPM. 
The PNGDF recognised that they could do little to prevent any concerted 
Indonesian military action against the OPM on PNG' s side of the border. In any 
event, PNGDF patrol commanders were not prepared to take on the Indonesians. 
Almost without exception, patrols checked with local contacts to ensure that they 
avoided Indonesian patrols. That undermined the PNGDF' s effectiveness as a 
deterrent force and ensured freedom of action by Indonesian troops and the OPM. 
The PNGDF felt that their approach was justified. Troops took comfort in 
the knowledge that there was little political will to suppress the OPM. The 
occasional hardline rhetoric against the OPM was not backed up with resources 
for the PNGDF to mount operations in the border area. Chan, as prime minister 
in 1980, asserted that 'his government did not recognise the OPM and that if there 
was a step up in guerilla activities in the border region ... PNG would feel bound 
to consider military action' (Post-Courier 10 December 1980: 1). But even Diro, 
in 1983, stepped back from openly criticising Indonesia over an incursion that 
year. Ultimately, in the 'unlikely event that Papua New Guinea could muster the 
political will ... and the logistic support to ... seal the border, the OPM would 
continue to operate ' (May 1986: 62). 
Civic Action Patrols 
'The Arniy's 'civic mission ... [is designed to make] the PIR aware that the role of 
the national Army ... is to be ... loyal to the authority of the ... [Papua] New 
Guinea Government' (Hastings 1969: 187). 
The expansion of the PIR and allocation of generous funding in the 1950s 
and 1960s raised the state of preparedness as intended. However, the soldiers, 
57 See May (1986: 78-84). 
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other than those assigned to border duties, had few opportunities to use their 
skills. The unrest which occurred in 1957, 1961 and 1964 coupled with the need 
for the soldiers to recognise their role in the country, especially their 
subordination to the civil authority, gave impetus for Australian defence officials 
to find a way to channel the soldiers' energy. 
In 1965, the then Commander, PNG Command,58 Brigadier Hunter, CBE, 
L VO, had been impressed with a concept put forward by an Indonesian student, 
then Lieutenant Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, 59 at the Australian Army Staff 
College at Queenscliff.60 That concept proposed a national army, which was built 
on strong links with the people. Wibowo emphasised the 'valuable role played by 
civic action' (Sinclair 1992: 113). Brigadier Hunter saw parallels between PNG 
and Indonesia. He was also conscious that the Papua New Guinean soldiers had 
to earn their place in an independent PNG. This was particularly important given 
criticism of the army at the time, in part arising from unrest in 1961 and from 
clashes between soldiers and the police in 1964 (See Chapter 2). The then 
Defence Minister had emphasised the development of a 'well- disciplined, stable 
and reliable ... force completely loyal to the government [ which would] . . . help 
identify the people with their army' (Lynch 1969: 22-23). 
Towards the end the 1960s, veterans of the Vietnam conflict, posted to 
PNG Command, brought their experiences in civic action in Vietnam to the PIR. 
Many of these Australians completed training in Papua New Guinea prior to their 
deployment to Vietnam. On their return, they used their experience to train PIR 
soldiers. However, not everyone was pleased with the civic action programme. 
Some were worried by the army's civic action role, which, paradoxically, 
had been introduced to facilitate public scrutiny of the army. Defence officials 
believed that pre-independence concerns over the army's role in the state could be 
put to rest if the public and government better understood the force. Officials also 
recognised the need for soldiers to understand their obligations to government and 
58 PNG Command had been created in January 1965 and included all ADF units , including the 
PIR, stationed in the then Territory of Papua and New Guinea (Sinclair 1992: 220) . 
59 Brigadier General Wibowo would later assume command of Indonesian Forces in Irian J aya. 
60 The College trains selected officers, including foreign students, for senior command. 
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people. Nonetheless, Vincent Eri (later PNG Governor-General) noted in 1969 
that the army was 'replacing the administration in the minds of the people [ and] 
preparing the ground for some future action' (quoted in May 1998: 150). 
The Defence Force 'favoured civic action projects which [ were] relatively 
minor in nature [so that they could be completed] in a relatively short period of 
time' (Mench 1975: 127). Even so, the army also sought projects which had a big 
impact on the community (ibid.). Such projects were a constant reminder of the 
incapacity of local and provincial governments to deliver services, especially 
during the 1980s. Coincidentally, the army by that period was distancing itself 
from civic action in order to support law and order operations. The frequency of 
civic action patrols had declined from eighteen in 1976 to fourteen in 1982 and no 
patrols in 1989 (Defence Report~ 1976, 1982, 1989). In some cases, the capacity 
of units, especially the infantry battalions, to carry out civic action was restricted 
by financial limitations on movement, and by the loss of expertise among soldiers 
in minor engineering roles. 
Mench (1975: 127) forshadowed potential risks if the army was used to 
conduct civic action on a greater scale. He pointed to the possibility of military 
intervention arising from popularity gained through civic action. Politicians 
during the 1980s, including Ben Sabumei, as Minister for Defence, emphasised an 
increased role for the army in civic action, especially in the Highlands. The 
Engineer Battalion was allocated special funding, given primary responsibility for 
civic action and relocated to Lae from Port Moresby, largely for this purpose. 
However, financial restrictions, low manning levels and inadequately skilled 
manpower prevented a serious PNGDF commitment to civic action, in spite of the 
political pressure. 
The PNGDF felt comfortable with a smaller civic action role. Indeed, 
senior officers had a long-held view that the army's primary role was to defend 
the country from an external aggressor. Commitments elsewhere, including civic 
action, detracted from that role. The officers recognised that civic action brought 
the soldiers closer to the people which had recruitment and intelligence dividends. 
However, deployments were costly and the troops had limited time to use their 
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military skills while involved in CIVIC action. Senior officer attitudes were 
reflected in the defence review in 1990, which indicated that they were concerned 
that the Defence Force had to 'shoulder more of the civic action burden ... at the 
expense of their military role' (PNGDF Discussion Paper 1990: 64). Senior 
officers also felt that politicians were employing the army for their private use 
(discussion Colonel Nuia 5 November 1996). 
Aside from national politicians, the PNGDF had to contend with pressure 
from provincial and local governments for military support in the community. 
The framework for civic action requests had been deliberately established to 
ensure that all requests had political support before the army assigned its priorities 
according to unit commitments and capabilities. Interested parties forwarded 
requests for assistance to the local authority, usually the provincial government 
(Defence Report 1982: 29). The requests were prioritised and submitted to the 
Department of Defence for consideration. Such requests were received prior to 
the financial year in which the project was to be undertaken so that the 
Department could programme the patrol into the training schedule. Civic action 
requests were also referred to other government departments so that the provision 
of services was evenly shared. This was especially important where material 
costs were high. The PNGDF has limited capacity to provide materials but it is 
suited to the provision of skilled manpower and transport. Tasks suited to 
Defence were allocated to one of the PNGDF units for project liaison and 
completion. Civilian authorities were ultimately responsible for all projects, 
thereby ensuring the army's subordination. 
The PNGDF insisted on this system, often to avoid wantok or influential 
individuals from pressuring them into agreeing to army support. During the 
1980s, political rivalry between the levels of government, corruption, and general 
administrative inefficiencies led to an increasing tendency to go direct to the 
army. Mench (1975: 126) noted that the practice of working outside the formal 
system was already used prior to independence. 
Notwithstanding criticism, the introduction of a civic-action patrolling 
programme provided the means to address several issues affecting PIR soldiers at 
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that time. In part, the momentum for the introduction of ci vie action patrols was 
provided because soldiers were becoming bored. In 1967, soldiers were sent to 
villages on civic action patrols, 'to mend radios, build roads and bridges; in fact, 
anything that would break the boredom' (Ryan 1970: 270). Ryan may have given 
an exaggerated account. However, soldiers were becoming bored with daily 
military life. Border patrols tended to be conducted on a roster basis, which saw 
most PIR soldiers deployed to the border area once every twelve months. During 
the rest of the year, soldiers trained without a clear purpose. 
The Army recognised at the time that soldiers were disgruntled over their 
exclusion from Vietnam (See Colebatch 1974: 277). The soldiers failed to 
comprehend why, as members of the Australian Defence Force, they could not be 
deployed on operations in Vietnam. Some interpreted the situation as a slur on 
their capabilities. Some, especially senior officers, recalled the issue after the 
PNGDF' s operational service in Vanuatu and, later, Bougainville. They noted, 
pointedly, in 1980 and 1990, that the Australians, unlike the PNGDF soldiers, 
lacked recent experience in guerilla operations. The civic action programme 
provided a timely change for the troops. The patrols also promised benefits for 
the army in PNG, in addition to contributing to the morale of the troops . 
The army conceded that 'the troops, spending most of their time 1n 
baiTacks, had been growing away from their people' (Ryan 1970: 270). Civic 
action patrols enabled the army to work closely with the villagers, establishing 
bonds of friendship. The patrols were so successful in this regard that local 
politicians were concerned that the army was undermining the civil authority in 
the provision of local services. Those concerns influenced discussion on the role 
of the post-independence PNGDF. 
The civic action programme had modest beginnings. Patrols mounted by 
the PIR along the border were extended to other areas of PNG. The immediate 
gain for the army was a widening of the recruitment base. The opportunities 
flowed from two aspects. Recruitment was extended to a broader cross-section of 
the community thereby reducing the imbalances· of tribal groups, which appeared 
often in African pre-independent armies. The other advantage was the army' s 
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ability to recruit from otherwise isolated communities, which set up important 
networks in the event of operations in the area. The failure to continue this 
approach by the post-independence PNGDF led to problems during the 1988-90 
Bougainville crisis. Those problems were a result of the absence, since 1979, of 
any PIR civic action patrols on Bougainville (See Chapter 7). 
The civic action assistance was well received by local villagers. After 
independence, development slowed in the provinces as inefficiency and 
inadequate provincial government funding led to a decline in services. Villagers 
and local governments sought the army's assistance in development projects. In 
time, the PNGDF, faced with its commitment to Bougainville from 1988, was 
overwhelmed by requests. Those requests provided the PNGDF with an 
opportunity to develop close rapport with the communities and provided soldiers 
with training. Yet few civic action requests received assistance. The reasons for 
the poor army response need to be understood. 
The PNGDF' s inability to respond to requests for assistance arose in part 
from the changes in civic action management within the PNGDF. Civic action 
projects were small scale, requiring basic skills which initially were within the 
capabilities of the RPIR. For the most part, special skills, such as carpentry, were 
to be found within the Pioneer Platoon, part of the Support Company of the 
battalion. The skills of the Pioneer Platoon were gradually lost through 
resignations, lack of courses, and the recruitment to the Engineer Battalions of 
members of the platoon. The battalions became dependent on the Engineer 
Battalion for assistance. In the end, the Engineer Battalion assumed control of 
civic action, especially as the RPIR became involved in internal security. 
The engineers were able to provide more sophisticated assistance to the 
civil community by combining their skills and engineering plant. However, the 
projects were limited by the availability of troops, many of whom would see 
service in internal security operations, including on Bougainville. Transportation 
problems associated with engineering plant also constrained their use. 
Civic action received little emphasis from the mid-1980s. The PNGDF 
argued that the costs were not being shared by other departments and the role of 
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the army in the first instance was security - not civic action. The PNGDF's 
approach did not affect recruitment, which provided some motivation for its 
involvement. Recruiting tours were becoming restricted to major centres in the 
absence of adequate funding (See Chapter 2). In those centres, adequate 
representative numbers of provincial groups were available. Nonetheless, some 
civic action did occur with the assistance of Australian Defence aircraft. 
Operation Halvin Goix 
In 1988, 1 RPIR mounted a c1v1c action patrol to Tapini District, in 
response to a local request for army assistance in repairing the local school.61 The 
patrol - codenamed Halvin Goix - was allocated to B Company, 1 RPIR. The 
task presented two problems for the army: Tapini was located an hour's flying 
time from Port Mores by and the nature of the ci vie action required carpenter 
assistance not readily available within the battalion. The lack of unit transport 
ensured that troops could not be deployed by road. (Tapini was three to four 
hours drive over poor roads.) However, arrangements were made to use a RAAP 
Chinook in country for training to deploy the troops to and from Tapini. 
The lack of tradesmen was addressed by seeking assistance from the 
PNGDF Engineer Battalion. The Provincial government provided the materials 
for the school repairs as a condition of the request. On 1 August, the company 
deployed by Chinook to Tapini, receiving a rousing welcome on their arrival. 
Local officials, including an armed patrol officer, met the troops. The patrol 
officer explained that local raskols had been active in the area and he was setting 
out on a patrol to investigate. The officer's weapon was in a poor state of repair 
and he had little ammunition. He had a difficult job. The local people (Goilalas) 
had a reputation for volatility, especially in the settlements around Port Moresby. 
Notwithstanding local crime levels, soldiers set about repairing the school. 
The soldiers established a strong rapport with the local people in the four weeks in 
Tapini. Complimentary reports about the soldiers were also conveyed to the 
national government and Headquarters PNGDF. Yet the benefits of civic action 
61 As Training Adviser, I coordinated RAAF air support, deploying with the patrol to Tapini. 
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appeared to be lost. No patrols were mounted by 1 RPIR for the next three years. 
Conclusion 
The border with Indonesia has been a potential flashpoint for years. 
Serious incidents have occurred and the PNGDF has found itself embroiled in 
tensions. Even so, Indonesia's limited aims, essentially confined to the OPM, 
have contributed to a relatively stable situation. The concern in PNG is that the 
PNGDF lacks the capability necessary to police the border. That situation is 
unlikely to change thereby ensuring that at best the PNGDF will be no more than 
a trip-wire force as it was during the Second World War. 
Indeed, PNG will put store in the Treaty with Indonesia, and in its 
relationship with Australia. PNG will inevitably see more in the JDP than 
Australia sees is the case, which could pose problems for Australia in the future. 
The sporadic activities of the OPM will add to tensions though the rebels' 
increasing tendency to resort to terrorist tactics, especially hostage-taking, 62 may 
undermine their cause. 
For the PNGDF, there is little incentive to improve capabilities. Since 
1984, its attention has been firmly focussed on internal security. In any event, the 
PNGDF cannot be committed to both border duties and internal security, as 
Bougainville has shown. As a result, intelligence, familiarity with the area, and 
local contacts will be eroded. The net effect will be an undermining of the 
PNGDF' s capacity to mount effective border patrols - in spite of its long 
association with the area and the key role it plays in PNGDF history. 
********************* 
62 Hostage taking by the OPM increased from 1996. 
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RPIR Border Patrols 
1980-90 
(Defence Reports 1980-90) 
1980-1981 
Appendix 2 to 
Chapter 4 
Patrols details not specified in Defence Reports for this period. 
1982 Taim Senis Imonda 
Jumping Wallaby Morehead 
Longlong Magani Kiunga 
Go /si Amanab 
Stretim Banis Skotihao 
Rausim Puripuri Morehead 
Painim Muruk Bewani 
Bel Isi Imonda 
Splitim Banis Skotiahao 
1983 Kokoda Tasol Ningerim 
Painim Tarapia Morehead 
P ainim Strong Wutung 
Painim Kuka Aitape 
Singirip Tumas Bewani 
1984 
No patrols listed in Defence Report for the period. 
1985 Sosobi 
Sanap Isi 
Biku Gabua Fly River bulge 
Yellow Bird II Blackwater 
Rausim Kwik !&II Bewani 
Rausim Kwik III Wutung 
Lukautim Wantok Wutung 
Mar/Apr 
Jun/Jul 
Aug/Sep 
Mar 
Apr/May 
Jul 
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1986 Rabia Gabuna Morehead/W earn 19 Mar - 8 Apr 
Biku Namo Kiunga/Ningerum 
White Seagull Kiunga/Ningerum 
Bushman Wutung/Bewani 10 - 25 Jan 
Tully Gully Green River 14 Aug - 3 Sep 
Blue Hills Bewani 10 - 24 Dec 
1987 Back Track Ningerim 12 Apr - 2 May 
Crocodile Rock Ningerim 19 Mar - 2 Apr 
Brukim Wara Ningerim 20 Jun - 3 Jul 
Muddy Grass Weam 1 Sep- 22 Sep 
Blue Hills Ningerim 27 Oct - 12 Nov 
Northern Star Bewani 4 - 25 Feb 
Frenim Aitape 14 Apr - 6 May 
Luk Save Green River 9 - 30 Jun 
Bushman Bewani 11 - 31 Aug 
Emu Bob Bewani 20 Nov - 20 Dec 
1988 Luk Save Ningerim 22 Jul - 1 Aug 
Brown Eagle Weam/Bensbach 22 Nov - 13 Dec 
Christmas Wutung/Bewani 4 - 25 Jan 
Silip Kirap Green River 14 Mar- 5 Apr 
Apple Pie Bewani/Skotiau 4 Apr - 27 May 
Blue Pin Bewani/Skotiau 9 Oct - 9 Nov 
1989 
No patrols conducted due to Bougainville Operations 
1990 
No patrols conducted in southern border area. 
Sandaun Bewani 18 Jan - 1 Feb 
Yellow River Bewani 20 Jun - 28 Jul 
Northern Eagle Yapsie 18 Aug - 20 Sep 
Shooting Star Amanab 19 Nov - 10 Dec 
Last Tango Bewani 6 Dec - 15 Dec 
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Chapter 5 
Changes in the Force 
Introduction 
The PNGDF entered the post-independence decade with ongoing 
commitments to border security and enjoyed a short-term deployment on 
operations in Vanuatu. However, soldiers would soon change their focus to 
internal security. As that prospect increased, the PNGDF would undergo a 
facelift, commencing in 1985. The changes involved would have a long-term 
effect on the Force, and would provide a measure of the extent to which the post-
independence army could manage responsibilities under the Constitution. The 
nature of the changes and their impact on the PNGDF need to be understood as an 
important element in its history. 
Equipment and organisational changes play important roles in the 
effectiveness of any army. In the case of the PNGDF, these changes would 
invariably affect the performance of the Force. At first glance, some of the 
changes appear to be largely cosmetic, such as uniform changes (See below). 
However, each new piece of equipment introduced into the army has a flow on 
effect. Uniforms impart a professional image and boost morale. New weapons 
and equipment affect training and logistic procedures. All changes have initial 
and follow-on costs and therefore impact on the Army budget. Equipment 
decisions cannot easily be made without a thorough examination of these effects. 
Rushed decisions rarely achieve the desired results and often burden the force 
with long-term problems. The first post-independence decision was the 
replacement of PNGDF uniforms. At the very least, the decision marked an 
important development in PNGDF history. 
A Different Image 
At independence, the PNGDF saw no need to change the uniforms worn 
by its soldiers since 1956. The juniper green uniform had a distinctly PNG 
association - members of the PIR and, later, the PNGDF, including Australian 
defence personnel posted to those units , had worn the uniform since its 
introduction. Stocks of juniper green uniforms were low and by 1985 new and 
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cheaper materials were available. They were easier to maintain and more 
comfortable in the tropical climate. Unlike the juniper uniform, the new uniform 
materials did not require starching. For these reasons the decision was made to 
replace the juniper uniform. The new uniforms included provision for separate 
colours for the Land Element (green), Air Element (blue) and the Maritime 
Element (white). The Kumul badge was retained. The new dress was introduced 
in September 1985 at a cost of Kl.5 million (Post-Courier 3 May 1985: 2). 
The replacement uniforms were popular with the soldiers. The decision to 
provide new uniforms, including new field uniforms, was timely and improved 
morale immeasurably. The soldiers had long complained of the lack of 
replacements. Even when spare uniforms were located in the supply system, the 
soldiers found the right sizes difficult to obtain. Uniforms were a fundamental 
piece of equipment for soldiers who were becoming increasingly critical of the 
poor logistic system. Importantly, the deteriorating state of army uniforms 
inhibited the maintenance of discipline. For example, in 1985-88, soldiers were 
observed in ill-fitting uniforms or wearing dress damaged by long-term use or 
exposure to the sun. 63 Officers would not order the soldiers to find replacements 
because they knew there were none. So corrective action on dress standards, and 
on long hair, poor shaving habits, cleanliness and so forth were also overlooked. 
The new uniforms were timely and beneficial for ceremonial reasons as well.64 
The PNGDF was also investing in new equipment. The PNG government 
had exerted pressure on the commander to purchase three Israeli Arava 201 
aircraft costing $US 9 million. The commander complied and the first aircraft 
arrived in the country in 1985. The Arava - the first example of PNGDF 
diversification from Australian-sourced equipment - could carry twelve armed 
soldiers. The aircraft's short take off and landing (STOL) characteristics made it 
particularly suited to operations in the rugged terrain of Papua New Guinea where 
airfields are short and often carved out of mountainsides with steep and 
63 Author's experience as the Military Adviser in 1 RPIR 1985-88. 
64 In 1984, plans were made for the presentation of new Regimental colours to each of the 
battalions, following the conferring of the title 'Royal ' on the Pacific Islands Regiment. 
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limited approaches. With its arrival, the Arava would become the third aircraft 
type in service with the PNGDF - the Dakota DC3 and the Nomad being the 
other two. The logistic burden of maintaining so many aircraft types in a small 
army was further compounded in later years. 65 Within two years of its arrival, 
Defence Minister Pokasui claimed that 'with no spare parts available, the Arava 
aircraft was useless' (Post-Courier 30 September 1987: 2). 
The Arava had other problems. The tropical climate 1n Papua New 
Guinea reduced the life of the aircraft, which was designed more for operations in 
the Middle East. In addition, the aircraft had a limited troop and load carrying 
capacity. While the Arava' s landing and take off capabilities were valuable, its 
use in support of border operations was limited to reconnaissance and resupply. 
As a long-haul troop transport, the aircraft was economically inefficient. 
Plans were also made for the acquisition of four 31.5 metre Pacific Patrol 
Boats (PPB) under the Australian Defence Co-operation Programme, at a total 
cost of K25 million. On 28 February 1987, HMPNGS Tarangau (01) was 
commissioned, becoming the first defence maritime vessel purchased since 
independence. In spite of the PPB' s superiority over the aging Attack class patrol 
boats, the new boats attracted criticism from the PNGDF. Concerns centered on 
the lack of air-conditioning; the craft's limited range; susceptibility to rough 
weather; and inadequate armament - 7.62mm, 30mm or 50mm machine guns. 
In time, that criticism would threaten the defence relationship. 
Australia agreed to fit air-conditioners to each boat but the other problems 
persisted. In 1991, the PNGDF overcame the armament problem by purchasing 
the Oerlikon cannon, an automatic weapon, for each boat. The cost of each round 
of ammunition for the Oerlikon was K400 at 1989 prices; an expense the PNGDF 
could ill afford. 
Organisation 
The PNGDF introduced its first organisational change since independence 
in August 1980. Approval was given for the creation of a Military Plans Branch 
65 The PNGDF acquired four Iroquois helicopters in 1989 and two Casa aircraft in 1992. 
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(Defence Report 1984/85: 24).66 The newly created branch was tasked with the 
creation of a strategic plan for the development of the Force, taking into account 
future roles. The branch had an inauspicious beginning. Colonel Tau Nauna 
(Central Province), appointed to head the branch, resigned in 1982. His 
successor, Colonel Paul Soma (NSP) resigned in 1984. Lieutenant Colonel Karry 
Frank (Central Province) assumed acting responsibilities in February 1984 before 
being replaced by Colonel Rockus Lokinap (New Ireland Province) in June 1984. 
Lokinap had only two other officers on his staff- the branch establishment of 12 
was never filled. 
The many changes and lack of staff hampered the development of a 
strategic plan. Still, the branch could point to two notable successes in strategic 
planning: the 1988 White Paper which served as 'the basis for the formulation of 
the PNGDF Concept of Operations, and the Force Structure' (Defence White 
Paper 1988: 1), and the creation of a Defence Intelligence Branch. 
The 1988 White Paper represented an important benchmark for PNG and 
the PNGDF in determining the future of the Force. The Paper gave rise to a Ten 
Year Development Plan, an ambitious programme for the expansion of the 
PNGDF, and a proposal to provide personnel for UN duties. 67 The Plan was 
heralded with much fanfare by the then Defence Minister, Arnold Marsipal. He 
noted that the plan was the first white paper on the defence of Papua New Guinea 
since independence. The Defence Paper concluded that a major threat to the 
security of Papua New Guinea was not likely in the foreseeable future. However, 
the threat of 'minor skirmishes' (ibid.: 6) was not ruled out. The government also 
recognised that the PNGDF needed modernisation so that the army had a defence 
capability without external assistance. 
The Defence Report laid the groundwork for an expansion of the force, 
and the provision of new equipment, including aircraft, naval craft and new 
weapons. The PNGDF senior leadership now had the necessary blueprint from 
66 A proposal put forward by Colonel Francis, an Australian officer then PNGDF Chief of Staff. 
67 The PNGDF, aware of the Fijian role in UN deployments, were attracted by the prospect of 
overseas experience - and the UN pay and conditions. 
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government as the basis for its training, equipment purchasing schedule, and 
budgeting plans. Yet in spite of the government's recognition of PNGDF needs 
and its agreement for expansion and equipment purchases, senior officers were 
critical of the document. That criticism would not surface until the 1990s, when a 
rationalisation of the PNGDF was undertaken with the assistance of consultants. 68 
In an internal report, PNGDF officers commented that the defence 
priorities in the White Paper had doubtful validity for Papua New Guinea's 
strategic outlook (discussion Colonel Bau-Maras (Chief of Plans) of 19 April 
1996). The core force concept was criticised and officers questioned the claim 
that considerable warning would occur in the event of a threat. In particular, 
officers were critical of the outside influence that had given rise to the White 
Paper. That thinly-veiled reference to Australian involvement in the preparation 
of the White Paper reflected long-held PNGDF views that Australia played too 
much of a role in PNG internal affairs. 
The Report had been prepared with the assistance of the Australian 
Defence Department. Australian defence officials had been concerned by the 
PNGDF's increasing involvement in internal security, the poor state of 
preparedness of the PNGDF, and the lack of a clearly defined commitment by the 
PNG government to its defence force - in spite of its increasing reliance on the 
army for internal stability (See Chapter 6). Australian Defence officials could 
also offer the benefit of their experience in the preparation of defence white 
papers. Yet, in spite of these factors, the PNGDF leadership questioned 
assessments made in the 1988 White Paper. 
Notwithstanding the government's endorsement of the White Paper, the 
PNGDF criticism was justified on some issues. The government had agreed that 
without an expansion from 3050 to 5200, the PNGDF could not meet its 
responsibilities for external and internal defence, including border security, and 
civic action. (That argument was central to the PNGDF review conducted in 
1990-92, which recommended a modest expansion and the provision of basic 
68 For more detail on the review refer to Dibb and Nicholas (1996). 
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equipment and weapons.) In the absence of concerted action to address those 
concerns, the Force was ill-prepared for the Bougainville unrest in 1988. 
The 1988 report was flawed in other respects. The Paper provided the 
basis for force expansion but ruled out any threat of invasion. Defence argued for 
a higher manpower ceiling than the existing 5200, but provided no figures. The 
proposed expansion identified the need for new units but gave no breakdown of 
costs. The government endorsed the White Paper in principle but insisted on 
approving detailed proposals. PNGDF officers chose to ignore the subtleties of 
the government's decision. The officer corps was attracted to some elements of 
the plan, largely because of its promise of expansion and, with it, the purchase of 
new equipment, including fighter aircraft and artillery. 
The other major organisational achievement was the creation of a Defence 
Intelligence Branch (See also Dorney 1990: 208). In 1988, Defence set about 
amalgamating all existing intelligence sections (Defence Report 1988: 50). A 
Defence Intelligence Branch (DIB) would 'prepare strategic assessments, ... and 
provide dedicated intelligence support for PNGDF operations' (ibid.:). The 
change proved timely. On Bougainville the following year, the PNGDF found it 
was poorly served by the National Intelligence Organisation (NIO). The DIB 
assumed a greater role, well beyond that of military intelligence, in an attempt to 
make up for NIO deficiencies. Indeed, plans were made for DIB representation 
similar to that on Bougainville in provinces on the mainland, in addition to the 
border posts at Kiunga and Vanimo. Manning restrictions and Bougainville 
commitments prevented those proposals being implemented. On Bougainville, 
DIB personnel were implicated in controversial practices, including the abuse of 
human rights (See Chapter 7). 
Changes at the Top 
Brigadier-General Diro remained commander for six years after 
independence. He survived two changes of government, a feat not matched by 
any of his successors. Diro' s retention reinforced the army's political impartiality 
and its loyalty to the government of the day. However, after 1981 the commander 
would change four times in five years. That would see the appointment 
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increasingly politicised with less emphasis on promotion on merit. Successive 
commanders promoted to the position would, in tum, promote others within the 
Force to ensure loyalty. The process would undermine the PNGDF' s 
independence and confidence within the rank and file in their leadership. 
The frequent changes in commander would also divide the officer corps 
into factions. A culture of alliances would become all-pervasive, often to the 
detriment of Force efficiency. These factions would work against each other, 
ignoring their leadership responsibilities for the smooth running of the Force. The 
officers' actions were no different to what had already occu1Ted in the 
bureaucracy. However, factionalisation began to impact on the PNGDF at a time 
when the government was dependent on the army for internal stability. The 
leadership weaknesses would not be exposed immediately because law and order 
operations required only small elements of the PNGDF. Later, on Bougainville, 
the cracks in the officer structure became more pronounced and PNGDF 
performance faltered. 
The growing gap between the PNGDF hierarchy and its soldiery meant 
that officers could no longer rule out the threat of military action against the state. 
The circumstances, which were tested in Cabinet's 1977 disciplinary action 
against Brigadier-General Diro (Chapter 2), had changed. Problems within the 
officer corps began to emerge in 1984 with the resignation of Colonel Huai. At 
the time, Huai was critical of the then PNGDF commander, Brigadier-General 
Noga. That criticism stemmed from Huai ' s belief that the government was 
imposing decisions which were detrimental to the effectiveness of the PNGDF 
(Post-Courier 25 Jan 85: 2). The Arava purchase was a case in point. Huai 
believed that Noga should have withstood the pressure. Commanders, he argued, 
needed to assert their position more when it came to operational issues. 
Several senior officers in the PNGDF shared Huai ' s view. Two followed 
Huai's lead in resigning from the Force - Colonels Jack Maniana (Chief of 
Logistics) and Paul Soma (Head, Policy and Planning). The resignations and the 
barrage of public criticism unsettled the government. The Defence Intelligence 
Branch and the NIO were tasked to investigate the umest. They concluded that 
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the situation 'threatened the stability of the Force ' (Post-Courier 22 April 1985: 
2). The assessment was exaggerated, though ethnic tensions arising from the 
conflict between Huai and his supporters, and those who stayed loyal to Noga, 
were of concern. In this instance, the two camps were predominantly Papuan; in 
later years, ethnic background decided the allegiances of many officers and 
soldiers (See later in this chapter). In time the issue settled, but the government 
was uneasy, uncertain of PNGDF loyalty. So was the Opposition. When, in 
November 1985, a change of government occurred, following a no-confidence 
vote, the incoming prime minister, Paias Wingti, appointed Huai as commander. 
Wingti' s action confirmed in the minds of many the role of politics in the 
appointment of commander. Huai had, in 1985, openly supported a political party 
(PPP) then in coalition with Wingti ' s Peoples Democratic Party (PDM) and had 
declared publicly his intention to run in the 1987 election. Through his actions, 
he was inextricably linked to the Wingti/Chan coalition, thereby ensuring his 
future in the PNGDF when the coalition gained power. 
Notwithstanding his early standing with Wingti , Huai was replaced in late 
1987. According to then Defence Minister, Pokasui, Huai 'had allowed infighting 
and political lobbying among senior officers ' (May et al. 1998: 164). Brigadier-
General Lokinap, a New Irelander, was appointed on 11 January 1988. In a wider 
reshuffle coinciding with the commander' s appointment, the government also 
stood down Colonels Dademo, Dotaona and Guria - all Papuan officers . That 
decision stemmed from August 1987, when James Pokasui, a former PNGDF 
captain and an Islander, assumed the portfolio of defence minister. Many saw 
Lokinap ' s appointment by Pokasui as Islander influence in the new government. 
Other appointments within the officer corps seemed to lend weight to the 
allegations. For example, Colonel Nuia, from East New Britain, was appointed 
Chief of Operations. Leader of the Opposition, Sir Michael Somare, slammed the 
government' s decision to remove the Papuan officers, noting it ' smacked of some 
form of payback' (Post-Courier 15 January 1988: 2). Denials of regionalism did 
little to dampen criticism. In its defence, the government claimed that the Papuan 
officers lacked loyalty, but this merely heightened public concern about the 
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potential for PNGDF action against the state. That concern could be traced to 
events in Fiji. 
The Fiji coups earlier that year had prompted many in Papua New Guinea, 
especially within the government, to be alert to signs of unrest in the PNGDF. 
Public concern was heightened by speculation in PNGDF units about the army's 
ability to mount a coup following the Fiji example (ibid.: 2). The Opposition 
fuelled debate, claiming that poor morale and a lack of funds could lead to a coup. 
Wingti claimed that stability, loyalty, lack of popular support, and the dispersed 
nature of the PNGDF ruled out any possibility of a coup (ibid.: 1). Yet the 
government was worried: approval had already been given for the call-out of the 
troops for a new law and order operation (Green Beret 87) ; so the army' s loyalty 
to the government was paramount. 
The Fiji coups caught the attention of the PNGDF as they did for many in 
the region at the time. Discussion of the issue within the PNGDF mirrored 
discussions taking place in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere. The officers and 
men of the PNGDF units expressed surprise and shock at the military takeover in 
Fiji and conversation came around to the parallels which could be drawn between 
the Fiji Military Forces and the PNGDF. Some members of the PNGDF claimed 
they could replicate events in Fiji if the need arose. Others gained satisfaction 
from the jolt given to the PNG government and the likelihood that the army would 
receive more consideration in the formulation of the budget. A happy soldiery, 
they argued, would be less likely to stage a coup. 
Certainly, many would have been surprised if the discussion of coups by 
the military had not taken place. However, there was not evident in the 
discussions cohesive support for any such action by the PNGDF. Indeed, the 
discussion tended to be concentrated in small groups of common rank or ethnic 
background. In all that, the professionalism of the PNGDF was not at risk, even 
as other standards were in decline. Nevertheless, the murmurings - fuelled, in 
my view, by experiences during law and order operations - would ultimately stir 
the PNGDF into action, during pay riots in 1989 (See Chapter 7). 
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While the debate continued in the PNGDF and elsewhere, the government 
was moving to shore up its hold on the military. The PNGDF officer corps was 
scrutinised to identify potential coup leaders . The CPC had noted at 
independence that coup instigators usually came from below the senior ranks. 
The PNG government concluded that Colonel Nuia69 was the most likely to lead a 
coup (personal communication Colonel Nuia of 15 October 1996). Australian 
defence analysis bore out the government's suspicions. In an intelligence 
assessment prepared at the time and passed to the PNG government, Colonel Nuia 
was identified as a coup risk (ibid.). Nuia was called before the NEC, which 
demanded a reaffirmation of his loyalty. Surprised at the claim - in his view he 
had given the government no reason to doubt his loyalty - Nuia confirmed his 
loyalty to the government of the day. No more came of the matter. However, 
Nuia never forgot Australia's role in this embarrassing issue. He remains 
suspicious of Australia's involvement in PNG. 
The events of 1987, and subsequent publicity, promoted regionalism 
within the PNGDF. Within the framework of suspicion and rumour, individual 
servicemen turned increasingly to wantoks, voicing their discontent. As 
politicians surrounded themselves with their supporters in the bureaucracy and in 
the PNGDF, so too did the army officers. In the process, professionalism was 
eaten away, with poor performance protected by senior allies in government. 
Initiative and commitment gave way to other priorities concerned with 
consolidating positions of power. This had ramifications for the Australia/PNG 
defence relationship. 
PNG-Australia Bilateral Relations 
As the PNGDF committed to law and order operations, relations with 
Australia, and with the Australian Defence Force in particular, were undergoing 
changes. Such relations had been changing steadily since independence. 
Relatively large numbers of ADF personnel were still serving in the PNGDF. 
However, attitudes within the PNGDF leadership towards Australia were 
changing as younger soldiers, with only dim memories of the pre-independence 
69 Colonel Nuia was appointed PNGDF Commander in May 1997. 
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period, joined the Force. The training of PNG officers exclusively in PNG since 
1975 also changed attitudes towards Australia. 
Relations had earlier been strained by the PNGDF' s Vanuatu experience 
(See Chapter 3). The Australian government's attempt to dissuade PNG from 
committing a contingent to Vanuatu, and Australia's hesitation in supporting the 
Kumul Force,70 did little for defence and foreign relations between the two 
countries (discussion Brigadier-General Nuia 1 August 2001). Chan felt strongly 
about PNG' s right to determine its role in the region. If necessary, Chan had been 
prepared to go it alone. In the event, that was not necessary, but relations in the 
mid 1980s were on a different footing and, with several new appointees having 
held the commander's position between 1981 and 1985, the process of change 
would continue. Certainly, since 1985 many in the PNGDF felt relations with 
Australia had not been good. 
PNG' s commitment of the PNGDF to internal security operations from 
1984 presented a dilemma for the Australian government and the ADF. Both 
were uneasy about the role of its personnel in internal security. At the time, the 
ADF had not been used in any similar role in Australia for many years.71 Policy 
governing ADF duties in PNG stipulated that defence personnel were not to be 
involved in operations or training associated with internal security. That policy 
arose from ministerial consultations in 1977 which set down conditions for the 
use of ADF personnel in 'politically sensitive situations' (Gubb 1994: 31 ). Those 
guidelines caused particular problems for the bilateral relationship in the run-up to 
the Vanuatu deployment. 
ADF training officers were serving in the RPIR. The restrictions were to 
affect profoundly their value to the Papua New Guinea commanding officers. 
Within the RPIR, 50 per cent of training was devoted to internal security tactics. 
That meant that while ADF training officers played a key role in training for 
counter-insurgency war, they were prevented from assisting with internal security 
70 Australia was 'n_ervous about the operation, but eventually provided logistic support' (JCFADT 
1991: 163). 
71 The ADF was called out in 1978 to provide security for the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting (CHOGM) after a bomb exploded outside the Hilton hotel in Sydney. 
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training. (The Australian Government recognised, belatedly in 1991 , the need for 
' Australian assistance to ... [promote] the development of the PNGDF to aid the 
civil power' [JCFADT 1991: 160]). The PNGDF also held the view that as the 
ADF did not have experience in internal security, there was little they could offer 
to units on this issue. The training officers were also prevented from involvement 
in border operations, including deployments. Canberra strictly controlled ADF 
visits to the PNG/Indonesian border area, and where these were approved, the 
duration and location of visits were limited (See Chapter 4). By 1986, the 
conditional use of the ADF in the infantry battalions, combined with the ADF 
policy on localisation, led to the withdrawal of the last training officers.72 
Aside from the role of ADF staff, other changes were taking place. The 
ADF adopted a policy of disengagement from its long-term presence, preferring 
short-term options. That policy reinforced PNGDF views at the time that 
Australia was cutting back on defence assistance. The decision in December 
1985 that ADF personnel should wear Australian defence uniforms rather than 
those of the PNGDF underscored PNGDF perceptions that Australia was 
distancing itself from the longstanding relationship. Eventually, concessions were 
made by Australia for those personnel posted to line positions within the PNGDF 
- largely technical or specialist support areas - to wear the Kumul badge on 
their Australian uniforms. Nonetheless, the PNGDF believed that the linkages 
were being eroded. 
Diversification 
The changes 1n PNGDF/ ADF relations went well beyond the uniform 
issue. Nor were the changes restricted to the defence relationship . PNG 
politicians were reassessing the bilateral relationship. New generations of 
politicians, many of whom were well educated, enjoyed public appeal by 
exploiting nationalist sentiment. They sought to counter Australian influence -
real or imagined - by seeking new bilateral relationships with neighbours such 
as Indonesia, and wider afield. The government's policies on bilateral issues 
72 In December 1988, I completed duties as the military adviser in 1 RPIR - the las t Australian 
Army officer to serve with the PIR since its fo rmation in 1940. 
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invariably influenced PNGDF attitudes. Some government policies, such as the 
purchase of the Arava from Israel, impacted directly on the PNGDF. 
Australia was quick to point out that PNG, as an independent state, had the 
right to seek new links, in defence as elsewhere. Australia encouraged PNGDF 
diversification, which would reduce its dependence on the Defence Co-operation 
Programme. (Diversification was a general trend in third world armies with a 
decline in single military aid dependency (Janowitz 1964: 71).) Australian 
defence policy also encouraged the PNGDF and the PNG Defence Department to 
assume responsibility for maintenance of the multi-million-dollar defence 
installations built by Australia prior to independence. By doing so, PNG would 
be responsible for all aspects of defence, including capital works. However, 
Australia reserved the right to restrict PNG' s use of defence co-operation funds to 
purchase military hardware from other countries. 
Australian defence planners intended that PNG, where it pursued 
diversification and the acquisition of new military hardware, would come to 
appreciate fully the complexity of military materiel management. The costs of 
such equipment went beyond initial purchase costs. Maintenance and training 
were affected. These needed to be addressed by PNG in the equipment proposals. 
Australia wanted PNG' s Department of Defence to assume responsibility for 
maintenance and the routine equipping of its soldiers. In the event, the 
rationalisation needed to provide for the Force's operational needs within budget 
limitations was not forthcoming. Australia's defence policy objectives would 
only be possible if the defence assistance programme met the initial high 
construction costs of projects, such as the reconstruction of the naval wharf at 
Lombrum on Manus Island. 
Two other notable projects - the construction of a medical facility at 
Taurama Barracks and the Air Transport Squadron facilities at Jackson's Airport 
in Port Moresby - were set up during 1986-87. While the Defence Co-operation 
Programme paid the lion's share of the costs, these facilities were not constructed 
exclusively by _ Australians. The ADF encouraged PNGDF supervision, and 
counterpart funding for some of the buildings. The PNGDF gained valuable 
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experience while the Defence budget contributed to the facilities' cost. Even so, 
budget mismanagement in the PNGDF caused difficulties in counterpart funding. 
The Taurama Hospital Project provides a useful subject for examination of 
the Defence Co-operation Programme in the late 1980s. The project, designed in 
consultation with the PNGDF (Director of Health Services and his staff), 
recognised the poor state of medical facilities within the PNGDF. The new 
facility was to provide two operating rooms, complete with pre-operative waiting 
areas and a post-operative recovery ward. The project design included the 
provision of medical equipment. Overall, the cost was $Al million. A combined 
ADF/PNGDF engineer team carried out construction and the facility was opened 
in early 1987. The facility was closed after the opening ceremony and remained 
so for several years until it was converted into a maternity care ward for 
dependents. The medical facility, which was the most modern in PNG, was never 
fully utilised. The problems were apparent even during construction. 
The principal problem was the availability of medical officers within the 
PNGDF, especially specialist officers such as anaesthetists. Medical officers 
were enticed from the PNGDF by the private sector. Specialists were always 
difficult to recruit. So the facility could not be used for want of qualified local 
staff. Another problem related to health standards. The area had to be maintained 
free of contamination to reduce the risk of infection. This was not done because 
the facility was not used. In time, the cost to the PNGDF of decontamination was 
prohibitive. The PNGDF also disputed the appropriateness of the hospital layout, 
even though the design was a joint undertaking. This latter problem appears to 
have arisen as the PNGDF came under pressure to use the facility. Still, the 
infrastructure created at Taurama and elsewhere was valuable. 
The projects provided experience for the ADF and created facilities 
capable of supporting ADF units operating in PNG. The facilities were high 
profile, tangible evidence of the contribution made by the Defence Co-operation 
Programme to the development of the PNGDF. The defence co-operation focus 
on these areas ~hould have released PNGDF finance for the equipment of its units 
- uniforms, radios, vehicles and weapons. All too often these were not replaced. 
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Preference was given instead to other purchases, with senous long-term 
implications for the PNG defence budget. A case in point was the purchase of 
two Spanish Casa aircraft in 1990. Decisions such as these reduced funds for 
soldiers and caused morale in units to decline; it also undermined the capacity of 
the PNGDF to conduct operations - a combination, which was to be more 
exposed on Bougainville in 1989. 
Since 1979, Australian military units had exercised in PNG with PNGDF 
elements. Pre-independence links between Australian infantry units (the Royal 
Australian Regiment) and the PIR continued with annual exercises. Some PIR 
units also participated in army exercises in Australia. In the main, joint exercises, 
which utilised Australian air support, were conducted in PNG. Exercises such as 
Wantok Warrior (company level training), Paradise (a naval exercise) and Night 
Falcon (special forces) became regular events. 
The joint exercises gave ADP units an opportunity to train outside 
Australia in terrain which tested operational procedures and unit capabilities. 
There is no doubt that the training was valuable for the ADP. Australia 
recognised the ongoing benefits for the ADP with the JCFADT noting these in 
their report for that year (1991: 13). The PNGDF benefited as well, with troops 
able to widen their knowledge of equipment and procedures. In addition, the 
soldiers were able to use - at no cost - ADP aircraft and logistic facilities. 
However, the benefits for the PNGDF declined as their numbers participating in 
the exercise were reduced. As a result, the justification for ADP exercises in PNG 
was undermined. 
In 1987, exercises Wantok Warrior and Night Falcon, which were 
conducted separately, did not take place. The cancellation was due to the 
PNGDF's inability to participate due to commitments to Operation Green Beret 
87. Another key factor was the strain in the defence relationship arising from 
Australia's decision, announced in 1986, to reduce its defence aid (Defence 
Report 1986: 8). For their part, Australian defence policy makers thought it 
prudent - especially in a PNG election year - to avoid defence exercises in 
PNG which did not involve the PNGDF. To ignore this issue would have called 
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into question the state of PNG' s internal stability and the PNGDP' s capacity to 
deal with internal problems. 
By 1988, the exercises had resumed but another law and order operation 
- LOMET 88 - and commitments to national disaster assistance prevented a 
more active role for the PNGDP in that year. Ultimately, only a handful of 
soldiers was made available for these exercises. The fallowing year the PNGDP 
was fully committed to Bougainville. The combined exercise programme had, by 
1986, all but disappeared (JCPADT 1996 PADT 54). Aside from the PNGDP's 
inability to cope with the added burden of joint exercises, political concern in 
Canberra over Australian units exercising in PNG with a secessionist war on 
Bougainville prevented ADP deployments. 
That marked the end of exchange exercises with Australia. Contact with 
the ADP was subsequently limited to those attending courses in Australia or those 
working with ADP members posted to the PNGDP. The training of PNGDP 
soldiers in Australia, and the recommencement of officer training for PNGDP 
cadets in Australia from 1985, maintained contact between the PNGDP and the 
ADP. (Similar PNGDP training occurred in other countries, including the United 
States, Indonesia, Malaysia and New Zealand. However, the numbers attending 
courses in those countries were substantially less than those in Australia.) 
The cancellation of exchange exercises in 1987, with implications for the 
bilateral relationship, seemed out of character with events of that year. A new 
government, headed by Prime Minister Wingti, was formed after the June 
elections. One of its initiatives was to formalise bilateral relations with Australia. 
A treaty, later called the Joint Declaration of Principles (JDP), was proposed by 
Wingti to establish formally the nature of Australia/PNG relations. Prime 
Ministers Hawke and Wingti signed the agreement on 9 December 1987. PNG 
saw in the agreement a commitment by Australia to defend PNG from attack by a 
hostile foreign power. Australia did not see that responsibility as unconditional. 
Australia had in mind the potential problems posed by any expansionist 
threat from Indonesia. The potential for low-level tensions arising along the 
PNG/Indonesian border was a key area of concern. Indeed, that concern had 
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prompted the expansion of the PIR in 1957 (See Chapters 2 and 4 ). However, the 
Australian government did not want to be drawn into a confrontation with 
Indonesia within the framework of the JDP. Nor did it want PNG to act 
irresponsibly because it had the backing of a larger regional power. Wingti 
recognised the potential problems posed by Indonesia but he did not rely on the 
JDP. Indeed, even before its signing, he had concluded a Treaty of Mutual 
Respect, Co-operation and Friendship with Indonesia in March 1987 (See Chapter 
4 ). Under that agreement, the two countries agreed to close liaison, especially 
along their common border, and consultation. 
Localisation 
Since self-government in 1973, a process of localisation had been 
underway in the PNGDF. Localisation was the term given to the gradual 
replacement of Australians within the PNGDF by Papua New Guineans. The 
pace of localisation was determined by the availability of suitable Papua New 
Guineans with the qualifications or skills to do the job. In the infantry battalions, 
localisation was achieved rapidly; even commanding officers were localised, 
beginning with the appointment of then Lieutenant Colonel Diro in 1974. In the 
technical areas, especially in supervisory positions, however, localisation was a 
slower process because PNG officers lacked experience in rank and 
qualifications. Effective supervisory skills took time to acquire. 
By independence a degree of localisation had been achieved. However, 
there were problems with localisation, which would impact on the PNGDF. As 
part of localisation planning, suitable replacements for Australians were identified 
from among the Papua New Guineans. In some cases, the choice was made 
simple because few individuals were suitably qualified to assume the 
responsibility. Little effort was made to ensure that a group of more junior, less 
experienced Papua New Guineans was available to provide future appointments. 
Many suitable individuals left for other employment, especially when faced with 
relatively young incumbents in the top job and little prospect of promotion. 
Others were enticed by private enterprise and the prospect of better pay as the 
country's economy grew. 
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The second (and third) tier of qualified soldiers was important to the 
formation and maintenance of a post-independent army. By the 1980s, the loss of 
these individuals was posing problems for the PNGDF. The first group of Papua 
New Guineans in the key positions was moving on or finding problems in 
carrying out their responsibilities due to the lack of qualified assistants. In some 
areas of the PNGDF, especially support elements, ADF personnel were posted to 
the subordinate positions to maintain services - in effect a process of 
delocalisation. Papua New Guineans accepted the system. Indeed, senior officers 
preferred using junior ADF personnel to having ADF advisers of equal rank. 
Still, the use of Australians was largely a band-aid solution to a more deep-seated 
problem. Ultimately, the success of localisation depended on depth within the 
PNGDF, with Papua New Guineans at every level. As more qualified defence 
personnel - medical officers, pilots and technicians - were enticed to the 
private sector with the promise of higher wages, especially in the lucrative mining 
sector, the PNGDF began to suffer. The problems were to surface with the 
Bou gain ville deployment in 1989. 
The policy of localisation had been initiated before independence. The 
statistics (Figure 5.1) show an active and consistent policy of replacing Australian 
defence personnel with Papua New Guineans, who by the mid-1980s commanded 
all units of the PNGDF. However, not until 1986 did the cost of loan personnel 
cease to be 'the most significant cost in the defence assistance programme' 
(Defence Report 1986: 7). This proved to be an important factor in 
PNG/ Australian relations. The PNGDF had been concerned that assistance was 
being restricted so long as funds were being used to pay the salaries of ADF 
personnel in country. The PNGDF wanted to reduce ADF numbers and so gain 
access to the funds. That became their motivation in supporting a more rapid 
localisation rate, which, ultimately, undermined the PNGDF' s effectiveness. 
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Figure 5.1 
Localisation 1980-1990 
(Defence Reports 1980-90) 
Year No. of Australians 
1980 160 
1981 140 
1982 114 
1983 99 
1984 74 
1985 52 
1986 60 
1987 39 
1988 20 
1989 15 
1990 29 
For Australian defence policy planners, localisation proved useful in 
measuring the effectiveness of the defence assistance programme. The planners 
could point to a reduction of 131 Australian Defence personnel in the PNGDF 
between 1980 and 1990. In spite of the rapid rate of localisation, Australian 
defence officials denied that PNGDF effectiveness had been put at risk, confident 
that PNGDF problems were not well known outside of defence circles. Reports 
of the Defence Co-operation Programme glossed over many of the emerging 
problems. The ADF pointed to the success of defence co-operation in creating an 
increasingly independent PNGDF. That explains why, even within the ADF, so 
many were shocked by the appalling performance of the contingent on 
Bougainville. The declining ADF presence was not reflected in annual DC 
expenditure which, until 1992, showed a steady increase (Figure 5.2). Defence 
Cooperation Programme funding varied annually according to defence priorities 
that year. However, an indicative breakdown (based on FY 1993/94) 
(Department of Defence 1994) was: 
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• training, including exchanges - 40%; 
• ADP personnel, including loan and project staff - 55 % ; 
• mapping operations - 2 % ; 
• support for Pacific Patrol Boat - 1 %; and 
• aircraft maintenance - 2 % 
Figure 5.2 
Defence Co-operation Programme-Expenditure 
(Defence Co-operation 1985: Annex H) 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
A$m 
14.2 
15.2 
16.7 
17.3 
16.4 
16.0 
22.9 
24.3 
27.4 
27.4 
37 .973 
Australian defence policy planners responsible for defence co-operation in 
the 1980s, especially in the period 1985-90, must accept some of the blame. Even 
when the ADP managed to tum around declining capabilities, the PNGDF 
command unwittingly undermined the gains. One example arose from PNGDF 
participation in Australia' s bi-centennial celebrations. 
As Australia approached its bicentennial year, the Australian Defence 
Force (ADP) planned a military tattoo as its contribution to the celebrations. 
Given the strong historical links with the ADP, the PNGDF was invited to commit 
73 Defence aid grew to $52m in 1992 but thereafter declined. By 2001 , the aid level was $12m. 
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a military band for a six-month tour of Australia. The band was drawn from the 
Band Platoons of 1 and 2 RPIR. 
However, while the band was in Australia, Headquarters PNGDF made 
the decision to reform the platoons on their return as the PNGDF Band Platoon 
and place the sub-unit under Headquarter' s command rather than return the 
bandsmen to their former battalions. So ended a thirty-four year tradition with the 
commanding officers of both battalions losing the band platoons from their 
establishment. The battalions also lost an important medical capability - all 
bandsmen were trained as stretcher bearers. When 1 RPIR deployed to 
Bougainville in 1989, the absence of the bandsmen/stretcher bearers reduced the 
unit's capacity to provide emergency medical attention to casualties. The 
bandsmen who stayed behind in Port Moresby, were left to play at the funerals of 
PNGDF casualties. 
The reasons for the demise of the PNGDF since independence - in spite 
of substantial defence aid assistance from Australia - are a subject of special 
interest. Arguments dating back to the Second World War maintained that an 
indigenous force lacked the qualities needed for a professional army. Others 
suggested that wantokism and the factional nature of the army militated against a 
cohesive army. Australia has long been conscious of these problems but held to 
the belief that strict discipline combined with education, sustained training and 
border patrolling would strengthen the force. By holding to that belief, Australia 
produced an enviable professional army by 1975, capably commanded by 
indigenous officers, albeit supported by a core element of ADF personnel. 
Yet the PNGDF has been in decline since independence in spite of 
Australian assistance which, by 1991, amounted to more than $500 million 
(JCFADT 1991: 175). One of the reasons for that decline has been the failure of 
the PNGDF to assume the role of ADF personnel. In the late 1970s/ early 1980s, 
Australians held key line positions in the command structure and were present in 
all PNGDF units. They literally ensured strong command of the Force. 
Localisation saw the numbers of Australian personnel decline, coinciding with a 
change for the ADF staff remaining from command positions to advisory 
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positions. Those changes effectively saw a decline in Australian influence. At 
some point around 1982-84, the number of Australians fell below a critical point 
beyond which their numbers collectively could no longer arrest or even slow the 
decline in PNGDF capabilities. Nevertheless, Australia - encouraged by the 
PNGDF hierarchy anxious to reduce Australian influence - did not waiver from 
its policy of reducing ADF personnel in the PNGDF. Still, Canberra was 
prepared to try other options. 
Some in the Australian military argued that training PNGDF members in 
Australia would inculcate in the soldiers discipline and professional standards. 
Those standards could then be integrated in the PNGDF on their return. Few 
would dispute the value of Australian training. But the standards were simply not 
put into effect in PNG because the Force lacked the collective will to impose such 
standards. In the words of one officer, returning after graduation at the Royal 
Military College, Duntroon, once you step on PNG soil, professional standards in 
the PNGDF have no currency. 
Many former ADF advisers, including myself, hold to the view that the 
PNGDF can only be turned around by the presence - in sufficient numbers - of 
Australian servicemen in line positions in PNGDF units. Further, I would argue 
that reform of the PNGDF would also depend on the appointment of a 
commander with a reputation for strong discipline, and a capacity to withstand 
political influence in all its forms. That approach would test the political will of 
any PNG government but the absence of such a decision increases the prospect of 
military intervention. 
Localisation was appropriate policy. However, the process should have 
been dependent on monitoring and evaluation of PNGDF capabilities. The 
dogged reduction in ADF personnel, regardless of the consequences, played a part 
in the collapse of the Force as a professional army. Australian efforts to influence 
change in the absence of a significant presence within the PNGDF, through a 
more mature relationship, and through foreign and defence policy mechanisms, 
were ineffective alternatives. That led to an increasing tendency to make aid 
conditional, for example, on improved human rights or reductions in the Force. 
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However, conditional aid alienated the PNGDF, undermining any effectiveness 
Australia's approach may have yielded. By the late 1990s, Australia was faced 
with little choice but to reduce aid and, by so doing, lose any remaining 
opportunities to bring about change in the Force. 
The changing focus of ADF financial aid was another factor which played 
a role in the problems of the PNGDF. Early assistance was directed at 
infrastructure development and maintenance, and defence budget support. 
Australia moved away from these areas in the late 1980s in order to make the 
PNGDF more responsible for its management - and for the costs associated with 
that responsibility. Program aid became the new approach with Australian 
assistance targetted to specific projects, coupled with an insistence on counterpart 
funding. The PNGDF with its budget already strained by law and order 
operations often failed to meet its obligations for counterpart funding. Australian 
aid levels invariably dropped substantially; in some cases the inability of the 
PNGDF to contribute any counterpart funding saw proposed projects abandoned, 
leading to a decline in the quality of defence infrastructure. 
Australian defence aid since independence has suffered the disadvantage 
of many aid programmes in that aid, without a strong capacity to influence and 
implement towards specific objectives, fell short of making the PNGDF a viable 
organisation. Australian/PNG defence relations were bound to come under 
pressure. For its part, the PNGDF faced other problems. 
Ex-servicemen-A Policy Saga 
In January 1979, the defence minister proposed a once-only compensation 
payment to Papua New Guinean war veterans (Defence Report 1980/81: 7). The 
proposal acknowledged the long-held view that veterans had not been adequately 
paid for their services, even during the war when they received less than the 
Australian servicemen - an issue which led to tensions (See Chapter 2). The 
NEC approved the proposal, directing the minister for defence to fund the scheme 
(K3 million) and make the gratuity payments over a number of years. 
In the initial proposal, 4500 of the original 9000 ex-servicemen were to 
receive payments according to their rank. In October 1979, the gratuity payments 
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were extended to include police veterans awarded military campaign medals 
(during the Second World War) (Defence Report 1979: 8). Public pressure 
further forced the NEC to authorise payments to the relatives of deceased 
veterans. Subsequently, PNGDF ex-servicemen joined the chorus of those 
seeking compensation. Through their links with serving soldiers, they encouraged 
the rank and file to support them. As the number of claimants increased, tensions 
grew between the Department of Defence and veterans and their families, and 
between ex-servicemen of the PNGDF and serving personnel. Public sympathy, 
including from many related to former carriers, formed behind the veterans. Ex-
servicemen saw an opportunity to press their claims. These proved a major cause 
for ex-servicemen's support in the 1989 pay riots (See Chapter 6). Grievances 
were carried into the 1990s. 
The problems with disgruntled ex-servicemen were fuelled by the Wingti 
government's decision in 1987 to reduce PNGDF numbers to the authorised 
ceiling of 3050. The PNGDF issued guidelines for units to identify individuals 
f~r discharge so that the PNGDF could accord with the government ceiling. 
Some 347 personnel were identified (Defence Report 1987: 31) among the many 
soldiers who were medically unfit, past retirement age, or had presented 
disciplinary problems. In the latter case, those soldiers who faced seven charges 
or more for discipline were identified for discharge. 
Discharges were not handled efficiently, with many soldiers, including 
disciplinary cases, sitting in Taurama Barracks awaiting discharge because funds 
for their repatriation could not be found. (Suggestions that legal impediments 
prevented the discharge of soldiers were incorrect. The Commander, PNGDF, 
has the power of dismissal, subject to the natural justice provisions of the 
Constitution. Importantly, courts martial may be conducted against PNGDF 
personnel with provision under the Constitution for the appointment of a National 
Court judge, contrary to the JCF ADT ( 1991: 165) view that the Force cannot hold 
court martials [Discussion Counsel, PNG Ombudsman Commission of 31 July 
2001]). The group caused many problems in lRPIR, and little was done to speed 
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up the discharge process.74 Poor administration added to PNGDF' s woes, with 
soldiers discharged without their entitlements. Pay grievances were not resolved 
until 1996. But it was the ex-servicemen who would dog the PNGDF for years to 
come, unsettling the Force when the mood took them and swelling the ranks of 
mutinous soldiers when soldiers demonstrated over grievances. 
The absence of efficient discharge procedures for service personnel 
remains one of the biggest headaches for the PNGDF leadership. Disgruntled ex-
servicemen fuel discontent in the ranks while they remain in barracks awaiting 
discharge, safe in the knowledge that they rarely face disciplinary procedures. 
That has occurred because PNGDF officers are often uncertain how long funds 
for repatriation may take. (Prior to the 1980s, discharged personnel were returned 
to their province within hours of discharge.) Even when soldiers are removed 
from the barracks, many remain in the urban areas nearby, pocketing the money 
for return travel to their province and maintaining links with friends in the Force. 
So ex-servicemen remain, becoming a supportive voice outside army ranks. 
Defence Expenditure 
Lack of finance has been an underlying cause of problems affecting the 
efficiency of the PNGDF. While senior officers and unit commanders have 
pointed to the need for larger budget allocations in order to improve the PNGDF, 
the financial problem is more complex. The budget was only modestly increased 
during 1980-1990, in large part to fund pay increases. The Defence Department 
created many of the problems by its inability and unwillingness to work within 
budget provisions. Co-ordination of forecasts, prioritising of requirements , and 
disciplined supervision of budget allocations were consistently lacking. Unit 
operational and logistic forecasts were routinely inaccurate, ignoring the true 
running and replacement costs of vehicles, weaponry and rationing. Even the 
forecast costing of rations , quarters and training personnel was botched. 
Inefficient administration and poor management of recruiting targets resulted in 
the PNGDF exceeding the ceiling strength set by government and used by it to 
74 Author's experience as a military adviser in 1 RPIR 1985-88. 
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allocate funding. That ensured that the Defence Department began each year with 
insufficient funds. 
Defence officials responsible for budgetary matters exercised little real 
power within the PNGDF. Historically weak in the eyes of the PNGDF, the role 
of the department had been secondary to operational issues. Senior managers did 
not adhere to quarterly allocations designed to instil financial accountability in 
units. Commanders simply ignored them. Units used a system of ILPOCs 
(Integrated Local Purchase Orders) which allowed purchases on credit - not 
always from the cheapest source. The army knew that money would run out 
towards the end of the financial year and by holding back, other units of the 
PNGDF would have the advantage. Faced with commitments to law and order 
operations, the PNGDF argued that the cost was a government and police 
responsibility. Overspending (Figure 5.3) grew with law and order commitments. 
Figure 5.3 
Defence Expenditure v/. Budget Allocation (1980-1990)(K Millions) 
(Defence Reports 1980-90) 
Expenditure Allocation 
1980 26.2 25.9 
1981 25.0 23.4 
1982 25.0 22.3 
1983 32.1 27.4 
1984 34.6 37.4 
1985 34.6 31.2 
1986 35.6 35.2 
1987 38.4 34.2 
1988 39.6 34.4 
1989 48.0 41.2 
1990 67.3 43.2 
Major equipment purchases together with the maintenance costs of 
existing capital added to the problems. One short-term solution to inadequate 
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funding was to postpone barrack maintenance. However, in the long term, the 
cost of maintenance escalated, burdening the PNGDF with an unmanageable 
expense. In 1986/87 defence co-operation funds were used to address 
maintenance problems but important follow-on maintenance by the PNGDF did 
not occur. Little provision was made for the maintenance of equipment. In some 
cases, the costs were considerable, particularly for equipment purchased as part of 
the PNGDF' s policy of diversification. Equipment not used by the ADP, such as 
the Israeli Arava and the Spanish Casa aircraft, could not be supported even by 
private contract in Australia. Without money available for major overhauls in 
other countries further afield, the equipment became unserviceable. 
The PNGDF's financial problems are not, as the PNGDF has argued 
consistently, simply the result of inadequate funding. Rather, the financial 
hardship is the result of a distortion of defence priorities, which has seen 
increasingly larger slices of the defence budget taken up by personnel costs, by 
2000 between 70-80 per cent of the budget. Budgetary management aimed at 
containing costs has led to a repeated failure to make provision for the cost of 
replacement materiel, including defence infrastructure. Dibb and Nicholas (1996: 
3) argue that a more appropriate balance in funding should be personnel 50 per 
cent, operating costs 30 per cent and equipment and facilities 20 per cent. 
The PNGDF has failed to demonstrate that by getting the balance 1n 
perspective, the Force could be in a position to develop defence capability. There 
exists a dire need to get the basics right. Soldiers must be clothed, fed, equipped 
and accommodated in addition to receiving appropriate training. That would 
deliver a higher standard of morale, commitment, and faith in their leadership 
than is evident in the Force. 
A cycle of equipment replacement is also absent from planning. The need 
to programme replacement items according to the Force strength before 
equipment reaches its expiry date has yet to be developed. Such planning is also 
the principal preliminary step to costing the defence budget submissions each 
year. Over the past decade, the PNGDF leadership concluded that defence 
capacity can only be improved by securing additional soldiers and equipment. 
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One of the keys areas contributing to the PNGDF's ongoing demise is the 
burden of unallotted personnel. Dibb and Nicholas (1996: 59) identified some 
1300 surplus staff who made up Force strength but were not holding 
establishment positions. The PNGDF stands to reduce personnel costs markedly 
by discharging these personnel, although the redundancy costs were estimated to 
be K15 million in 1996 (ibid.: 112). That option does not sit comfortably with the 
army. The difficulties with the ex-servicemen in 1987 /89 (See Chapter 6) have 
convinced the PNGDF leadership - and now successive governments - that the 
issue is too sensitive. That will ensure the army will remain cursed by high 
personnel costs characteristic of the PNGDF since the 1980s. 
Much of the blame for the PNGDF' s financial problems can be attributed 
to the Force, though the government's role in not giving adequate recognition to 
the cost of law and order cannot be ignored. The PNGDF' s financial position was 
not unique. Other government departments had similar problems. That served to 
encourage the PNGDF. The army knew that the government would be reluctant 
to call it to account because of the government's growing dependence on the army 
to uphold civil authority. By the time soldiers were sent to Bougainville, the 
PNGDF cared little for budgetary limitations - the army had a convenient excuse 
for its financial mismanagement. However, excuses were little comfort to troops. 
A Soldier's Life 
The army's financial and administrative problems invariably took their toll 
on the soldiers. Replacement uniforms could not be obtained as uniforms wore 
out. Unit weapons were unreliable - even patrols deploying for border 
operations had difficulty finding suitable weapons (See Chapter 4). Radios were 
not replaced or serviced and units had few vehicles. Most vehicles were used 
beyond their serviceable life and operated only by cannibalising others. The 
RPIR Toyota landcruisers were, by 1986, six years old. So troops were 
knowingly put at risk whenever these vehicles were used. 
The main area of concern for soldiers was the rationing system within the 
barracks. Meals were poorly prepared, nutritionally unbalanced and often short of 
rationing entitlements. For example, frozen meat, provided in bulk, could not be 
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sliced at Taurama Barracks. Once issued to Taurama catering staff, the unfrozen 
meat was returned to Murray Barracks for slicing before meals could be prepared. 
Vegetables were often rotten when unloaded and shortfalls were not made up, as 
no provision was made in the purchasing system for wastage. Often soldiers 
received only rice for their meals. Commissioned officers, assigned as duty 
officers, abrogated their responsibility to visit messes daily to ensure the adequacy 
of the meals being served. Soldiers therefore had little recourse for complaints. 
Equipment and rationing problems were fundamental management 
problems. Many could be resolved with initiative and commitment. Had these 
problems been addressed, morale within the Force would have improved. Yet 
PNGDF officers did little, in part because they lacked confidence in their ability 
to resolve the issues. Many simply relied on army discipline to keep soldiers in 
check; even that was fast becoming a fragile commodity by the mid-1980s. 
Married soldiers fared better with food but they too suffered problems. 
Married quarters often needed maintenance, in some cases for safety and hygiene 
reasons. Many considered the soldiers fortunate to have unit housing: in 1986, for 
example, some 480 married soldiers in the Port Moresby area lived with wantoks, 
the vast majority in settlements. With the soldiers regularly away, their families 
were exposed to dangers. Their situation often caused welfare problems, which 
the PNGDF was unable to resolve. Soldiers deployed to isolated areas for 
extended periods could not easily be extracted to their home bases. When soldiers 
- both married and single - tried to use free travel and leave entitlements to 
return home, they frequently found that funding was not available. All these 
factors combined to make soldiers an unhappy lot, susceptible to unrest when the 
mood took them. 
Conclusion 
The changes 1n appearance and equipment during the 1980s reflected 
fundamental changes in the Force. Ten years from independence, the PNGDF 
was in almost every respect an independent army responsible for its own 
decisions, albeit still dependent on Australian defence aid. Even there, however, 
the PNGDF was becoming an equal partner in the decision-making. That 
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reflected in part the changes in foreign policy towards Australia and the latter ' s 
role in the security of PNG. There is little doubt that the PNG Defence 
Department felt more comfortable with the situation and senior officers, in 
particular, were satisfied with their new-found authority. 
However, the independent army was held together by an increasingly 
fragile leadership and entrenched officers were offered little incentive for 
performance. In some cases, they flouted their authority with few benefits for the 
rank and file. That led to instances of ill-discipline within units. The public had 
little knowledge of the problems. However, over the years, the murmurings 
within the ranks grew. The grievances would eventually manifest themselves on 
Bougainville and in the 1989 pay riots (See Chapter 6). All this occurred as the 
PNGDF found a more prominent role in PNG society. 
The PNGDF was being drawn away from an external focus as the 
government grappled with the law and order problem (See Chapter 6). Internal 
security commitments, including assistance in disaster relief, would also result in 
the decline of the longstanding PNGDF presence on the PNG/Indonesian border, 
in spite of friction with Indonesian forces stationed there (See Chapter 4 ). The 
PNGDF lacked commitment to border operations, in part because of the extended 
deployment and lack of support for operations away from their home base. As the 
focus turned to internal security, the PNGDF had less contact with Australia. 
Changes in the PNG/ Australian relationship were inevitable given the time 
which had elapsed since independence. Australia favoured localisation, a process 
which changed PNGDF attitudes to Australia. PNGDF attitudes towards the 
Defence Co-operation Programme had been influenced by debate on the role of 
DC and the cost to DC of ADF personnel stationed in PNG. Australia also stood 
back from internal security involvement at a time when the PNGDF needed 
support, especially in logistics. Australia's stance was influenced by the 
politicisation of the PNGDF, especially since 1985. The diversification theme, 
which gained momentum in the mid-1980s was influenced by politics. The result 
was the formation of new alliances with countries with their own concerns about 
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Australia's role in the region. The PNGDF was frustrated by the challenges 
facing the force yet felt it could no longer rely on Australian support. 
The commitment to internal security increased in spite of troop reductions. 
The ceiling (3050) prompted many in the Force to question the government's 
support. Burgeoning costs for the maintenance of equipment, including high-cost 
items obtained through diversification, left little financial capacity for additional 
demands. That impacted on the provision of rations and quarters for the troops, 
already disgruntled over conditions of service. The circumstances would 
ultimately strain relations within and outside the Force. Against that background, 
law and order operations would pose new challenges for the PNGDF. 
*********************** 
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Chapter 6 
Law and Order Operations 
'the value of the PNGDF lies partly in its existence as a national force with a 
reputation for efficiency and loyalty to the government ... ' (Mench 1975: 120). 
Introduction 
Within a decade of independence, the PNGDF was on the streets of the 
capital, Port Moresby, and in other major urban areas - at the government's 
request. Between 1984 and 1990, the PNGDF played a major role in each of six 
law and order operations in PNG (Appendices 1 and 2). The Somare government 
first authorised the use of soldiers to bolster police patrols around Port Moresby in 
late 1984, in spite of political concerns at independence about using the army in 
any internal security role. Some politicians, especially John Momis (leader of the 
Melanesian Alliance Party and one of the founding fathers of the PNG 
Constitution), expressed concern about the appearance of soldiers on the streets, 
questioning whether the government's action was constitutional. Momis' s 
concerns did not attract much support, in part because the number of defence 
personnel involved was relatively small - about 34 men. Later, the number of 
soldiers increased as the law and order clampdown escalated. By then, public 
concern over crime ensured widespread support for the use of troops. In time, the 
government accustomed Papua New Guineans to the use of the army in the fight 
against crime. Few seemed concerned about the risks in using the PNGDF. 
A Constitutional Role 
The CPC75 has very serious reservations about the army being used against its 
own people in any but the most extreme cases of civil disorder, and then subject to 
specific conditions (CPC Report, 1974: 1313)76 
The Constitutional Planning Committee, influenced by the lessons of post-
independent African states and their history of military takeovers , reluctantly 
provided for an internal security role for the PNGDF in the Constitution. 
However, the Committee took great care to build in safeguards and to emphasise 
75 Constitutional Planning Committee. 
76 See also Goldring 1978: 248-260. 
155 
that the use of the army in internal security was likely to be remote (personal 
communication Mr W. Lussick, OBE77 of April 1996). Disturbances that might 
warrant PNGDF intervention would be 'of such intensity [and] so widespread that 
the police are unable to cope and the authority of the government is seriously 
challenged' (CPC Report, 1974: 13/5).78 The CPC envisaged that, even in these 
extreme circumstances, the PNGDF would become involved in a graduated 
response, providing logistics, cordons, and roadblocks (CPC Report 1974: 13/5). 
The emergency provisions would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny (Goldring 
1978: 252). 
The role of the army after independence was the subject of widespread 
discussion prior to 1975 (See Chapter 2). Many, including members of the CPC, 
were acutely aware of the potential problems, given the Gazelle unrest in 1970 
and tensions on Bougainville in 1975. Then, public attention had been drawn to 
the possibility that internal unrest could stretch police resources, justifying the use 
of the army. The Gazelle issue helped focus political attention on the role of the 
army in internal security. May (1993: 6) records a 'general feeling that the 
administration had acted prematurely' in calling-out the army. Another academic, 
O'Neill (1971: 15) agreed, believing that the use of soldiers would have damaged 
the 'image of the army in the community'. 
Others, concerned about the prospect of a military coup, favoured a 
paramilitary role. Before independence, some had argued for an amalgamation of 
the police and the army. The then minister for territories , Morrison, favoured that 
approach. Other regional countries, for example Vanuatu, adopted the 
paramilitary option. However, this option reflected a limited capacity to finance a 
standing army, and the absence of any regional threat to these island countries. 
PNG understood that the army was a valuable 'status symbol ' (Turner 1990: 118). 
Yet there were other factors unique to PNG, which justified retention of the 
PNGDF. The country was the largest in the South-West Pacific, sharing a border 
with Indonesia. Colonial concerns over Indonesia influenced PNG' s views (See 
77 Mr Lussick, a member of the CPC, toured Africa extensively as part of the planning process. 
78 For more detail on Emergency Powers in the Constitution, see Goldring 1978: 248-260. 
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Chapter 4). PNG also knew that the army would receive ongoing support from 
Australia. The question therefore was not whether PNG should have an army but 
what would be its role. In that, Michael Somare would play an important part. 
Somare, Chief Minister in 1972, believed in separating the roles of the 
army and the police and in restricting the army's use to exceptional 
circumstances, such as national emergencies. Somare had made a genuine effort 
in the early seventies to gain a better understanding of the army and its role. The 
army too had encouraged such contact in order to bring the PNGDF and PNG' s 
political leaders closer to allay concern over the army. At the same time, soldiers 
were being educated in their responsibilities to serve the people and to support the 
government of the day. Somare believed that the army had a key role in post-
independent PNG. 
Other PNG political leaders, mindful of the risks posed by unrest in the 
Gazelle in 1970 and on Bougainville in 1974/75, agreed that use of the army in an 
internal security role was a possibility. Senior army officers were also urging a 
role79 (May 1993: 8). The views of academics and others also contributed to the 
debate. In acknowledging the army's role, however, the various groups were not 
convinced by arguments that 'integration of the army into the political system 
[ would] better prepare for an [internal security] role' (Sundhaussen 1973: 30). 
That may have worked in Indonesia but few felt comfortable with the army 
involved in government. The result could be a challenge to the civil authority. 
Political leaders felt that an appropriate balance rested with a clear definition of 
the military' s role, and stringent conditions under which troops could be called 
upon to assist in internal security. 
The CPC and PNG politicians were not the only groups concerned over 
the army's role in internal security. Prior to independence, academics were also 
voicing concern. Sundhaussen (1973: 31) noted that 'an army involved in internal 
security is already involved and de facto in politics ' . Hastings (1969: 30) shared 
the view, believing that 'once an army assumes that role [in internal security], it 
79 After several years of internal security operations, PNGDF officers later opposed the army's use 
in small-scale police operations (Lieutenant Colonel J. Koaba Post-Courier 30 March 1989: 1). 
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inevitably becomes involved in the politics of maintaining law and order'. The 
Indonesian army with its prominent role in internal security, stood out as a 
regional example. 
Mench (1975: 118), however, foreshadowed that the PNGDF provided the 
government 'with a valuable reserve of force', a point not lost on PNG's 
politicians. Indeed, Mench (ibid.: 117) believed that 'military aid to the police 
may prove less exceptional in PNG than had been the case in Australia'. This 
took account of Australian attitudes at the time of PNG' s independence. 
Australian soldiers had not been used in internal security ( except during the 
Second World War). Australians therefore felt uncomfortable with internal 
security powers conferred on the PNGDF. 
Mench (1975: 58) also claimed that the Gazelle unrest prompted hastily 
arranged training in internal security following the call-out. That could be 
interpreted to suggest that until the Gazelle problems, the PIR did not conduct 
training in internal security. However, the PIR had been training in internal 
security for years. In 1968, for example, troops deployed to the border following 
elections in Irian J aya received training in crowd control ( discussion Lieutenant 
Colonel Ormston80 (Retired), 21 November 1997). In 1970, soldiers conducted 
similar training in preparation for the Gazelle. 
The constant theme in these cautionary messages was the need to keep the 
army focussed on external defence. In that, the army had an unchallenged role. 
The police carried responsibility for law and order. Warnings from academics 
reinforced mistrust of the army in an internal role. Mediansky (1970: 41) warned 
that calling out the troops would 'result in ... civilian supremacy itself [becoming] 
dependent on the army'. This echoed the view of Janowitz (1964) that 'civil 
supremacy depended on sharp organisational separation between internal [the 
police] and external [the army] violence forms'. Yet these views left unanswered 
the problem of dealing with internal unrest which outpaces police capabilities. 
While the use of the army in internal security was seen as only a remote 
possibility, in spite of the Gazelle incident, support for such a contingency still 
80 Lieutenant Colonel Ormston was in 1968 a platoon commander in 1 PIR. 
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existed in PNG political circles. In 1971 , 'in the wake of increasing lawlessness 
in the Highlands, highland politicians called for the use of the PIR ' (May 1993: 
39). The same support was evident in 1977 (ibid.: 40). In the event, the PIR was 
not used until 1984. 
By 1975, the Constitution had put 1n place a number of checks and 
balances, including: 
• a division of control between command of the army and political control with 
a separation of powers between the commander and the defence minister; 
• the creation of a secretary of defence; 
• limitations on the powers of call-out requiring approval by the Governor-
General acting on the advice of the National Executive Council; and 
• subordination of troops to the civil authority in the event of call-out. 
Before examining the PNGDF' s involvement in law and order in detail, it 
is important to understand the Constitutional and legal provisions governing the 
use of the Force, especially in relation to the primacy of civil authority. Since 
1975, the PNGDF had stood out from involvement in internal issues. The 
deployment of the Kumul contingent to Vanuatu in 1980 helped reinforce the 
PNGDF' s external-oriented defence outlook. The other influence was the view, 
not without some justification, that the PNGDF would only be called upon as a 
last resort, where the internal situation had deteriorated to a point where only 
through the assistance of soldiers , armed and under their own command, could 
civil authority be restored. Indeed, using the British Army experience in internal 
security in Northern Ireland, the Middle East and Hong Kong, on whose training 
the PNGDF modelled its own, the internal situation must be critical before 
military intervention is considered. Even then, intervention is limited, sufficient 
for the restoration of police authority. 
Under the PNG Constitution, the PNGDF may be called upon to assist the 
civil authority in: 
• a civil disaster; or 
• the restoration of public order and security on being called out in accordance 
with Section 204 (call-out in aid to the civil power); or 
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• accordance with an Act of Parliament, during a period of declared emergency 
under Part X. 
In the latter case, the emergency prov1s1ons of the Constitution are 
governed by several principles set down by the CPC prior to independence 
(Goldring 1978: 249/250): 
• introduction and continuation of emergency powers are subject to 
parliamentary control; 
• emergency powers must: 
- recognise human rights; 
- be limited in extent; 
- should not, except 1n extraordinary circumstances, include detention 
without trial; 
- be justified by the Government; 
- include safeguards against abuse of power; and 
- be subject to scrutiny (by an Emergency Committee). 
The nature of defence support, including command and control 
arrangements, weapons and special powers, is established through consultation 
between the army and the police. In some cases, the police may recommend to 
government certain special requirements, for example, whether the soldiers will 
b . . 1 f 81 e given spec1a powers o arrest. In most situations involving the army in 
internal security duties, once order has been restored the police assume 
responsibility and the soldiers are withdrawn. Another option is to use soldiers to 
protect installations, allowing police to concentrate on restoring order. In all 
cases, the key profile is of the police, not the army, whose role should be limited. 
The reasons underlying this approach lie with the need to maintain the 
subordination of the Army, which recognises the different approaches by the 
police and the Army, and the principles of minimum force. For these aspects to 
81 While the delegation of arrest powers is consistent with the principle that the army should have 
no greater powers than those given to the police, it is difficult to see the rationale for such action. 
Soldiers should, at all times, be working with the police with whom the power of arrest properly 
lies. 
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be managed in any response to a breakdown in civil authority, the government 
sets down clear responsibilities for the Army, including a well-defined chain of 
command and good communications channels. In their absence, there is a risk of 
excessive use of force and of soldiers being used in a way which is inconsistent 
with the Constitution. These issues seem not to have been established before 
soldiers deployed. Perhaps such matters were considered well outside the 
situation - only 34 soldiers assisted the police in those early days. Still , even 
this small operation provided lessons for future law and order operations. 
Prior to PNG' s independence, the PIR trained for a role in aid to the civil 
power. Tight security surrounded the army' s training, even within the PNGDF-
only PIR units trained for internal security operations. Recruits, for example, 
were not even shown crowd control procedures until just prior to graduation. 
Training in riot control did not become part of recruit training until 1973, as the 
PNGDF prepared for independence. Care was also taken in moving troops to 
internal security training outside the barracks. Gas masks and protective 
equipment were concealed during movement. Most training was conducted away 
from public view to avoid political fallout and to maintain a degree of secrecy 
about military tactics. By independence, Constitutional provisions for the use of 
the army in internal security ensured continued training for such an eventuality. 
The PNGDF' s internal security training followed procedures which were 
designed to control the population and to restore authority. Soldiers operating in 
this role followed two main principles: the maintenance of public confidence and 
adherence to the legal provisions, especially in the use of minimum force. These 
provisions set down, as a fundamental principle, the primacy of the civil power. 
Troops on call-out were subordinate to the civil authority - the Police 
Commissioner and his delegate (a subordinate police officer) in the area of 
operations. The other guiding legal principles set down that: 
• soldiers had the same - no more no less - rights and duties as civilians with 
regard to self-defence and arrest, including in the use of force; and 
• notwithstanding that soldiers acted in response to the orders of a supenor 
officer, the soldier was ultimately responsible in a court of law for his actions. 
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While the PNGDF acted under the overall command of a police officer, 
the army sought to avoid joint operations where the police commanded troops 
directly. The army reasoned, with some justification, that soldiers were more 
effective under their own officers. In any event, Army/police procedures varied; 
the terms used by each disciplined force were different and each force employed 
different drills. Sound command procedures, especially under difficult and 
hazardous situations were fundamental to achieving the restoration of civil 
authority. That approach did not rule out a police presence in army units in the 
interests of accountability and to take advantage of police powers of arrest. 
Senior army officers and the police accepted these arrangements. Training 
in internal security centered on regular liaison and familiarity by members of both 
forces with each other's tactics. These reduced problems on the ground in the 
event that soldiers were called out. Given their routine deployment in crises, the 
police were experienced while, until 1984, soldiers had been limited to theory. 
Aid to the Civil Power 
Broadly, the PNGDF role in assisting the civil authority was intended to 
re-establish control. Patrols, roadblocks and observation points were measures 
employed during a state of emergency or curfews as the situation dictated. 
Procedures used by the security forces could also be complex where the threat 
was considered high. The emphasis in PNGDF internal security training was to 
present a disciplined and professional face to the public. However, it was 
important to recognise that the army's presence arose because the police were no 
longer capable of enforcing civil authority. In those situations, the PNGDF 
represented the last bastion of defence against anarchy. By necessity, troops were 
deployed to achieve quick results within the limitations of minimum force. 
In understanding the army's role, it is useful to compare some of the 
procedures. The basic army formation used in internal security was the platoon 
(34 men). The platoon was the smallest conventional army unit commanded by a 
commissioned officer, usually a lieutenant. The unit had a radio integral to its 
formation and therefore possessed a capacity for control by higher headquarters. 
A platoon had good firepower, which ensured a capacity to operate away from the 
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main unit for limited periods of time. Importantly, the platoon could be broken 
into three smaller elements (sections) should the need arise. For all these reasons 
the platoon, capable of manoeuvre even within the confines of urban areas , 
became a useful formation in internal security. One principal use of the platoon 
was in restoring police control during riots and large-scale demonstrations. The 
structure was commonly referred to as the boxformation (Figure 6.1). 
Figure 6.1 
The Box Formation82 
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The box formation has the hallmarks of the hollow square 83 - providing 
protection against attacks from any direction (all round defence). The platoon 
commander could adjust the platoon's focus if confronted by new threats , 
ensuring flexibility in manoeuvre. The platoon presents a disciplined, well-armed 
and cohesive military formation to the public. Similarly, the procedures followed 
by the platoon in dealing with riotous crowds are set-piece and rehearsed in 
keeping with the laws governing the use of troops. Clear and unambiguous 
warnings to disperse are given to the crowd before adopting the use of force. In 
the event that troops are required to fire, specific targets, usually ringleaders, are 
82 The Bannerman was responsible for displaying a warning banner prior to action being taken by 
the soldiers while the Wiremen set up the wire obstacles to protect the unit from the crowd. 
83 The hollow square was first used in European warfare by infantry in the Eighteenth Century to 
defend themselves against cavalry charges. 
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identified before the order is given. Automatic or indiscriminate volleys fired into 
crowds are avoided. In such tense situations, the highest standards of training, 
discipline and leadership are essential. Indeed, the deployment of small units, 
commanded by young and inexperienced officers, demanded high standards. 
The crowd dispersal tactics based on the box formation offer the most 
common army presence in aid to the civil power aside from cordon operations. 
The platoon box formation is a discrete army unit. Since the PNGDF became 
involved in law and order operations in 1984, crowd dispersal procedures have 
never been used. That begs the question of why the PNGDF was needed. The 
success of army intervention relied on police co-operation, far from assured given 
their dubious history. 
Police/ Army Relations 
The early history of the PNGDF, including during the Second World War, 
1s marked by clashes between soldiers and the police. Rivalry and physical 
confrontation has instilled in the members of both forces a degree of antipathy 
toward each other. Attitudes had changed little when soldiers joined the police on 
the streets of Port Moresby in 1984. Still, some argued that by assisting the 
police, the two forces would be drawn dangerously close together. For those who 
argued this way, running battles between police and soldiers in 1987 must have 
been reassuring. 
Figure 6.2 
Police/ Army Clash - January 1987 
On 1 January, a policeman reprimanded a soldier for allegedly sexually assaulting the 
policeman's girlfriend. Soldiers later assaulted the policeman near Gordon's Barracks, 
Port Moresby. When police responded, the soldiers sought the assistance of troops from 
Murray Barracks. Police cars were damaged and a police officer assaulted. Further 
confrontations occurred on 3 and 5 January. 
On 6 January, Prime Minister Wingti called the Police Commissioner and the PNGDF 
Commander to account, directing them to restore order in the police and army ranks. The 
Commander threatened soldiers involved in the melee with the sack. Within days the 
tensions eased (Post-Courier 5 January 1987: 2). 
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Mench (1975: 204) had warned that an' attempt ... to balance .. . the 
police [against the defence force] .. . may lead to the setting up of dangerous 
rivalries'. The government, as a matter of priority, did ensure that the defence 
force strength remained below that of the RPNGC. Yet no account seems to have 
been taken of the advantages enjoyed by the army over the police. The army had 
superior firepower and a concentration of manpower in key parts of the country, 
especially in the capital, Port Moresby. These made the army the most powerful 
of the three disciplined services. 
Mench seems not to have taken account of the rivalry between the two 
forces, which already existed. The PNGDF view was consistently that the army 
was in every respect superior to the police. That view was reinforced by the 
army's assistance during law and order operations conducted from 1984. Others 
shared Mench's view. Colonel Glanville, now retired, said in 1985 that the 
army's involvement in internal security would 'destroy ... fragile national unity ' 
(quoted in Standish 1994: 63). Both Glanville and Huai (then Chief of 
Operations) rejected in 1981 any military intervention in internal security. Their 
position was at odds with Diro, who in 1975 supported an army role in internal 
security - a view shared by senior PNGDF officers at the time. 
Standish (1994: 63) claimed that the PNGDF was not ' designed for 
internal security roles ' . The basis for that view is not clear. In fact, the 
formations designed for external defence were easily deployed for internal 
security operations - subject to regular training in such operations. That 
structure had been used by the British army in the Middle East and in the Far East 
since the Second World War. 
Neither the army nor the civil authorities were well prepared for military 
assistance in internal security. The Gazelle call-out in 1970 had shown poor 
liaison between the various agencies , detracting from the fundamental need to 
promote a 'constitutional tradition of civil supremacy over the military' (Mench 
1975: 59). The situation had not improved by the mid-1980s when law and order 
operations were mounted. Inter-agency co-operation was still described as ' ad 
hoc' (Morauta 1984: 14). Attitudes within the police and the army did little to 
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foster a co-operative effort. The police envied the standards of accommodation 
and rationing maintained in the army bases. The soldiers were better equipped, in 
spite of an overall deterioration in army standards since independence. 
The army conducted much of its internal security training without police 
involvement. The situation did not improve until 1986 when police mobile 
squads began to conduct joint training. Senior army officers saw little of their 
police counterparts. The benefits of joint training in communications and 
deployment eluded the security forces. That made more difficult a joint approach 
in combating crime. Frustrations and conflict which were never fully resolved 
added to tensions between the forces. 
Before examining the early operations 1n detail , it is important to 
understand the sequence of events and the influences behind the government's 
decision to call out the PNGDF. Indeed, these events would be repeated within a 
few months, in 1985, when soldiers would be deployed to assist in larger 
numbers. In examining events, special attention must be given to the nature of the 
threat to internal security- the so-called raskols and tribal fighting. 
Raskols - A Growing Concern 
'Many ... believe that the deteriorating law and order situation is leading the 
country down the road to anarchy. Others say it is already there' (Turner 1990: 
162). 
The term raskols was 'first used in the 1960s to describe Port Moresby's 
youth gangs but it gained currency after the gangs ... adopted the name in the 
1970s as a badge of notoriety' (Dorney 1990: 301). Within two decades, the 
raskol gang had become 'the most potent and disturbing symbol in contemporary 
law and order folklore in PNG' (Dinnen 1996: 93). Raskols know that the threat 
of police intervention while committing a crime is low, the risk of detection after 
the event small, and even if arrested and convicted - neither are certain - there 
is little likelihood of serving a full sentence. Those are the facts. Debates which 
emphasise the um·eliability of statistics, and the prevalence of violent crime in 
other countries, including Australia, do not diminish the criminal threat in PNG. 
Attempts to dress up crime as an act of survival or the raskols as latter-day Robin 
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Hoods insult the victims of crime and those who live with the threat - black and 
white. Put simply, PNG has a serious and worsening crime problem. 
Figure 6.3 
Raskols 
(Pacific Islands Monthly 1993: 1) 
A number of studies has been conducted into the raskol phenomenon in 
PNG.84 The efforts of other individuals have not been duplicated in this thesis, 
which draws upon their findings and, my own first-hand experiences. 
One of the central issues of crime in PNG is the glaring paradox -
criminal activity is rampant among people who hold sacred across all tribal 
cultures the principle of payback. In this system, any act against an individual 
risks payback by the victim's tribal group - not necessarily against the member 
who committed the offence. The payback system is at least theoretically a great 
leveller, especially among highland people. Yet little payback for criminal 
attacks occurs beyond tribal fights. For example, Papuan raskols carry out 
criminal activity with apparent impunity, even against fellow Papuans. In 
discussions with Papua New Guineans, the paradox has been explained 1n 
different ways. Some argue that raskols are protected by tribal groups in return 
for their protection from other criminals and for a share in the spoils. The 
magnitude of the raskol problem was starkly revealed in December 1984. At least 
eleven gangs with a membership of 3000 operated in Port Moresby (Appendix 3). 
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Capital Fright 
In Port Moresby, in response, the public looked for measures to thwart the 
raskols. 'Port Moresby became a city under siege' (Dorney 1990: 305) as those 
who could upgraded security around their homes (Figure 6.4 ). Fences, electronic 
gates, sensors and metal grills on windows and doors became commonplace in the 
capital. Security became 'big business ' (Post-Courier 31 May 1985: 2); the 
installation of domestic security devices and fences cost upwards of Kl 6,000 at 
1985 prices (ibid.). These measures were supplemented by security guards. 
Under PNG law, the guards could not be armed. As the raskols often had at least 
one firearm, the guards offered little opposition. The guards worked night shifts 
without rest so that many simply slept on the job, failing to provide even early 
warning of a raskol attack. On occasion, guards assisted the raskols with 
information. Unscrupulous security firms also staged break-ins to secure a 
lucrative guard contract or to improve business. 
Figure 6.4 
Security Measures - Port Moresby 
(Post-Courier 31 May 1985: 2). 
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Dogs became a popular security measure in the capital. The animals were 
relatively cheap, were loyal , and it was well known that raskols and Papua New 
84 See, for example, Harris (1988). 
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Guineans generally had a fear of dogs. Still, the raskols devised ways of dealing 
with the dogs either by distracting or killing them. Most people used the dogs for 
early warning rather than any serious attempt to deter criminals. 
The police also used dogs effectively as an anti-crime measure. Police 
dogs were trained at Bomana, a police training facility on the outskirts of Port 
Moresby. The pups were fostered out to the public for their first twelve months 
before training as police dogs. The German shepherd pups were not mature 
enough to be trained before twelve months though from 1988 the police began 
training the dogs at six months in order to meet the RPNGC demand. The police 
provided food weekly and all veterinary care. As care of the dogs was important, 
only members of the public who could guarantee the dogs' security received the 
animals. Sir Michael Somare was among those who fostered dogs. 
In time, radio networks supplemented the physical security measures 
around and in houses. Radios provided a quick and usually reliable link to 
assistance in the event of trouble. Raskols were in the habit of cutting telephone 
lines before entering premises. Radios were especially useful when away from 
home - some models even indicated position when activated. Sprays, screamers 
and, ultimately, guns were used to enhance security though the latter required 
licenses. These improved security but did not always shift the balance in the 
individual's favour when faced with a criminal gang armed with pistols or rifles. 
The cost of add-on security was often high though, in time, new buildings 
incorporated the security features in their design. The high cost of maintenance of 
electronic devices, which were particularly susceptible to tropical weather, 
influenced policy decisions on housing for staff. Some companies decided to 
build compounds to enhance security and reduce the numbers of guards. (Air 
Niugini built the first compound in Port Moresby in 1969.) Another form of 
compound living included the use of high-rise buildings. Even so, these were 
targetted by criminals. The buildings posed other problems. In Port Moresby, the 
buildings often lacked water pressure and occupants were vulnerable in the event 
of fire - the fire brigade lacked equipment for buildings higher than two stories. 
In time, others would choose to fly in/fly out, leaving their dependents in 
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Australia. Under this scheme, costs were reduced dramatically, not only for 
security but also for medical and education expenses. 
A Wider Problem 
The raskol problem was not unique to Port Moresby. Since 1966, robbery 
and looting had been reported along the Highlands Highway together with 
increasing crime in urban areas of the Highlands (Clunies-Ross et al. 1973: 30). 
Nor were raskols the only threat to law and order. Tribal fighting had challenged 
policing in the country even before independence. However, according to 
Mapusia, a research officer in the RPNGC, the frequency and ferocity of tribal 
fighting had increased since 1973 (1986: 66; See also Standish 1994: 64). In 
response, the government introduced an Inter-Group Fighting Act in 1977 
(Mapusia 1986: 57) and used the mobile squads to restore order. 
Tribal fighting was prompted by traditional issues, especially land 
disputes, bride price, payback and theft. In time, political issues would also lead 
to fighting. Tribal fighting has been the subject of much research. Clifford 
(1984: 92) saw tribal fighting as a response to disorder, a view shared by Mapusia 
(1986: 65) who believed that the fighting was neither civil unrest nor a threat to 
the security of the state. Others saw the police, and later the security forces , as 
part of the problem. Dinnen, at an academic presentation in Canberra (5 
November 1996) on PNG: The State of Violence or the Violence of the State, 
highlighted the retributive character of police actions, especially when operating 
under emergency measures. Police operations were often punitive, according to 
Dinnen - a theme reflected in the names of operations, such as Mekim Save (to 
make [people] understand). Dinnen claimed that operations proved counter-
productive, often alienating the police. 
In spite of these aspects, governments strengthened the measures, 
employing elements of the PNGDF in 1987 in the highlands. In time, tribal 
fighting and raskol activities across the country threatened economic activity, 
especially around mining sites. Preventative measures added to the cost of 
production through the increasing use by mining companies of fly in/fly out 
arrangements for staff and air transportation of goods and mineral products. 
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The mining industry provided key benefits for the Papua New Guinea 
economy. However, employment programmes have fallen short of meeting the 
needs of the workforce. During the 1980s, 4000 new jobs each year were 
insufficient for the 40,000 strong labour force (Brunton 1986: 35). Many youths 
expect that education will ensure employment and access to goods. When that 
fails to materialise, these individuals have 'a feeling of purposelessness and 
alienation [both] closely associated with their subsequent anti-social behaviour' 
(National Planning Office 1981: 355). Successive governments failed to respond 
to the unemployment problem, according to Brunton (1986: 35-40) due to: 
• a lack of political cohesion and the absence of a common view on national 
destiny; 
• an imbalance between the allocation of government resources to youth and 
young people's expectations; 
• low levels of political consciousness; and 
• an expensive and inefficient public sector. 
Certainly these issues explain why law and order problems forced the 
government to adopt contingency measures as a quick fix solution. Bi-partisan 
support for emergency measures was more easily obtained than political support 
for a long-term economic policy which may have reduced unemployment. By the 
time the government took action against crime, raskols had adopted a pattern of 
activity which depended for its survival on fear and community support. 
The 49 Steps 
'the law and order problem ... is a complex ailment ... caused by a combination of 
economic, social and political factors' (Turner 1990: 163 quoting from the 
Clifford Report 1984). 
In October 1984, the NEC, meeting in Madang, approved 49 measures 
aimed at combating crime. 85 The decision was prompted by sustained public 
pressure over previous months for the government to address rising crime. One of 
the key decisions was to involve the PNGDF in law and order operations; this was 
85 NEC Decision 176/84 'Measures to Combat the Breakdown in Law and Order' (Turner 1990: 
165). 
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one of a number of confidence-building measures designed to increase the 
manpower available in the fight against crime. Indeed, the police had often 
argued that for want of more police crime was getting out of control. The 
government decided that using PNGDF manpower would be a cheaper short-term 
alternative than the recruitment of additional police. The government also 
reasoned that the PNGDF was already a disciplined force with powers under the 
Constitution to assist the civil authority. In any event, the deployment of soldiers 
was only a temporary solution. After the police had regained control, the soldiers 
would no longer be needed. However, the government did not understand the 
tactics used by the PNGDF in internal security. That lack of understanding had 
been apparent before independence, including by Michael Somare, then chief 
minister. The government's decision would have long-term consequences. 
Indeed, Turner (1990: 177) noted that: 
if strong-arm para-military tactics and attitudes continue[d] to hold sway 
. .. [it] would mark the beginning of an irreversible march to the 
destruction of the founding principles of Papua New Guinea. 
Operation Santa Claus 84 
When the PNGDF was called upon to assist the police in 1984 - as 
supplementary manpower not as formed units - Headquarters PNGDF did little 
to counsel the government on the implications. Rather, PNGDF staff were more 
concerned over the question of whether weapons would be authorised for its 
soldiers. Others, outside the Defence Force, including some within the RPNGC, 
were worried about the risk of clashes between soldiers and the police, especially 
given their past history of conflict. In the event, the main cause of concern in the 
police ranks was their insistence that they be issued long trousers like the soldiers. 
In shorts , then standard issue for general duties officers , the police felt inferior to 
their army counterparts (personal communication Superintendent D. 
Ramathugula, RPNGC of 8 August 1996). Mobile squad trousers were issued. 
On 21 December 1984, a platoon of soldiers deployed from Taurama 
Barracks to assist the police in Port Moresby. During the operation -
codenamed Santa Claus 84 - soldiers were allocated on the basis of two per 
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patrol, accompanying a lone policeman (Figure 6.5). After much debate between 
the commander and the police commissioner, over whether the patrols should be 
armed, each patrol was issued with one smoke gun. The smoke or gas gun was a 
1.5 inch calibre, single barrel, shot gun used to fire tear gas canisters into crowds 
up to a range of 200 metres. The weapon was carried for its deterrent effect with 
little application in thwarting armed criminals. The soldiers were not permitted to 
carry weapons. Soldiers were also used to supplement police at roadblocks. 
Overall, the defence presence was small - 34 men compared to 650 police. 
Figure 6.5 
Combined PNGDF/Police Patrol - 1984 
(Post-Courier 24 January 1985: 3) 
The decision to deploy the PNGDF was opposed by then Colonel Huai 
(Chief of Operations). Huai argued that the PNGDF had become no more than 
cheap manpower. Others opposed the government's decision to use the army, 
especially Father Momis who described it as a 'constitutional violation' (Post-
Courier 28 January 1985: 3). However, public concern over law and order muted 
outcries over the government's use of the troops. Police Commissioner Tasion 's 
claim seven days into the operation, that serious crime had dropped allayed public 
concern over the use of soldiers in internal security. 
The operation in Port Moresby, which concluded on 8 January, provided 
only temporary relief. On 10 January, a young Papua New Guinean woman was 
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pack-raped, suffering severe head injuries in the attack. That prompted a 
women's rally which re-ignited pressure on the government on the issue of law 
and order. Only a week after the incident, raskols raped two expatriate women 
and a nine year old girl. One suspect was arrested but escaped on the way to 
court. Public anger intensified and, mindful of the 1984 women's 
demonstration, 86 the government again authorised the call-out of the PNGDF. On 
21 January, a company of soldiers was allocated to police operations in Port 
Moresby for three months. 
Operation Hot Spot 
The operation - codenamed Hot Spot - was modelled on the combined 
activities of Operation Santa Claus 84. The soldiers (100-120) provided extra 
manpower for police patrols, which facilitated operations over a more sustained 
period. On the streets of Port Moresby, an army presence was becoming routine. 
Ten years after independence, 1985 would not be a good year for the PNG 
government. Law and order problems would worsen, compounded by other 
nagging national issues. The PNGDF had its own problems after beginning the 
year in the public spotlight in combined operations with the police. In February, 
allegations by Enga MP, Paul Taurato, that military weapons were being used in 
tribal fighting in the highlands appeared in the press. Indeed, two soldiers armed 
with self-loading rifles (SLRs ), 87 allegedly took part in tribal fighting in Enga 
(Post-Courier 21 February 1985). Brigadier-General Noga responded to the 
allegations by ordering an investigation and a stringent check of weapon holdings 
in all military bases. By March, Noga reported that two soldiers on leave had 
been involved in tribal fighting but he assured the public that no army weapons 
had been used. 
The accuracy of those weapon checks was questionable. In August 1986, 
for example, Lance Corporal Dogeri Leva was fined K35 for removing an SLR 
rifle from Taurama Barracks on 14 September 1984 - a weapon used in the rape 
86 In 1984, a rally which followed the rape of a New Zealand woman and her daughter, expected to 
number 5000, drew 25000 in protest (Turner 1990: 167). 
87 The 7 .62 mm self-loading rifle was standard issue for riflemen in the PIR. 
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of an Australian woman on Tuesday 1 April 1986 (The Times 13-19 August 
1986: 3). That weapon had been missing from the 1 PIR armoury before the 
PNGDF carried out the weapon checks ordered by Brigadier-General Noga in 
February/ March 1985. Yet its loss was not discovered and reported. 
The security of military weapons began to fall away in the 1980s.88 
Military regulations require all weapons to be accounted for on each occasion 
they are issued. In addition, the unit was required to conduct full weapon checks 
each pay Thursday. Weapons were to be stored in armouries with the bolts/firing 
mechanisms removed and stored separately in a safe. Keys to armouries were 
secured in the Guard House of each unit at the end of each day. Yet, weapon 
checks were not always carried out in accordance with procedures; armoury keys 
were taken home and the weapons left unattended in quartermaster stores. In 
those circumstances, weapons could easily be removed for extended periods or 
simply sold. In some cases, soldiers rented weapons to raskols for a weekend or 
used the weapons themselves in criminal activities. 
In March 1985, more problems emerged for the PNGDF. The police and 
the National Intelligence Organisation investigated the Force, following rumours 
of potential unrest arising from poor morale. The principal cause of the unrest 
was attributed to the resignation of Colonel Huai (Chief of Operations) on 31 
January. Huai had been a vocal critic of the government, attacking its use of the 
PNGDF on law and order operations, the lack of funds for defence, and the 
government's decision to purchase the Israeli Arava aircraft against defence 
advice. Huai had resigned in protest, promising to assist soldiers as a civilian 
(Post-Courier 28 February 1985). 
On 4 March, Huai, now a civilian, again attacked the government, this 
time over politicising the PNGDF. In part, he was again referring to the 
government's decision to purchase the Arava aircraft. That purchase had come in 
for close scrutiny with allegations that PEL AIR Aviation had received K400,000 
88 By 1996, the PNGDF could not account for eighty-five weapons. 
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commission on the sale89 (The Times 2 June 1985: 1). Huai said that 'the next 
commander had to be beyond reproach' (Post-Courier 4 March 1985: 2). Huai's 
actions enjoyed popular support from the rank and file of the PNGDF. Still, some 
recognised that the publicity also had benefits for Huai's well-known ambition to 
contest the 1987 elections as a member of the People's Progress Party. Whatever 
Huai's motivation, the publicity did little to help Brigadier-General Noga whose 
leadership came under scrutiny. The government sought to shore up the 
commander, publicly announcing continued support for him. Even so, rumours of 
unrest undermined government confidence in the PNGDF' s loyalty. Some in 
government were mindful of Father Momis' s warnings in January when he 
criticised the use of soldiers in internal security; a process which 'destroyed 
[PNG's] democratic image ... [with] military coups not long in coming' (Post-
Courier 28 January 1985: 3). 
Operation Green Beret 85 
'[ crime J ... is shaping the internal economy of PNG and shaking the confidence 
of the population in the ability of the system to deliver peace and order' (Dorney 
1990: 288). 
Public concern over law and order had been building since January 1985. 
The early operations conducted in Port Moresby failed to remove the raskol 
threat. Indeed, people were no longer confident in the government's ability to 
establish order let alone improve the situation. The police too were concerned, 
examining all possible options. Consideration was given to a request for 
Australian defence personnel to assist in logistics, communications and training. 
No official request was forthcoming although, at the time, an Australian 
communications specialist was advising the RPNGC as part of an ongoing 
commitment. The · Australian presence in the RPNGC had been declining since 
independence, as it had been in the PNGDF. Concern in Australia over the 
deteriorating law and order situation in PNG would lead to the establishment of a 
law and order aid programme under the auspices of Australia's AusAID agency. 
89 PEL AIR had featured in a controversial incident in which Prime Minister Somare had 
intervened to prevent a search of a PEL AIR aircraft by customs officials (Dorney 1990: 234-235). 
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In April 1985, the Chairman of the Law and Order Task Force, speaking at 
a gang retreat - an initiative designed to rehabilitate raskols - encouraged gang 
members to join the PNGDF. The comment was made during a demonstration 
rifle shoot for raskols by soldiers at the Goldie River Training Depot. The raskols 
were impressed by the firepower of military weapons, some seeing their potential 
use in criminal activity. Some raskols did join the PNGDF, eluding the 
mandatory criminal check by using false names. However, soldiers with criminal 
backgrounds undermined discipline. Some used their positions to support 
criminal activity. The raskol presence in the PNGDF and their adverse effect is 
addressed in Chapter 7. 
Initiatives such as gang retreats did little to curb crime. On 7 June, a New 
Zealand woman and her daughter were pack raped, rekindling memories of a 
similar attack in October 1984. A week later, the same gang carried out several 
holdups around Port Moresby, eluding police attempts to capture them. Crime 
worsened when, on 11 June, twenty-two prisoners escaped from Bomana gaol. 
Government patience ran out on 12 June. The NEC approved, initially for 
a period of twenty-one days, a state of emergency with effect from 13 June. A 
curfew was introduced in the National Capital District from 2100 hours to 0400 
hours effective from 17 June (Figure 6.6). Parliament endorsed the NEC decision 
for a state of emergency and extended the period for two months until 4 
September. Under the provisions of the Constitution, a state of emergency may 
be introduced for a period of twenty-one days provided the NEC decision is 
endorsed by Parliament within fifteen days (Section 239 (1 )). Parliament can 
extend the initial period to two months , and for subsequent periods of two months 
(Section 239 (1) and (3)). Notwithstanding support for the State of Emergency, 
the Opposition had earlier criticised the Somare government over its decision. 
Opposition leader Wingti suggested that the government was 'playing with the 
peoples ' short-term emotions ' (Post-Courier 24 April 1985). 
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Figure 6.6 
Curfew - June 1985 
(Post-Courier 17 June 1985: 14) 
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The state of emergency involved 1500 police - 400 extra police were 
brought to Port Moresby from outlying provinces - and 140 (1 RPIR) soldiers 
(Post-Courier 14 June 1985: 1). The operation included a plan to saturate Port 
Moresby with 105 patrols (involving 300 police), backed up by the Criminal 
Investigation Division and Force 10,90 jointly responsible for investigating serious 
crime such as rape, robbery and murder. Police Headquarters at Konedobu would 
coordinate operations through seven police stations in the capital.91 Surveillance 
operations at settlements, especially routes in and out of those areas, were set up. 
The police also offered Kl 000 reward for information on criminals. Overall, the 
resources represented an impressive array of security force muscle designed to 
build public confidence and to capture criminals. However, for the operations to 
be successful, major obstacles had to be overcome. 
90 A Serious Crime Squad, Force 10 was known as the 21 Squad before the state of emergency. 
91 Police stations included Port Moresby, Boroko, Hohola, Gerehu, Gordon, Tokarara and Badili. 
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Port Moresby, an area of thirteen square kilometres, had a population of 
350,000. Police estimated that there were 370 gaol escapees In the city, In 
addition to about 3000 raskols. The police faced a daunting problem of 
identification even if the criminals could be apprehended. To achieve success, the 
police relied on information, which was not always forthcoming, in spite of the 
rewards, because people feared the raskols and police. Of the police available, 
provision had to be made for three shifts daily and rest for those involved. 
Even so, some success was achieved in the state of emergency. Among 
those arrested were three police; one was subsequently charged with the rape of 
the expatriate woman and her daughter as well as with several robberies. 
However, many of those arrested were charged with curfew infringements which 
were largely incidental to the operations. Those arrested included Wiwa Kerowi 
(Post-Courier 19 July 1985: 2) - later Governor-General of PNG. Still, the 
arrest figures gave the illusion of success, bolstering public confidence. 
Soldiers played their part in the operations , conducting, in addition to foot 
patrols, several cordon and search operations in support of the police. These 
operations were consistent with the PNGDF' s role in internal security. On 25 
June, the two mile settlement was cordoned and searched. On 19 July, another 
cordon operation was mounted against Morata settlement (Post-Courier 19 July: 
1). The operation lasted two hours. 'Thousands of kina worth of equipment was 
recovered and over 100 suspects aiTested ' (ibid.). 
The police saw the settlements as legitimate targets. A motley collection 
of ramshackle buildings on the fringe of Port Moresby, the settlements housed 
large numbers of people, many of whom were unemployed. The people were 
squatters living on land for which they paid nothing, a fact which created 
antipathy between them and the traditional Papuan landowners of the area. These 
areas were often, though not exclusively, the refuge of raskols. Income and, at 
times , daily needs , were provided in part by criminal activity. The co-existence of 
squatters and raskols provided a useful cover for criminal activities. The police 
had little sympathy for people in the settlements. Strong-arm tactics were 
commonly used during raids on these areas. Property confiscated during these 
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raids included items legitimately owned. However, in the absence of receipts , 
people could not verify their claims of ownership. The police approach alienated 
many people who, if treated differently, could have assisted the police in law and 
order operations and in general policing. 
On 2 July, soldiers were given additional tasks. They were used to guard 
Bomana Gaol (Post-Courier 2 July 1985: 2) - scene of many breakouts in recent 
years. The troops were there to bolster the Corrective Institutions Service (CIS) 
and prevent further breakouts. Security at Bomana, located next to the Police 
Training College on the outskirts of Port Moresby, had concerned the public for 
some time. In 1985, the gaol housed 460 prisoners. Bomana was one of several 
gaols located throughout PNG. All shared common problems. Indeed, in 1985 
the then minister for corrective services, Mr Marsipal, described the gaols as 
'chicken sheds' (Post-Courier 12 June 1985: 2). Prisoners could escape simply by 
leaping over fences - or by walking through them. 
The state of PNG gaols and the prison service generally was shameful. 
The CIS shared problems of poor morale and a lack of resources with the RPNGC 
and the PNGDF. The CIS was criticised, noting that: 
overcrowded conditions have been common; juveniles have been put in 
with hardened criminals; prison breakouts ... [are] frequent; there appear 
to be high rates of recidivism; ... [there are] abundant reports of brutality 
by prison warders; accusations that warders have inadequate skills and 
[are] physically unfit, and the CIS's concept of rehabilitation seems 
extremely vague (Turner 1990: 176-177). 
Prisoners knew that the best time to escape was on government payday 
when 'warders were distracted or turned up to work drunk' (Post-Courier 5 June 
1985: 2). The beleaguered CIS had poor prisoner checking procedures, 
inadequate search practices, and lamentable professional conduct in the 
performance of their duties. Too few criminals were successfully prosecuted in 
the courts, largely because of poor arrest and evidentiary procedures. Prisoners 
would often opt for a mass break-out which effectively overwhelmed the warders. 
Large numbers of criminals on the streets ensured crime levels would escalate, 
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taxing police resources. Against that background, it is difficult to understand 
government claims in September that crime was coming under control. Confident 
of its judgement, the government eased the curfew on 3 September to 2400 hours 
to 0400 hours. Even so, Parliament remained cautious, extending the state of 
emergency at its meeting in October to 4 November. 
The state of emergency ended in December 1985. In spite of its intensity 
and the numbers of security force personnel involved - in all , one quarter of the 
total security force personnel in the RPNGC/PNGDF - the restoration of civil 
control was shortlived. Outwardly, the public and the government considered the 
operation a success, justifying the enormous financial cost and the lapse in 
policing elsewhere in the country. However, in time the government would have 
to repair the damage by conducting operations beyond Port Moresby. For the 
moment, people enjoyed temporary relief from the criminals, now lying low or 
threatening other communities. The government still had not appreciated that so 
long as the resource problems of the RPNGC were not addressed, emergency 
measures achieved only temporary gains. The government also failed to 
recognise that serious problems could quickly erupt in PNG, straining security 
force resources. One such case was the Okuk riots in 1986. 
The Okuk Riots 
The internal stability of PNG had been under threat since independence, in 
spite of the law and order operations aimed at restoring authority. The fragility of 
that authority could be quickly exposed. Periods of anarchy highlight the 
weaknesses of the security forces and their ability to respond. Often these 
incidents occurred in rural areas , especially in the highlands, beyond the gaze of 
the wider population. However, when these incidents occurred in urban areas , 
such as in Lae or Port Moresby, the events could not be ignored. The 1986 Okuk 
riots in Port Moresby (and other centres) graphically illustrate the problem. 
Iambakey Okuk was a firebrand politician. A passionate orator, he 
enjoyed wide respect in spite of his often erratic approach to government. As 
deputy to Sir Julius Chan in 1980, he proved unmanageable to the detriment of 
government solidarity. On the death of Okuk from liver cancer on 14 November 
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1986, Prime Minister Wingti, facing a vote of no confidence and conscious of the 
upcoming national election in 1987, saw political advantage and regional benefits 
in a state funeral. He decided to take Okuk' s body to Mt Hagen, Goroka and 
Kundiawa after the body lay in state in Parliament in Port Moresby, to allow 
people to pay their respects. That decision would have dire consequences. 
On Monday 17 November,92 with Okuk' s body lying in state at 
Parliament, crowds in Port Moresby got out of control. Highlanders exacted a toll 
on anyone not seen as paying respect. Raskols and others looted stores amid the 
confusion. Rioters attacked and damaged government infrastructure and vehicles. 
Fifteen police were injured and police vehicles burnt. So widespread was the 
rioting, the police were caught off guard. People sheltered at home or with 
friends to escape the violence. Schools closed as did business houses. Airlines 
ceased operations as staff and passengers found movement in the city impossible. 
The daily Qantas flight was diverted to Cairns. Anarchy persisted in Port 
Moresby for three days until order was restored on Wednesday 19 November. 
Why did the police take so long to regain control? 
The police had no warning of the unrest. Indeed, the trouble seems to 
have been largely impromptu, sparked by police hardline tactics in the early 
stages. However, the police did not respond quickly to the escalating violence, 
which allowed the trouble to spread to other parts of the capital. Yet the scale of 
rioting and its widespread nature only partly explains the problem. The police 
reacted to the problem by concentrating on the area around Parliament. That left 
little capacity for problems elsewhere. Even when police became aware of the 
unrest wider afield, police reinforcements, especially riot squad members from 
MacGregor Barracks outside Port Moresby, could not be transported. In the end, 
police commandeered vehicles or used other government vehicles. In time, a 
helicopter assisted with co-ordination. The problems in Port Moresby were not 
appreciated at the time. If it had been necessary to call-out the PNGDF to assist, 
limited numbers were available. 
92 The account of events is compiled from first hand experience by the author in Port Moresby 
over the period 17-19 November 1986. 
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The First Battalion, which had provided soldiers for Santa Claus 84, Hot 
Spot and Green Beret 85, was on exercise three hours from the capital. Transport 
was not available to return the soldiers quickly to assist the police who were hard-
pressed, concentrating their efforts in key areas. In the event, the task was made 
easier when, by day three, the fire went out of the rioters and they began to 
disperse. Police resources were further stretched as Okuk' s body was transported 
around the country with the unrest spreading to Lae and to the highlands. Even as 
memories of the unrest faded, crime in Lae and in the highlands demanded 
emergency government action. 
Operation Green Beret 87 (Koo lex )93 
Until 1986, law and order operations had been conducted in Port Moresby. 
However, crime problems existed elsewhere. Government claims of success in 
the capital encouraged other areas, including Lae, to press for similar operations 
in their areas. Criminal activity was rampant in Lae even as Port Moresby came 
under curfew in 1985. However, the scale of that activity did not attract concern 
until 1986 when police came under pressure to curtail criminal activity there. The 
law and order problems in Lae were exacerbated by an influx of people from 
Morobe and highlands provinces. The Highlands Highway enabled low-cost 
access to people in search of employment. Squatter settlements were established 
and Morobeans were displaced. In late 1986, a policeman in pursuit of a raskol 
shot another youth - an incident which saw 'public confidence in the police take 
a sudden nosedive to hostility' (Post-Courier 1 September 1986: 1). The next 
day, riots in Lae resulted in damage to twenty cars, creating problems for the 
police. The policeman was later charged with murder. 
On 4 March 1987, Timothy Bonga, MP raised in the national parliament, 
as a matter of public importance, the 'ever-increasing criminal activities in Lae ' 
(Post-Courier 4 March 1987: 1). Bonga had experienced first hand the criminal 
problem with the death of his brother at raskol hands in December 1986. 
Notwithstanding Bonga' s pleas, Prime Minister Wingti resisted emergency 
93 The PNGDF codename for this operation was Koolex. 
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measures, noting he would 'not react to a crisis situation in an unprepared, ad-hoc 
manner' (ibid.). Wingti also refused an Australian aid offer of K500,000. 
Wingti felt that the long-term solution to the law and order problems was 
increased employment. He refused to 'be side-tracked by crisis', and he was 
critical of 'solutions [ which] were short term and, however drastic, were doomed 
to failure' (Turner 1990: 175). In January 1987, however, Wingti made an about-
face. He indicated a willingness to accept a curfew if local leaders demanded one. 
He was conscious that national elections, later in 1987, could be under threat 
unless crime was brought under control. Wingti was also aware that criminals 
had torched the Lae police station on the night before he visited the city. On 15 
July, the NEC approved a curfew in Lae and the call-out of the PNGDF. 
Deployment began the same day and the operation - Green Beret 87 - lasted 
until 31 July 1987. 
Operation Green Beret 87 involved 200 police and soldiers. In addition, 
100 special constables were appointed in Lae to assist. For the first time, soldiers 
too were given the powers of special constables. Those powers gave soldiers the 
right to arrest suspects in the same manner as the police. The high profile 
presence of police and army personnel in Lae had the effect of restoring public 
confidence. Within weeks, the public began to enjoy freedom and security, which 
had been eroded by criminals in the years leading up to the curfew. Few seemed 
concerned at the restrictions on their movement imposed by the curfew. Still, the 
degree of personal security was fragile. As the curfew was drawing to a close, the 
horrific murder of Heather Mitchell, an Australian pilot with Pacific helicopters, 
on 4 July during the police clampdown, brought home the limitations of curfews 
in preventing crime. Even so, further operations were mounted. 
Operation LOMET 88 
In spite of the limited success of earlier emergency measures, the law and 
order operations in Port Moresby (1985) and Lae (1987) were seen as an 
appropriate response to criminal activity. Port Moresby and Lae were considered 
under control but criminals were still operating with relative impunity in the 
highlands. National and provincial pressure led to demands for similar operations 
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1n the highlands. Eventually, the government capitulated and a state of 
emergency - codenamed LOMET94 88 - was declared in the five highland 
provinces with effect 12 September 1988 and lasting until 12 December 1988. 
The law and order problems in the highlands were further complicated by 
tribal fighting, which was rife in 1988, especially in Enga, Southern Highlands 
(Nebilyer Valley) and in the Western Highlands. Once the result of 'marriage 
problems, pigs and land disputes, [modem day issues such as] political 
opportunities, ... the material returns of political office, elections, the development 
of bisnis [business] and motor vehicle accidents have added new reasons to fight' 
(Turner 1990: 170). The government's Inter-Group Fighting Act in 1977 had 
failed to combat the problem, in part because the Act did not allow for the 
prosecution of groups; only individuals could be charged with offences (Mapusia 
1986: 65). The police were hard pressed to control the spread of clan-based 
fighting in the highlands which, even when contained, threatened to break out 
again at any time. The increasing use of firearms by tribesmen made police 
efforts more dangerous in the difficult terrain. Those problems prompted the 
deployment of troops for LOMET operations. 
Armed soldiers deployed to the highlands in support of the police. Many 
of the operations mounted during LOMET involved soldiers in support of the 
police mobile squads.95 These squads used brute force in putting down tribal 
fights , justified on the basis that such measures were the key to suppressing tribal 
unrest. Mobile police routinely burnt villages, looted, raped and killed in the 
name of justice. While the army played largely a support role, soldiers quickly 
learnt from the mobile squad tactics. 
The practices drew criticism at the time. Standish (1 994: 65) noted that 
'state violence against the public and large-scale destruction of property received 
... public and parliamentary condemnation' . Standish (ibid.: 80) also claimed that 
94 Law and Order, Murderers, Escapees and Tribal Fighting. 
95 Mobile squads were formed on a part-time basis in 1962, in response to riots on Buka Island. 
The first full time squad was set up at Bomana Police College in 1966 (Mapusia 1986: 65). 
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the security forces' actions provided the highlands people 'with a common cause 
which could seriously damage national unity'. The claims of security force 
excesses were justified. Soldiers returning from operations confirmed that their 
involvement with the police invariably resulted in co-operative efforts, including 
abuse of power. Soldiers believed, however, that the seriousness of the situation 
and public demand for a hard line, justified their actions. The slur on the 
PNGDF' s reputation was disappointing. The police had been feared and hated 
even before independence-the PIR was not (Nelson 1972: 204). 
During LOMET, soldiers were tested on few occasions. Only one incident 
in which a soldier fired on tribesmen attacking a police/army patrol was reported. 
Overall, LOMET merely suppressed tribal fighting and had a similar short-term 
effect on raskol activity. Still, the operation, like those in Port Moresby and Lae, 
was acclaimed a success. No more operations on the same scale would be 
conducted in the highlands - Bougainville gave the government no choice, with 
the PNGDF and police hard pressed to maintain a presence on the island. 
However, the PNGDF was to be involved in a smaller - yet significant in its 
precedent - operation at Ok Tedi. 
Operation Iron Foot 
In September 1988, a PNGDF platoon based at the Kiunga outstation was 
placed on alert, following industrial unrest at the Ok Tedi mine. Workers were 
threatening to close down the mine. The government was prepared to assist when 
police based at Kiunga expressed concerns over possible damage to the mine site. 
The PNGDF operation - codenamed Iron Foot - was to prevent access to the 
minesite. The deployment occurred during 22 to 25 September (Defence Report 
1988). Roadblocks were set up. However, the dispute was resolved. Even so, the 
use of the PNqDF to protect the minesite was the forerunner to Bougainville 
operations. Operation Iron Foot barely tested the PNGDF. Still, law and order 
operations had exposed problems in the army, especially logistic aspects. 
Logistic Implications 
The deployment of platoon or company groups on law and order 
operations presented few logistic problems for the PNGDF. In 1985, soldiers 
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operated close to their main barracks with its rations , transport and facilities for 
rest. Similarly, in Lae, troops could be supported from Igam Barracks on the 
outskirts of the city. However, Operation LOMET in the highlands posed new 
challenges. In order to get around its problems in supporting soldiers deployed 
there, Headquarters PNGDF looked for assistance to the police and their special 
funding provisions under the emergency. The PNGDF elements were rationed 
and quartered in various police barracks in the area. As a result, the PNGDF did 
little contingency planning for operations where soldiers, especially in larger 
groups, would be required to operate away from army bases. 
Wider Implications 
The army' s principal concern, albeit muted, was with the adverse effect 
assistance to the police was having on training schedules. In the end, training 
programmes were largely abandoned.96 In their absence, little was being done to 
prepare the PNGDF for its increasing role in internal security. The absence of 
regular training also affected broader military skills, discipline and unit cohesion 
which began a rapid decline. The Bougainville deployment exposed that decline, 
from which the PNGDF would be hard pressed to recover. The evidence of it was 
also starkly shown in instances of army unrest, for example, Operation Albatross 
in 1988 and the 1989 pay riots (See below). 
The poor state of the PNGDF can therefore be traced to the period 1985-
88; internal security commitments changed the face of the PNGDF, largely 
because the army derived little from its deployment in support of the police. 
Soldiers quickly became bored with the grind of internal security duties which 
demanded night shifts over tlu-ee to six months. The deployments were often 
bereft of the planning and preparation characteristic of army operations. Briefings 
on the crime situation were ad hoc and fell short of the detail required for 
contingency responses. Soldiers were often confused about the rules of 
engagement and the extent of their power under the SOE, and over the chain of 
command. Even rudimentary planning such as rostering, the location of assembly 
points, relief arrangements, and pre-patrol inspections were absent. Duties were 
96 Author 's experience as a Military Adviser 1985-88. 
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principally related to curfew enforcement with few incidents to break the 
monotony, reinforcing the argument that the army was used prematurely on law 
and order operations between 1984 and 1987. 
Unit commanders viewed the PNGDF' s role in aid to the civil power as 
rmnor 1n comparison to the PNGDF' s wider responsibilities for the country's 
defence. The relative ease with which the soldiers handled their role on the 
streets gave a false sense of security. Indeed, a handful of soldiers seemed to 
achieve far more than the police had managed before the emergency. Officers 
could point to the success achieved in deploying increasing numbers of soldiers 
wider afield between 1985 and 1988. However, the pivotal role of special 
funding and of government aid in those operations was not recognised. The 
officers failed to respond to the steady decline in military skills and standards of 
discipline brought about by the internal security operations. The officer corps 
was therefore culpable at every level for the dismal performance of the army on 
Bougainville. Even more damning was the fact that once the lack of 
professionalism had been exposed publicly, these officers lacked the credibility 
and loyalty within the Force, by then highly factionalised, to address confidently 
the weaknesses - especially the indiscipline. The erosion of Force capabilities 
continued in 1989-1990, accelerated by rebel successes. 
The use of the PNGDF in law and order operations underscored the 
senousness of PNG' s law and order problems. Even under emergency 
restrictions, criminals still had scope for criminal activity. Curfews, for example, 
did not prevent crime in daylight hours. Nor could the emergency measures 
prevent a resurgence of crime once the operations ended. Among the many 
studies carried out into PNG' s law and order problems - the Clifford Report and 
the Harris study are but two - analysis has shown that the emergency measures 
failed to curb crime. No effective long-term strategies to reduce crime - which 
might have justified the cost of law and order operations, and the army 
deployment - were put into effect. Indeed, the army deployment served to 
undermine defence capabilities, which would lead ultimately to the PNGDF' s 
ignominious withdrawal from Bougainville in 1990. 
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Police success during the emergencies can be attributed to the co-
ordinated use of resources, including army manpower, the provision of additional 
funds, and government pressure for results. With the loss of those resources after 
the emergency, and the absence of any collective will on the part of the police to 
maintain a high profile presence as a deterrent to criminals, effectiveness waned. 
Co-ordination of intelligence and manpower simply failed to materialise. Police 
argued that without resources there was little incentive to combat the criminals. 
For their part, successive governments have persistently failed to allocate 
resources sufficient for an expansion of the police and for the acquisition of 
resources to boost police morale and confidence. Those budget increases which 
were granted tended to be swallowed up by the higher costs of policing, 
particularly in salaries. 
The net effect was a poor public image of the police who were criticised 
for their absence on the beat and for their inability to respond in a timely manner 
to reported crime. Indeed, my observations between 1970 and 1990 confirmed 
declining police confidence and standards. Two-man foot patrols gradually gave 
way to four-man car patrols with a reluctance to tackle criminals without back-up 
and preferably police dogs. Criminals learnt that they could commit a crime and 
make good their escape before the police responded. Against that background, 
the PNGDF view that their presence on the streets derived essentially from police 
inefficiency was understandable. PNGDF contempt for the police grew. 
The PNGDF quickly recognised police limitations, especially against an 
armed PNGDF. While the numbers in the two disciplined forces were 
comparable, the PNGDF possessed greater firepower and its numbers were 
concentrated in Port Moresby and Lae. Those advantages gave the PNGDF a 
clear edge. On Bougainville, the PNGDF took control and neither the 
government nor the RPNGC was prepared to call the soldiers ' bluff. 
The government' s solution to its crime problems was a demonstrated 
preference for one-off funding and the call-out of the army to enhance police 
capabilities. That knee-jerk response in using the PNGDF had wider 
implications. The army' s use in internal security outside military parameters -
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under army command, armed for crowd dispersal and in protection roles -
ensured a breakdown of professional standards, erosion of the PNGDF' s 
subordination to the civil authority and, with it, a loss of accountability and 
respect for the government. 
Changes in army attitudes towards the government were already taking 
place among the lower ranks while their senior officers preoccupied themselves 
with issues such as border security. However, the PNGDF was being drawn into 
internal security. Later, on Bougainville, internal security duties would come to 
dominate all aspects of the PNGDF; the scale of that commitment would reduce 
its capacity to patrol PNG' s borders or to deter potential aggressors. The vision 
of PNG' s leaders at independence - indeed their insistence - that soldiers 
would be used in internal security as a last resort, had been replaced by a 
willingness to use them routinely, without adequate safeguards. 
Relations between the PNGDF and successive governments had been 
under strain since 1982 when force numbers were reduced. Paradoxically, the 
government had called increasingly upon the army to shore up its authority while 
reducing the PNGDF's capacity to deliver. The government did not match its 
expectations of the PNGDF with the necessary commitment. Soldiers were also 
concerned that their pay and conditions were being eroded. Many felt slighted by 
politicians who were widely seen to be looking after their own interests. Soldiers 
had a deep sense that their value to PNG was not being recognised. An increasing 
incidence of ill-discipline reflected an erosion of professional standards. That 
indiscipline was evident in annual defence reports presented to the government. 
However, the government ignored the warning signs. As conditions in the 
barracks deteriorated (See Chapter 5), feelings of injustice would eventually 
manifest themselves in challenges to government authority, and then, in 1989, 
direct confrontation with the government. 
Challenges to Government 
Operation Albatross 
The government decided in April 1986, as part of its decision to close Lae 
airport, to move the Air Transport Squadron (ATS) from Lae to Nadzab airport, 
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twenty kilometres inland. Nadzab was a new airport facility built by Australia for 
PNG's independence. Civil aviation operators had already moved from Lae. The 
decision to move ATS would cost K20 million, including new infrastructure. The 
ATS relocation was the first large-scale move of any PNGDF unit since the 
1960s. Notwithstanding the government's plan, the PNGDF remained in Lae, 
claiming that money was not available for the provision of amenities on the same 
scale as at the old base. On 20 November 1987, Wing Commander O'Connor 
handed over command of ATS - the last PNGDF unit commanded by an 
Australian - to Lieutenant Colonel Lai97 (East Sepik). During the fly-past for 
the occasion, a DC3 crashed, perhaps signalling difficult times ahead for the unit. 
The minister for civil aviation announced in June 1988 that Lae airport 
was to be closed to air operations. The decision effectively ended PNGDF flights 
through Lae airport. On 5 June, Brigadier-General Lokinap ordered 1 RPIR to 
secure Lae airport and PNGDF assets there on 6 June (Defence Report 1988). 
The operation - codenamed Albatross98 - was mounted to prevent the 
Department of Works tearing up the airstrip. A platoon, commanded by 
Lieutenant Paul Iatau, departed Port Moresby in a DC3 in the early hours of 6 
June to carry out the operation. After securing the airport, the armed troops 
prevented officials from entering the airport. Lokinap argued that the operation 
was necessary to ensure that the PNGDF remained capable of air support for 
operational reasons (discussion Brigadier-General Lokinap 18 April 1996). Prime 
Minister Wingti later reprimanded the Commander but the PNGDF remained at 
Lae airport until 1991, when the ATS relocated to Port Moresby. 
Pay Riots-1989 
In August 1987, James Pokasui, a former PNGDF captain and then MP, 
was appointed minister for defence, replacing Stephen Tago. Pokasui understood 
the problems facing the PNGDF, noting concern over 'poor morale and a sharp 
drop in discipline' (Post-Courier 17 August 1987: 2). He emphasised the need to 
97 Lieutenant Colonel Lai was one of the first four Papua New Guineans with Form 6 education 
recruited to bec01ne the first pilots in the PNGDF (see Chapter 2). 
98 Experience as a military adviser in 1 RPIR 1985-88. 
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improve conditions of service, especially pay and housing. Pokasui also 
advocated force expansion, noting the need for three engineer battalions, doubling 
the size of the PNGDF within fifteen years (Post-Courier 30 September 1987: 2). 
Pokasui' s proclamations were welcome news for a beleagued PNGDF, 
faced with demands for troop involvement in law and order operations and natural 
disaster assistance. However, the minister seemed to have little idea of how these 
changes would be achieved and he would 'not say where the money would come 
from' (ibid.). Nonetheless, the defence minister pressed on with change. On 22 
December, Pokasui appointed Brigadier-General Lokinap as Commander, 
removing Huai for 'indiscipline and infighting' (Post-Courier 22 December 1987: 
2). Pokasui went further, sacking three colonels on 15 January 1988. 
In a bid to resolve the emerging pay issue, the PNG Department of 
Defence agreed to the conduct of a review by Hay Consultants funded by the 
Defence Co-operation Programme. The review analysed each position in the 
PNGDF and assessed the pay entitlements of each. The review was supported by 
the ADP, which saw value in an examination of both job descriptions and pay 
levels. The pay issue was to further damage the defence relationship as soldiers 
saw Australia in part to blame for the shortfall in pay expectations. 
On 20 January 1989, the defence minister announced a pay rise-the first 
in twelve years for the soldiers - backdated to 11 January 1988. An interim 
amount of Kl 7 per pay would be paid to all members of the Force. The pay rise 
would add Kl .48 million to the PNGDF salary vote. Pokasui pointed to serious 
discrepancies in PNGDF pay rates, noting that army pay had fallen behind 70 per 
cent in relation to the wider PNG workforce. In the minister's rush to announce 
the pay rise, little consideration was given to the accuracy of detail or the need to 
brief soldiers on the proposed pay changes. In the absence of official information, 
soldiers assumed that pay would increase 70 per cent. Media reports heightened 
expectations. The actual pay rises by rank varied (Figure 6.7) with the most 
substantial given to one individual - the Force Chief Warrant Officer - of 58 
per cent. Officers also received substantially more than the lower ranks. Cabinet 
192 
limited the pay rise to all ranks in the first year to 25 per cent and spread the 
remainder over three years. 
Figure 6.7 
PNGDF Pay Rates - 1988 -1989 
(Kina per fortnight) 
1988 
Recruit 104.90 
Private 123.89 
Lance Corporal 145.95 
Corporal 155.15 
Sergeant 174.14 
Warrant Officer 203.10 
Chief Warrant Officer 212.49 
CWO (Force) 228.41 
Lieutenant 217.48 
Captain 272.14 
Major 338.11 
Lieutenant Colonel 475.04 
Colonel 552.14 
Brigadier -General99 961.59 
1989 
104.90 
145.95 
164.35 
193.12 
232.82 
272.14 
317.40 
392.77 
265.62 . 
392.77 
475.04 
552.14 
631.73 
961.59 
The pay rise was set down for payment on Thursday 8 February 1989. 
The day before, on 7 February, sailors from the Maritime Element billeted at 
Taurama Barracks received their pay early to allow for their putting to sea. 
Soldiers at the Barracks took the opportunity to compare the sailors' pay rise 
against the promises and expectations. They found the pay levels fell well short. 
Angry, soldiers headed for Murray Barracks where the Headquarters and Pay 
Office were located. The Barracks Duty Officer, Major Paul Dala contacted 
Colonel Nuia who was attending an Australian High Commission function, to 
99 The rate of pay received by the PNGDF Commander remained unchanged in the review. 
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inform him of the unrest. Nuia returned to Murray Barracks to find the Chief of 
Staff, Colonel Karry Frank attempting to contact the Commander who was at that 
time on Bougainville with the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC). 
Nuia told Frank not to bother the Commander but rather to focus on defusing the 
problem. However, Frank refused to confront the troops ( discussion Colonel 
N uia of 18 December 1996). 
Colonel Nuia, who knew many of the soldiers, told them they should 
present their grievances to their respective unit commanders in the morning (8 
February). The troops agreed and returned to Taurama Barracks. That could 
have been the end of the unrest had unit commanders taken up the issue. 
However, poor communications and a lack of appreciation of the soldiers' mood, 
saw the soldiers march en masse to Murray Barracks on 8 February. 
The soldiers headed for the Officer's Mess and the commander's 
residence. Again Nuia intervened, ordering the force sergeant major to assemble 
troops on the parade ground. On this occasion, Colonel Frank attempted to 
address the soldiers but was howled down. Colonel Nuia fared little better and he 
was assailed with cans. During the proceedings, an unidentified officer told the 
soldiers that their grievances were not the making of Headquarters - they should 
take their concerns to Parliament, then in session. That fateful remark prompted 
the troops to march on Parliament, gathering raskols in the process. 100 
At Parliament House, an apprehensive deputy prime minister, Akoka Doi, 
caved in to the soldier's demands, promising pay rises. That placated the soldiers 
but not before parts of the Parliament were damaged. At some point during the 
unrest, the N amaliu government contemplated the use of Australian troops to 
counter the riotous troops. 101 Doi' s promises only made matters worse. The 
Defence Department brought forward the pay increases to pay soldiers . 
Meanwhile, the government announced an inquiry into the mutiny, standing down 
the commander and secretary. Colonel Bau-Maras was appointed acting 
100 Soldiers attempted to gam access to the armouries but were prevented by officers who 
anticipated their actions. 
10 1 According to Mr J. Wall, Political Adviser to Prime Minister Namaliu (1988). 
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commander and was still in command a month later, when troops deployed to 
Bougainville on Operation Blue Print. Within days, Bau-Maras would also be 
called upon to provide troops to counter unrest in Port Moresby. 
Operation Southern Breeze 
After the sobering experience of the PNGDF pay riots in February, the 
police were vigilant for unrest which could again get out of hand. In April 1989, 
a demonstration, largely by Papuans, was held in Port Moresby to advocate peace 
and an end to inter-communal conflict between Papuans and highlanders which 
had been evident in the capital for several weeks. However, the march 
'degenerated into wild scenes' (Turner 1990: 172). Police killed a Papuan youth 
in the melee, prompting further unrest. Many youth armed themselves as business 
houses were looted. The PNGDF was called on to assist with a company of 
soldiers deployed at the height of the riots. The deployment - codenamed 
Operation Southern Breeze - was shortlived, with soldiers bolstering the police 
presence at roadblocks in the city. No incidents occurred during the deployment 
and the troops, after three days, returned to barracks. 
Conclusion 
Analysis of law and order operations since 1984 shows that in spite of the 
police clampdown, reinforced by the presence of the PNGDF, PNG remained 
afflicted by a high rate of crime. Dinnen (1996: 98) concluded his examination of 
the operations by describing the joint PNGDF/police measures as 'spectacularly 
unsuccessful'. The ongoing use of the security forces to shore up internal security 
attests to the government's inability to best the criminals. The lack of success 
stems from the government's incapacity, in large part because of an absence of 
strong and co-ordinated commitment, to address the economic, social and political 
issues which underlie the law and order problem. Against that background, 
Wingti' s belief that crime would only be defeated by growth leading to 
employment, is astute, though in the face of public pressure he too opted for 
hardline measures for their immediate effects. 
PNG's crime problems demand a sustained and increased commitment of 
resources for the police, the CIS and the judicial system. The PNG government' s 
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reluctance to adopt longer term strategies for its problems is influenced in part by 
its lack of confidence in its disciplined forces - even with additional resources. 
Lending weight to the government's caution is the rate of change in political 
office - votes of no confidence have created a culture driven by short-term goals. 
Even with the necessary resources, the security forces 'would have difficulties in 
tackling the range of challenges facing criminal justice agencies in Papua New 
Guinea' (Dinnen 1996: 95). Meanwhile, the capacity of state controls will be 
further eroded, increasing the demand for emergency measures to arrest the spiral 
into lawlessness. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that the criminals are 
modifying their activity; during curfews, raskols adopted new tactics for daring 
daylight attacks when the police presence was low. 
The emergency measures were a catalyst for change in PNG society. 
They were also to bring about changes in the PNGDF, its focus , and in its 
relations with government, the police and the public. Law and order operations, 
which began in 1984, marked a shift from an external focus to internal security. 
Indeed, for the remainder of the decade and beyond, the PNGDF would become 
committed to internal security operations. In the early 1970s, that scenario 
prompted some to foreshadow a potential military takeover. Certainly, the 
PNGDF had assumed a higher profile in internal affairs in the period 1984 to 
1990. Soldiers had also challenged government authority during operation 
Albatross (1988) and during the pay riots in 1989. However, soldiers had not 
joined the police in the abortive coup led by Commissioner Tohian in 1990 (See 
Chapter 7). Troops had also deployed to Bougainville and sustained operations at 
the government's bidding in 1989. In spite of that, a more serious and sustained 
challenge, given the events of 1980-90, became more likely. That caused many in 
government to be wary of the PNGDF, a situation made more difficult by the 
government's increasing dependence on the force to uphold civil authority. 
PNGDF involvement in internal security had changed relations between the 
government and the soldiery. 
Police/PNGDF relations also changed in this period. Clashes between 
members of the two services continued as they had throughout their history. The 
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joint operations in combating crime had changed little in that regard. Friction had 
also increased between senior PNGDF officers and the police hierarchy over 
command and control of soldiers deployed for joint operations. Even so, the 
lower ranks of both services were being drawn closer together in their shared 
effort to combat crime and restore order. That was particularly evident in 
operations involving the police mobile squads. The army learnt and adopted 
many of the harsh practices employed against the civilian population, borne from 
frustration in establishing order. Clashes continued, suggesting that longstanding 
animosity would remain, fuelled by PNGDF conviction that the army was 
superior to the police. 
In spite of the PNGDF' s preoccupation with internal security during the 
1980s, the Force structure did not change substantially. The PNGDF certainly 
used their profile to argue for increases in strength and for a larger share of the 
national budget. However, organisational change was modest and limited to the 
formation of a Plans Branch and to the amalgamation of intelligence capabilities 
of the Force (See Chapter 5). These changes were driven more by Force 
initiatives to improve overall capabilities than by any real attempt to address 
shortfalls exposed by PNGDF involvement in internal security. For the most part, 
therefore, the PNGDF organisation remained largely unchanged from that set up 
at independence, retaining its capacity for external defence and, where necessary, 
internal security. 
The role of the army under the emergency provisions warrants particular 
criticism. The employment of soldiers in a policing role undermined their value 
as a professional army. Bougainville aside, increasingly their value to the state in 
internal security has been confined to that of additional manpower. Over time, 
the PNGDF lost its capacity to conduct conventional internal security operations 
- a loss compounded by force indiscipline and poor leadership. In that process , 
the PNGDF' s capabilities as a defence force have been damaged - possibly 
irrevocably. That poses particular problems for the PNG government, which has 
become, to some extent, dependent on the PNGDF to uphold its authority. In a 
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matter of time, that environment would create for the PNGDF a central role and 
with it a stronger voice in the running of the country. 
As the decade drew to a close, the PNGDF changed direction. The 
Vanuatu operation had begun the 1980s, bringing success for the Force. The 
PNGDF had now assumed a more prominent role in assisting the civil authority in 
its fight against crime. Those operations posed problems for command and 
control, and logistics, and undermined training in counter-insurgency warfare. 
Soldiers had to come to terms with an erosion in their conditions of service and 
financial constraints in spite of an increasing commitment. As standards of 
discipline were undermined their motley state was out of step with their newfound 
status as an instrument of state control. Against that background, it was inevitable 
that soldiers' patience would run out in 1989. However, the unrest was shortlived 
as the PNGDF faced a new challenge - a secessionist war on Bougainville. 
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PNGDF/RPNGC Operations 
December 1984-March 1990 
Dates Operation 
21 Dec 84- Santa Claus 
8 Jan 85 
21 Jan- Hot Spot 
21 Apr 85 
17 Jun- Green Beret 85 
4 Nov 85 
15 Apr- Green Beret 87 
31 Jul 87 
12 Sep-
12 Dec 88 
22 Sep-
25 Sep 88 
30 Mar 89 
12 Mar 90 
Apr89 
(Koolex) 
LOMET88 
Iron Foot 
Blue Print 
Southern Breeze 
SOE/Call-Out 
Call-out 
Call-out 
SOE 
SOE 
SOE 
Call-out 
SOE 
Call-out 
Appendix 2 to 
Chapter 6 
PNGDF 
Platoon 
Company 
Company 
Company 
Company 
Platoon 
Battalion 
Company 
1987 
KKK 
Kips 
Koboni 
Apes 
Laddies 
Mafia 
Spikes 
Heltex Jawas 
Waga Jawas 
Jawas 
Raipex 
G105 
Tigers 
Bomai Apex 
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Port Moresby Gangs - 1987 
(Post-Courier 20 May 1988: 11) 
Appendix 3 to 
Chapter 6 
1980 1975 1963 Suburb 
KKK Texas Texas Konedobu 
Town 
Ela Beach 
Maggies Gabutu 
GGB 
Rough Riders Badili 
Koboni Devils Sabama Kaugere 
Mob 
Macarthurs Joe's Mob Joe's Sabama 
Mob 
Kila Kila 
Horse camp 
Fever Amigos 
Sons of Japs Hohola 
Laddies Ebony 
Laddies 
Heltex Gerehu 
sos Pirates 
Wanos Waigani 
Jawas Tokarara Rapex 
Raipex Raipex Raipex Tokarara 
Erima 
Kelly Co. OB kako Gordon 
Kaivas 
sos 
G105 Morata 
Disco 45 
Tigers Six Mile 
Four Mile Four Mile 
Rascals 
Bomai Apex Boroko 
Harlem Lords East Boroko 
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Chapter 7 
Bougainville (1988-90) 
'the PIR is most likely to be used to maintain order or suppress secession within 
Papua New Guinea' (Nelson 1972: 207). 
Introduction 
In 1989, the PNGDF was to face its greatest challenge as a force for 
internal stability. In spite of the experience gained since 1984 and the mounting 
evidence since then that the PNGDF' s future role rested with internal security, the 
PNGDF was ill prepared for the Bougainville unrest. On Bougainville, the cracks 
in military discipline would fracture and military leaders would be found wanting. 
Indeed, under international scrutiny, the problems dogging the PNGDF could no 
longer be hidden. In time, the Bougainville experience would have profound 
effects on the force, and flow-on implications for the authority of government. 
Papua New Guinea was poorly prepared politically, economically and 
militarily for the unrest on Bougainville. The seeds of PNG' s problems there had 
been sown in the years before independence when Bougainville' s integration into 
the new state had almost slipped from PNG' s grasp. Port Moresby introduced 
provincial government largely in response to Bougainvillean concerns. However, 
in the years that followed independence, successive governments did little to 
husband PNG' s relationship with Bougainville, in spite of the singular importance 
of the Panguna mine to PNG' s economy. When Port Moresby focussed on 
Bougainville issues, such as reviews of the mining agreement and during national 
elections, the government did not read a growing sense of unease among 
Bougainvilleans and a mood which led many to question their place in PNG. 
Bougainville unrest would precipitate a challenge to state authority and 
subject the PNG state to international condemnation for its human rights abuses. 
For its part, the PNGDF' s experience on Bougainville would set the scene for 
challenges, after the precedent set in 1989 when troops marched on Parliament. 
The professional standards of the PNGDF had, since the Vanuatu 
deployment, been in decline. That decline was masked until 1989 by the Army' s 
limited involvement in law and order operations, which did little to expose the 
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weaknesses of the Force. Leadership skills, too, declined and the minor role 
played by PNGDF officers in internal security camouflaged the depth of the 
problem, providing little incentive for these problems to be addressed. The police 
and the PNGDF became preoccupied with an internal security role, conducting 
quick-fix hardline operations as band-aid solutions to increasing law and order 
problems. 
A Snapshot 
North Solomons Province was named in the 1975 Organic Law on 
Provincial Boundaries, following the unilateral declaration of independence 
(UDI) on the eve of independence in 1975. The Province incorporates the main 
island of Bougainville, Buka Island and the adjoining atolls, including Nissan 
(Green), Kilinailau, Mortlock, Nukumanu, Nuguria and the Carteret Islands. 
Buka and Bougainville Islands (See map) combined are 240 kilometres long and 
64 kilometres wide at the widest point covering some 9000 square kilometres. 
A Simmering Problem 
Port Moresby had long maintained that Bougainville was, and must 
remain, an integral part of Papua New Guinea. PNG' s stance was partly 
influenced, in 1988/89 as it was in 1975, by the need to control Bougainville's 
mineral resources. This was Australia's view when, as the colonial power, it 
insisted on Bougainville' s incorporation in the PNG state at independence. Port 
Moresby's policy was thus historically driven. PNG's reliance on Bougainville's 
resources was reduced by other mineral prospects, at Porgera, Misima, Kutubu 
and Lihir, but the national government was not prepared to countenance 
secession, fearing that secession would have a domino effect, given separatist 
sentiment in other regions. 
Several key factors lie behind the rebellion on Bougainville - the mine, 
poor colonial boundaries, redskins102 and land. The precise beginnings of 
Bougainville ' s problems are a matter of conjecture. However, the recent tensions 
had their beginnings in the decision of the British and German colonial powers to 
incorporate Bougainville into New Guinea. Bougainvilleans consider themselves 
102 Bougainvilleans refer to their lighter-skinned countrymen as redskins. 
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closer to Solomon Islanders than to PNG, claiming they are a 'culturally, 
ethnically, historically and geographically distinct group from the rest of PNG' 
(Hannett 1975: 290). Indeed, Bougainvilleans have pointed especially to their 
black skins which set them apart from lighter-skinned islanders and come to have 
such important political ramifications (Oliver 1991: 224). These are strong 
arguments, which cannot be dismissed lightly. 
Bougainvillean claims of being a race apart from PNG have not been 
accepted by all, least of all by the PNG government. I~or was the claim of a 
Bougainvillean consensus for independence accepted. Critics point to the extent 
to which Bougainvillean groups have been divided in the conflict, and to the 
traditional conflict evident in Bougainvillean history. Before European contact, 
'each district [was] in a constant state of war with its neighbours' (Oliver 1991: 
101). By 1941, Europeans had ended 'inter-tribal warfare [and] imposed a new 
form of territorial grouping ... which conformed only in part to traditional tribal 
boundaries' (Oliver 1973: 55). During the Second World War, however, in the 
absence of the Australian Administration, tribal conflict was revived. Tensions 
were never far below the surface nor was payback for past deeds forgotten. 
Conflict would again emerge in the 1988 rebellion. 
The war experience had a marked effect on Bougainvilleans as it did in 
other Asian/Pacific areas. The Australians' defeat by the Japanese showed 
Bougainvilleans that the colonial administration was not all-powerful. Indeed, the 
'changes undergone in mental attitudes towards Europeans served to ensure that 
relations ... would never be the same as ... before the war ' (Connell 1990: 45). 
The chiefly system on Bougainville has been an issue of contention. The 
predominance of the matrilineal system, especially in relation to land ownership, 
distinguishes Bougainville from much of the rest of PNG. Essentially, there are 
two types of chiefly system. In Wakunai , Buin and the Siwai, 103 chiefly status is 
derived by matrilineal decent - a feature also of the Panguna Valley. In other 
areas, tribes are 'dominated ... by one particular matrilineage [or by] ... leaders 
[who] earned their positions of authority . . . by ... military or political skill' 
103 Discussion with John Siau, former provincial secretary, NSP, in Canberra on 7 February 1997. 
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(Oliver 1991: 105). The extent to which such individuals influenced events and 
the degree of control each could exercise is uncertain. In early European 
settlement, the Germans, and later Australians, appointed village headmen, 
blurring the distinction among tribes. These were not always traditional chiefs. 
In spite of the divisions among clans and language groups (Figure 7 .1), 
Bougainvilleans traded with each other, and 'trade . . . kept many otherwise 
warring tribes at peace' (Oliver 1991: 102). The Panguna mine also influenced 
Bougainvillean unity in several ways. The experience of 'working together 
served to dampen ... intertribal hostility [among Bougainvilleans]' (ibid.: 109). 
Solos 
Figure 7.1 
Bougainvillean Language Groups 
(Oliver 1991: 4) 
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The same could not be said of relations between Bougainvilleans and 
other Papua New Guineans, referred to as redskins. Many redskins were drawn 
by employment opportunities offered by the mine, a process encouraged by the 
Australian Administration and the PNG government after independence in order 
to build a skilled national workforce. However, redskins had arrived on 
Bougainville before the mine. Due to the shortage of Bougainvilleans prepared to 
work on the plantations across the island, companies were 'obliged to recruit 
Chimbus [from the highlands] thereby helping to create ... inter-ethnic hostility' 
(Griffin 1990: 7). By 1990, the rebellion had seen off all but a few of the redskins 
and Bougainvilleans began to tum on each other. 
With the arrival of the first Europeans in 1902, when Marist missionaries 
established a permanent residence at Kieta (Oliver 1991: 35), the church was to 
play a central role in Bougainvillean affairs. The Catholic Church spearheaded 
the religious crusade into Bougainville, presiding over 80 per cent of the province 
by 1988. Within twelve years of the Marists' arrival, missions had also been 
established at Buin, Koromira, Torokina and Buka increasing to twenty-one by 
1939. The Marists took every opportunity to extend their influence, so much so 
that they zealously sought to monopolise indigenous education and win converts 
through medical aid (ibid.: 59). The Seventh Day Adventists and Methodists 
were also strong influences, especially in Central Bougainville (Griffin 1982: 
116). Through religion, Bougainvilleans shared a common belief and with 
Catholicism predominant, religion was a unifying influence. 
Cults created unity in some areas of Bougainville. Cults in central 
Bougainville worried early administrators . Officials established councils in an 
attempt to solve the problem of cargo cults and general disaffection among the 
Nasioi. 104 Still, cargo cults prevailed and often reappeared. 105 These cults - 'a 
catch-all term - [had political connotations not intended by cult leaders and it 
was believed that] cultists [were] unlikely to fit the definition of an organised 
force out to supplant established authority' (Polomka 1990: 38). Yet cultists were 
104 For more detail on the Nasioi see Ogan (1974). 
105 For more on Bougainvillan cargo cults see Ogan (1974). 
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a feature of the rebellion in 1988. Widespread destruction of infrastructure after 
the security force withdrawal was attributed to cultic influences. The cultists 
argued that the island's future lay with traditional lifestyles without the trappings 
of Western influences. 
The first secessionist murmunngs began in 1968. Bougainvillean 
parliamentarians advocated secessionism that year. A coincidence of events 
probably accelerated independence as an issue among Bougainvilleans in 
subsequent years. Students at the University of Papua New Guinea formed the 
Mungkas106 Society - a Bougainvillean pressure group. This was followed by 
the formation of a local Kieta group - Napidakoe Navitu 107 - on Bougainville 
which before long advocated secession, or new kinds of territorial alignments 
(Griffin 1982: 113). From its central location around the Panguna mine, the 
group exerted considerable influence over local tribes and created an awareness of 
secessionism as an issue further afield. The group lifted the stakes by seeking a 
referendum on secession in 1970. 
Bougainvillean opinion was further polarised by a car accident in 
December 1972 in which a highland girl was killed when struck by a car driven 
by two Bougainvilleans. The two Bougainvilleans - Dr Luke Rovin and Peter 
Moini - were murdered in payback near Goroka (Eastern Highlands). Their 
murder resulted in demands for the deportation of all redskins from Bougainville. 
Longstanding ethnic issues came to the surface and Bougainvilleans became 
acutely aware of- and sympathetic to- secession as a political option. 
Since early European contact, the people had played an active part 1n 
administration of the province. They were keenly sought after as policemen and 
soldiers as well as for bureaucratic positions. Later, many were active in 
academic institutions, both as staff and as students. So Bougainvilleans had a 
grasp of developments, both within the province and nationally. They had a 
sharpened sense of ethnic identity from their contact with other Papua New 
106 Mungkas comes from the Telei (Buin) word meaning black (Griffin 1982: 2). 
107 Napidakoe was an anagram of the names of ethnic villages in Kieta while Navitu means 
'grouping' in Nasioi (Griffin 1982: 113) . 
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Guineans. With the onset of mining-related construction at Panguna, Arawa and 
Loloho, the separatist cause now had a focus. Still, the trigger for Bougainvillean 
calls for independence came not from the mine itself but from the move towards 
Papua New Guinean independence in 1975. 
Bougainville unilaterally declared independence on 1 September 1975, 
prompted by a growing concern that the province was being neglected. There was 
ineradicable widespread secessionist sentiment which made the North Solomons a 
special case (Griffin 1990: 10-15); the 'colonial experience did little to create in 
Bougainvilleans a sense of a common destiny with other Papua New Guineans' 
(Griffin 1982: 113). The declaration, only days before PNG was due for 
independence (16 September), posed a serious challenge for the Somare 
government. Bougainvilleans had timed their move well, threatening to 
overwhelm Port Moresby on the eve of independence. The declaration of 
independence may have worked had it not been for the importance of the Panguna 
mine to PNG's post-independence economy. As so often is the case, the 
secessionists occupied 'the wealthiest part of the state' (Prescott 1978: 267), a 
factor which worked against them. Somare was able to resolve the issue by 
conceding an interim government for Bougainville. Provincial government 
followed a year later. Bougainvilleans had been mollified because they were 
unsure of what they really wanted at the time (Oliver 1973: 190). 
The Panguna Mine 
If the issue was deferred in 1976, why did Bougainvillean patience run out 
1n 1988? The catalyst for unrest in 1988 was undoubtedly the Panguna mine. 
Landowner bitterness over the environmental impact of the mine and the scale of 
compensation was compounded by ethnicity, dislike of redskins, and disputed 
colonial boundaries. The Panguna mine (Figure 7.2) was a massive development 
by any standard. During 17 years of operation, the mine produced revenue of 
K19 billion. Mine management offered an unprecedented (in underdeveloped 
countries) 20 per cent equity to the Administration and contributed K75 million to 
the North Solomons provincial government (Oliver 1991: 121). 
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Figure 7.2 
Panguna Mine 
(Oliver 1991) 
Hostility towards the mine began early, when CRAJBCL (Bougainville 
Copper Limited) entered the Guava mountains 'uninvited' (Griffin 1990: 8) in 
1964. For Bougainvilleans, the notion of trespass would prevail, heralding the 
beginning of an uncomfortable marriage between Bougainvilleans and the mining 
company. The Australian government further created tension when the then 
minister for territories declared that 'the fruits ... of the Panguna mine would go 
to [PNG] as a whole and not the Panguna mine owners in particular, nor to 
Bougainvilleans in general ' (Oliver 1991: 131). Bougainvilleans were incensed, a 
feeling of injustice exploited later by local politicians which served to escalate 
expectations of increased income (Polomka 1990: 61). In response to landowner 
pressure, the Mining Ordinance was changed. Problems persisted, however, 
because the Ordinance did not take into account land destroyed by mining, did not 
put aside funds for the island' s development, and did not decide who were 
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108 landowners. The latter issue meant that a small group of Bougainvilleans 
received benefits while others, including many with equal claims, were denied 
access to the funds. 
Mine management accepted that the landowners had an entitlement to 
royalties and recognised that the landowners needed an organisation to control the 
use of funds for the longer term benefit of Bougainvilleans. The formation of the 
Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) in 1980 provided the means to achieve 
longer-term goals and a central body with which the mine and government could 
negotiate. BCL also set up the Road Mine Tailings Leases Trust Fund 
(RMTLTF) to benefit landowners. 
Problems were not resolved for long. In 1988, younger Bougainvilleans 
around the mine who felt they had not benefited from the landowner royalties, 
demanded compensation. These formed the new PLA led by Perpetua Serero. 
Later, in January 1990, militants kidnapped and killed Mathew Kove, a member 
of the PLA, from Guava village. Militant attacks against fellow Bougainvilleans 
would lead to inter-tribal conflict and, eventually, civil war. 
For the mine, other problems had been straining relations with 
Bougainvilleans. Staff and Bougainvilleans experienced difficulties in 
comprehending official identity and the nature of transaction (Oliver 1991: 113). 
Those difficulties undermined confidence in deals struck. Bougainvilleans were 
already suspicious of the mine. They were especially disturbed by the then 
Administration's assertion in the 1960s that all mineral rights (under the 
Australian Mining Ordinance 1928-40) belonged to the Crown - a rule entirely 
alien to Bougainvilleans (Griffin 1982: 122-138). 
Disquiet among Bougainvilleans was not confined to the Panguna Valley. 
In the late 1960s, the acquisition of land for the construction of Arawa also led to 
unrest which was driven by 'growing opposition to the forced sale of any 
Bougainville land' (Oliver 1991: 140). Ironically, the Arawa site was imposed on 
BCL (which prefe1Ted land further inland) by the Administration so as to 'arouse 
108 No authoritative list of landowners was ever recorded. A more detailed account of the 
landowner issue is contained in Connell (1990: 43-46) and Oliver (1991: 120-129). 
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less opposition' (ibid.: 140). Publicity about the Administration' s forced 
acquisition of land 109 was best illustrated in the now famous photograph of a 
R 110 . . d 1. orovanan woman resisting an arme po iceman. 
Not all the blame for poor relations can be attributed to CRAJBCL. 
Disagreements between the national and provincial governments over relative 
shares of income also made for poor relations (Polomka 1990: 61). BCL points 
out that criticism over its handling of public relations with the Bougainvilleans 
fails to recognise that it was the national government - not the mine - which 
failed to include Bougainvilleans in the 1981 review of the mining agreement 
(May and Spriggs 1990: 11). As a result of the government's negligence, 
grievances were allowed to simmer for six more years until in 1987 Momis called 
for 'a fresh start from BCL' (ibid.: 12). Indeed, Momis demanded, as part of his 
Bougainville initiative, payments of K12 million to the provincial government, a 
substantial increase over the K3-4 million per year paid (Post-Courier 6 May 
1987: 1). No changes in royalty eventuated and tensions rose. 
Political Issues 
Port Moresby was justifiably concerned over tensions 1n Bougainville 
Province towards the end of 1988. Landowner unrest over environmental 
damage, especially to the Jaba River, was pronounced. Port Moresby had 
commissioned in July 1988 an independent report in response to landowner 
representations. Research by Applied Geology & Associates, New Zealand 
consultants, offered the best prospect of reconciling differences between 
landowners and the mine. Completed in November 1988, their Report was 
'critical of [BCL] but ... Bougainvilleans [felt that] it was not nearly critical 
enough' (Oliver 1991: 207). The report was the 'spark which ignited the 
militancy which turned into a revolution ' (ibid.). 
BCL was well aware for many years that the ' disposal of the mine's 
tailings [had been a] persistent ... headache ' (ibid.: 136). Notwithstanding BCL's 
109 For more detail on the land issue see Ogan (1971). 
110 Rorovanans who occupied land in the area of present day Loloho and Arawa were 'descendants 
of .. . Shortland Islanders [in the Solomon Islands]' (Oliver 1991: 122). 
210 
efforts to manage the problem, including through compensation, the highly-
visible impact of mining served to remind landowners of the scale of change. 
Apart from the mine' s immense crater - two kilometres across - villagers saw 
pollution of the Jaba River. The mine's tailings were 'much greater than people 
believed [ with] the river ... twenty times wider than in the pre-mine era' (Polomka 
1990: 52). Photographs of the river seem to bear out Bougainvillean claims. 
Convincing them that mining was not seriously damaging the river would have 
been futile. Mine officials, however, asserted that within fifty years of the end of 
mining the river would flush itself of the tailings residue. 111 Such a timeframe 
would have little appeal for Bougainvilleans. 
Landowners were concerned that Bougainvilleans were being denied their 
fair share of mining profits. The compensation and royalty issues had a 
chequered history. When mining began in the 1960s, the mine compensated 
landowners for 'damage ... to their buildings, trees and gardens, ... but not to pay 
rent' to landowners (Oliver 1991: 126). In 1967, BCL negotiated the 
Bougainville Copper Agreement which under pressure from Bougainvillean MP 
Paul Lapun, 112 gave landowners 5% of the 1.25% of mining royalties' (Griffin 
1990: 8). Re-negotiation of the Agreement, set for review every seven years , did 
not include the provincial government in 1981 though BCL argued for its 
inclusion (Polomka 1990: 63). Landowners' expectations of a substantial 
increase in payments, fuelled in campaigning for the national elections of 1987 by 
politicians such as John Momis, did not eventuate (May and Spriggs 1990: 12) . 
Bougainvilleans were already bitter that revenue from the mine was being 
used for the benefit of the rest of PNG. For them, the PNG national flag 
represented relations between the two groups - 'a red half dominating a black 
half with only a patch of gold [the mine] in common' (Oliver1991: 225). These 
views had stirred secessionist feelings in the lead-up to independence in 1975, and 
eventually led to the declaration of independence on 1 September 1975. The 
111 In 1996, eight years after the mine closed, the J aba River still shows signs of the mine tailings . 
11 2 Lapun was nicknamed the 'five per cent man' as a result (Sir M. Somare 1996). 
211 
failure to include the provincial government in the 1981 negotiations of the 
Copper Agreement, aggravated tensions and led to the 1988 rebellion. 
Operation Tampara 
Shortly after landowners demonstrated their displeasure over the 
environmental report by Applied Geology and Associates, problems began to 
develop. On 22 November, 'men looted ... explosives and detonators, complete 
with fuses and primer detonator cord for the timing of explosives, from the 
Panguna Mine magazine' (Post-Courier 25 November 1988: 3). In another 
incident on 26 November, 'arsonists set fire to the BCL administration block 
causing KS00,000 damage' (Post-Courier 29 November 1988: 4). In response, 
the government increased the number of police on Bougainville by two mobile 
squads (fifty men) and, on 5 December, deployed more police bringing the total 
number to 120. The squads provided extra manpower to handle special problems 
and they were more heavily armed, with semi-automatic weapons. Importantly, 
they had been successful in quelling unrest in the volatile highlands. Much of that 
success had been achieved by intimidation through weight of numbers and 
superior firepower - essential ingredients in tribal warfare. 
On deployment to Bougainville (codenamed Operation Tampara), the 
mobile squads were used to protect the mine, following threats by militant 
landowners to blow up installations. The landowners made good their threat on 1 
December by blowing down a power pylon at Pakia - part of the line supplying 
the Panguna mine. On 2 December, in spite of the police presence, 'arsonists 
destroyed Camp 6 (the Pink Palace) at Loloho' (Post-Courier 5 December 1988: 
2). On 4 December, another pylon was blown. 
The groups responsible for the week of damage called themselves 'Rambo 
1, 2, 3 and 4' (Layton 1992: 307), giving them a sense of organisation and 
purpose. The militants carefully selected their targets. The power line was 
essential to mine production. The isolated location of the damaged pylons made 
repairs more difficult. In addition, the pylons were deliberately collapsed across 
the Port-Mine Access Road (PMAR) disrupting mine traffic. The closure of the 
mine, estimated to cost Kl .4 million per day in lost production (Post-Courier 5 
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December 1988: 2), incensed Port Moresby, especially Police Commissioner 
Tohian. In a public statement, he instructed the police to 'shoot to kill' (Post-
Courier 7 December 1988: 1)- a statement which merely inflamed the situation. 
The government in Port Moresby took a more practical view of events. 
The mine was crucial to the PNG economy, contributing 45 per cent of export 
revenue and 12 per cent of gross domestic product (May and Spriggs 1990: 38). 
deputy prime minister Akoka Doi agreed to meet rebel leader Francis Ona113 and 
landowners at Guava Village. After the meeting, Doi confidently announced that 
the landowners had agreed to end acts of sabotage (Post-Courier 8 December 
1988: 1). The meeting appeared for several weeks to have broken the cycle of 
violence. However, Christmas/New Year historically leads to a closure of 
government in Port Moresby and important follow up attention was not given to 
landowners' concerns. 
Little wonder then that fresh threats were made against BCL on 4 January 
1989 (Post-Courier 4 January 1989: 1). The water pump station on the Jaba River 
was the next target. After this, the government imposed a dusk to dawn ( 1800 -
0500) curfew for two months. Port Moresby wanted to reassert its authority114 
and to reassure non-Bougainvillean workers - redskins and expatriates alike. 
However the police, encouraged by Tohian' s earlier order, took a tough line. Port 
Moresby increased police numbers to 300. Within a week, two police had been 
wounded in an ambush - the first security force personnel targetted by the 
militants. The escalation in hostilities declined after January with February 
incident free on Bougainville. As a result, the government relaxed the curfew on 
Bougainville from 2200 to 0500. 
While the national government was pleased, political leaders faced a new 
and more immediate threat in Port Moresby in February. Disgruntled soldiers, 
mainly from 1 RPIR at Taurama Barracks, rioted over pay grievances. Parliament 
was attacked and an apprehensive deputy prime minister defused the issue by 
11 3 Francis Ona, a former mine worker, rallied landowner support, becoming the self-appointed 
leader of the militant secessionist movement in 1988. 
114 Port Moresby was also concerned that the events on Bougainville may lead to landowner umest 
elsewhere in PNG. 
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publicly caving 1n to PNGDF demands. In the days that followed, the 
government stood down PNGDF Commander Lokinap115 and Defence Secretary 
Mokis pending an official inquiry. 
In the wake of the Port Moresby riots, the situation on Bougainville was 
about to take a turn for the worse. Two police were wounded at Aropa airport on 
8 March. On 17 March, a Bougainvillean youth- Clement Kavuna116 - died in 
suspicious circumstances while in police custody. The government had other 
problems in Port Moresby. In March, Prime Minister Namaliu was facing a vote 
of no confidence from opposition leader, Paias Wingti. The government was also 
having trouble with Police Commissioner Tohian, who was reprimanded for 
defying government policy. Tohian claimed he was misrepresented in the media 
but John Momis, Minister for Provincial Affairs, threatened Tohian with 
dismissal. Momis was justifiably concerned that authority needed to be asserted 
over the security forces. For his trouble, he was threatened on 6 March by a 
group of 100 police not to press for Tohian ' s dismissal. Police Minister Ij ape ' s 
appointment of an investigating team to examine the incident did little to reassure 
people of the government's control over its security forces. Port Moresby would 
complicate its problems on Bougainville by not calling the police to account. 
On 14 March, a new dimension was added to the general unrest in the 
province. Highland workers raped and killed a thirty-two year old Bougainvillean 
nurse - Deborah Raboni - at Aropa. Bougainvilleans, with the memory of 
highland killings in the early seventies, killed five Western Highlanders in pay-
back. Inter-communal violence followed, with riots in Arawa. Aropa airport was 
closed. Later that night, the terminal was burnt down. Trouble also appeared in 
Buin, well beyond the mine area. With the curfew due to end on 23 March, and in 
response to Opposition calls for ' firm, fair and decisive action ' (Post-Courier 21 
March 1989: 2) , the government deployed 130 soldiers to guard installations. 
11 5 Brigadier-General Lokinap was not in Port Moresby at the time of the riots. 
11 6 Kavuna is said to have been a cousin of then PNGDF Lieutenant Sam Kauona. 
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Legal Issues 
As early as December 1988, the police commissioner had requested the 
support of the PNGDF on Bougainville. The request was supported by the 
National Executive Council (NEC) and forwarded to the governor-general who 
authorised the call-out order on 23 December 1988, in accordance with the call-
out provisions of the Constitution (Section 204) 117 (See Chapter 6). In April 1989 
and following the deaths of two PNGDF members, the government came under 
pressure to authorise a state of emergency or to use the provisions of Section 
205 118 to increase the powers of the PNGDF. The government acknowledged that 
the PNGDF needed increased powers, especially to deal with the insurgency now 
emerging. The Defence (Aid to the Civil Power) Regulation under Section 204 
was amended authorising the soldiers to: 
• search without warrant; 
• arrest without warrant; 
• overpower or neutralise any armed resistance; 
• using force, disarm any person carrying an offensive weapon; and 
• use such force as is necessary [ when confronted by] armed resistance ... to 
effectively eliminate the armed resistance (Defence Aid to the Civil Power 
Regulations (1988). 
The changes recognised the special nature of the Bougainville insurgency. The 
security forces were, for the first time since being involved in law and order 
operations, facing a serious threat from a well organised and armed opposition. 
Operation Blue Print 
The deployment of the PNGDF contingent, scheduled for 29/30 March, 
was codenamed Operation Blue Print. Colonel Nuia, then Chief of Operations, 
chose the name because, in his assessment, the operation would be markedly 
different from previous law and order operations. On Bougainville, the PNGDF 
would be fighting an insurgency. PNGDF experience on Bougainville, Nuia 
11 7 Liria (1993) claims that the Defence Force was deployed to Bougainville under Section 25 of 
the Defence Act. Rather, the PNGDF deployed under Section 204 of the Constitution. 
11 8 Section 205 (2) of the PNG Constitution provides for the use of the PNGDF in a war-like 
situation, including outside PNG, subject to parliamentary authority. 
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argued, would form the doctrine - the blue print - for future contingency 
operations (personal communication Colonel Nuia 5 November 1996). As a 
result of the call-out, Morobean Lieutenant Colonel Key, Commanding Officer 1 
RPIR, conducted a reconnaissance on Bougainville in early December 1988.119 
In spite of the military deployment, the government looked for new ways 
to settle the dispute. John Kaputin, the Member for Gazelle (East New Britain), 
was appointed to head a truce committee; however Kaputin reacted slowly, 
commenting that the 'Bougainville issue had been there for twenty years -
what's the rush?' (Post-Courier 4 April 1989: 1). Redskins began to leave the 
province as militants attacked a government station in Torokina on 25 March; the 
trouble was spreading to the west coast of the island. The government boosted 
the PNGDF contingent, comprising one company, by a second company of ninety 
soldiers. That deployment was a gradual ratcheting up of the conflict. 
The army contingent had no guidelines for their activities on Bougainville. 
They also had no legal cover for military operations. Instead, in accordance with 
the call-out provisions, troops could only deploy on police authority and with a 
police presence. At this stage, soldiers had no powers of arrest or search - these 
were only conferred later during a state of emergency. The rules of engagement 
stipulated that soldiers could only return fire if first fired upon. Weapons carried 
by soldiers were limited to semi-automatic types. The PNGDF, under the 
principles of minimum force, was not permitted to use machine guns, grenade 
launchers, mines or mortars. Nonetheless, Lieutenant Colonel Key ordered that 
machine guns be taken to Bougainville though these were not carried on 
operations until the declaration of the state of emergency, which came into effect 
on 26 June 1989. 
Lieutenant Colonel Key also had problems with his base area. Key 
selected Aropa beach as his support base and to house troops not deployed on 
operations. The site had the advantage of being close to Aropa airport (some five 
hundred metres) for resupply and the camp provided security for the airport. Key 
wanted to avoid locating the camp in close proximity to villages and he was keen 
119 Experience as military adviser to the Commanding Officer 1 RPIR 1985 - 88. 
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to stay away from plantations in the area. Key acknowledged that security was a 
problem but he had only one company in the initial deployment to assist police 
and provide camp security. Key's decision was criticised for other reasons. 
The camp, located on a narrow peninsula with the sea on the eastern side, 
was exposed to view for several hundred metres and therefore vulnerable to fire. 
Security was poor. Indeed, 'there were no routine clearing patrols ... [and] the 
perimeter was never cleared or patrolled' (Liria120 1993: 22). The main Arawa-
Buin road also ran along the camp's western and southern side. Rebel agents 
could easily determine contingent strength; obtain details of the PNGDF' s plans; 
or steal weapons and ammunition. The camp layout lacked organisation which 
did not reflect well on the PNGDF, given that the camp was in full view of all 
those entering or leaving Bougainville via Aropa airport. Observers noted that 
soldiers were dirty and unshaven. Key's problems were compounded as the 
escalating violence led to greater numbers of troops being deployed; he had left 
little room for expansion. 
Key chose the campsite when the rebels seemed intent only on vandalism 
against the mine. The camp, part of a swamp, flooded after torrential downpours. 
In the absence of any vegetation, the site offered no respite from the tropical heat 
- even under tentage temperatures soared. The camp did not have access to 
fresh water. In time, the burden of transporting water, even using borrowed BCL 
water trucks, became too much. The camp was relocated to the north-western 
side of the airport but this was only marginally better. As the focus of military 
activity centered more on the mine, the troops moved to Panguna in July. 
Soldiers were initially employed on guard duty at the mine and around the 
PNGDF camp at Aropa airport. Few were left for forays into Central 
Bou gain ville in search of Ona. On 5 April, within days of the contingent's 
arrival, the PNGDF issued an ultimatum to Ona to surrender by 6 April or soldiers 
would be sent to arrest him. By law and in the absence of the police, the soldiers 
had no powers of arrest under the call-out provisions in effect in April 1989. The 
120 Liria drew on his Bougainville experience as an intelligence officer on Bougainville during 
1989 to write his book Bougainville Campaign Diary. 
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PNGDF could not carry out the threat and would pay dearly. The PNGDF was 
beginning to act as a separate entity to the police for the first time since it began 
assisting the police in 1984. 
On 6 April, Key sent one platoon to the road junction near Orami village 
(See map) to control movement in the area. While there, the platoon commander, 
Lieutenant Y andu, 121 was instructed to investigate reports of criminals at Orami. 
Y andu cleared the village without incident. He then led his patrol back towards 
the road junction but without the same measure of security. Militants ambushed 
the group shortly afterwards. His batman, Private Lomas Jaruga (also known as 
Martin Romas) (Kokoda), was killed outright while Lieutenant Yandu (Sepik) 
died before reaching medical aid. Soldiers from Y andu' s platoon, on learning of 
his death, panicked and grouped together according to wantok alliances for 
protection - wantok rather than military drills dominated the soldiers' action 
(personal communication Colonel Nuia of 15 October 1996). 
Port Moresby reacted to public outrage by claiming that the militants had 
weapons from foreign sources. The claim was false but helped explain the 
PNGDF deaths at the hands of a few poorly-armed militants. Defence Minister 
Marsipal asserted that soldiers were 'now in the front line [replacing the police] 
with orders of shoot to kill' (Post-Courier 11 April 1989: 1). In the escalating 
violence, the police were only too happy to step back and let the soldiers bear the 
brunt of militant attacks. 
Following the killing of the two PNGDF members on 6 April , the 
militants were involved in several other incidents that month, including the 
wounding of another soldier, damage to more pylons and an arson attack on the 
Tinputz government station. Faced with increasing casualties, Port Moresby 
turned its attention to setting up a more efficient casualty treatment system. 
Lieutenant Y andu had died because prompt medical attention was not at hand. 
Defence Minister Marsipal specifically wanted a helicopter for medical 
12 1 Lieutenant Yandu was appointed just prior to deployment, replacing Lieutenant Kaliop who 
was moved to fill the second in command position after the incumbent was arrested for dangerous 
driving on the eve of the contingent's departure (personal communication Lieutenant Kaliop, May 
1995). 
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evacuation. That led to the provision of a civilian S76 Sikorsky helicopter122 on 
24 April under commercial arrangements, one day before the wounding of another 
soldier and a policeman. The helicopter would play a significant role in 
operations (Liria 1993: 39). Exploratory talks with the Australian government 
over the acquisition of helicopters under the DC Programme also began. 
Meanwhile, the government offered landowners increased equity (9 per 
cent) in the mine in order to end the violence. While the proposal was being 
considered, Namaliu reshuffled his cabinet to shore up his fragile coalition. In an 
ill-planned action, the security forces, over a three day period, allegedly tortured 
some Bougainvilleans and burnt Anganai village near Arawa, destroying twenty-
five houses (Post-Courier 21 April 1989: 2). The 'burning [of the villages] was 
intended as a lesson, a punishment' (Liria 1993: 46). The police also assaulted 
workers from the Kieta-based National Broadcasting Commission (NBC). The 
assault alienated media representatives who could have proved invaluable in 
supporting restoration of authority in the province. Combined, the actions of the 
security forces undermined any prospect that landowners would accept Port 
Moresby's offer. That same day Private Buka (Manus Province) was killed at 
Sipuru. Three PNGDF were wounded in the same area a week later. The 
militants again turned their attention to the mine. On 15 May, several BCL 
workers were wounded - the first time mine staff had been attacked. BCL 
management closed the mine, increasing pressure on Port Moresby to introduce a 
state of emergency. 
The militants kept up the pressure, wounding Michael Bell, an Australian 
mine employee and former district officer. The motives for the attack- the first 
on an expatriate - may never be fully known. The incident may have been 
simply an escalation in the conflict; one of many. Some, however, allege that 
Bell was a deliberate target because of his earlier association with the 
development of the mine. In any event, other BCL workers were targetted on 23 
May and more pylons damaged. Expatriates began to leave Bougainville. 
122 A civilian contractor flew the helicopter. 
219 
Port Moresby's response to the latest shootings was to establish a two 
week truce with effect 24 May. Francis Ona, the rebel leader, was invited to 
negotiate a surrender on the basis that he and other rebels would be given 
immunity from prosecution. However, the prospect of any settlement seemed 
increasingly remote as Namaliu received fresh reports of security force excesses. 
Soldiers assaulted John Price, an Australian, and burnt Pakia village as 
retribution123 for the wounding of seven security force members on the Port-Mine 
Access Road. By May, about fifty police had already been withdrawn from 
Bougainville for disciplinary offences (Polomka 1990: 32). In time, many of 
those disciplined for misconduct were to return to Bougainville. 124 Liria reports 
that during 1989/90, 'no attempt was made to instruct the troops [in the need for] 
a favourable approach towards the local population' (Liria 1993: 47). More 
casualties among the PNGDF heightened tensions on Bougainville. If Port 
Moresby was serious about controlling security force excesses, then the re-
instatement on 21 June 1989 of soldiers involved in the February pay mutiny sent 
the wrong messages. 
On 20 June 1989, the national government outlawed the Bougainville 
Revolutionary Army (BRA) (Figure 7.3). That had a two-fold purpose: to provide 
a legal framework under which BRA suspects could be tried, and to deter people 
in other areas of PNG from adopting similar organisations. 125 By outlawing the 
BRA, however, the national government provided further recognition of the 
militants as a secessionist army fighting for the province ' s independence. Under 
Kauona' s126 leadership, the BRA became 'a formidable insurgency force ' (ibid.: 
76). The government's proclamation also gave the militants little incentive to 
desist from attacks on the security forces and jeopardized forthcoming operations. 
123 Liria (1993: 117) claims incorrectly that the PNGDF first torched villages during Operation 
Bull Dog (12-28 July). Soldiers (and police) were burning villages well before that date. 
124 Major De Markus , a PNGDF Company Commander, was withdrawn on three occasions for 
human rights abuses (personal communication Major De Markus November 1992). 
125 Port Moresby already knew of the Fly River Revolutionary Army in Western Province. 
126 Sam Kauona returned to Bougainville to fight with fellow Bougainvilleans in 1989. 
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Figure 7.3 
BRA Outlawed 
(Post-Courier 20 June 1989) 
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Prior to the state of emergency declaration on 26 June 1989 (Figure 7.4), 
the PNGDF had played a subordinate role to the police on Bougainville, in 
keeping with the call-out provisions. Activities were on a small scale - patrols, 
roadblocks and the protection of key points - usually in the company of police. 
The SOE plan set down three phases: 
• Phase 1 
• Phase 2 
• Phase 3 
Evacuation of villagers around the PMAR; 
Identification [and targetting] of pockets of resistance; and 
Rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
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Figure 7.4 
Declaration - State of Emergency 
1NDEP[\D~ST STAT~ or PAFCA ~~lV,; (JIJI;,;EA 
DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 
I. fGNA TIU$ KJLAGE, G.C.M.G., c .B.E, i<S/.J. . Guv1.:?mur-Gf:HH~ral 1 by virtue of the powers conterred by .Section 228( 1} of t~ie 
Constitutlon :::!.nd all 0H1e r puwl.::lr~ rri!:l ~r 1cib lir1~ 1 r.H.:ii rig with 
and in ac-cordsnce wtth. thi:! ~dvice of ttle Natio'1al 
Executive Cz:i u r I ci I, ht! rl~oy Jl~ci.dJt' lb~ ~xistt!r I ctl ul a 
national emergency in rclntion to Bougriinvillc Province with 
etf~ct fr1_1m 6 nrr1 on 26lh Jur,~. i 989. 
:T · .,, iL ,,.{,..t· 
-t~· . , .. .J 
' ,.-1.' 
The June 1989 declaration included special provisions for the command 
and control of the security forces and the conduct of the emergency. The Police 
Commissioner (Paul Tohian) was appointed controller and provision was made 
for the appointment of a deputy controller - Colonel Lima Dotaona, CBE - to 
command police and PNGDF elements on Bougainville. 127 The government' s 
decision had important implications. While the civil authority still rested with the 
police, command on Bougainville was now exercised through a military officer -
a structure which was arguably inconsistent with the Constitution. The 
appointment confused control arrangements with the police and PNGDF chain of 
command. While Dotaona was responsible to the police commissioner, located in 
Port Moresby, he relied on Headquarters PNGDF for logistic support. Dotaona 
was also required to work with the Provincial Peace and Good Order Committee. 
127 Personnel with the Corrective Institutions Services (CIS) serving on Bougainville also came 
under the command of the Deputy Controller. 
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As Port Moresby adopted a harder line on Bougainville, Australia issued a 
diplomatic warning note cautioning Australians about travel there. At about the 
same time, HQ PNGDF replaced Lieutenant Colonel Key with Lieutenant 
Colonel Walter Salamas (New Ireland Province). Salamas had served in 1 RPIR 
as the battalion second-in-command (2IC) in 1986/87. Indeed, he had been acting 
commanding officer in 1986 for six months during the absence of the then 
Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Vagi Mae, LVO. Salamas had also 
served under Lieutenant Colonel Key. In addition to his earlier experience in 1 
RPIR, Salamas had the advantage of observing developments on Bougainville 
before assuming command. By the time he assumed duty as Commanding 
Officer 1 RPIR in late June 1989, Salamas was well prepared. He would not have 
an easy time of it. Faced with PNGDF indiscipline and escalating militant 
activity, Salamas would soon preside over military operations on a scale not seen 
in PNG since the Second World War. 
The state of emergency got off to a bad start. On 3 July, a day after six 
police were wounded in separate incidents on the PMAR, members of a police 
mobile squad assaulted Premier Kabui and Michael Laimo, also a member of the 
provincial government. The attack on Kabui and Laimo was a direct challenge to 
the local civil authority under which the security forces were acting. Both 
Bougainvilleans were members of the Peace and Good Order Committee. 
Namaliu responded by sending a Parliamentary Cornmittee128 to investigate. The 
Committee, appointed to oversee the SOE and led by Sir Hugo Berghuser, arrived 
on Bougainville on 11 July- two weeks after the SOE came into effect. 
In May 1989, prior to the conduct of operations under the SOE, Salamas 
decided to move the bulk of his forces to Panguna. The long period of 
deployment and the growing numbers of contingent personnel had seriously 
strained the logistics system. Even before Bougainville, the defence system was 
incapable of supporting large numbers in the field, especially over extended 
128 The Parliamentary Committee is required to exercise supervision of emergency powers on 
behalf of Parliament. Members cannot be Ministers and the Committee must be representative of 
all parts of the country (Goldring 1978: 232). 
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periods. The contingent commander consequently accepted offers of 
accommodation and rationing from BCL. The soldiers' presence enhanced the 
security of the minesite and enabled staff to build a strong relationship with the 
PNGDF. While the establishment of the base at Panguna served these purposes, 
the move away from Arawa also safeguarded the government and the PNGDF 
hierarchy from public exposure of the weaknesses besetting the PNGDF. Until 
March 1990, the PNGDF was rationed and quartered by BCL, a process which 
disguised the true cost of the security forces' deployment on Bougainville. 
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Lieutenant Colonel Salamas, having decided to move his troops to 
Panguna, planned an operation - codenamed Nakmai Maimai 130 - to clear the 
road route to the mine for the safe passage of his forces (personal communication 
Lieutenant Colonel Salamas of 15 November 1996). (The codename in a local 
language in New Ireland Province means 'lonely leader'.) The operation began in 
the early hours of 3 July with the evacuation of villagers from Poromai, Sideronsi 
and Porakake. Dotaona wanted to reduce the possibility of civilian casualties and 
to isolate the militants from the civilian population. Dotaona' s operational plan 
called for the concentration of 1 RPIR elements along the PMAR to clear the road 
and its environs of the military threat (Appendix 2). The operation was riddled 
with problems and doomed from the beginning. Poorly planned, with insufficient 
time and insufficient troops, success was superficial (Liria 1993: 48). By their 
action in first evacuating the villages in the area, the PNGDF had lost the element 
of surprise. The militants escaped the area or prepared ambushes. 
The operation called for the clearance of twelve kilometres of road and the 
searching of sixteen main villages. Even allowing two hours for village cordons 
and search, and the movement of two companies at less than one kilometre an 
hour, the task could not have been completed in six days. More importantly, the 
clearance of the road was an impossible mission unless a large force remained in 
129 Liria (1993: 38) refers incorrectly to this first PNGDF operation as Tampara, which was the 
police codename for its deployment to Bougainville. 
13° For security reasons, codenames should contain two words , which bear no relationship to the 
intended operations and should not contain colours. 
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the area to prevent rebel reoccupation. Dotaona' s claim, six days later, that the 
road was secure (Post-Courier 6 July 1989: 1) gave a false sense of security to the 
government, the mine and the people. The plan was essentially a show of force 
(personal communication Brigadier-General Singirok of 16 October 1996). 
Troop morale was also low - the PNGDF had suffered three fatalities in 
four months. Soldiers 'found themselves in a frustrating and hostile environment 
socially as well as physically' (Fraser 1989: 33). Moreover, the PNGDF had been 
unsure of its role, confused over government policy which alternated between 
carrot and stick, and unsure of the true extent of the militant threat. Recognising 
the problems, the government acceded to defence requests for operational 
allowances to compensate the troops for service on B ougainville. Two 
allowances were paid: each member received an operational allowance of K15 131 
per day and a patrol allowance of K2.50 per day. The government's generosity 
would add significantly to the cost of operations. Some officers and soldiers 
supporting operations from Port Moresby also claimed the allowances as did 
those in support bases in Rabaul and on Nissan Island. Service on Bougainville 
quickly became a lucrative business. In the long term, soldiers would become so 
used to the higher pay levels that problems would arise when these ceased on their 
return to the mainland. 
On 29 June, only days before Operation Nakmai Maimai , B Company, 1 
RPIR, which had been given the task of clearing the road, staged a mutiny. 
Patience among B Company members had run out. Mutiny by soldiers on 
operations was a serious offence. In the case of the PNGDF, such mutinous acts 
were not uncommon. In 1987, for example, B Company, 1 RPIR, had refused to 
obey the orders of the company commander.132 Given the background of security 
force indiscipline, the PNGDF Commander on Bougainville or in Port Moresby 
should have taken prompt and severe disciplinary action against B Company 
personnel. Instead, the task was reallocated to A Company. 
131 Later, the allowance was increased to K25 per day. 
132 Author's experience as a military adviser in 1 RPIR 1985-88. 
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According to Liria (1993: 43), 'you should never ever negotiate a situation 
with a group of soldiers, especially in an operational area, where fear of death is 
the ... reason'. While I do not underestimate the difficulty of confronting armed 
troops in the situation described, the incident should never have been ignored. 
The indiscipline pointed to poor management of the contingent and poor 
leadership and training in the unit. By avoiding confrontation as officers of the 
PNGDF invariably do, indiscipline is encouraged. This was indeed the case, both 
for B Company on its next tour, and for other elements of the PNGDF. 
Colonel Dotaona, Liria' s commander, believed that discipline was 
essential. By Liria's account of another incident (1993: 98-99), Dotaona 
intervened to stop soldiers beating a villager. Dotaona was challenged by an 
officer - Lieutenant Markham (personal communication Lieutenant Colonel Key 
on 17 April 1996) - and threatened with a weapon. Dotaona stood his ground 
and the officer backed down. Had PNGDF officers followed Dotaona' s example, 
discipline might have been safeguarded; so too the human rights of 
Bougainvilleans. 
During Operation Nakmai Maimai, PNGDF activity was not confined to 
the PMAR. After militants captured a military vehicle and two weapons near 
Guava village, close to the mine, a deliberate attack on the village involving C 
Company personnel was planned. Guava village, located on the Panguna Mine 
rim, was also the birthplace of rebel leader Francis Ona. A reinforced platoon 
began the attack at 0400 hours against the rebel force, estimated at about 10-20. 
Soldiers took the ridge after some four hours of fighting at around 1100 hours 
(personal communication Brigadier-General Singirok of 17 October 1996). 
The then Operations Officer (1 RPIR), Major Singirok, 133 gave a public 
account of the Battle of Guava134 which made front page news on the mainland-
little wonder given that the government found good news from Bougainville hard 
to find. Singirok' s account of the battle thrust him into the spotlight - as 
133 Singirok was appointed Commander of the PNGDF in December 1995 (and again in 1998). 
134 Liria ( 1993: 111) clai1ns that the battle occurred during Operation Bull Dog. The date of the 
incident was on 7 July 1989, during Operation Nalanai Maimai. 
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happened later when he was a battalion commander on Bougainville in 1994. 
Still, the battle was little more than a skirmish in military terms. According to C 
Company soldiers, the militants were lightly armed with little ammunition and, 
except for two killed, withdrew shortly after contact was first made. Soldiers 
found that the rebels had used PNGDF training manuals at the site. The rebels ' 
use of weapon pits (Figure 7 .5) was for protection rather than any serious attempt 
to hold ground. Indeed, in 1989/90, the rebels had never sought to hold ground. 135 
Figure 7.5 
Guava Ridge - After the Battle 
(Post-Courier 7 July 1989: 2) 
The report frequently referred to the militants as members of the 
Bougainville Republican Army (BRA) (Post-Courier 7 July 1989). Later, 
government officials acknowledged that Port Moresby's repeated use of the term 
Bougainville Republican _ (later Revolutionary) Army created a false image of a 
well-organised guerilla force fighting for secession on behalf of Bougainvilleans 
(personal communication with Mr P. Bengo (Secretary, Prime Minister's 
Department 1989) on 17 April 1996). Still, the PNGDF account gave the 
135 Rebels determinedly defended approaches to the Kongara in 1996 during a PNGDF offensive 
- codenamed Operation High Speed II. 
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government some good news, vindicating the hardline approach taken under the 
SOE and showing promise of an end to the troubles on Bougainville. Port 
Moresby also gained the (false) impression that the militants were off balance and 
receptive to a settlement. 
During Operation Nakmai Maimai, the PNGDF used the Mortar Platoon 
for the first time on Bougainville. The platoon had been deployed to provide 
protection and to gain experience even though the weapon's use was not 
consistent with the principle of minimum force on SOE operations. In any event, 
mortar fire with a range of 3.7 kilometres proved to be ineffective against the 
rebels (See also Liria 1993: 117). Rebel groups were rarely large enough to 
. .f h f h ff . d f . 1 136 JUst1 y t e use o t e mortars 1n an o ens1ve or e ens1ve ro e. The 
ammunition was expensive and because of its weight and special handling 
requirements, even small quantities added considerably to the logistic effort in 
resupplying the army on Bougainville. 
The mortar platoons had had problems before Bougainville. The platoons 
had long been under strength, lacking qualified personnel. The weapons were in 
poor order. Barrels were worn and the sights for the mortar tubes were not 
calibrated. There was only one current, qualified mortar line officer for both 
platoons, which meant that live firing was contingent on his availability. Range 
practices - required annually to maintain skills - at the only approved PNGDF 
range, at Urimo Training Area, near Wewak, had been largely abandoned. The 
mortar platoon on Bougainville relied on maps, which were not accurate, 
especially regarding village locations, and the fall of shot was difficult to observe. 
Few battalion officers had recent experience at adjusting mortar fire. Overall , the 
use of mortars on Bougainville was risky business -for both sides. 
Headquarters PNGDF was negligent in approving the mortar deployment 
and the release of ammunition. The use of the mortar platoon on 10 July at night 
on Guava village was irresponsible and indefensible. Little wonder that, 
136 Integral to the infantry battalion, mortars are used against enemy in the open or in defended 
positions and to provide a smoke screen. While still useful in thick vegetation, the effectiveness 
of mortar fire is limited by the controller's inability to observe the fall of shot. 
228 
following the incident, Headquarters PNGDF issued orders that mortar use was to 
be approved by Port Moresby. Those directions were ignored when on 18 July 
during Operation Bull Dog, the mortars fired on suspected rebels near Musinau 
village. The mortars would be used again, often deployed as sections (two mortar 
tubes), over coming years. Mortar rounds often fell indiscriminately, wounding 
civilians and terrorising the local population. Soldiers confirmed later that the 
mortars were fired regularly, especially at night, without adequate controls. The 
PNGDF even fired the mortars from its ships - a notoriously unstable platform 
and dangerous for the troops involved. The PNGDF' s use of white phosphorous 
rounds (WP) attracts particular condemnation. WP bums the skin and can drift 
well beyond target areas. The mortars gave the PNGDF no tactical advantage in 
its fight against the militants - a judgement now conceded by Brigadier-General 
Singirok (personal communication 17 October 1996). In the end, mortars were 
out of step with what was essentially an internal security operation. 
Operation Bull Dog 
Flushed with apparent success during Operation Nakmai Maimai, a new 
operation - codenamed Bull Dog - was planned to commence on 12 July 
(Appendix 3). The codename was chosen because one of the objectives of the 
operation was to capture rebel leaders, including James Singko, deputy president 
of the rebel government and right-hand man to Francis Ona. Singko was said to 
have a face like a bull dog (personal communication Lieutenant Colonel Salamas 
of 15 November 1996.) Dotaona planned to use the operation to clear the area 
around the minesite. Dotaona' s focus on the mine was driven by political 
priorities. The reopening of the mine was vital to the PNG economy. Before that 
could occur, the militant threat to the mine had to be removed. To facilitate 
further operations, the government extended the SOE for two months from 16 
July. 137 The day before Operation Bull Dog commenced, the Parliamentary 
Committee for the supervision of the SOE arrived on Bougainville. At Namaliu's 
137 The original SOE was declared for four weeks from 26 June 1989. 
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direction, the committee was to investigate reports of human rights abuse by the 
security forces. Facing renewed operations against the militants and with two 
more soldiers wounded on 10 July, the PNGDF was not receptive to what they 
perceived as political interference. 
The tactical plan was to deploy three companies into the area south of the 
minesite. One company (All RPIR) was to clear the western side of the Jaba 
River to !simon (See map). Another company (D/1 RPIR) was to clear the 
eastern side of the river. That company, on reaching !simon, was then to clear 
north-east as far as Bopam. A third company (C/1 RPIR) was to patrol east to 
clear Guava, Musinau, Mt Kupara and Kupei village. The three companies were 
in little danger of accidentally contacting each other, especially with the well-
defined Jaba River between the closest companies. However, the rebels also had 
every opportunity to escape, as many did. 
The slow moving companies , faced with difficult terrain and thick 
vegetation, and the need for A and D companies to stay abreast of each other, 
effectively lost the advantage of surprise when the advance began from Panguna. 
Also difficult to understand, given the co-ordination needed for A and D company 
operations, is why the Battalion headquarters did not accompany the force as is 
usual practice when two companies are operating in concert. No blocking force 
was in place to the south or east and much of the area south of the mine was not 
covered in the operation. 
Reinforcements were difficult to deploy and casualties , including non-
battle injured, could only be evacuated by carriers. This meant weakening the 
strength of the patrol or abandoning the operation. Patrolling in groups larger 
than a section strengthened the force, but the soldiers were difficult to control in 
thick vegetation. Shortly after deployment on the PNGDF' s first operation into 
the Kongara (Operation Kisini Dog) , patrols grew to platoon or company size138 
(See also Liria 1993: 124). These invariably made a lot of noise and were 
138 The PNGDF claimed that larger groups improved control by utilising company or platoon radio 
communications - sections had no radios - and these larger groups could counter any rebel 
threat. However, the groups were formed largely to build confidence among the troops. 
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slow moving, and the rebels were easily able to evade contact or create confusion 
by surprise attacks. Sub-units were spread over large distances by the nature of 
the terrain or channelled along narrow paths. Resupply of these large groups was 
a logistic nightmare, taking time and resources. Surprise was lost with resupply 
aircraft revealing company locations to the rebels. 
Even so, Operation Bull Dog was proclaimed a success on its conclusion 
on 28 July, largely because of the high profile military presence around the mine. 
The soldiers had managed to kill Ona' s younger brother - Ambrose Leo - on 
19 July in a chance encounter (Post-Courier 19 July 1989: 1). Mine management 
welcomed the effort and foreshadowed the mine ' s reopening as soon as repairs 
could be completed. However, optimism about the success of the operation was 
misplaced. Although additional troops were deployed during the operation -
three companies were involved - the area to be cleared was beyond their 
capacity in the time allowed. The minesite was 8 square kilometres. To achieve 
success, soldiers would need to conduct 'patrolling, searching and ambushing 
[ with] a high degree of battlecraft, personal fieldcraft and teamwork' (McKay139 
1987: 187) over a sustained period, coupled with good leadership. 
During Operation Bull Dog, Liria (1993: 176) claims that arrangements 
were made to whisk Francis Ona out of Bougainville for negotiations with 
Namaliu on or around 19 July. Liria further claimed that knowledge of the plan 
was limited to several key officers and the prime minister. However, the then 
secretary of the Prime Minister's Department and the then commander of the 
PNGDF have dismissed the notion of a clandestine plan to fly Ona from 
Bougainville. Liria' s speculation coincides with rumours at the time of Ona' s 
presence in Madang, generated by the belief that Ona was visiting his wife who 
came from Karkar Island, Madang Province. 
On 31 July, two soldiers were wounded at Arawa. Only four days later the 
long awaited Iroquois helicopters - in April Australia had agreed to provide four 
helicopters under the Defence Co-operation agreement- arrived on Bougainville 
139 Gary McKay served as platoon commander in Vietnam (where he was awarded a military cross 
for valour under fire). Vietnam operations were similar to those on Bougainville. 
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(Figure 7 .6). The helicopters proved valuable, offering a medical evacuation 
capability. As such, their arrival provided an important and timely morale boost 
for the contingent. However, the helicopters came with conditions imposed by 
Australia and accepted on behalf of the PNG government by Prime Minister 
Namaliu. They were to be used for troop transport, patrolling, surveillance and 
medical evacuation. The conditions prohibited the: 
• use of the helicopters as gunships; 
• arming of the helicopters; and 
• use of the helicopters [as platforms] for offensive fire. 
Figure 7.6 
PNGDF Iroquois Helicopters 
(Post-Courier 4 August 1989: 4) 
Australia's concern in providing the PNGDF with helicopters was that the 
militants could construe the act as 'military assistance to PNG, [prompting] the 
rebels to retaliate against Australians on the island' (Senator G. Evans July 1989). 
In the event, Australians were attacked though probably for other reasons. The 
question arises as to whether the rebels appreciated the subtle qualifications to 
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Australia's charity. In spite of the conditions imposed by Australia, the four 
aircraft were quickly improvised as gunships . ( discussion Lieutenant Colonel 
Salamas 15 November 1996) (See also Liria 1993: 113). Indeed, offensive fire 
was regularly directed from the helicopters at suspected targets, including 
villages. Soldiers fired machine guns attached by rope, and grenades from 
grenade launchers (M203/M79) or simply dropped grenades into villages. 140 The 
conditions were violated and the Australian government was shown evidence of 
such instances (Channel 7 Sunday programme July 1989), but little was done to 
enforce the prohibitions - something which the PNGDF quickly realised. 
The 'gunship' issue confused the debate over whether the conditions had 
been breached. Gunships, in the military sense, include helicopters which have 
been fitted for that role with mounted machine guns (such as the General Purpose 
Machine Gun (GPMG) M60 or mini guns) and/or rockets. 141 The image 
frequently conjured up is that of the Iroquois helicopters used in Vietnam. The 
PNGDF has never attempted to fit fixed weapons to the Iroquois and so never 
breached the conditions in that sense. However, Australia was also concerned 
that the helicopters were not used as gun platforms for offensive fire against 
ground targets - by mounted or temporarily mounted weapons. That distinction 
was lost by continual reference to gunships, especially by the press. 142 
Operation Kisim Dog 
By August, the PNGDF was becoming frustrated and agitated over its 
inability to counter the rebels (personal communication Lieutenant Colonel 
Salamas of 15 November 1996). The PNGDF decided to go after the rebels and 
their leaders in their Kongara 143 stronghold. On 4 August, militants sabotaged the 
Mt Takanait repeater station, effectively closing down communications links with 
Bougainville for two weeks (Post-Courier 4 August 1989: 2). Only one of NSP's 
three repeater stations remained untouched - the facility at Mount Bei on Buka 
140 Soldiers confinned these routine activities in various discussions in 1989/90. 
141 Weapons 1nounted on the aircraft frame are capable of more accurate fire than are weapons 
attached by ad hoc means. 
142 The PNGDF also used its Arava aircraft to engage suspected rebel targets. 
143 The Kongara extends from the Panguna mine to the Beuta Mountains in the south and to 
Sipuru/Kuritave/Meridau villages as far as the Crown Prince Ranges in the east. 
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Island. On 4 August, the PNGDF launched Operation Kisim Dog (meaning to 
catch or get the dog (rebels)). The concept of that operation was to 'close in on 
the BRA's Kongara area and eliminate the rebel leadership and its forces' (Liria 
1993: 123) (Appendix 4). The PNGDF's objective is worth further examination if 
only because the concept was to influence future operations, as late as 1996. 
As Liria noted, 'senior military officers strongly differed on the mission of 
the security forces on the island' (1993: 121). One group, which included 
Colonel Dotaona, saw the PNGDF' s primary role as protecting the mine and 
government infrastructure. Others, especially Colonel Nuia, who was appointed 
deputy controller in September 1989, believed that to end the problem and regain 
the initiative, an all-out attack on the rebel stronghold was required. While either 
option or a combination of the two had merit, · both required large forces and a 
committed effort to achieve success. 
Operation Kisim Dog had another flaw - the operation would only work 
if the BRA stayed to fight. PNGDF intelligence showed that the rebels were 
members of disparate groups spread throughout the Kongara and beyond. The 
PNGDF also knew from their experience so far, including on Guava Ridge (7 
July), that the rebels did not attempt to hold ground. So at best, soldiers would be 
looking for lone militants or small groups who might appear fleetingly or merge 
with the local population. Militants could also attack soft (undefended) targets 
elsewhere as they had done at Mount Takanait in North Bougainville. 
In part, the PNGDF command realised the problems, including the 
difficulty of covering an area of fifty to sixty square kilometres of difficult terrain, 
often at high altitude, and covered by thick vegetation. The PNGDF intended to 
counter the elusiveness of the rebels by conducting the operation at section level 
supported by helicopters. The PNGDF also gambled on meeting rebel groups less 
than four militants in number and poorly armed. The soldiers would saturate the 
area with twenty to twenty-five groups. However, the sections would require 
good leadership, excellent navigation skills, professionalism and confidence, and 
close co-ordination. These conditions could not be met. In any case, a section of 
ten soldiers was insufficient to cordon and search and to protect itself while 
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clearing a village. From the beginning, fear spread among the PNGDF that 'five 
to ten men could not survive on their own' (ibid.: 148). 
In spite of the odds, troops deployed to their pre-assigned positions. 
Major Kasey Rovae (B Company) deployed to Sipuru, Major Doug De Markus 
(A Company) to Kuritave and Major Donny Bouwe144 (D Company) to Moru-
Meridau. During the deployment, mortars were used against a cave complex in 
the Beuta Mountains, which was believed to be used by a militant group. Little 
was achieved though a militant mess hut and some bush accommodation were 
found further north and destroyed (personal communication Colonel Nuia of 15 
October 1996). Within eleven days, the troops were recalled to Panguna. By 
then, the PNGDF claimed to have swept the area and cleared the rebels (personal 
communication Lieutenant Colonel Salamas of 15 November 1996). Shortly after 
the operation began, the rebels pressed for talks, insisting on the withdrawal of the 
PNGDF as a pre-condition. The rebels had used that approach as a tactic to 
reduce military pressure and to keep Port Moresby off balance - a tactic which 
irritated the PNGDF and prompted criticism of the government in Port Moresby. 
Events of the next few weeks would not favour the PNGDF. On 17 
August, soldiers manning a roadblock shot at a car, which failed to stop. The 
occupants of the car were off-duty soldiers; one, Private George Mena (ENB) was 
killed and another wounded - the first casualties through friendly fire (Post-
Courier 17 August 1989: 1). On 29 August, soldiers killed two women in an 
ambush at Kuritave. It remains unclear why soldiers were conducting operations 
during the ceasefire and the PNGDF came under immediate pressure to explain 
the incident. Lieutenant Colonel Salamas later claimed that the incident was a 
case of mistaken identity; the women were travelling at night with suspected 
rebels. The PNGDF objected to the scrutiny, especially from their government. 
On 1 September, Lieutenant Colonel Salamas ejected the Parliamentary 
Committee from Panguna, in part prompted by the treatment of the contingent 
over the last month. Salamas was also annoyed that he had not been informed of 
144 In 1991, Major Bouwe committed suicide in Port Moresby. 
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the visit in advance (personal communication Lieutenant Colonel Salamas of 15 
November 1996). The incident resulted in Salamas being removed from his 
command on 14 September and replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew 
Trongat, 145 a Buka Islander. (A month later, Trongat was replaced by Lieutenant 
Colonel Gabriel Tamegal, 146 an engineer officer.) However, the PNGDF's 
problems would continue. On 6 September, the Panguna mine restarted only to 
stop eight hours later when militants shot BCL workers on the PMAR - the very 
road which the PNGDF claimed was cleared after Operation Nakmai Maimai. 
Four days later, one soldier [Private Simon Ou'u (Oro)] was killed and another 
three injured when their vehicle overturned on the PMAR. 
The government, however, was enjoying some success 1n brokering a 
solution to the problems on Bougainville. John Bika, a minister in the provincial 
government, had prepared a peace package, which provided greater autonomy for 
Bougainville. The night before the package was to be signed (11 September), 147 
Bika was assassinated by militants. The message was clear, the militants wanted 
nothing short of secession. On 18 September, the government was further 
embarrassed. A soldier setting up a booby trap was accidentally killed. News of 
the booby traps reached a public still shocked by the rapid deterioration of the 
Bougainville situation. Members of the security forces had died. The Panguna 
mine - central to PNG' s economy - was closed with seemingly little prospect 
of opening. The militants, a ragtag group of hill people, had so far defied large 
and expensive efforts to bring them to justice. Now, soldiers were resorting to 
home-made booby traps as a weapon. Even the militants, who had proved adept 
at using explosives, had not resorted to such primitive methods. The public 
demanded to know who authorised the PNGDF to use booby traps and why the 
army was now using these devices. 
Why indeed! Booby traps require special expertise to set up. They were 
145 Colonel Trongat died in 2000. 
146 Lieutenant Colonel Tamegal died of a heart attack in Port Moresby in 1995 aged 42. 
147 Authors vary on the exact date of Bika' s death. Oliver (1991: 220) claims Bika died on 10 
September while Dorney (1990: 142) and Polornka (1990: 81) claim the date was 11 September. 
My source is the PNG Times of 2 May 1991 The Bougainville Crisis Chronology 1961-91. 
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not part of conventional PNGDF training. Training in the use of mines was 
largely confined to the claymore. 148 The decision to booby trap the pylons was 
driven by the belief that this was a cheap and effective method of safeguarding 
them. To be effective, mines and booby traps should be covered by fire to 
prevent them being removed by the enemy. The decision did not take into 
account that the rebels could remove the devices and use them against the security 
forces. Interestingly, in spite of the militants' explosives abilities, they never used 
booby traps in 1988/89. 
Deputy Prime Minister Diro, who had resigned from the PNGDF in 1982, 
and was elected to parliament the same year, had become deputy prime minister 
and minister of state for the Bougainville situation. He had no hesitation in 
admitting he had ordered the use of booby traps. He went further by announcing 
the posting of rewards of K200,000 for rebel leaders - dead or alive. Diro 
stepped back however, when on 2 October another soldier - Lance Corporal 
John Mu'uh (Manus) - died in a second explosive accident. The PNGDF had 
been dealt another blow; this was the fourth occasion in which a soldier had died 
by accident. The PNGDF was managing to kill more soldiers than the rebels. 
The Minister for Defence noted that the PNGDF was experiencing 'declining 
morale as a result of the tragedies among the [Force]' (Post-Courier 4 October 
1989: 2). The government, faced with the apparent intractability of the 
Bougainville problem, also had its confidence in the PNGDF shaken. Defence 
Secretary Mokis commented that the 'crisis has revealed fundamental weaknesses 
in the command structure and shows the Force lacks the capability to respond to 
internal security contingencies' (Post-Courier 4 October 1989: 2). 
Criticism, especially from within the defence hierarchy, did little for the 
morale of the contingent. The soldiers had lost confidence in their leadership and 
they had little idea of Port Moresby's strategy. In the wake of the Bika killing, 
148 The claymore was devised as a means of breaking up massed attacks and to provide protection 
for defensive positions. The mine, a command-detonated directional device, mounted on four 
legs, can be fired in banks. Each mine fires seven hundred ball bearings. 
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the government decided that a harder line was needed. To achieve that, 
something had to be done to improve the performance of the PNGDF. Port 
Moresby appointed Colonel Leo Nuia, OBE, as Deputy Controller with effect 16 
S b h d . f B . d. G 1 L ki 149 h eptem er on t e recommen atlon o nga 1er- enera o nap, w o 
considered Colonel Dotaona had not asserted military control (personal 
communication 17 April 1996). Nuia enjoyed a tough man image, preferring 
operations to administrative roles. Nuia also knew Premier Kabui, having met 
him in 1988 during Nuia' s visit to a United States military action team on 
Bougainville. 150 Nuia was a hardliner with little sympathy for the secessionists. 
The government, which had earlier authorised 200 additional troops for 
Bougainville (Post-Courier 17 August 1989: 1), gave Nuia three weeks to restore 
authority. Nuia introduced stricter curfew hours from 1800 to 0500 (instead of 
2200 to 0500) and prepared for an offensive; an approach consistent with Nuia' s 
long-held view that only by attacking the rebels in their stronghold could the 
crisis be resolved. Mine protection, he argued, was a job for the police. The 
PNGDF could achieve little by adopting a defensive posture around the mine. 
That decision spoilt PNGDF relations with mine staff and local authorities. 
Before Nuia was able to start operations, the government announced that it 
would be pursuing a peace package with the landowners. A peace ceremony was 
set for Friday 27 October at which Prime Minister Namaliu would attend. The 
hope was that Francis Ona would also attend with members of the NSP 
government. Namaliu was under pressure for a withdrawal of the security forces 
from Bougainville, and facing another no confidence vote, he endeavoured to 
negotiate a settlement. Namaliu claimed that he 'always believed in the value of 
dialogue and the negotiation process' (Post-Courier 3 November 1989: 2). The 
ceremony was given special significance as a traditional Bougainvillean way of 
resolving differences. The breaking of the spears as it became known (Post-
149 Namaliu was not altogether comfortable with Nuia - in spite of being from the same area of 
East New Britain-but in the end accepted Lokinap' s advice. 
150 The civic action team seemed unaware of any trouble brewing around the minesite (personal 
communication with the U.S. Team leader in Port Moresby late 1988). 
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Courier 30 October 1989: 1), went ahead but without Ona. On the same day, 
another soldier was wounded. 
Namaliu resisted pressure from hardliners for stronger action. On 23 
November, he extended the state of emergency for another two months but eased 
the curfew (2100 hours and 0400 hours). That day, a soldier- Private Boni Gau 
- was killed at Panguna. He was the eighth151 PNGDF soldier killed since the 
deployment. The militants continued sporadic sabotage while in the south police 
mounted a special operation - codenamed Seaside - to clear the Koromira-Buin 
road of criminal activity (Post-Courier 23 November 1989: 2). Police would 
patrol the road as a matter of routine. That practice was later to prove fatal. 
Namaliu met with Premier Kabui and representatives of the Panguna 
landowners in Rabaul on the weekend 25/26 November. The results were 
encouraging, with Namaliu declaring unanimous agreement on all major issues. 
The government set about a three-phased process designed to broker a ceasefire 
and lead to the eventual withdrawal of the security forces. By so doing, 
reconciliation could take place and, finally, negotiations to reach a settlement. 
On 30 November, three police were killed at Aropa and several others 
wounded. They were the first police killed in the crisis. In the attack, the rebels 
stole six semi-automatic AR 15152 rifles and ammunition. On 4 December, rebels 
burnt down the repeater station behind Arawa, thereby shutting down 
communications with the province. The Mt Kupara repeater station was an 
important link in PNG' s communications network - one of three located in 
Bougainville Province - and the first public property targetted by the militants. 
Still, N amaliu persisted with peace, announcing a thinning out of the security 
forces in accordance with the Rabaul agreement. The rebels, flushed with 
success, increased the pressure. 
Militant activity soon forced the withdrawal of public servants from 
southern Bougainville (Post-Courier 12 December 1989: 1). The security forces 
151 The Post-Courier (23 November 1989) claimed incorrectly that Gau was the ninth fatality. 
152 The civilian version of the US Colt M 16, the AR 15 (5.56mm) is one of the weapons on issue 
to the police mobile squads. The AR 15 , unlike the M 16, has no automatic fire capability. 
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approved the plan, arguing that they could not provide security across the island. 
Rather, their forces should be concentrated in the centre - an approach also 
important to Nuia' s plans for a large-scale offensive there. The withdrawal 
underlined Port Moresby' s inability to enforce its writ and delivered the rebels an 
easy victory. Little wonder then that the rebels abandoned the ceasefire talks and 
demanded the full withdrawal of the security forces from Bougainville. Namaliu 
responded firmly, rejecting the rebel demand. He asserted that the security force 
presence was non-negotiable. 
The national government was struck another blow when, on 29 December, 
BCL announced that 2000 staff at the mine would be retrenched from 9 January 
(Post-Courier 29 December 1989: 2). BCL reasoned that with continuing militant 
attacks, there was little prospect of the mine reopening. Rather, a caretaker staff 
would remain and the rest of the workforce would be free to leave. The BCL 
workers quickly joined the line of non-Bougainvilleans leaving the province. 
BCL' s decision was a vote of no confidence in the security forces. Still, Colonel 
Nuia was pleased to be rid of the burden of mine security. Nuia used the BCL 
decision to promote his plan for operations. 
Operation Foot Loose 
By January 1990, Colonel Nuia had used the three months since his arrival 
to prepare for operations against the militants. Nuia had assembled an impressive 
array of military muscle. He had five companies, air support and a logistics base 
to support his operations. As he had long argued, Nuia abandoned mine security 
and concentrated his military forces against the rebel heartland. Nuia believed 
that the offensive 153 would destabilise the rebels , forcing them to abandon their 
bases. 'Rebels on the run were more vulnerable to attack' (personal 
communication Colonel Nuia, OBE, of 19 September 1996). He chose, as the 
name of this operation, Foot Loose, which reflected his strategy of keeping the 
rebels off balance. The operation had two phases: phase 1 would force the rebels 
153 The same strategy was repeated in 1996 - against Nuia' s advice. A PNGDF offensive -
codenamed High Speed II- involved a battalion seaborne landing at Aropa airport and an assault 
into the Kongara. The attack stalled as troops, lacking helicopter support, confronted a hostile, 
well-armed rebel force . The operation was soon abandoned (see Dorney 1998: 124-144). 
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onto the run while phase 2 would see the rebels rounded up (ibid.:) (Appendix 5). 
The success of his strategy depended on: 
• the concentration of security forces in the Kongara in a co-ordinated manner; 
• the militants remaining in the area and engaging the PNGDF; 
• a sound logistic system capable of supplying over 500 soldiers in dispersed 
locations for several weeks; 
• a capacity to evacuate wounded soldiers quickly without detriment to the 
efficiency of the logistic system; 
• good intelligence on the militants; and 
• surpnse. 
Nuia's plan for Foot Loose was risky. He would be tying up most of the 
PNGDF in difficult terrain without the capacity to respond quickly to rebel threats 
elsewhere. By ignoring these issues, Nuia' s plan risked unravelling. That would 
expose the government's tenuous position on Bougainville and, combined with 
human rights excesses, would deliver much sooner than expected a Bougainville 
free of Port Moresby's presence. Port Moresby failed to appreciate that unless 
threats against the militants could be backed up by the judicious use of force, it 
risked having its bluff called and relinquishing the initiative to the rebels. 
Operation Foot Loose was launched on Thursday 11 January. 154 PNGDF 
elements deployed to Sipuru, Demberwei, Daratui and Rumba areas. Within 
hours of the PNGDF deployment, a soldier - Lance Corporal Karobata - shot 
and killed a woman and her child at Kuritave village. The soldier had followed a 
vehicle travelling without lights to a village. Suspicious, the soldier approached 
the village and fired into a hut, killing the woman and the child at her breast. He 
was charged and gaoled for manslaughter, according to Colonel Nuia (15 October 
1996). The PNGDF too suffered casualties. 
The rebels reacted to the PNGDF operation by mounting a series of well-
orchestrated attacks. While the PNGDF was harassed in the Kongara, the rebels 
154 The next day the national government extended the state of emergency for a further two 
months . Another extension would not be necessary- troops were withdrawn from Bougainville 
two days before the SOE was to expire on 16 March 1990. 
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targetted other areas of Bougainville. The most devastating attack occun·ed on 
the night of 17 January. A band of rebels attacked Kuveria gaol, north of Arawa. 
Four CIS officers were killed and a further ten wounded. Several weapons were 
stolen. In anticipation of police reinforcements, the rebels set up an ambush at 
Manetai. Several police were wounded in the ambush. 
On 24 January, the Australian government issued a second diplomatic 
advisory notice urging all Australians without essential business to leave 
Bougainville. In seeking to protect the safety of Australian citizens, the 
government was also conscious that Australia's policy position gave other foreign 
governments with citizens and investments in Bougainville a measure of the real 
situation. For Australia, the notices were a compromise between the safety of 
Australians and the risk of undermining Port Moresby's position. That explains 
why the notices were issued so late relative to the deteriorating situation on the 
ground. In publishing the second notice, Australia was also intent on reducing the 
number of people who might need to be evacuated if the situation worsened. 
Even as these measures were being put in place, the rebels were extending their 
area of operations, searching for soft targets. 
Battle of Buka 
A PNGDF platoon was garrisoned on Buka Island. This element was an 
ad hoc unit - part of a composite company (Golf Company) assembled at 
Murray Barracks before Operation Foot Loose. The soldiers were located at Buka 
township with a modicum of security - weapon pits were not well sited and 
soldiers lacked the ability to support each other in the event of attack. Soldiers 
were not expecting trouble as the rebels had not been active on Buka. 
At around 2130 hours on 12 February, Bougainvillean rebels crossed Buka 
Passage undetected and attacked. Panic gripped the platoon. Amid the confusion, 
soldiers leapt into B uka Passage to escape. Four soldiers were killed - Privates 
Mark Barin (Madang), Allan Miria (Central), Maino Lakasisi (Central) and Mano 
Taguna155 (Southern Highlands). Reports on the incident suggested that the 
155 Private Taguna was captured by the rebels, tortured, then killed. 
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soldiers were 'irresponsible and careless' (The Times 22 February 1990: 1). 
Colonel Nuia conceded that poor security contributed to the PNGDF losses 
(personal communication of 19 September 1996). 
The rebels had once again exposed the weaknesses of the security forces. 
However, the incident was significant for other reasons. The death of the four 
soldiers led to retribution by the PNGDF. Two days after the battle, on 14 
February, six suspected rebels were executed in what became known as the St 
Valentine's Day massacre (See 'Human Rights Abuses' below). The PNGDF 
casualties resulted in a renewal of the government efforts to broker a ceasefire. 
From September 1989, a peace initiative was being developed by 
academics, including Graeme Kemelfield, 156 and the rebel leadership. Progress 
was made even as other peace endeavours, for example, the breaking of the 
spears, was occurring. As these collapsed and plans for Operation Foot Loose 
were being finalised, the academics put their plan to the government. They 
proposed consultation between the rebels and Port Moresby; a settlement which 
resulted in some form of relationship with PNG; and the involvement of 
international observers. 
The plan showed promise and a ceasefire was brokered to take effect on 2 
March 1990. The achievement was notable for two reasons. First, development 
of the initiative took three months, mostly in secret and against a backdrop of 
other peace initiatives seemingly offering better prospects of success. Secondly, 
the initiative was sold to a government which had run out of patience. Namaliu ' s 
willingness to try again is notable, given the fragility of his coalition. 
Operation Foot Loose came to an abrupt end on 2 March when the 
government announced a ceasefire. Under protest, Colonel Nuia signed the 
ceasefire on behalf of the government. Within days, Port Moresby agreed to the 
withdrawal of the security forces from Bougainville. Some claim that the 
decision was made by Namaliu's chief of staff, Chris Haiveta, who came under 
pressure from politicians such as Momis (personal communication Mr Paul 
156 The initiative is covered in more detail in May and Spriggs (1990: 62-72). 
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Bengo, CBE on 17 April 1990). Others claim that the security forces withdrew 
unilaterally on Colonel Nuia's authority. The latter claim was given more 
credibility by press reports that Nuia snubbed the international observers and 
refused any handover on their arrival. This was not an accurate account. 
Nuia was given explicit instructions by the national government through 
the PNGDF chain of command to withdraw all troops from Bougainville no later 
than 16 March (personal communication Colonel Nuia of 19 September 1996). 
Nuia first became aware of the need for a handover to the observers when Red 
Cross officials passed a note to him at Aropa airport. As Nuia had no government 
direction, he refused to comply, but rather carried out his original orders to 
withdraw by 16 March. Nuia was conscious at the time that by 12 March the 
rebels outnumbered the PNGDF on the ground. He had experienced rebel threats 
first hand when armed militants took his car at Arawa. Indeed, Nuia had been 
given a platoon by the Commander for protection as the last troops left. 
The replacement of the security forces by an independent group of 
observers and the disarming of the militants were seen as preconditions for any 
talks to negotiate a settlement. Senior figures in Port Moresby, including Momis 
and Namaliu, believed that the security forces were contributing to the escalating 
violence through human rights abuses. The decision to withdraw the troops was 
an admission that Port Moresby had lost control. 
On 16 March, the Australian government issued its third and final notice 
urging all Australians to leave Bougainville by the first possible means. On that 
day, Australian diplomatic representation on the island ended with the withdrawal 
of High Commission officers. 
Port Moresby's plan could possibly have worked had a framework been 
first put in place to facilitate the withdrawal and the arrival of the observers. 
There were other problems with the plan. The militants went through the motions 
of collecting weapons - largely old or traditional types with little military value 
- and concentrated these at collection points. However, these were just as 
quickly returned to their owners rather than being destroyed once the observers 
departed. The militants had won an early and unexpected victory. 
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In spite of the precautions undertaken since November 1988, PNGDF 
contingency planning for Bougainville had serious shortfalls. The Commanding 
Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Key, had arrived on Bougainville only a week before 
the first PNGDF fatalities occurred. Prior to Bougainville, the PNGDF had been 
influenced by the experiences of earlier law and order operations. Then, the 
PNGDF had reinforced police authority against lightly-armed or unarmed 
civilians. The PNGDF underestimated the militants, dismissing the rebel threat as 
little more than gossip (personal communication Lieutenant Colonel Key of 16 
April 1996). 
The soldiers deployed to Bougainville in March 1989 were ill-prepared. 
The core elements of the first contingent were drawn ostensibly from 1 RPIR, 
which was based in Port Moresby (Taurama Barracks). In the four years before, 
the unit had been committed to six law and order operations - Santa Claus 84, 
Hot Spot, Green Beret 85, Green Beret 87 and Lomet 88. The soldiers were the 
most experienced in internal security in the PNGDF. By 1989, soldiers were tired 
of the grind of internal security duties. They had been used piecemeal, without 
the supervision of their officers, and penny-packeted around the country. Many 
of the bad habits of the police, especially the riot squads with whom the army 
formed a rapport on Bougainville, had been inculcated in the soldiers. 
The PNGDF commitment to law and order operations left little time for 
1 d . . S ld. . 1 157 regu ar or structure tra1mng. o 1ers not on operations were on eave or 
deployed on border duties. Basic skills, especially tactics, weapon training and 
sub-unit drills, declined along with morale, discipline and unit standards - once 
proudly high. Funding shortages led to a deterioration in equipment, uniforms 
and weapons. Where weapon replacement trials were conducted, the process was 
painstakingly slow .158 In 1986, three years before Bougainville, 1 RPIR received 
100 M16 (5.56mm) rifles and several Ultimax (5.56mm) light machine guns 
(LMG), well short of the numbers of replacement weapons required to equip the 
157 Soldiers received 35 days paid leave per year together with free return travel to their home 
village once every two years. 
158 A trial carried out for a replacement light machine gun for sections dragged on for four years 
before the Ultimax 100 LMG was selected and issued. 
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battalion. Still, because law and order operations required one, or possibly two, 
companies at a time, equipment was pooled for soldiers being deployed. Little 
was left for the soldiers remaining in the barracks. Vehicles were similarly 
allocated. Radio deficiencies compounded the command problems in a unit 
which had deployed to the field at battalion level once in recent years, in 1986.159 
Unit stores were therefore deficient, life-expired or unreliable. This 
affected unit efficiency and contributed to low morale and a lack of confidence 
within the ranks. The dismal state of affairs was well known at headquarters but 
sanctioned by neglect and experience in law and order operations in which the 
PNGDF faced little threat. Troops were overconfident in their ability to secure 
areas where a breakdown in law and order had occurred. They were more highly 
respected than the police but the 1989 pay riots had dented their image. 
Importantly, the troops had not participated in law and order operations as 
discrete army units. Internal security training in barracks bore little resemblance 
to operations. 
Unit commanders had recognised the problems and some corrective action 
had been taken. A two-year training programme had been introduced in 1987 in 1 
RPIR with regular reviews of unit efficiency. Command post exercises160 were 
conducted to improve command and control through radio communications 
though radio deficiencies dogged the system. However, the programme was 
disrupted regularly. By 1988, sub-units were only capable of platoon-level work. 
In the six months before deployment to Bougainville, many of the unit officers 
were posted, further disrupting unit cohesion. By 1986, internal security training 
( .d h . ·1 ) d 50 f 1 · · · 161 a1 to t e c1 v1 power ma e up per cent o tota unit tra1n1ng. On 
Bougainville, operations were vastly different in character and intensity to 
previous law and order operations. 
On Bougainville, troops operated on counter revolutionary warfare (CRW) 
lines - a concept inconsistent with aid to the civil power provisions in the PNG 
159 A battalion exercise was conducted at Kupiano/ Marshall Lagoon (Central Province) in 1986. 
16° Command post exercises test command and control procedures , and , except for headquarter 
staff, do not involve troops. 
161 In the 1970s, internal security training was 30 per cent of the unit training (Mench 1975: 117). 
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Constitution. As a result, the Defence Act ( 1988) was changed. 162 Conventional 
CRW163 training had accounted for the other 50 per cent of the training time. 
Indeed, the soldiers had been well practised in CRW scenarios which were 
surprisingly similar to the Bougainville situation. Soldiers were familiar with 
patrolling and ambushing routine. This training had been conducted at section 
(ten men) level without radios and with little support. Why then did the battalion 
perform so badly on Bougainville? 
Several reasons exist for the soldiers' poor performance. The soldiers 
were not natural bushmen as their fathers had been during the Second World War. 
Most were unable to live off the land. Some could not even recognise edible local 
fruits. Training had been centered on open vegetation in Central Province - a 
lack of funds and transport prevented exercises further afield. 164 The proximity of 
Taurama Barracks to the exercise area ensured a short supply line. In any event, 
exercises were only three weeks' duration so the logistic system was untested. 
The terrain in Central Province offered good visibility, up to 200 metres or 
more at times. Soldiers were able to see the enemy at some distance, firing aimed 
shots with weapons superior to the other side. Good visibility also ensured 
navigation was simple. Soldiers who came from the province had local 
knowledge and a close rapport with the villagers. Life in the field posed few 
challenges. Leadership was not tested. The largely dry climatic conditions posed 
few difficulties for soldiers who were accustomed to a dry warm climate. 
Uniform needs for wet and cold weather were ignored in favour of basic field 
dress. Helmets and flak jackets were in short supply and restricted to internal 
security drills in an urban setting. These items were not used on CRW operations 
because of their weight and the need to reduce noise. Importantly, all exercise 
scenarios described a local population supportive of the PNGDF. That ensured 
military information was safeguarded and information on the enemy forthcoming. 
162 In aid to the civil power, a principle of minimum force is observed. Machine guns, mortars and 
grenade launchers are not carried on operations - Bougainville was to be an exception. 
163 The PNGDF terminology for CRW was counter insurgency operations (CIO). 
164 Some training was carried out on the Kokoda Trail when Australian aircraft were available. 
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The shortcomings in unit performance were not limited to the soldiers and 
logistics. Officers, especially at the junior level, had few of the skills necessary to 
command soldiers under difficult conditions in an operations area. For example, 
some new graduates of the Lae Defence Academy had never seen a platoon in 
defence. They therefore had little idea of the expanse of ground covered by a unit 
of that size or an understanding of the problems likely to be encountered in 
moving a group through primary jungle. These officers lacked confidence, 
especially in their ability to navigate in jungle away from larger formations. 
So Bougainville came as a shock, the more so given that few civic action 
patrols had been conducted on Bougainville since independence. The last 
PNGDF patrol on Bougainville - Operation Pitala Butunama - was conducted 
in 1979 in Kieta and Buin (Defence Report 1979: 15). Maps were in short supply 
and out of date. Close vegetation and difficult terrain, often at high altitudes and 
with unusually high rainfall, made operations daunting. The 'Sepik swamps with 
their large mosquitos were a preferable option to the tactical nightmare presented 
by ... Bougainville [and] more hazardous than the PNG/ Indonesian border' (Liria 
1993: 71-72). Even during the Second World War, Bougainville was 'depressing 
and energy-sapping' (Sinclair 1990: 224 ). The close vegetation exaggerated the 
loneliness and created confusion. Regular rainfall helped mask the rebels' 
movement. Soldiers were required to return fire instinctively. Using a weapon in 
this manner requires practice, which was denied 1 RPIR before deployment. 
Even though ammunition was not in short supply, unit officers argued that there 
was no transport to convey troops to the range at Goldie River. In any case, 
soldiers had few occasions on law and order operations when they were required 
f. h . 16s to 1re t e1r weapons. Soldiers also found that the Bougainvillean rebels 
presented as a more serious threat than did the raskols encountered on earlier law 
and order operations. 
165 The only recorded incident occurred during LO:MET 88 when a PNGDF sergeant fired in self 
defence after a joint police/PNGDF patrol was attacked by a tribal group. 
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The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) 
The first reports of sabotage against the mine were attributed to militant 
landowners. Later, they were more commonly referred to as militants. Early in 
1989, the militant groups came to be known as Rambos. Liria (1993: 75) said that 
these rambos were so named 'because they all acted in 'Rambo' style against the 
security forces, and were inspired by the movies of the same name'. This was a 
popular misconception. Rambo was an acronym for the Revolutionary Army of 
Bougainville. Later, this was changed to the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. 
The rebels posed a serious threat to the authority of government on 
Bougainville. Liria (1993: 78) describes the rebels well: 
The rebel, of very black skin colour, was physically a very fit person. He 
scouted the mountain ranges and those dreadful ridges with ease. He 
carried very little weight on his back. He would dash for safety through 
heavy undergrowth, down extremely steep slopes, which were almost 
cliffs. His hands and feet were tough, his strong physique made even 
tougher through the harshness of jungle life. He had little fear of the 
elements, and used them to his advantage at every opportunity. He was 
already an expert tracker and was fast becoming an expert in guerilla 
warfare. He easily found food and shelter ... , and rarely carried food. 
Above all, he knew the terrain extremely well. If he found himself in a 
new area, he took the most hazardous trail ... [making] it difficult for the 
security forces to follow, or to get in his way. They scorned us as those 
'redskin' killers who would pour so many rounds after a fleeing dog by 
mistake, and who ... preferred ridgelines, established tracks and creeklines. 
Many Bougainvilleans (and a few redskins) who joined the ranks of the 
BRA, were probably given many incentives to do so. Some were motivated by 
secessionism, others by payback for security forces abuses , and others by the 
excitement. During the period 1989-90, armed militants probably numbered 
between 200 and 500 though modem weapons probably numbered less than fifty. 
The militant bands were spread across Bougainville but especially concentrated in 
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the south and central area of the island. Given their relatively small number, how 
could these groups stand against the PNGDF and inflict casualties? 
The militants first armed themselves with shotguns and .22 rifles -
common in many PNG villages and used for hunting. These weapons were 
especially effective in close quarter action where injuries could be inflicted. In 
time, the militants acquired by stealth and at the scene of clashes, security force 
weapons. The Second World War had also left a valuable legacy for the rebels. 
Arms dumps on the island still housed many weapons with ammunition available 
to those who knew their location. The Torokina area - scene of the allied 
landings in 1944 and a large allied base-was valuable in this regard. 
Armed with this assortment of weapons, the rebels could choose the time 
and place of attack. The rebels would kill or wound and quickly withdraw. By 
the time the security forces carried out their drills and searched an area, the rebels 
were gone. The hit-and-run tactics slowed security force operations and frustrated 
its members who rarely saw the enemy. Rebels operated in small groups to avoid 
detection and capture, and to achieve surprise. Since they operated largely in 
their own areas, they could melt into the local population to escape. 
The militia groups worked to a broad militant agenda of harassment, 
diverting the security forces when operations put pressure on an area. Militant 
activity had a disproportionate effect on PNGDF operations with small rebel 
groups forcing major deployments and long drawn out searches. These tactics 
tied down large numbers of security force personnel. Because of rebel successes, 
the PNGDF stopped operating in small groups, opting instead for company-size 
deployments. That process explains how increasing numbers of PNGDF made 
little difference to the deteriorating security situation on Bougainville. 
If members of the loose militant coalitions, including local leaders, were 
caught or killed, the militant effort was not seriously jeopardised. Little 
intelligence was available on other groups or on the location of militant leaders. 
That explains why the military effort on Bougainville failed to complete an 
intelligence picture, which could usefully be used for operations. As a result, no 
key rebel leaders were killed by the PNGDF in the period up to 1990. 
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Later, after the security force withdrawal in March 1990, the BRA ranks 
swelled with new recruits. Some were inspired by BRA successes while others 
were encouraged by the opportunity for criminal gain. These new recruits have 
often been referred to by the hardcore rebels as 'seconhan (second hand) BRA' 
(Layton 1992: 308). Many, especially the criminal elements, did much to 
undermine the potential gains of the Bougainvilleans. Armed and accountable to 
no one, they preyed on local people such as those with \Vhom there were tribal 
feuds, killing and raping at will. As a result, the BRA alienated itself from the 
populace, which had supported the militants during their campaign. In the wake 
of the security force withdrawal, Bougainvilleans were unable to establish even a 
rudimentary administrative framework. Within several months, Buka people who 
had been spared the worst of security force excesses, formed a resistance force 
and invited the PNGDF back. 
During 1989/90, Sam Kauona, a former PNGDF lieutenant, gave the 
rebels a decided advantage. Kauona joined the militants after security forces 
killed a relative. Whatever Kauona' s motive, he proved to be an important 
addition. During 1989, when the militants were targetting the mine, Kauona's 
knowledge of explosives was put to good use. Still, not all damage was Kauona's 
handiwork. Even before he returned to Bougainville in March 1989, militant 
landowners were destroying pylons and mine buildings. The expertise for these 
attacks came from the many Bougainvilleans employed at Panguna in explosive 
work. They also knew of the valuable explosive stocks held both at the Panguna 
mine and at the Manetai limestone quarry; both were early militant targets. 
Human Rights 
The abuse of human rights on Bougainville was occurring long before the 
PNGDF deployed there in March 1989. The police, especially the mobile squads , 
had applied their highlands-style treatment of the people in areas of unrest. The 
police made no distinction between Bougainvilleans and highlanders. The 
PNGDF was already familiar with police tactics, having observed first hand their 
treatment of civilians during operations Green Beret 87 and LOMET 88. Against 
that background, the PNGDF assumed the police role after they arrived. 
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Some soldiers were rough-house types drawn from the raskol gangs of the 
maJor cities. Others made themselves popular within army units by 
demonstrations of abuse as a means of cementing their position in the group. Still 
others did not oppose the abuses for fear of alienating themselves. Subordinates 
misinterpreted the hardline action demanded by some officers to mean physical 
abuse of the local population. In some cases, the abuse arose from frustration in 
fighting an elusive enemy. The killing of close friends motivated other soldiers. 
For all these reasons and others, abuses occurred on Bougainville. Where these 
occurred in the early days of the deployment and the perpetrators escaped 
disciplinary action - as many did - a pattern of abuse was established which 
quickly became widespread. Still, at no time was the abuse of human rights 
government or PNGDF policy. 
Beatings and the destruction of civilian property became an outlet for 
frustrated soldiers. Peer pressure also played a role. Officers, even those who 
opposed such activity, did not intervene. Some (like Liria) feared troops would 
react against them as observed at Aropa when Colonel Dotaona stopped a beating. 
Younger officers wanted acceptance by the soldiers and so tacitly supported them. 
Police did not intervene because they too were complicit. In any event, command 
of the SOE on the ground rested with a PNGDF commander. Even when 
provincial government voices were raised in protest, they were ignored by Port 
Moresby, especially by past commander-turned-politician, Ted Diro. 
So the pattern of abuse continued, even in the urban areas. Checkpoints 
set up by the PNGDF were sites of harassment. Young men were beaten or 
forced to lie on the hot bitumen for hours in the sun. Women were molested 
under the thinly-veiled guise of searches for weapons. Villages were burnt as a 
form of punishment and in retaliation for ambushes or simply on suspicion of 
harbouring rebels. Soldiers believed that all Bougainvilleans should be made to 
suffer for the actions of those few militants in the bush in the flawed belief that 
Bougainvilleans would turn against the rebels in favour of the government. The 
defence atrocities 'fed the ranks of the BRA' (Forster 1992: 369). No special 
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effort was made to enlist local support using a hearts and minds campaign until 
the troops returned to Bougainville in late 1990. 
Contrary to popular belief, the human rights abuses perpetrated by the 
PNGDF were not simply the result of frustration and rising casualties in the 
Bougainville rebellion, though these contributed to the problem. The seeds of 
indiscipline had been sown during earlier law and order operations. The human 
rights record of the PNGDF on Bougainville is a sad one, the more so given that 
the soldiers acted against those whom they had sworn to protect. Furthermore, 
their action showed to an international audience the force's poor record of 
professional conduct. Even more damning is the absence of prompt action by the 
PNG government against soldiers for these abuses. 
The abuses on Bougainville have been the subject of investigations by the 
United Nations and Amnesty International. Their full extent may never be 
known. Some accusations are so horrific that there is a natural tendency to 
dismiss them as propaganda. Amnesty International (1990 and 1993) has given 
an account of abuses during the periods 1989-90 and 1991-93. Publicity has been 
given to the Minatong166 case (December 1989) and the St Valentine's Day 
massacre (February 1990) (Figure 7.7). In the latter case, Colonel Nuia 
corroborated eyewitness accounts in an interview with Four Corners in May 
1991. At the time of the interview, Nuia was commanding a force on 
Bougainville, which was still committing abuses. 167 
166 The assault and subsequent death in police custody of Aloysius Minatong in December 1989 is 
described in Spriggs and Denoon 1991: 174. The soldiers shown in the photographs of the victim 
are members of the PNGDF Engineer Battalion. No disciplinary action has ever been taken 
against those members of the security forces involved in the incident. 
167 The conduct of the PNGDF in the massacre was verified by eyewitnesses - including soldiers 
of the PNGDF contingent- interviewed during my visit to Buka and Bougainville in May 1991. 
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Figure 7.7 
St Valentine's Day Massacre 
On 13 February 1990, after a rebel attack on a platoon of Golf Company on 12 
February (Battle of Buka), soldiers were despatched north from Arawa by vehicle 
to intercept rebels withdrawing south from Buka Island. Colonel Nuia reasoned 
that the rebels would follow the main north-south road. The PNGDF enjoyed local 
support in North Bougainville at that time. Facing a low threat, Nuia decided to 
move troops by vehicle to cut off the rebels. The plan worked and a large contact 
occurred near Tinputz. Soldiers later arrested seven (unarmed) Bougainvilleans, 
suspected of being rebels, and flew them by helicopter to Arawa. Eyewitness 
accounts confirm that the Bougainvilleans were beaten and hospitalised. Later, 
soldiers 168 took them away and shot six - a seventh escaped. The bodies were 
disposed of by helicopter at sea. Those killed were: Ranmo Benito, Siru Lebatavi; 
Lazarus Gemon; Joe Sirabea; Allan Mateari; and Moiva Sibanai. 
Those soldiers who are guilty of human rights abuses are widely known 
within the PNGDF. Still, no action can be taken against them because of the 1994 
amnesty granted to members of the security forces (and the rebels). 
Bougainvilleans who know of atrocities now have little recourse in seeking justice 
on behalf of the victims. The amnesty decision and inaction on the government's 
part in the years before that decision are a travesty of justice. The deliberate 
abuse of Bougainvilleans by groups of armed soldiers is also an abuse of power. 
Such conduct sets aside a professional army from armed thugs. Why then did the 
government fail to take action against the security forces? 
Prime Minister Namaliu was well aware of the extent of the human rights 
abuses occurring on Bougainville in 1989. He contemplated action but found that 
there were widely divergent views about the atrocities, and the action which 
should be taken. Diro, then deputy prime minister, argued that the abuses were 
inevitable and unavoidable. Momis and others believed that an independent 
tribunal was required. There was no consensus within government on the way 
168 The soldiers were led by an officer from the PNGDF Engineer Battalion. 
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ahead. The government was also conscious that the PNGDF was suffering poor 
morale, the ex-servicemen ' s pay issue was unresolved, and the pay riots of 
February 1989 were still a vivid memory. Fearing a backlash if action were taken 
against the PNGDF, and facing a shaky coalition, Namaliu was left little room for 
manoeuvre. In the event, he did nothing and the security forces continued 
systematic abuses. 
Withdrawal 
'the history of counter-guerilla warfare points to bitter and protracted campaigns 
in which superior morale often conquers superior material' (Mench 1975: 119). 
The PNGDF withdrew from Bougainville by 12 March 1990; the 
withdrawal represented an ignominious defeat by a rag-tag guerilla army of less 
than 500. Ironically, the PNGDF had been shamed by its own people and not by 
some external aggressor. That same week represented the fiftieth anniversary of 
the raising of an indigenous battalion (June 1940), the Pacific Islands Regiment, 
and a medal was later issued to commemorate the event. However, Port 
Moresby's view of the PNGDF may be reflected in the fact that no campaign 
medal, conspicuous service medal or honours have been awarded to the PNGDF 
for Bougainville service. 
Political/ Military Relations 
'Political decisions and policies were not made on the basis of solving the crisis 
[they were] becoming a playground for party politicking and power play' (Liria 
1993: 139). 
Port Moresby ' s failure to assert its authority on Bougainville and to 
prevent landowner unrest escalating into a full-blown secessionist struggle cannot 
easily be attributed to a few key mistakes. Problems existed at the political level 
and on the ground. In the beginning and often throughout the crisis, politicians 
and senior departmental officials , including the PNGDF Commander, failed to 
recognise warning signs in the unrest on Bougainville, which were threatening the 
mine operations and, eventually, the PNG economy. The problem was 
compounded by the ill-considered response taken by the police mobile squads 
(Operation Tampara) which failed to modify their methods to take account of the 
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nature of the situation on Bougainville. In this , the police rank and file and their 
commanders in Port Moresby must share the blame. 
Port Moresby' s decision to send the PNGDF to Bougainville (Operation 
Blue Print) was based on the government's belief that there, as in earlier law and 
order crises, the PNGDF would make the difference. The government' s 
confidence was shared by the PNGDF. In the past, its mere presence had been 
sufficient to tip the balance in the government's favour and see its authority 
demonstrably restored. 
Excessive confidence among the soldiers undermined their effectiveness 
on the ground. Soldiers failed to follow drills and to remain alert. Rebel 
successes would, ultimately, leave the soldiers and their officers demoralised. 
Early over-confidence, however, only partially explains the PNGDF' s poor 
performance on Bougainville. Analysis points also to inadequate training, weak 
leadership and poor equipment. The PNGDF was vulnerable from the beginning, 
especially against a committed foe. 
In spite of the PNGDF command and logistic weaknesses, military 
vulnerabilities could have been overcome. Military objectives were often 
uncertain, confused by inconsistent policy and blurred divisions of responsibility, 
even after the declaration of a state of emergency. Uncertainty and frustration 
assumed broader dimensions in the wake of rebel successes and resulting security 
force casualties. In that climate, soldiers were quick to apportion blame for their 
failings in the field - in some cases justifiably- to the national government. 
The tasks allotted to the PNGDF - protection of the mine, clearance of 
the PMAR and the destruction of the rebel army - were beyond their capacity; 
the more so given the unrealistic timeframes set down for operations which 
ignored the terrain and the rebel threat. Operations on Bougainville against a 
confident and mobile rebel force are inherently demanding in time and resources. 
On the ground, the contingent was shored up by BCL' s willingness to 
underwrite its rationing and logistic requirements. However, once the soldiers 
deployed beyond the mine, logistic weaknesses were exposed. On occasions, the 
contingent' s inability to resupply forward elements constrained operations to 
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several weeks. Command and control problems were overlooked in spite of the 
difficult terrain and inadequacies of the PNGDF radios. Flexibility in manoeuvre 
and follow-up was lost. Compromises reduced the PNGDF threat to rebel 
activities. Committed operations over extended periods of time, even by small 
elements of the PNGDF, were rare. Operational plans were often leaked to the 
rebels even before the PNGDF deployed. Army activity became predictable and 
knowledge of its logistic weaknesses and of the troops' lack of enthusiasm 
encouraged the rebels. Against that background, the rebels operated almost with 
impunity. Success invariably eluded the PNGDF along with opportunities to 
bolster confidence. 
Government criticism of the PNGDF further alienated the troops and 
added to tensions. Mistrust and suspicion prevailed with a two-fold effect: 
• soldiers attributed their failure to poor government policy, lack of resources, 
and insufficient recognition of their problems; and 
• the government, faced with an intractable problem on Bougainville, was 
uncertain of its approach and unwilling to compromise on its opposition to 
secession. 
The litany of setbacks on Bougainville arose for reasons which extended 
beyond the absence of any judicious use of the PNGDF. Military operations were 
routinely compromised by an eagerness to pursue peace, even at the risk of 
undermining Port Moresby's military muscle. In time, the PNGDF would play a 
spoiler role in settlement prospects as a spiteful response to the government's 
handling of the issue. On those occasions, the government trod cautiously in 
dealing with the PNGDF, mindful that only months before, in February 1989, 
soldiers had marched on Parliament. 
The government seemed to ignore the complexity of the problem, which 
underscored its intractability. Bougainville simply did not lend itself to easy 
solutions yet compromise was resisted. Government consensus on the way ahead 
was elusive. Indeed, 'divisions between the hawks and the doves within the 
national government and differences among Bougainvilleans made negotiations 
difficult' (May 1996: 3). Even among government agencies, cohesion was 
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lacking, and co-operative effort on the ground was inhibited by susp1c1on and 
jealously. 
The PNGDF, which bore the brunt of the casualties in the conflict, and 
now commanded the security forces on the ground, felt the army should be given 
a free hand. The soldiers particularly resented the need to consult and inform the 
provincial government, which was suspected of working with the rebels. Indeed, 
it was widely known that Premier Kabui was related to Francis Ona and to the 
rebel agent in Honiara, Martin Miriori. 169 The ground troops also criticised their 
military leadership. Those in Port Moresby would not give them adequate 
support and those in command on the ground were often absent in town. 
The soldiers found especially provocative Port Moresby' s apparent 
willingness to accommodate the militants. When the soldiers moved into rebel 
areas, rebel leaders would sue for negotiations, insisting on an army withdrawal as 
a precondition. Soldiers felt they were being sold out. Lives were being risked 
only to hand the initiative back to the militants. Over time, the soldiers became 
convinced that the reason for their failure to best the rebels was Port Moresby's 
stance, and a lack of money and equipment. 
When, in response to the challenge to its authority on Bougainville, the 
government authorised PNGDF involvement, no clear objectives were set. As 
hostilities intensified, the government again failed to evaluate the situation, 
especially the potential risks of escalation. Indeed, Port Moresby simply looked 
for a bigger stick. For his part, the PNGDF Commander failed to counsel the 
government on the difficulties presented by operations on Bougainville and, 
importantly, the very slim chances of success countering a guerilla threat, 
especially given the terrain and limited resources. As well , the cost of escalation 
was not spelt out in spite of the ongoing overspending in the defence budget; 
rather there was a tendency to see cost only in terms of lost mining revenue, 
which skewed the necessity for military action. 
169 Martin Miriori was, a few years later, assisted by the Australian government to escape from 
Honiara to Europe, following several failed attempts, allegedly by the PNG government, to 
assassinate the rebel agent (Author's experience as part of the evacuation planning team). 
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The appointment of a military officer to oversee operations on 
Bougainville may have been done with the best intentions. However, the PNGDF 
was given no incentive to act in a subordinate role. The appointment of the Police 
Commissioner as Controller was a constitutional charade dressed up to assure 
Parliament and the people that the defence force was acting in assisting the civil 
power. The truth of the matter was that Port Moresby had few ideas of how to 
deal with the rebellion. 
Implicit in Port Moresby's preparedness to negotiate was the realisation 
that a peaceful settlement was the only solution. Yet the government did not 
translate that into a coherent policy or co-ordinate departmental efforts toward 
achieving that goal. As a result, there was confusion on the ground and in Port 
Moresby with people working at crossed purposes. 
The PNGDF, and especially 1 RPIR, which deployed first to Bougainville, 
did not develop a strategic plan to prepare for its increasing use in internal 
security. No account was reflected in annual training objectives issued by the 
Commander or his subordinate commanders. Rather, there was a tendency to 
perpetuate established internal security drills which failed to take account of the 
alternative ways troops were being used between 1984 and 1988. Indeed, soldiers 
had not been required to use drills practised since independence in the internal 
security operations since 1984. The units also failed to translate skills in counter-
insurgency operations, practised as late as 1988, into action on Bougainville. 
The PNGDF was further disadvantaged by its unfamiliarity with the 
province. The abandonment of civic action patrols on Bougainville after 1979 not 
only limited knowledge of conditions; absent also were the important army-
civilian links established during these patrols. The army was foreign to most 
Bougainvilleans. That situation ensured poor intelligence and a natural alienation 
from the civil populace. To compound the PNGDF' s problems, rivalry existed 
between the National Intelligence Organisation and the Defence Intelligence 
Branch. Potential benefits derived from combining their efforts were lost. 
Many of these problems may well have been minimised in their effect on 
the performance of the PNGDF if the basic standards of discipline, leadership and 
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fieldcraft had been sound. However this was not the case. Soldiers were 
unprepared physically and mentally for the demands of sustained operations. 
That was reflected in their lack of self-confidence and the lack of confidence in 
their leadership. The soldiers lacked competent navigation skills, relying on main 
roads and villages as checkpoints. Sub-units could not effectively be controlled 
below company level due to radio deficiencies and poor operator knowledge. 
On operations, PNGDF field commanders often committed every 
available sub-unit with scant regard for the capacity of the logistic system. Even 
when this became painfully obvious, the solution was to limit the duration of the 
activity rather than to sustain a lower presence in the field. That process also 
prevented troops being rotated in the field, maintaining pressure on the rebels. As 
a result of the total commitment, no reserve was constituted nor a reliable method 
for deployment maintained. This severely limited the field commander's capacity 
to respond to rebel threats outside the immediate area of operations. 
Bougainville challenged the PNGDF. Welcomed by the local people tired 
of police brutality, the PNGDF had the opportunity initially to take stock of the 
situation and to identify its limitations on Bougainville. That assessment should 
have formed the basis for a comprehensive briefing to the government on the 
capacity of the PNGDF to deal with the unrest. In the meantime, the PNGDF 
could focus on mine security. A co-ordinated and professional approach to its 
role may have minimised the risk of escalation and facilitated a framework for 
some form of settlement. Indeed, military officers should first have recognised 
that the fragile situation could not be allowed to escalate. An insurgency there 
was simply beyond army resources. Given its limitations - few personnel, lack 
of mobility and poor logistics - the PNGDF needed to concentrate on judiciously 
allocating its force. 
Instead, threats to the rebels and operations in their heartland proved too 
provocative for a militancy driven by the desire for compensation and secession. 
The PNGDF' s hard-line suggested to the government that if the talks failed, it had 
a strong stick in the form of the PNGDF. Independent assessments would have 
shown that Bougainville ' s problem did not lend itself to a military solution and 
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urged caution. At the least, the government should have given due recognition to 
the cost of the deployment - even in 1989 a considerable drain on the 
government coffers. 
Government/ PNGDF Relations 
The intractability of the Bougainville conflict strained relations between 
all levels of government, especially between political leaders and the PNGDF. 
Port Moresby recognised that the PNGDF played a pivotal role on Bougainville, 
even if its activities, at times, threatened peace prospects. The full implications of 
the PNGDF' s role in its relations with government could not be fully assessed 
while the conflict continued to defy a settlement. However, a marked weakening 
in the army's accountability to government and an erosion of the army's 
subordination to the civil authority, was evident in the early stages of the crisis. 
The army has been prepared to use collective force or the threat of it to 
gain its objectives - expansion, equipment and pay increases. Government has 
been challenged on more than one occasion. The PNGDF has embarrassed the 
government internationally over its abuse of power. Further weakening of the 
PNGDF leadership has raised questions over the army's loyalty and the extent of 
control exercised by the commander and his officers over the rank and file. The 
government has also noted with concern the stronger links between the PNGDF 
and the police as a result of their shared experience on Bougainville. 
Port Moresby's problems with its army will not be resolved with a 
Bougainville settlement. Indeed, all the indications suggest that law and order 
problems will demand more of the army's attention. So the government needs to 
handle the PNGDF deftly, always uncertain of its dependability. 
The Bougainville Experience - PNGDF 
The Bougainville experience underscored, for the PNGDF, the importance 
of basic professional skills and values - a high standard of training, leadership 
and resources. The lack of a decisive victory over the rebels in 1989/90 left a 
force demoralised and divided by interference from a government anxious for 
military success. The PNGDF paid a high price for its involvement on 
Bougainville in 1989/90. Fourteen soldiers were killed and many more wounded. 
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In large part, the casualties resulted from poor leadership, inadequate training and 
indiscipline. 
6 April 
5 May 
17 August 
11 September 
18 September 
2 October 
23 November 
4 February 
12 February 
14 February 
Figure 7.8 
PNGDF Killed- Bougainville 1989-90 
1989 
2 Lieutenant Stephen Yandu East Sepik 
Private Lomas J aruga Oro 
Private John B uka Manus 
Private George Mena E/New Britain (Friendly Fire) 
Private Simon Ou'u Gulf (Car Accident) 
Private Francis Wasali E/Sepik (Explosive Accident) 
Lance Corporal John Mu'uh Manus (Explosive Accident) 
Private Boni Gau Morobe 
1990 
Private Simon Gabi tu 
Private Mark Barin 
Private Allan Miria 
Private Maino Lakasis 
Private Mano Taguna 
Corporal Jack Haladei 
Wes tern Province 
Madang 
Central 
Central 
Sth Highlands 
Milne Bay 
The PNGDF was riddled with indiscipline. PNGDF leadership was so 
weakened that soldiers rely on force to achieve results. Such action is not 
confined to Bougainville. Soldiers have also been prepared to act against the 
government if necessary. In spite of these problems, Bougainville has 
strengthened the hand of the PNGDF. The Force was important as an instrument 
of state in aid to the civil power and the precedent of appointing a military 
commander to oversee civil operations has exaggerated that role. 
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Implications for Australia 
The Bougainville problem which emerged in 1989/90 posed difficulties 
for Australia. The legacy of its colonial administration and Australia's investment 
interest in the Panguna mine necessitated caution. On the former, Australia has 
long been conscious of the need to be seen to protect PNG sovereignty. On the 
latter, Australia recognised that Australian investment elsewhere in PNG could be 
jeopardised unless the Bougainville issue was handled with care. For those who 
understood the background to the rebellion, there was also an acknowledgment of 
Australia's part in Bougainvilleans' sense of injustice. 
Early policy established that Bougainville was a PNG problem; Australia 
supported the view that PNG' s territorial integrity had to be protected and 
Australia stood willing to become engaged in mutually agreed ways (Spriggs and 
Denoon 1992: 146-151). Consideration had been given to the use of the ADF 
during the Bougainville crisis but the option was dismissed because of the 
potential domestic problems in becoming too involved, and especially in 
assuming a key role. 170 However, Australia's concerns ignored PNG and wider 
regional expectations that Australia, as a major regional player, had the 
credentials and historical connections which justified its involvement. Indeed, 
Australia faced little opposition in the region to any involvement on Bougainville, 
including from Indonesia, which feared any spread of instability in PNG. 
Australia had already faced a dilemma over Bougainville in 1975 in the 
run-up to PNG' s independence. Australia insisted that PNG should come to 
independence as one country. That decision was undoubtedly influenced by the 
importance of the Panguna mine and by the apparent absence of widespread 
support on Bougainville for secession. In 1988/89, as tension increased on 
Bougainville, Australia was first concerned with the safety of its citizens and the 
protection of its investments. Once the mine closed (15 May 1989) and the 
Australians left, Canbe1Ta turned its attention to the implications of Bougainville 
for PNG unity and stability. A complicating factor in Australia's position over 
Bougainville was the bilateral defence relationship. 
170 Author's experience as the PNG Desk Officer in DIO 1989-90. 
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Australia's husbanding of the PNGDF since independence established 
close links through training and logistic arrangements. (The 1987 Joint 
Declaration of Principles had no ramifications given that Bougainville was an 
internal matter for PNG.) Australia was prepared to continue its support for the 
PNGDF so long as that support was not exclusively for Bougainville operations. 
Australia's conditional stance was made more essential given the PNGDF' s abuse 
of human rights. The need to insulate Australia against any charges of complicity 
in the PNGDF actions influenced the decision to impose conditions on the four 
Iroquois helicopters. However, Australia's stance invited criticism from the 
PNGDF with many questioning Australia's reliability as a defence partner and its 
motives. Bougainville had wider implications for Australia. 
Sensitive to its role as a colonial administrator and to its hard-line 
approach in establishing the Panguna mine, Canberra recognised the 'weight of 
historical baggage' (Spriggs and Denoon 1992: 149) which limited Australia's 
capacity to become involved. However, in supporting PNG Australia had not 
shirked its international responsibilities. Security force abuses have been 
condemned and Canberra has used its influence to defuse tensions between PNG 
and the Solomon Islands arising from the spillover effects of incursions into 
S 1 , · 171 o omons territory. 
Conclusion 
'Bougainville has focussed attention on a range of endemic problems that 
successive governments have pushed aside' (Fraser 1989: 34 ). 
On the scale of world conflicts, Bougainville barely rates a mention. In 
casualties alone during 1989/90 fewer than 1000 people died- 14 of whom were 
PNGDF servicemen. In spite of the regional spillover effects, PNG' s problems on 
Bougainville have been bearable internationally. Indeed, few concessions have 
been forced on PNG through foreign pressure. In that light, the failure of the 
militant leadership to attract international support for its UDI can be understood. 
171 The PNGDF did not violate Solomon Islands sovereignty until 1991, which is outside the 
period covered by the thesis. 
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For PNG, the political and econormc costs have been contained. The 
importance of the Panguna mine has diminished with the commencement of 
production from several large mines elsewhere in the country. The government 
was not undermined by the policy failures on Bougainville. Law and order 
problems elsewhere in the country did not threaten the stability of the state, in 
spite of the size of the security force commitment on Bougainville. 
If the PNGDF had been in a state of decline before 1989, Bougainville 
accelerated its demise. Fractures in the army's professionalism, discipline, 
leadership and loyalty gave way under the strain of Bougainville. Under domestic 
and international scrutiny, the PNGDF failed to restore normalcy and Port 
Moresby's control. On occasions, the PNGDF undermined government policy. 
Yet PNGDF failures on Bougainville show the accumulation of years of neglect, 
including a willingness by successive governments to overlook infractions. 
Together, these have delivered a force which cannot uphold government 
authority. Indeed, neglect has established a coterie of groups of questionable 
loyalty, which threaten the government in power and, beyond that, the democracy 
of the state. Moreover, PNGDF indiscipline in the period 1980-1990 created a 
force which is unpredictable, lacking military order and strong leadership. 
Individual members were driven by agendas dictated by wantoks, politicians, 
criminal interests and survival- a dangerous brew of influences. 
************************ 
BOUGAINVILLE 
0 • 
~tai 
155·27 · E 
BOUGAINVILLE 1989/90 
OPERATION NAKMAI MAIMAI (3-6 JULY 1989) 
Rorovava No 
-:f\_Cape Puipui 
155•35 · E 
1
~-:
1 Bora Shoal 
,, 
I I 
·. / 
6°10 ' S 
Pan kamcf:::::::.·.; .. 
... · .·. 
..................... A/1RPIR Route 
Height Shading: 
[==:J ........ ............ . 0-200m 
c=:J ............ ......... 200 - 400 m 
400 - 600 m 
600 - 800 m 
800 - 1000 m 
1000 - 1200 m 
1200 - 1400 m 
1400 - 1600 m 
> 1600 m 
. . .. 
/ ·::::: 
C 
BOUGAINVILLE 1989/90 
OPERATION BULL DOG ( 12 -28 July 1989) 
Takanupei Island ·:/, 155°36 · E 
• I - -) 6°09 ' s 
:-- Bora Shoal 
Kapo Poin!._ti -· 
,, 
I. I 
.. _.i>· 1Kerekerina Point 
Arawa Bay ~W1kama Point 
Pankama?:-·•·-: 
',,_,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,, ,,. 
Height Shading : 
C=:J ... .... ,,,,.,, ... .... . 
C=:J 
C3 
I .,_ .. •,:! 
C=:J 
C=:J 
C=:J 
C=:J 
IRPIR Route 
0 - 200 m 
200 - 400 m 
400 - 600 m 
600 - 800 m 
800 - 1000 m 
1000 - 1200 m 
1200 - 1400 m 
1400 - 1600 m 
> 1600 m 
ol ">< 
BOUGAINVILLE 1989/90 
OPERATION KISIM DOG (4-28 AUGUST 1989) 
'1 RP1R 1~ 1; ,' ( /---:,·/ r/J / rr1V1.11,; ~li~ti,'11-~~1~~iJ~'i~~ , f r ~~t~~~f'~~i1~ ~\~"·;a~i.~ ~ ';~~~~111~~ ibB n , . . ,:l!I) ., " _ . • . .,..,~ .,, 1.,~. ~J. l k ~. 1 _..,,,,r.,. ,, . "" . ::&:., . ~ ,,~,,, .,,, - ·, " ,lf/L . . ~- . "' ~- _ ~ .li'i!"" _ • ~"' .• ,;;,i;;.,[;.;;l?/:,,~.-=-- .. , 
~ 155°44 ' E 
Taurarku Point 
( /'"''\~ ta (Aro1a) Airport 
--- ~~ : inville • ~ : 
er Sawmill \ i ~ 
I ~ 
~ wind break 
\ 
Height Shading: 
c=J ..... .. ............ .. . 0 - 200 m 
c=J ...................... 200 - 400 m 
c=J .... ........ ...... .... 400 - 600 m 
,~, .. -" · ·•· I . . .. . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . . 600 - 800 m 
c=J ..... ................ . 800- 1000 m 
c=J ...................... 1000 - 1200 m 
c=J .. ... ................. 1200 - 1400 m 
1400 - 1600 m 
> 1600 m 
BOUGAINVILLE 1989/90 
OPERATION FOOT LOOSE (11 JANUARY-2 MARCH 1990) 
~ 
155°44 ' E 
Taurarku Point 
~ wind break 
Height Shading : 
C=:J ,,,,,, ... .. ... ........ 0 - 200 m 
C=:J ....... ..... .... .. ... . 200 - 400 m 
E:::2':] ...................... 400 - 600 m 
I -:c~·~"'-'0 •~'d .. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 600 - 800 m 
C=:J ............... ..... .. 800 - 1000 m 
C=:J ........ ...... ........ 1000 - 1200 m 
c:J ...................... 1200 - 1400 m 
1400 - 1600 m 
> 1600 m 
265 
Chapter 8 
Coup d'etat 
'a coup ... depend[ s] on the degree of co-operation between the PNGDF and the 
Police ... cohesion aniongst the officers of both [ and J the assistance of the PNG 
bureaucracy' (Mench 1975: 188). 
At first glance, PNG has come through testing times. Democracy 
prevails, despite economic and political challenges, and, notwithstanding its 
turbulent history, the PNGDF has remained in barracks. However, this 
assessment belies the fragile nature of the PNG state and downplays the potential 
for events to combine to unravel the country's political institutions, creating the 
conditions for a coup. 
A PNGDF coup has been the subject of speculation since before 
independence. The ingredients for military action against the PNG state have 
existed for some time (See Turner 1990; MacQueen 1993; May 1998). Comfort 
cannot be taken in PNG' s twenty-six years of democratic government. Coups can 
come many years after independence and after years of stable government (May 
et al. 1998: 20). The Fiji coups in 1987 are a case in point. 
Prior to independence, PNG' s political leaders were careful to establish a 
military structure separate from the political apparatus of the state (See Chapter 
2). Many believed that under the Constitutional arrangements put in place at 
independence, coups could be prevented (Turner 1990: 118). According to 
Janowitz (1964: 212), however, 'even under civilian control of the military, the 
danger of military intervention is not removed'. In any event, the PNG 
government undermined the effectiveness of those safeguards by using the army 
in internal security from 1984. That decision coincided with a decline in PNGDF 
professionalism. 
Mench (1975: 188) believed that a coup was difficult in PNG without the 
cooperation of the police and the public service, though he conceded that 'support 
[from the police and the public service was] invariably ... forthcoming in the 
African experience' (ibid.: 208). He believed that PNG's geography and the 
relatively small size of the army meant that a coup could not be successful. 
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MacQueen (1993: 138) agreed that PNG's topography (as well as ethnicity, 
military capability, and institutional rivalry) ' militate against the achievement of a 
successful coup'. Others argue that the PNGDF is too small to conduct a coup. 
Yet the African experience shows that the possibility of a coup is not reduced by 
limiting the size of the army - an army of 250 in Togo in January 1963 carried 
out a coup (Morrison et al. 1989: 160). Janowitz (1964: 209) also noted that a 
coup requires 'only a small cabal of politically motivated officers ' . We should 
bear in mind also that coups do not need expensive weaponry or complicated 
strategic planning: 'a handful of men can wreak tremendous damage' (Lee 1969: 
164). Finer (1988: 225) too believed that the size of the armed force bore no 
relationship to the failure or success of a coup. MacQueen (1993: 138) held the 
view that 'it would be unwise to dismiss . . . some kind of serious military 
intervention'; he believed the real issue was whether a coup would be successful. 
As the demise of the PNGDF - through indiscipline, inadequate training 
and equipment, poor leadership and financial problems - became more evident 
during the 1980s, the PNGDF' s poor state of professionalism was exposed. 
MacQueen (1993: 137) suggested one benefit of the PNGDF's predicament was 
that the army 'failed to make itself an alternative to state authority '. However, 
that assumes that the army, among its motives for a coup, would seek to govern 
PNG. Sceptics of the PNGDF's coup potential argue that the problems besetting 
the Force rule out a coup attempt. However, problems in the PNGDF chain of 
command prevent control by the army hierarchy over the rank and file , making a 
coup possible. 
Officers 1n the Force have shown in discussions with the author an 
awareness of the difficulties in mounting a coup but they hold a firm belief that a 
coup is possible in PNG. Topography, they argue, gives the PNGDF, with its 
limited size, the advantage. Troops would secure key points around the capital , 
and in Lae and Wewak, well before intervention by police mobile squads from 
outlying provinces or by foreign forces. Denial of the main airfield at Jackson ' s 
Airport would further delay intervention. Such denial could be achieved quickly 
by parking trucks on the airstrip as secessionist rebels did at Aropa Airport on 
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Bougainville. So the army, with parliament as hostage and key points secure, 
could control the capital - a job which would be made even easier if there were a 
sympathetic police force and bureaucracy, and public support. Coordination of 
army action would be facilitated by signal systems independent of the civil 
authorities (Finer 1988: 7) [the RADSTA station at Taurama Barracks and Joint 
Force Headquarters Operations Room provide communications links with 
PNGDF units elsewhere in the country]. Army numbers would swell with the re-
enlistment of former soldiers, and the attraction of unemployed youth - as 
happened during the Bougainville crisis. The military - through control of public 
transport, food storehouses, telecommunications, the media and by introducing 
curfews and other security measures - could paralyse the nation for a time, 
achieving short-term objectives. The PNGDF has learnt from observing, at a 
distance, coups in Fiji in 1987. 
Politicians have been aware that ineffective and corrupt government has 
the potential to invite a coup. In 1987, Prime Minister Wingti noted in parliament 
that if politicians wanted to avert a coup they should 'shun personal enrichment' 
(Dorney 1998: 77). Some of the political elite have amassed large fortunes during 
political office; former Defence Minister Ijape, for example, 'left the parliament a 
wealthy man' (ibid.: 83). 
Wingti's preoccupation with coups stemmed from speculation about a 
PNGDF coup in the wake of the Fiji coups in 1987. Colonel Dademo, then Chief 
of Staff, seeing opportunity to enhance his career prospects, had reassured Wingti 
that year that the army was loyal to the govemment. 172 In contrast, Diro, a long-
serving commander, claimed that a coup was possible in PNG (Post-Courier 19 
November 1987: 1). (Diro still held that view in 2002 [discussion Brig-Gen Diro 
6 March 2002].) The then Defence Minister and former army officer, Pokasui, 
denounced in 1987 any suggestion of a coup (ibid.: 1). The debate increased 
awareness in the army of its potential political power, though at the time the 
PNGDF showed no proclivity to follow Fiji 's lead. 
172 Wingti was impressed by Dademo 's assurances, which probably influenced Wingti's decision 
to appoint Dademo as commander in 1992. 
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Causes of Military Intervention 
Military forces are especially sensitive to external interference in military 
issues, especially where such intervention impinges on command and control 
arrangements, or on decisions regarding the equipping and deployment of forces. 
African armies have often retaliated to perceived political interference in the 
defence force. That reaction stems from the belief that the profession of arms is 
unique, understood only by military professionals. For its part, the PNGDF has 
resisted government interference though such resistance has been muted at times. 
PNGDF efforts to protect its interests have also strained relations between the 
ADP and the PNGDF, especially in relation to the acquisition of equipment. 
PNG/ Australia Relations 
By virtue of its early involvement with the PNGDF, Australia has been a 
longlasting influence on the Force and on its role in society. The relationship 
between the PNGDF and Australia, arising from its colonial past, continued well 
beyond PNG's independence before its decline from the mid-1980s. 
Australia's military involvement in PNG during the Second World War 
and, later, in the face of a potential Indonesian threat, centered on its need to 
ensure the security of Australia and its territories (See Chapters 2 and 4 ). 173 That 
involvement led to the development of an indigenous force in PNG, in preparation 
for the country's independence in 1975. Australia identified early the need to 
educate Papua New Guinean soldiers in the role of the army and to provide the 
skills needed for a professional army. The absence of a military challenge after 
independence and the PNGDF' s success in Vanuatu stand testament to the 
success of Australia's efforts during the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Prior to independence, Australian defence officials recognised that a 
disciplined force in PNG required adequate pay and conditions, ethnic balance, 
access to promotion and political office, strong leadership and discipline. 
Australian defence support after independence, provided through the DC 
173 Australia, unlike European colonial powers which withdrew fr01n African colonies at 
independence, depends in part for its security on a stable Papua New Guinea because of the 
latter's proxirnity to Australia. 
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programme, ensured that, for a time, the PNGDF maintained its standards even as 
other institutions, such as the police, foundered. However, the Vanuatu operation 
In 1980 sparked PNGDF criticism of Australia, eventually leading to 
diversification from 1984 (See Chapter 5). The conditional nature of Australian 
defence aid and PNG' s reliance on substantial aid, caused tensions. PNGDF 
officers began flirting with Indonesia and other countries for materiel, which 
Australia was reluctant or unable to provide. 
Disagreements during the 1980s - for example over the JDP (see 139-
140), the patrol boat programme (see p. 126) and control of DCP funds (see pp. 
133-146) - further undermined the relationship. Over time, defence bilateral 
relations were damaged, being described by Brigadier-General Singirok in 1997 
as 'less than amicable' (Bohane in The Canberra Tinies 31 May 1997: 5). 
Singirok' s view was shared by many in the PNGDF, especially, but not 
exclusively, by those in the lower and middle ranks, who had little exposure to 
Australians. The colonial legacy was seen more as a historical fact - the 
PNGDF had long since formed its own traditions and style. PNGDF criticism 
gained momentum during Bougainville operations (See Chapter 7). Frustration 
and anger in the face of rebel resistance prompted soldiers to apportion blame for 
their failures elsewhere. Australia was a convenient scapegoat, being seen as a 
'fair weather friend' (ibid.: 5) as a result of conditions imposed on its support for 
Bougainville operations. Soldiers cared little for Australian criticism of their 
efforts and of their abuse of human rights. Perceptions of Australian interference 
drew an angry response. Australian officials seemed prepared to accept that risk 
in the mistaken belief that the friction would be temporary. In time, the conflict 
ld 1 d . 'f . 1 . 174 wou ea to a senous n t In re atlons. Thus, Australian influence was 
thwarted, undermining its potential to temper PNGDF indiscipline on 
Bougainville or any army threat to democracy in PNG. 
But the damage to the PNG-Australian defence relationship, which arose 
174 Mathias Ij ape, defence minister in 1996/97, commenting in 199 8 on Australia's role in the 
Bougainville issue noted 'as for helping ... with the conflict on Bougainville, Australia had been 
worse than useless' (O'Callaghan 1998: 62). 
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from the events during 1980-90, had profound ramifications. The ADP presence 
declined over the decade and with it one of the major influences on the PNGDF' s 
subordination to the civil authority. The ADP DC programme became a veneer 
suggesting close defence links and ongoing influence in the PNGDF which 
simply did not exist. The PNGDF was deteriorating, racked by widespread 
indiscipline and a willingness to resort to unrest when the mood took soldiers. 
The ADP had, since 1984, ceased to be a counter to PNGDF extremes. (In 1991 , 
the JCFADT (1991: 176) concluded that the Australian Defence Cooperation 
Programme was not sufficiently focussed on Papua New Guinea's 'real needs'. 
Yet, in subsequent years, Australia still resisted assistance to the PNGDF in its 
internal security role.) If the ADP influence was in decline from the mid- l 980s, 
diversification in the late 1980s accelerated that decline. 
Diversification 
In 1984, in spite of ongoing assistance from Australia, PNG politicians set 
the precedent for diversification by looking further afield for defence acquisitions. 
Their decision to purchase Israeli Arava aircraft was criticised within the PNGDF 
(See Chapter 5). Many PNGDF officers, opposed to the purchase, believed that 
there had been commissions (kickbacks). Several, including then Colonel Huai, 
who had led the Kumul Force in Vanuatu, resigned in protest over political 
interference in military decision making. Some officers believed that the Arava 
precedent would be followed by intervention in other military areas. In that, the 
PNGDF was protecting its corporate position, an action which, according to 
Perlmutter (1981), could trigger a coup. 
The Arava purchase was controversial for other reasons. The PNGDF 
justifiably questioned the aircraft ' s suitability to PNG conditions and criticised its 
second-hand-status. In part, also, the Arava controversy arose from tensions 
between Huai and the then PNGDF Commander, Brigadier-General Noga. Huai 
claimed that Noga should have resisted government pressure to purchase the 
Arava. Noga' s willingness to go along with the government on this issue may 
have been influenced by the fact that he had been earlier passed over for 
appointment by the government - contrary to the nomination of the Defence 
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Council175 - in favour of Gago Mamae, his junior. Upon Noga' s appointment as 
commander in 1984, he had come under pressure following reports of unrest in 
the ranks, leading to an NIO assessment and criticism of the PNGDF, following 
claims that army weapons were being used in tribal fights (See Chapter 6). Noga 
may have prudently chosen to go along with the government's decision to 
purchase the Arava at the time to shore up his appointment. The friction between 
Huai and Noga pointed to the emergence of factional powerplay which, until 
1984, had been simmering under the surface. The rapid change in commanders 
after 1984 fuelled the creation of factions. 
Notwithstanding its criticism of the Arava purchase, the PNGDF 
embraced diversification. Indeed, by 1986 Huai, then commander, was openly 
courting alternative sources of defence assistance, principally from Indonesia. 
Others followed his lead so that by 1990 diversification was a popular theme in 
defence circles. Senior officers pointed to the purchase of the Spanish Casa 176 
aircraft and British maritime in-shore craft known locally as the Binatang, 177 as 
examples of diversification which enhanced PNGDF capabilities. The 
acquisitions implied a PNGDF acceptance of responsibility for its future. 
However, decisions were made in isolation rather than as part of a 
strategic plan to enhance PNGDF capabilities. The PNGDF ran into trouble by 
investing capital funds in acquisitions - enticed by seemingly generous soft loans 
- which the army could neither maintain nor afford. Those acquisitions 
consumed scarce resources, denying the army much-needed uniforms, weapons 
and rations. Conditions in the barracks deteriorated, and in the field soldiers were 
unable to sustain operations. The hidden costs of diversification took a toll on the 
army, from which the PNGDF has yet to recover. Ultimately, the poor state of the 
Force provided an environment for agitators . Furthermore, diversification 
provided an environment for wider politicisation of the Force. 
The Arava purchase aside, diversification was promoted from within the 
175 Discussion Brig-Gen Diro of 6 March 2002. 
176 Indonesia also used Casa aircraft, providing a potential source of spare parts for PNGDF Casa. 
177 A Tokpisin word meaning ' insect' . 
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PNGDF with political and bureaucratic acquiescence. Unlike Third World armies 
elsewhere, diversification did not cause conflict between the army and the 
government. Indeed, the PNGDF was not subjected to interference on the scale 
experienced by African states such as Ghana, Zaire, Nigeria and Mali (Morrison 
et al. 1989: 161). Problems within the Force caused by diversification were the 
result of poor decisions, and the hint of corruption among senior officers, rather 
than government interference. A greater risk to civil/military relations was posed 
by the government's decision in 1984 to brush aside PNGDF concerns, albeit 
muted, and use the army in internal security operations, marking a change from 
the PNGDF' s pre-independence priority for external defence. 
Conflict of Roles 
The PNGDF holds to the view that its principal role is external defence -
1n spite of its growing commitment to internal security operations. Prior to 
independence, and under Australia's influence, the army established finnly an 
external focus. That focus continued in the 1980s, reinforced by PNGDF 
involvement in Vanuatu. Still, the army was prepared to play a supporting role in 
internal security, in accordance with army doctrine (See Chapter 6). However, 
the call-out of the army in 1984 was premature and resulted in soldiers being used 
as manpower to supplement police operations. The PNGDF' s limited role until 
1988 did not incite unrest as had occurred in other Third World armies; even so, 
experience in law and order operations invariably changed the PNGDF, 
increasing its potential for unconstitutional action. 
Internal Security 
By 1984, the PNG government, faced with mounting law and order 
problems, made the decision to call out the troops in a desperate bid to deal with 
the raskols (See Chapter 6). The call-out was authorised by a government led by 
Michael Somare who, at independence, had opposed the use of soldiers against 
Papua New Guineans. By using the army, Somare put at risk 'the integrity of the 
PNG state [by becoming] more dependent on ~he support of security forces in the 
face of growing law and order problems' (May 1998: 175). 
l 
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For its part, the public welcomed military assistance as a means of ridding 
urban areas of the raskol menace. As a result, links were cemented with urban 
populations as they had been in earlier years between PIR patrols and local 
communities through civic action. Those links extended to the PNG elite, 
facilitated, as Luckham (1991: 34) suggested, by the army's position as a 
guarantor of political order. Through public support and government demands for 
a military role in internal security, the PNGDF established itself as the 'power 
behind the throne' (ibid.: 10). In the process, 'political, economic and social 
forces [were] corroding the apolitical professionalism [of the PNGDF]' (ibid.: 3). 
In the period 1984 to 1988, the PNGDF was content to support the police. 
Friction, where it did occur, was restricted to local issues. In spite of a growing 
sense of its own importance, the army's limited role in the early years of internal 
security operations reduced the risk of PNGDF action against the state, in spite of 
some predictions. (See, for example, Nelson 1972; Mench 1975; Turner 1990; 
Luckham 1991.) Prior to Bougainville, the PNGDF's internal security role was 
limited to platoon or company groups (34-120 men) designed to raise the profile 
of the security forces and free police for operations. Most of the officers involved 
were junior commanders. The limited deployments therefore had little capacity to 
damage civil/military relations. 
The PNGDF' s increasing involvement in internal security, however, 
coincided with a decline in professionalism which had been evident since the 
Vanuatu deployment. Internal security operations accelerated that decline. 
Deployments in support of law and order operations combined with commitments 
to border security restricted training which might otherwise have addressed 
indiscipline, poor leadership and declining military capabilities. By 1990, after 
two years on Bougainville, the PNGDF had become a ragtag army. 178 
Fortuitously, the risks foreshadowed for PNG in the event of the army 
being used in internal security were not evident during the limited deployments in 
the 1980s. However, the Bougainville rebellion raised the stakes. Bougainville 
178 Later, the government became cautious in using the army, excluding a PNGDF role in the 
curlew imposed in Port Moresby in 2001, and reluctantly using some troops in the 2002 elections. 
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rebels posed a senous threat to PNG unity (See Chapter 7). The army's 
involvement on Bougainville was justified in the wake of policing failures though 
a military solution was never in prospect. Rebel successes on Bougainville led 
political leaders to question military judgement. 
Military Judgement 
By the 1980s, the PNGDF showed signs of morale and discipline 
problems. Commanders at all levels were experiencing problems in maintaining 
professional standards. In the absence of these standards, according to 
Huntington's (1968) argument, the potential for unrest within the ranks was 
inevitably heightened. Successive defence reports contained reference to 
disciplinary problems within the Force. Yet few officers accepted responsibility 
for finding solutions. In 1987, during officer training in 1 RPIR, the disciplinary 
problem - underscored by mutinies at Taurama Barracks, and, in a separate 
incident, at Kiunga outstation earlier in 1987 - was discussed with a view to 
finding a solution to the unit's problems. 179 While all acknowledged the problems 
and the need to instil professionalism, officers could not agree on a solution. The 
disciplinary problems continued, contributing to a deterioration in defence 
capabilities, which became evident on Bougainville in 1988/89, most starkly in 
the form of human rights abuses. There, the army's disastrous performance 
'exposed the myth of professionalism' (MacQueen 1993: 147). On Bougainville, 
PNGDF officers blamed political leaders for their demise. 
Few in the PNGDF understood the political leadership 's disposition 
towards compromise and bargaining (cf. Huntington 1957: 62-79). The 
government ignored PNGDF criticism for fear of provoking an army backlash. 
When tension subsided, senior officers were replaced. 
Army officers were certainly frustrated by the restrictions, imposed by the 
emergency provisions on the PNGDF' s use on Bougainville. Increasingly, the 
PNGDF was being driven by the need to 'equate its own worth, its very identity 
and honour, with achieving a victory, whatever the cost [and, in so doing, the 
army was becoming] less responsible to central control ' (Sydney Morning Herald 
179 Author's experience as a military adviser 1 RPIR 1985-88. 
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16 April 1993). The Bougainville experience, more than any other law and order 
operation, reinforced for the PNGDF the need to protect its interests, consistent 
with Perlmutter's (1981) emphasis on corporatism. 
In spite of tensions over Bougainville, government interference in PNGDF 
affairs during 1980-90 was measured, falling short of sparking an army backlash. 
Even tensions arising from troop reductions in 1986 - the ex-servicemen issue 
- and the government's failure to deliver on the Ten Year Development Plan 
(See Chapter 5), were defused. However, soldiers were prepared to challenge the 
government in 1989 over pay rates. 
Internal Triggers 
Pay and Conditions. PNG soldiers have been especially sensitive over 
pay and conditions throughout their history (See Chapters 2 and 6). In 1964, the 
Administration, aware of PNGDF sensitivity over pay, granted soldiers a pay rise 
after police mutinied over the issue. A more serious incident, however, was that 
in 1989 when troops marched on Parliament (See Chapter 6). The PNGDF, to use 
the words of Sarkesian (1978: 71), felt 'obliged to defend its own position and 
make its own definitions of legitimacy and identity'. Soldiers understood that the 
threat of force had results. 
The PNGDF, as Payne (1993: 118) noted, appropriately, is 'widely held to 
be discontented and acknowledged to be something of a wild card'. Mench 
( 197 5: 207) pointed to the inability of defence officers to prevent corporate 
action. Political leaders , like defence officers, have shown an unwillingness , in 
the face of PNGDF pressure, to stand firm on pay and conditions. Such caution 
recognises that army pay is an especially sensitive issue. That sensitivity has 
come about because soldiers hold staunchly to the view that, in the face of high 
risks , for example on Bougainville, their role in protecting PNG unity demands 
adequate compensation. 180 Soldiers argue that they were often 'risking their lives 
on credit' (Dorney 1998: 66). Pay and conditions remain a prickly issue. As 
180 Unlike other armies such as in Burma (Silverstein 1998: 82), the PNGDF did not play a role in 
the fight for independence. 
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foreshadowed by Nelson (1972: 203), the PNGDF had become accustomed to 
being generously treated, compared to other institutions in PNG. 
Yet, an army response to other issues is not predictable. Soldiers showed 
little reaction to the government's suspension of the Commander and Secretary of 
Defence following the pay riots in 1989. Reaction was also muted when the 
Wingti government reduced the size of the PNGDF from 3500 to 3050 in the mid-
1980s.181 Soldiers gave scant attention to the government's dismissal of several 
Papuan colonels in 1987. Even the withdrawal of troops from Bougainville, 
imposed by the government in 1989, failed to ignite tension - at least among the 
PNGDF. 182 However, on those occasions when soldiers have been pricked into 
action, such as the 1989 pay riots, the result has been a violent outpouring of pent-
up hostility. Since 1989, the reaction has become more vehement. The Force's 
predictability is further complicated by its factionalism. 
Ethnic Tensions. PNG society is characterised by its strong emphasis on 
tradition, especially wantok obligations which enmesh Papua New Guineans in a 
'web of mutual obligations' (Turner 1990: 142). Such obligations, combined with 
historical instances of unrest prompted by ethnic issues, threaten civil/military 
relations. As noted in Chapter 2, the clashes between ethnic groups in 1944 and 
1957, illustrate the problem. The wartime clashes prompted a change in the 
policy of allocating PIB members to units based on close tribal membership. 
Instead, the new policy emphasised tribal mixes. From 1960, the army made a 
special effort to break down tribal loyalty to build nationalism. Even then, critics, 
fearing the consequences, argued that the army was becoming a super tribe. 
Even so, tribal loyalties prevail in the PNGDF. The years of independence 
have done little to 'dissolve regional and provincial differences' (MacQueen 
1993: 148). Indeed, as professionalism has been undermined in the Force, tribal 
influences have grown, encouraged by politicisation of the officer corps during 
1980-90. On Bougainville, for example, soldiers facing death at the hands of the 
181 In contrast, in the late 1990s, government efforts to reduce the size of the defence force 
prompted armed defiance of the decision on several occasions. 
182 Police elements, however, reacted to their commissioner's call for the arrest of political leaders 
during the 'bar-b-coup' in March 1990, following the withdrawal. 
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rebels sought out like tribal groups for protection. Such behaviour had 
underscored Australian policy to allocate men according to tribal origin during the 
Second World War, but this had led to distortions in tribal representation. 
In spite of inter-tribal tensions, which have become more pronounced 
since 1985, the government has not hesitated in using the army during ethnic 
unrest. Soldiers were involved during Operation Southern Breeze in 1990, 
following Papuan unrest in Port Moresby. During that period, the PNGDF carried 
out a difficult mandate with a fair degree of internal cohesion and apparent 
absence of conflicts of ethnic loyalty (May 1995: 196-197). Even on 
Bougainville, Bougainvillean soldiers fought against other Bougainvilleans who 
sided with the rebels. However, the loyalties of soldiers cannot be guaranteed. 
The balancing of tribal groups in the officer ranks has been harder to 
achieve because promotion - at least until 1982 - was based on merit; ethnic 
imbalance has therefore been more pronounced among senior ranks. The early 
dominance of Papuans and Islanders ensured their access to promotion 
opportunities. Wider recruitment had little effect on that situation until 1985 
when Paias Wingti, a highlander, became prime minister. He encouraged the 
advancement of highlanders, calling for the promotion of then Lieutenant Colonel 
Paul Dala, and later Majors Kanene183 and Berapu. 184 In time, highlanders, at the 
urging of their political leaders, will demand a highlands commander - the only 
region yet to be represented in the appointment. The appointment of commander 
was bound to become controversial given the established practice of rotating the 
appointment of officers according to regions. Invariably, highlanders would come 
to expect their tum, after a series of Papuan and Islands commanders since 
independence. Wingti was not the only politician to influence promotion. 
Defence Minister Pokasui, an Islander, was behind the appointment of Brigadier-
General Lokinap - the first non-Papuan commander - who came from then 
Deputy Prime Minister Chan's electorate. 
183 Kanene later became head of the NIO, returning to the PNGDF in 2002. 
184 Berapu was later reduced in rank to Major after he unilaterally ordered the withdrawal of 1 
RPIR from Aropa during Operation High Speed II in 1996. 
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Political influence has seen the officer corps follow suit in appointing 
subordinate officers with similar ethnic backgrounds to ensure loyalty. That has 
been possible because the army continues to control postings, promotion ( except 
for colonels and above), training and, aside from the Arava purchase, defence 
spending. The practice of appointing loyal officers has had a profound effect on 
Force cohesiveness. Regional and tribal influences within the PNGDF, once 
identified, may be more readily understood, and the Force's predictability more 
certain, if that was the nature of the PNGDF. However, the army has become 
more complex as factions have become more pronounced since the PNGDF 
became politicised from 1983. 
Factions play a key role in military action against the state. Luckham 
( 1991: 28) noted that an analysis of 'factionalism is essential to understanding the 
armed force's political behaviour'. Further, he saw military factions as an 
'elementary form of political life ... structuring both their own inner conflicts and 
how and on behalf of who they enter politics' (ibid.). 
Few obstacles existed to the formation of coalitions - at the expense of 
their professional obligations - around those PNGDF officers expected to benefit 
from changes in government. Paradoxically, in the absence of professional 
standards, factions became the means of holding the army together since 1989. 
To some extent, in the absence of professionalism, a PNGDF without factionalism 
would be impotent. Units are able to conduct operations because of a collective 
will among factions to participate in those activities. Mutinies by factions 
galvanise support among other factions in the same way. Officers have since 
1988 exercised authority with the connivance of factions. 
Factions have been catalysts for intervention even in the absence of broad 
support from the remainder of the Force. In Bangladesh, where, in spite of the 
small size, the armed services exhibited a high level of internal rivalry (Ahamed 
1998: 107). Factions, for example, were responsible for coups in Sri Lanka in 
1962 (See Horowitz 1980), and the Philippines in 1993 (See Monteil 1993). 
Horowitz (ibid.: 6) noted that 'armies in new states are a coterie of distinct armed 
camps owing primary allegiance to ... mutually competitive ... ranks seething 
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with corporate, ethnic and personal grievances'. So the existence of factions in 
the PNGDF is not unexpected. However, the factional makeup is complex, 
complicated by regional loyalties. Factional membership in the PNGDF is a mix 
of shifting allegiances: soldiers join with others in search of personal benefit, 
while changes in senior appointments spawn new affiliations. The factions, with 
their ever-changing membership and inter-connecting links with former members 
and wantoks, make the Force unpredictable. The experiences of the PNGDF in 
the 1980s - internal security operations, politicisation of the officer corps and 
unrest over pay and conditions - saw the spread of factions in the Force. By 
1990, they were entrenched, and their influence grew in later years. (Factions 
played important roles in the Sandline issue in 1997 and during the army mutinies 
in 2001 and 2002.) The existence of factions increases the likelihood of an army 
challenge in PNG. Armed elements would be in a strong position to silence 
voices of dissent and galvanise support within the army. 185 In any event, a 
successful coup by one group may be seen by others in the military as a 'fait 
accompli [making] them acquiesce' (Finer 1988: 227). As Montiel (1993: 11) 
observed during the Philippines coup of 1993, 'loyalty among men in uniform 
endured'. As Janowitz (1972: 173) noted, soldiers who see the military as a 
profession are outnumbered by those for whom the army is just another job. 
Professionalism, which might be expected to constrain unrest, becomes a slippery 
concept in those circumstances. 
Officers are also aware that, with few exceptions, they command little 
respect among the soldiers, in spite of the high ratio of officers to soldiers (1 :9 as 
at 1990). 186 In 1989, for example, soldiers ignored orders from Colonel Nuia not 
to march on parliament (Post-Courier 13 March 1989: 4). Indiscipline over the 
years has eroded officers' control over the Force. Bougainville accelerated that 
decline, showing that even officers who might otherwise oppose unconstitutional 
action could be swayed - they invariably harbour grievances of their own. 
185 During the Sandline crisis in 1997, soldiers loyal to the commander prevented access to 
armouries by members of the army opposing his action against the government. 
186 The French army has a ratio of 1: 11 while the German army has 1:27 (Weigley 1991: 261). 
The generous number of officers in the PNGDF accounts for a high proportion of the budget. 
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Ahamed (1998: 105) noted in the Bangladesh coups that the personal grievances 
of coup leaders were a precipitating factor. The officers would argue later that 
their involvement was deemed necessary in order to safeguard the focus of 
intervention and maintain control over soldiers. 187 
Promotion Expectations. In the run-up to independence, a number of 
young PNGDF officers were rapidly promoted to ensure the nucleus of a post-
independent army. Early promotion ensured that these officers dominated senior 
positions in the PNGDF until the late 1980s. Tensions in the competition for 
promotion is one factor in triggering coups (Morrison et al. 1989: 161). In the 
PNGDF, those tensions were defused by the increasing politicisation of the Force. 
The first instance of politicisation occurred in 1982 when the government 
appointed Brigadier-General Mamae as commander, rejecting the Defence 
Council nominee. Such politicisation was aimed at 'expropriation of senior 
[PNGDF] positions for purposes of political patronage' (MacQueen 1993: 137). 
Politicisation removed the professional barriers to promotion, enabling junior 
officers access to higher ranks, regardless of experience. 188 Performance 
standards fell by the wayside - a good track record was not a prerequisite for 
promotion - as senior officers surrounded themselves with a loyal coalition. So 
rank, at least in the PNGDF' s case, does not necessarily reflect experience, 
education or ability (cf. Huntington 1957: 17). 
Officers learnt that promotion depended on the ability to attract political 
patronage and on the goodwill of others. Governments , seeking loyal and 
obligated commanders, were receptive to requests from new commanders to be 
rid of senior officers of questionable loyalty. That precedent was established by 
the Wingti government in 1987 when three Papuan colonels were dismissed, 
coinciding with the appointment of Brigadier-General Lokinap (See Chapter 5). 
(The practice continued in 1992, when Brigadier-General Dademo posted fi ve 
senior officers overseas, following his appointment (The Times 30 December 
187 Officers who joined mutinous soldiers in threatening the Morauta government over its policy to 
reduce the size of the PNGDF in 2001, justified their involvement on these grounds (discussion 
Lieutenant Colonel Lytus (Ret' d) of 8 November 2001). 
188 Politicians have not yet sought to influence the selection of individuals for officer training. 
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1992: 1).) Politicisation of the officer corps during the 1980s undermined the 
authority of officers in the PNGDF. Luckham ( 1991: 33) warned that 'officers 
supporting senior officers beholden to political leaders, for ethnic reasons or 
reward, have no obligations to politicians'. Rather, politicisation has forged a 
shared mistrust an1ong officers of their political leaders, creating, paradoxically, 
common cause among officers to challenge the government. That is in contrast 
with the view among politicians that political interference in army appointments 
guarantees loyalty. 189 But political brinkmanship of this nature risks inviting an 
army challenge, a prospect avoided since independence because the army has seen 
changes to government as the result of democratic process. 
Apart from the adverse effects of politicisation, professional standards of 
the PNGDF officer corps had been in decline since 1975. The education of 
officers, essential to a professional army in order to avoid administrative and 
disciplinary chaos (Weigley 1991: 49), was not evident in the PNGDF (See 
Chapter 5). Importantly, the emphasis, prominent in the 1960s and the 1970s, in 
military training on the PNGDF' s role in a democracy and its subordination to the 
civil authority - an approach adopted in the Philippines in 1987 to reduce the 
risk of coups - has declined since the mid-1980s. The last organised officer 
training in 1 RPIR was conducted in 1988. As a result, officers have been denied 
an opportunity to discuss problems facing the Force. For most, promotion was 
their principal focus. For those replaced, opportunities existed elsewhere, at least 
until the late 1980s. 
Career Ambition. Horowitz (1980: 6) identified ambition as the lynchpin 
of the coup d'etat. In short, ambition for military promotion or, alternatively, for 
political office frustrated, heightens the risk of a coup. Senior officers such as 
Diro, Mamae and Huai, were able to pursue a political career at the completion of 
their military service. Access to political positions has been cited as reducing the 
prospect of unconstitutional action (MacQueen 1993: 150). However, the 
political alternative had mixed success with only three ex-PNGDF officers elected 
189 See, for example, demands by Brig-Gen Singirok, an appointee of prime minister Chan, for the 
resignation of Chan and other ministers over the Sandline issue in 1997 (Dorney 1998). 
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to the national parliament - Diro, Lowa and Pokasui. Huai and Mamae, among 
others, were unsuccessful in their attempts. Other officers have opted for public 
service careers. Colonel Dotaona served as administrator for New Ireland 
Province while Brigadier-General Noga has played a similar role in Northern 
Province. Noga was also appointed to head the NIO 190 (and, in the mid-1990s, as 
High Commissioner to Australia). Others enjoyed diplomatic posts or positions in 
the private sector. Some army officers have been able to move to lucrative jobs 
though their success in the long term has been mixed. 
By 1990, however, fewer officers pursued these alternative career options, 
given the mixed success of others. Many chose to remain in the PNGDF, 
becoming sidelined in the frequent reshuffles of senior appointments. These 
disgruntled officers and factions sympathetic to their demise adopted the practice 
of undermining senior office holders from behind the scenes; a practice which 
became evident in the late 1980s, 191 and more widespread in later years. 
Given their mixed success in alternative careers, former officers have not 
yet penetrated political circles and the bureaucracy in significant numbers nor do 
they dominate key positions. This is in · sharp contrast with Indonesia under 
Suharto where the military was an essential part of the political system (Lawson, 
May and Selochan 1998: 11). Indeed, PNG has been careful to limit the army's 
role, in spite of arguments prior to independence by some, including Sundhaussen 
(1973: 30), for military representation in the government. Others (cf. Huntington 
(1968) have opposed that view, believing military involvement in politics would 
result in a 'breakdown of the ... democratic political order'. PNG is unlikely to 
see changes to legislation to allow serving officers in cabinet, as happened in 
Thailand (Bunbogkam 1998: 55). However, some political decisions in PNG 
have enhanced military power, such as the extension of the military retirement 
age for officers and the appointment of serving officers to the civil administration 
have occurred. Politicisation · of the officer corps still poses risks for PNG, 
190 The head of the NIO in 1999-2002 is also an army officer, Colonel Tokam Kanene. 
191 Colonel Nuia undermined the command on Bougainville of Colonel Dotaona in 1989 by 
denying much-needed resources in military operations against the rebels. 
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fracturing loyalty to the government and undermining military command in units. 
In the process, political awareness has been heightened, creating an environment 
susceptible to manipulation and political gamesmanship by the military and 
civilians (cf. Sarkesian 1978: 19). PNG political leaders, while suspicious of the 
army, recognise that the army's value extends beyond its use as a coercive force. 
Political Issues 
Exploitation of the Military. Politicians have been prepared to use the 
army for their own ends. A number of defence ministers have pushed for the 
relocation of army units to the highlands as a means of developing provincial 
infrastructure. One minister advocated basing Indonesian exchange personnel in 
the highlands with the PNGDF so that engineer tasks could be undertaken in the 
area. Such development initiatives were seen as a means of enhancing political 
standing. However, the establishment of regional outposts for army units would, 
were they to go ahead, see troops suffer the disciplinary, rationing and security 
problems seen at the border outstations from the mid-1980s (See Chapter 4). 
Notwithstanding political interest in an enhanced civic action role for the 
army - the PNGDF Engineer Battalion was relocated to Lae from Port Moresby 
to provide access to the highlands for that purpose - Bougainville operations and 
cutbacks in defence funding prevented expanded civic action tasks. Political 
leaders recognised that the PNGDF' s capacity to conduct civic action for political 
gain was limited. 
However, some political leaders invariably see the potential of the army as 
a means of shoring up their position, claiming a right to govern by virtue of army 
backing. Political leaders have, on past occasions, looked for other ways to 
protect their positions. Wingti in 1987 sought to muzzle media criticism of his 
government in a controversial media bill which was defeated. He also mounted a 
bid to extend his period in power by resigning as prime minister and seeking re-
election, in an attempt to avoid a vote of no confidence (a strategy which was 
subsequently overturned in the courts). In spite of these efforts, a one-party state 
in PNG has yet to emerge - Lawson, May and Selochan (1998: 148) pointed to 
concerns by some that PNG would yield to a one party state or a military 
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takeover. However, a change in the direction of PNG politics risks inviting a 
military response, as mooted by Mench ( 197 5: 196) at independence. 
The groundwork for the use of the PNGDF to political advantage has 
already been laid. Political appointments within the Force - the commander and 
colonels are approved by the NEC - make army officers beholden to politicians, 
and some are prepared to support unscrupulous leaders. Those circumstances 
underline the army's potential political power (Mench 1975: 195). Poor 
governance evident throughout PNG creates those circumstances. 
Government Ineffectiveness. Since independence, governments have 
grappled with problems of governance - at a cost to essential services. All 
departments, including Defence, have been starved of funds. For its part, the 
PNGDF has paid lip service to financial limitations. Soldiers recognise from past 
experience that the government is reluctant to call the army to account, preferring 
instead to mollify unruly troops. Instances of unrest will continue when army 
expectations are not met. The basis for the PNGDF' s willingness to challenge the 
government was established in the 1989 pay riots, and on Bougainville in 1989-
90. The JCFADT (1991; 165) believed that while the possibility of a coup 
remained 'unlikely - not least because of logistical barriers, ... in one quality the 
PNGDF is well placed to intervene, if it perceives . . . that corruption and 
instability have rendered the political establishment ineffectual ' . Public 
impatience over service deli very may see the co-opting of soldiers to support 
public demands for an end to government ineffectiveness and corruption 
unstated reciprocity from the army for public support on earlier occasions. 192 
Public support legitimises a role for the army in politics, and facilitates 
broader backing than the army's factional nature would otherwise allow. 
However, popular support for army intervention could dissipate if soldiers failed 
to act responsibly, as happened on Bougainville in 1989. In addition to the 
legitimacy drawn from the creation of an army at independence (cf. Finer 1988: 
6), the PNGDF has also been encouraged by public sympathy in the 1989 pay 
192 Soldiers joined public demonstrations during the 1990s to show solidarity with public concern 
over the Sandline issue, and over student grievances. 
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nots. Public sympathy could stay the hand of the police, overcoming the last 
internal obstacle to army intervention. Given public disenchantment, ' the 
military' s deposition of the government by force or the threat of force is at least 
not resisted and more often than not, is initially very popular indeed' (ibid.: 103). 
The 1961 coup in Korea was accepted by the populace as an inevitable result of 
political crisis (Kim 1998: 125). Popular support is not a prerequisite for a coup; 
it may follow from the promise of change. 
The army's involvement in internal security has led the PNGDF to see 
itself as the guarantor of internal order and therefore of democracy. Many 
PNGDF officers drew comparisons between the PNGDF and the FMF role in 
safeguarding national ideals in the Fiji coups of 1987. Luckham (1991: 11) noted, 
in a comparative context, that 'while the military remained in the wings, ... it has 
been a major actor in the political process by virtue of its proximity to the 
repressive apparatus of the state'. Sarkesian (1978: 19) shared that view noting 
that the 'military' s command of the instruments of violence gives it a political 
potential'. Mench (1975: 217) believed that the 'PNGDF [would] emerge as a 
significant political force'. That invites officers who might otherwise pursue a 
political career, as Diro, Lowa and others have done in the past, to see the 
commander's position as a powerful (and lucrative) alternative. Officers would 
be attracted to this role (as they were in the 1997 Sandline crisis), especially if 
they were seen as national heroes, prepared to put aside personal ambition and 
bear the risks associated with unconstitutional action for the sake of the people. 
Popular support has an added advantage for the PNGDF. One of the 
concerns of PNGDF officers in the past has been uncertainty over Australia's 
response to instability in PNG. PNGDF action against a democratically elected 
government would probably see a government under siege request assistance from 
Australia, as the Namaliu government did in 1989 during the pay riots (See 
Chapter 6). Consideration had also been given to the use of the ADF on 
Bougainville (See Chapter 7). 194 The PNGDF has contemplated the possibility of 
193 Students and the broader public supported the PNGDF during the Sandline unrest in 1997. 
194 Author's experience as the PNG Desk Officer in DIO 1989-90. 
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confronting Australians were unconstitutional action taken. Popular support for 
the PNGDF presents a dilemma for Australian political leaders. They would be 
hesitant to act if PNGDF actions were seen to be in response to public support for 
army intervention. Australia has the option to refuse, contrary to Mench ' s (1975: 
188) view that Australia would find it hard to decline a request by the PNG 
government to intervene in the event of a PNGDF mutiny. (Mench did note that 
Australia could experience problems distinguishing between a mutiny and a 
coup.) 
Rivalry 
Governments in PNG have taken comfort in the notion that the police act 
as a bulwark against PNGDF unrest. However, police allegiance is not 
guaranteed, as demonstrated by the Tohian incident in 1990 (See Chapter 7). 
Like their army counterparts, the police suffer from factional influences, 
undermining the Constabulary' s effectiveness as a counter to the army, and 
raising doubts about its reliability. (Indeed, the shared experience of Bougainville 
since 1989, especially among the Mobile Squads and the army, has been the basis 
for support from police elements during army unrest in the 1990s.) The police too 
have suffered from politicisation and the cumulative effects of neglect, and the 
government's willingness to opt for short-term options in response to law and 
order problems, has resulted in a decline in police capabilities. 
National Political/Economic Crisis 
'the frequent military ascension to power has often been motivated by a perceived 
need to save their nations from weak, corrupt, and undisciplined civilian 
leadership' (Goodman 1990: xiii). 
Papua New Guineans have shown a degree of acceptance of difficult 
economic circumstances but nevertheless have shown concern about the problems 
within PNG. Sir Ignatius Kilage, then Governor-General , noted in 1985 that 
unless checked, corruption threatened the nation's stability (Turner 1990: 141). If 
conditions worsen, and patience runs out, the PNGDF, concerned over internal 
stability, may perceive a need to intervene. Dorney (1990: 220) quoting the Chief 
Ombudsman's report of 1982, noted that stage four (of the four stages of 
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corruption) begins when the 'military, seizing upon the opportunity created by 
public disenchantment with widespread political con·uption, takes power amid a 
rhetoric of righteousness and morality' . (PNG, according to the then Chief 
Ombudsman was, in 1982, in stage two of corruption.) Already, the PNGDF 
revels in its perceived role as what Lissak has described as 'guarantor of 
fundamental and permanent interests of the nation' (1976: 20). Economic policies 
seen to be benefiting 'rich big men' prompted a coup in Uganda in January 1971 
while 'mismanagement, extravagance ... and moral corruption ' resulted in a coup 
in Congo in 1963 (Morrison et al. 1989: 673/424). PNG shows many of the same 
pre-conditions. 
PNG politicians are aware of the mood of intolerance among Papua New 
Guineans. Most politicians have stood aside when accused of corruption (like the 
then Minister of State, Ted Diro in 1991, following the Barnett Inquiry into 
Forestry) thereby avoiding prosecution under the Leadership Code. Some 
political leaders have chosen to ignore criticism and cling to power. Political 
leaders know that the dispersed nature of PNG' s population isolates unrest, 
limiting the threat to their positions, so most of their energy is focused on 
elections, when their positions come under scrutiny. Then, the voters listen 
patiently to the ' promises having seen little return from previous promises 
[suspecting that] parliamentary aspirants are feathering their own nests ' (Turner 
1990: 108). 
The army 1s not immune to corruption, though its incidence has not 
matched the scale and intensity seen elsewhere in PNG society. For many years 
after independence tendering processes and restrictions on staff who were 
authorised delegates mitigated against corrupt practices. However, diversification 
in the wake of the Arava purchase saw foreign companies, less constrained by 
professional ethics, enter the scene. Some of these saw quickly that potential 
sales could be secured with gifts and commissions. 
In the beginning, the PNGDF was awakened to corruption by small 
offerings such as free trips or special gifts , for example, during weapon trials of 
288 
the Ultimax 100 light machine gun in 1987. 195 At least two senior ranking 
officers - Brigadiers-General Lokinap and Singirok - received trips overseas at 
the expense of private companies seeking to sell vehicles to the army. (Singirok 
was subsequently found in 1999 to have also received a large payment in return 
for a favourable decision to purchase defence vehicles.) Brigadier General Diro, 
by 1987 a political leader, may have unwittingly awakened the PNGDF to 
corruption when he received funds for his political campaign from Indonesia's 
General Murdani (See Dorney 1990: 203). Brigadier-General Huai also received 
gifts from General Murdani. Allegations have been made that cars and other gifts 
were given to some officers by local companies in return for lucrative supply 
contracts, particularly during the Bougainville crisis. In the latter case, soldiers 
requisitioned Red Cross supplies for their own use and looted stores and mine 
housing, transporting the spoils on Defence ships and aircraft to the soldiers' 
home bases. 196 Certainly, Bougainville provided impetus to PNGDF corruption. 
The attention of the Ombudsman Commission was first attracted to corruption in 
the army in 1997. In that instance, Brigadier-General Singirok was found to have 
received K70000 from a supplier of military materiel (Dorney 1998: 313-314). 197 
For its part, the public does not see the army as a corrupt institution. 198 
Most officers seem content for the present to rely on political patronage and the 
promotion and higher pay and conditions of service that brings. That will change 
where opportunities for personal benefit are forthcoming (as arose on 
Bougainville in 1989-2000), for example, through avoidance of the tendering 
process or while the army is operating under emergency provisions. In the event 
that corruption were to become more widespread, equipment acquisitions based 
on such influences rather than on defence combat requirements would further 
undermine defence capabilities. Corruption in the Force reflects practices already 
evident earlier in PNG society. 
195 Author's experience as an adviser to the PNGDF trial team in 1986/87. 
196 Revealed in discussions between PNGDF officers and the author. 
197 For more on corruption in PNG see Dorney 1990: 215-245 and Turner 1990: 141-146. 
198 Complaints alleging corruption in the PNGDF were not lodged with the Ombudsman 
Commission until the 1990s. 
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Public attitudes towards politicians are reflected within the PNGDF ranks. 
Poor civil/military relations, police/PNGDF rivalry, government ineffectiveness, 
army factionalism, conflict of roles , di versification issues and pay and conditions 
- all of these issues have created tensions during the post-independence years, 
emerging starkly in 1980-90. Collectively, they have created in the minds of 
soldiers a perceived need to protect their position. In the ensuing atmosphere of 
tension, events have brought the army closer to intervention. Politicians have 
been cautious in dealing with the PNGDF though this has not prevented 
government leaders calling senior officers to account. 
All soldiers in PNG are volunteers. High unemployment has ensured a 
source of recruits though some have had undisclosed criminal histories. Most 
recruits possess a good education. That has been in sharp contrast with 
predictions by Janowitz (1972: 171), who suggested that volunteer armies became 
'increasingly dependent on less advantaged segments of society for manpower ' . 
A broad base of well-educated personnel has resulted in a more politically 
conscious soldiery who take an increasing interest in the running of government. 
A good education has led many to resist military discipline, by 1990 a tenuous 
concept in the PNGDF, raising doubt about the extent to which the officers can 
hold in check mutinous soldiers. On Bougainville in 1989/90, officers failed to 
prevent mutinous action on several occasions (See Chapter 7). 
A political crisis , especially in cases which ignore democratic process , 
would invite army intervention. No such action was evident during 1975-90 
because the army saw changes of government as democratic. However, in the 
event of a crisis - arising, say, from an election or during votes of no 
confidence199 - the army could find it difficult to resist stepping in as an ' arbiter 
between contending civilian claimants on power ' (Luckham 1991: 10). Equally, 
an economic crisis could prompt an army response. The closure of the Panguna 
rmne, and its subsequent impact on the PNG economy, had that potential. As 
Rizvi (1998: 99) observed in Pakistan, 'any serious crisis of governance .. . 
threatens the military' s interests because a society in turmoil and crisis cannot .. . 
199 There have been three successful votes of no confidence in the period 1975 to 1999. 
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support a government that has lost credibility'. In the end, the army's actions, 
will be influenced by its relations with government. 
Civil/Military Relations 
'[ armies will] necessarily be ... the mirrors of the governments and societies that 
they serve ... niany armies ... have organised and operated far more effectively 
than the political and social apparatus of their ... states' (Weigley 1991: 262). 
Relations between the military and the state will on occasions be strained. 
Huntington (1957: 62-79) noted that the 'military's view on security rarely 
accords with that of the political leadership's assessment of security problems; the 
latter balancing resource demands ... '. Nowhere, in PNG' s case, has that been 
more evident than on Bougainville. There the PNGDF did not accept the 
government's willingness to compromise PNGDF gains in order to negotiate. 
Before independence, the army had been critical of the government under 
Michael Somare, who gave the impression that the army was unwanted. On that 
occasion, political leaders responded by establishing closer links with the army. 
Yet from the 1980's, such links were not maintained. Janowitz (1964: 65) noted 
that contact between governments and armies in the third world must be sustained 
to engender trust. The Diro incident in 1977 was prominent among post-
independence tensions (See Chapter 2). Diro was reprimanded though he claimed 
that the defence minister had been briefed on his plans prior to the event. Diro 
felt he was a scapegoat. The government would have been more concerned at the 
time had it known of the existence of the PNGDF' s plan (Electric Shock) to 
control key points in Port Moresby if Diro were dismissed. 
The extent to which the rank and file knew of Diro ' s predicament is not 
altogether clear. Knowledge of the plan was limited, given the sensitive nature of 
its intent. At the time, Lieutenant Colonel Poang felt compelled to make 
contingency plans but the will for collective action by the PNGDF was less 
certain and, in the event, not tested. The belief by some army elements that such 
a contingency was necessary is noteworthy. Since then, the plan has remained in 
mothballs at Murray Barracks, passed to successive commanders ( discussion, 
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Brigadier-General Dademo, November 1992) - though not yet put into effect. 
More incidents followed, each with the potential to provoke the army. 
Tensions rose in 1987 when Prime Minister Wingti dismissed three 
Papuan Colonels (See Chapter 5). Huai saw the decision as a 'high level plot' 
(Post-Courier 2 February 1988: 4), implying Australian involvement in the 
decision. However, most of the criticism of Wingti's decision came from PNG 
political circles, prompted by an opportunity for political pointscoring. Josephine 
Abaijah had sought to do the same in 1977 when Diro faced disciplinary action. 
Yet, in spite of the outcry, the army stayed outside the issue. 
Still, the army has been prepared to protect its interests. In 1988, 
Brigadier-General Lokinap deployed armed troops to Lae to prevent destruction 
of the airstrip used by the PNGDF Air Element (See Chapter 5). Operation 
Albatross defied government authority by denying entry to the Department of 
Works' employees. Lokinap believed that his actions were justified. Indeed, he 
would have been encouraged by support from Defence Minister Pokasui, a former 
army officer, who sided with the Commander. Lokinap had hoped the action 
would safeguard the airport and the government would back down. Control of the 
airstrip remained with the army in spite of the government reprimand. 
Government authority was seriously challenged in 1989 when riotous 
troops marched on parliament, demanding the government deliver pay increases 
and improved conditions. Parliament was damaged and politicians jostled. 
Promises by the deputy prime minister that the problem would be addressed 
defused the situation. However, soldiers were prepared to take more extreme 
action by holding Parliament to ransom had the government not capitulated.200 
On Bougainville, the army was criticised for its withdrawal in May 1990. 
Media reports claimed the army withdrew unilaterally, ignoring its responsibilities 
for a handover to the international observer group deployed to monitor the 
ceasefire (See Chapter 7). The Australian Joint Committee for Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade (JCFADT) pointedly described the withdrawal as a serious 
breakdown in government control of the Force (quoted in May 1998: 170). At the 
200 Discussions with 1 RPIR soldiers at Taurarna Barracks 1990-92. 
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time, PNG political leaders seemed content to allow the army (and the police) to 
bear the brunt of the criticism. To do otherwise would have called into question 
the extent of the government ' s control over its security forces. 
So, the PNGDF has a record of mutinous action. Importantly, a worrying 
pattern emerged from the unrest during the 1980s in which unruly troops mounted 
increasingly serious demonstrations. (That pattern continued in the 1990s with 
Sandline, and a series of mutinies in PNGDF units, which saw soldiers arm 
themselves to underline their determination.) Certainly, the incidents of 
indiscipline during the 1980's suggest that the army will go to almost any length 
to safeguard pay and conditions of service. The PNGDF' s record of unrest poses 
difficulties in predicting triggers for unrest. Political leaders cannot be certain of 
the army' s reaction on issues. Even their choice of commander provides no 
guarantees. Rivalry between the army and police, and the poor state of relations 
with the bureaucracy, including within the Defence Department, further 
complicate the situation. 
PNGDF/DOD Relations 
Since the establishment of a civilian component in the Defence 
Department at independence, the secretary and his staff have worked in the 
shadow of the PNGDF. The department has often been a scapegoat for the lack of 
resources , on occasions becoming the target of PNGDF aggression. In 1989, 
Secretary Mokis was attacked during the pay riots. In an earlier incident, in 1986, 
Secretary Bengo, when threatened by unruly soldiers , sought the Commander ' s 
protection (discussion, P. Bengo, 17 April 1996). 
Soldiers see the Defence Department as a source of obstruction to their 
goals for expansion and in the payment of allowances. The civilian component in 
Defence - numbering 200 to 300 staff - recognises that the PNGDF is the real 
authority. The uneasy alliance has ensured civilian authority is hamstrung and 
reliant on the PNGDF, frustrating efforts to improve defence management, and 
PNGDF accountability, which underpinned the creation of the Department of 
Defence. The situation has not improved, in spite of an often-close relationship 
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between the commander and the secretary. The blame apportioned to Defence 
public servants, extends beyond the Department to the wider bureaucracy. 
Soldiers and the Public Service 
Soldiers have little respect for the bureaucracy, though that has not 
prevented close relationships between public service officials and army personnel. 
Those relationships arise from wantok links, and attendance at school with 
classmates who joined the public service. Informal links have also been 
maintained by social contact. Disdain and, sometimes, animosity, exist in spite of 
a shared view by soldiers and bureaucrats of politicians, which gives them 
common cause on some issues. Bureaucrats share the army's plight of inadequate 
resources, lack of direction and reciprocal loyalty by the government. The public 
service has often been a whipping post for politicians seeking to deflect public 
criticism of government failures. The public service's early record of poor 
performance arose, in part, from rapid expansion and the promotion of 
inexperienced departmental officers. Bureaucrats, like their army counterparts, 
may survive changes in government but harbour a dislike of political leaders. 
More senior appointees, who tend to change with government, maintain links with 
the army until their reinstatement. The demise of the public sector resulting from 
politicisation mirrors the problems of the PNGDF, emerging in the late 1980s 
from the same process. Army officers, appointed to positions in government, 
understand the true state of the public service. 
Army officers serve with Foreign Affairs, including in diplomatic posts , 
and in the National Disaster Organisation. Brigadier-General Noga was 
appointed head of the National Intelligence Organisation. Those links could play 
an important role in any army move against the government. Support from the 
broader public service is likely to be forthcoming because of shared grievances 
and attitudes among the PNG population. The public service is likely to be, at the 
very least, sympathetic to the PNGDF. Turner (1990: 123) lends weight to that 
view, noting that 'bureaucracies generally cooperate ... especially when they 
interpret [army action] as the triumph of the rational ... over the irrational and 
chaotic ' . Likewise, public service support would lead the population to see army 
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intervention as more credible. Glanville offered the contrary view that 'a coup 
would not have popular support [and] an angry populace would not stand 
passively by and allow the military ... to take the reins of government' (Post-
Courier 19 November 1987: 19). 
Intelligence has been an important factor in the staging of coups 
(Luckham 1991: 31 ). The extent to which intelligence would play a decisive 
factor in PNG depends on the ability of the army to draw upon intelligence 
networks; the effectiveness of those networks; and the army's capacity to limit 
knowledge of its intentions. The Defence Intelligence Branch (DIB) has proven 
effective in providing intelligence to the PNGDF not otherwise forthcoming 
through sources in the National Intelligence Organisation. However, the DIB 
presence is limited to major urban areas. Assistance could be provided by the 
NIO, which, on two occasions in the past decade, has been commanded by an 
army officer. Importantly, the army, plotting a takeover, enjoys a potential 
advantage: intelligence services - run by military officers - may deny the PNG 
government an independent and reliable source of information on the army and 
prevent early warning of a move by troops against the government. The gamble, 
for an interventionist army, in that scenario is that factions - especially wantok 
links - in the army, loyal to political leaders in the government, could undermine 
plans for a challenge, as occurred in the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Both the DIB and NIO have links to foreign intelligence agencies. 
However, information to which the NIO and DIB have access through such links 
is disseminated according to strict guidelines. Intelligence may not provide the 
army with early warning of challenges to army authority, risking the use of 
excessive force in an attempt to maintain authority; poor capabilities also mean 
that intelligence would not provide warning in the case of foreign intervention. 
Prospects of Military Action 
'there are very few places on earth where treasonable offences, sedition and even 
mutinous action are not treated very seriously. Papua New Guinea is one such 
place' (Editorial in National Newspaper quoted in Dorney 1998: 76). 
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The army's preoccupation with internal security has created the 
environment for a challenge. Prospects of overseas deployment along the lines of 
the Vanuatu operation are now remote, in spite of PNGDF attempts in the 1980s 
to provide officers for UN duties (See Chapter 5). The army's skills - and its 
leadership - have been eroded during internal security operations. The PNGDF 
has taken on the shape of a para-military force - albeit more heavily .armed -
with a limited capability for conventional warfare. Internal security has also led 
to politicisation of the army. That points to opportunities for collusion between 
political leaders and army elements, blurring the army's responsibilities. In the 
process, the army has become a shadow of its former self, just able to sustain 
operations for short periods in a limited threat environment. The erosion of 
PNGDF capabilities has come about when the PNG government is under siege, 
with Port Moresby's writ extending little further than the main urban areas. 
PNG' s political history shows so far a broad acceptance of the country's 
Constitution. Unlike the Indonesian military forces (Vatikiotis 1998: 31 ), the 
PNGDF swears allegiance to both the government and the country. Views on the 
prospect of a coup among senior members of the PNGDF vary. In 1987, in the 
wake of the Fiji coups, Glanville believed that soldiers could not maintain a coup 
because they would come under attack from civilian forces (Post-Courier 2 Jun 
1987: 3). Former Lieutenant Colonel Poang, who planned Operation Electric 
Shock in 1977, accepted that a coup was possible on the basis of 'disparities in 
social and economic development' (Post-Courier 2 Jun 1987: 3). An unnamed 
serving officer pointed to the probability of a coup given the 'immense internal 
corruption ... by large numbers of people' (ibid.: 3). Turner (1990: 121), echoing 
the views of Huai and Diro, believed 'military intervention, a limited action, is 
well within the realms of possibility'. (Diro still maintains a coup is possible, 
contingent on a charismatic military leader and the support of trade unions and 
university students (discussion Brig-Gen Diro of 6 March 2002.).) In spite of 
PNG' s geography and the size of its army, PNG is vulnerable to a coup. 
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Government Responses 
Horowitz (1980: xi) noted that coups succeed by capturing the centre of 
power quickly ... using surprisingly small amounts of force'. Factionalism, 
especially that based on ethnicity, PNGDF/police rivalry, and relations with the 
bureaucracy, would make the course of a coup difficult to predict; the triggers for 
a coup, and the reaction of political leaders, are also hard to predict. The PNGDF, 
is based on infantry battalions, capable of being deployed in urban or rural areas; 
with the potential for involvement in domestic politics (cf. Janowitz 1964). The 
army's inability to exercise authority beyond the urban centres would not inhibit a 
coup. Indeed, successive PNG governments have not demonstrated a strong 
presence beyond the urban areas. Control of the main urban areas would be the 
key. In the event that the army clung to power, consolidating its hold in the 
country, troops could be deployed to the key provinces and/or the assistance of 
the RPNGC could be enlisted. 
The difficulty facing PNG governments is one of balancing use of the 
army in internal security with maintaining the integrity of civil authority and 
limiting politicisation of the army. Such a balance is difficult to achieve, given 
the competing demands of political leaders to hold onto power. Politicians 
showed little interest in co-opting the army in the period 1980-90 by encouraging 
1 . h 201 H . army unrest to unsett e opponents 1n t e government. owever, c1rcumstances 
may arise whereby the army plays a role in securing or holding onto political 
power, such as occurred under Marcos in the Philippines, leading to the 
imposition of martial law. The PNGDF therefore 'needs ... care and more 
effective control to realise its full potential as a national asset' (O'Connor 1994: 
10) - that is the PNGDF's effectiveness as an asset could be degraded if the 
Force became too involved in internal security. In the early days , civic action 
ensured that the army was involved with the broader community but that 
involvement has declined with the PNGDF's withdrawal from civic action since 
the late 1980s. Mench (1975: 213) suggested that a containment approach may be 
201 In 1997, some politicians surreptitiously tested the willingness of senior army officers to 
support political objectives but without success (discussion Brig-Gen Nuia of 18 August 2001). 
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possible in PNG, whereby the PNGDF is placed within a political system with a 
defined role that would 'reduce the Defence Force's corporate isolation' (ibid.: 
213) (See also Sundhaussen 1973: 30). No support for that approach has been 
forthcoming among PNG political leaders.202 
The government cannot rely on the constitutional provisions for a separate 
army and police force, or in the balance between of the two forces. The army's 
superiority in firepower and its concentration of units in key urban areas, 
especially the capital, provide a marked advantage over the police. That could 
leave few options but to seek foreign intervention, especially from Australia.203 
Mench (1975: 187) did not rule out the possibility of a government seeking 
external assistance. Intervention by former colonial powers is not unusual: 
French Forces put down insurgencies in Chad, Cameroon, Niger, Congo and 
Gabon (Morrison et al. 1989: 161). 
Foreign intervention, even when backed by strong political will, however, 
faces potential risks, including casualties on both sides and among the civilian 
population. The Australian government would need to bear those risks in 
restoring order. 
If it did intervene, the PNGDF might not want to assume power for the 
long term, fearing, as Finer (1988: 27) suggests, 'that if they intervene and are 
vanquished ... the army itself will be forfeit'. The army might hold onto power 
until a civilian alternative was identified, focussing their efforts on the 
maintenance of law and order and an early return to civilian rule. By so doing, 
the military might protect its position in PNG and attract patronage and resources 
vital to its needs. 
********************************** 
202 Attempts by political leaders in the late 1980s to use the PNGDF for wider civic action tasks 
were thwarted by the Force's commitment to Bougainville operations (See Chapter 4) . 
203 By day 4 of the Sandline crisis in 1997, Defence Headquarters in Canberra was considering 
ADF options to assist the PNG govermnent restore order (O'Callaghan 1999: 158). 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This thesis has focussed on the period 1980-90, during which the principal 
influences on the PNGDF' s decline became starkly evident.204 Importantly, the 
PNGDF showed in that period a willingness to take increasingly serious 
unconstitutional action. Notwithstanding its accomplished war record and its fine 
tradition, the PNGDF has been dogged by indiscipline, including mutinous 
behaviour, even from the early days following formation of the PIB/NGIB. By 
the 1980s, the instances of unrest were growing in frequency and scope, 
accelerated by politicisation, declining professional standards, a refocus from 
external to internal defence, and the erosion of defence relations with Australia. 
The absence of a military challenge in the years after independence was 
due in large part to the continued high profile of the ADF in PNG - at least until 
the mid-l 980s. That ensured the maintenance of professional standards and, in 
the absence of an internal security commitment before 1984, subordination to the 
civil authority. Moreover, the PNGDF, like the broader populace, took comfort in 
the central role of democratic process in changes of government. 
But the decline in ADF influence which began with Australia' s qualified 
support of the PNGDF' s Vanuatu deployment in 1980, coincided with declining 
professionalism. The rift in ADF/PNGDF relations widened as the PNGDF was 
drawn into internal security operations. The mid- l 980s proved a watershed in 
relations in the wake of PNGDF criticism of the Joint Declaration of Principles, 
the Pacific Patrol Boat Programme, and access to DC funds for PNGDF priorities. 
In 1989-90, Bougainville operations all but ended the defence relationship, 
damaged by the conditions imposed on the use of helicopters , criticism of 
PNGDF human rights abuses and failure to provide much needed logistic support. 
The resulting loss of Australian influence ensured that from the mid-1980s, 
subordination of the PNGDF to the civilian authority became a tenuous concept: 
the PNGDF openly challenged the government in Lae in 1988 during Operation 
204 The reasons for focussing on this period, which have to do with my previous employment are 
explained in Chapter 1. 
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Albatross and, in spite of government action to bring the Force under its control, 
soldiers attacked parliament eight months later. On Bougainville, within twelve 
months of its deployment, army operations sabotaged government attempts for a 
negotiated settlement, and perpetrated human rights abuses against the local 
population and members of the provincial government - in defiance of 
international condemnation. So tenuous was government control over the 
PNGDF that the army was withdrawn from Bougainville, abandoning 
Bougainvilleans to internecine conflict. Thereafter the extent of government 
control over the PNGDF would be in question. 
Potential to sour civil/military relations was not confined to internal 
security operations. Pay and conditions have been prickly issues throughout the 
PNGDF' s history. Soldiers have shown a consistent willingness to protect their 
corporate well being. Their determination has been unstinting, in a history of 
incidents within the barracks, and manifestly, in the pay riots of 1989. In that 
instance, their demands were taken to the steps of parliament, where concessions 
probably headed off a more violent threat to political leaders. We should have no 
doubt, given the PNGDF' s history, that troops will protect, aggressively if 
necessary, their pay and conditions of service. 
The army's response to other issues has not always been as predictable. 
Political interference in officer appointments in the 1980s - even when several 
officers were dismissed in 1987 - drew little response. But politicisation of the 
officer corps and the institutionalisation of factionalism which began in the 1980s, 
have ensured that vested interests, with diminished prospects of political careers, 
will continue to jockey for power. Foremost among those vested interests are 
highlanders who, encouraged by political leaders such as Wingti in 1987, have 
come to expect, from the rotation of the commander's appointment among 
regions, their turn at the spoils of office. 
The events of the 1980s highlighted by the Fiji coups (1987), pay riots 
(1989), and the Bougainville campaign (1989-90), cast doubt on the effectiveness 
of safeguards put in place at independence to keep the army in check. A policy of 
balancing Force numbers against those of the police assumed police loyalty to the 
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government; the Tohian 'bar-b-coup ' in 1990 and the shared experience of the 
army and police on law and order operations between 1984-90 casts doubt on the 
extent to which the police are likely to act as a counter to army excesses. 
Moreover, the limited size of the PNGDF has proved no barrier to its exerting 
pressure on the government - several hundred unarmed soldiers were enough to 
wring concessions from government in 1989. 
Successive governments have been culpable 1n the erosion of 
professionalism in the PNGDF. Politicisation of the officer corps fuelled 
factional di visions and resulted in the promotion of officers based on political 
imperatives rather than merit. Those officers sidelined in the process undermined 
the authority of unit commanders and their control over the rank and file. 
By the 1990s, factions had emerged as the catalyst in army indiscipline 
and, as such, pose the principal risk as a trigger for an army challenge. Officers, 
who might be expected to temper army unrest, harbour their own grievances and 
are beholden to factions through which, as became evident on Bougainville in 
1989-90, officers draw much of their authority. Officers lost their standing and 
respect among the troops after the 1980s, forfeiting that entitlement by siding with 
soldiers or by failing to check soldiers' excesses. Officers have been complicit in 
Force machinations aimed at undermining competitors for promotion. The 
absence of professional training, especially in the principles of the army's 
subordination to the civil authority, further eroded the officers' effectiveness. 
Politicisation has been instrumental in undermining the PNGDF officer 
corps. The appointment of officers on political grounds has removed the natural 
barriers to promoting poor performers. Few alternatives exist for officers cast 
aside in politically-sponsored reshuffles, and by 1990 this had become a regular 
feature in the Force. Political careers lost favour following the limited success of 
former PNGDF officers; Lowa (1977), Diro (1982) and Pokasui (1987) were the 
exceptions. Divisions in the officer corps, and the rewards on offer from political 
leaders for army acquiescence, ensured few obstacles existed to wider political 
interference. Already in the decade 1980-90, political leaders had imposed the 
Arava purchase, changed five PNGDF commanders in eight years, and relocated 
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the Engineer Battalion to facilitate a wider army role in civic action. Only the 
Bou gain ville rebellion distracted attention from the army' s historically limited 
role in ci vie action. 
The preparedness of successive governments to use the army in internal 
security is inexcusable. No justification existed prior to Bougainville in 1988 for 
the call-out of the soldiers. But the damage to PNGDF professionalism could 
have been contained if the government had used troops consistent with the army's 
internal security doctrine. Instead, soldiers were separated from their 
commanders and replicated the role of the police - especially the mobile squads. 
Professionalism invariably suffered as the army struggled to meet the demands for 
manpower arising from law and order operations between 1984-88 and the need 
to maintain a credible presence along the PNG/Indonesian border, and conduct 
much-needed training. By 1990, Bougainville operations demanded the 
PNGDF' s principal attention, at the same time reducing the PNGDF presence at 
the border outstations to a token few troops repatriated from Bougainville, many 
for human rights abuses. Also by 1990, the cumulative detrimental impact of law 
and order operations transformed the Force from a professional army to a ragtag 
group, prone to indiscipline. Soldiers held the government in contempt, setting 
their own rules for their conduct on Bougainville - the St Valentine's Day 
massacre underlining their approach to rebel intransigence - and on their return 
to the mainland. The government's failure to prosecute those involved in the pay 
riots, and the government's preference to grant amnesty to those accused of 
human rights abuses further damaged civil authority in the eyes of the troops. (By 
2001, armed mutiny by disaffected soldiers would again result in amnesty for the 
conspirators.) The soldiers were quick to learn that the army held the whip hand; 
the government's capitulation in the face of military determination set new and 
dangerous precedents. 
Public service dealings with defence take their cue from the government. 
Since the mid-1980s, Defence Department civilians have accepted their place in 
the shadow of the PNGDF. Many in the public service - and the police -
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sympathise with the army, sharing their dislike of political leaders who have been 
only too willing to use the bureaucracy as a whipping post for failed policy. 
The conditions which have prompted Third World armies to challenge 
government therefore exist in PNG. Already, the PNGDF has shown a 
willingness to defy government authority when the mood takes it. Since 
independence, PNGDF indiscipline has increased in scale, frequency and 
violence. PNGDF action will always be unpredictable, given the factional nature 
of the Force, its poor leadership, and indiscipline. Predictability is further 
complicated by the army's increasing tendency to shirk responsibility for its 
actions, an approach encouraged by the failure of court proceedings to bring 
unruly members to account. However, the PNGDF is not the only uncertainty. 
Papua New Guineans have become impatient with the pace of change and shown 
a willingness to demonstrate against underdevelopment and political corruption. 
Elections, the principal tool to redress government failings, occur every five 
years, frustrating a population impatient for government action. The public views 
the PNGDF as a protector, arising in part from its law and order profile. Views 
within the PNGDF have historically reflected those of the wider society; little 
separates military and civilian attitudes to government. Soldiers like their civilian 
counterparts experience problems with housing, access to education, and with 
ns1ng pnces. 
The PNGDF's new-found status is accentuated by the poor state of other 
government institutions. There has been growing public criticism of bureaucratic 
inefficiency and friction between officials 1n national and provincial 
administration as reasons for underdevelopment. The police have been criticised 
over their failure to reverse the trend in law and order, in spite of costly police 
operations. Both the public service and the police share grievances with soldiers; 
in the case of the police, the two have been brought closer by their shared 
experience on Bougainville. The police and public service are thus less likely to 
oppose unconstitutional action. 
Analysis of the PNGDF' s capacity to mount a challenge, based on its 
chequered history to date, also raises fundamental questions about its capacity to 
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fulfill its external defence and internal security roles under the Constitution. The 
PNGDF could not mount a Vanuatu-style operation without undergoing a long 
period of intense training, and receiving the support of a foreign power, and 
putting at risk PNG' s internal stability. Already, the PNGDF' s ability to maintain 
border surveillance, or respond to internal contingencies, is limited. 
In the absence of collective commitment among political leaders in PNG 
to reverse the trends of recent years - corruption, law and order problems, 
government ineffectiveness and army indiscipline are but a few - the risk of an 
army coup against the state is in prospect. The success of an army coup in the 
long term is less certain; the army, given its limitations, could not guarantee 
improved governance in PNG. Still, a coup will take place so long as challenges 
to state control go unanswered and PNG political leaders place personal interests 
ahead of the country's development. 
************************************ 
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Chronology 
1940 19 Jun Formation of the Papuan Infantry Battalion 
1942 23 Jul First Action - Awala 
1944 Mar Formation of the First New Guinea Infantry Battalion 
1944 Sep Formation of the Second New Guinea Infantry Battalion 
1945 Aug Formation of the Third NGIB 
1949 Jul PNG Volunteer Rifles formed 
1950 Pacific Islands Regiment reformed 
1952 Oct Vanimo outstation established 
1953 Patrols begin from Vanimo 
1956 4 Jul Presentation of colours to PIR by Sir W. Slim 
1957 Riots 
PIR expanded 
1961 Riots 
1962 Feb Cape Moem base established 
11 Mar Trooping of the Colours with Battle Honours 
1962 Aerial mapping of the border 
1962 United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) 
assumes administrative control of West New Guinea 
1963 Indonesia assumes control from UNTEA over West New 
Guinea 
Australia commences defence expansion ($1.5b) 
1963 reports of Indonesian forces crossing border 
1963 Dec First Papua New Guineans commissioned 
1964 Jan PNG Recruit Training Depot set up at Goldie River 
1964 Sep Boots, Puttees and Hose Tops replace sandals 
1965 3 Jan 2PIR formed 
Exercise Badwash - first in border area 
Minor clashes between Indonesians and Papuans 
1969 Indonesian patrol enters Wutung (PNG) 
18 May Indonesian patrol enters Kwai (PNG) 
1970 Nov 
1 Jul 
Aug 
1972 
1973 26 Jan 
1973 12 Feb 
1974 26 Nov 
1975 16 Sep 
1977 
1981 Jul 
1982 Sep 
1985 May 
Oct 
1985 17 Jun 
1986 Mar 
1987 15 Apr 
Mar 
9 Dec 
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Patrol in Green River 
Security situation in border area deteriorates 
First in-service commission - Goldie River 
Border defined with 6 meridian markers in northern sector 
OPM declares West Papuan independence 
Troops on stand-by - Gazelle unrest 
Papua New Guinea-Indonesia Border defined with 8 
meridian markers in southern sector 
PNG House of Assembly fully elected 
PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) designated 
Large-scale patrolling by PIR resumed 
Indonesia/ Australia fix boundary 
Indonesia/ Australia agree on border arrangements 
PNG Independence 
Brig-Gen Diro reprimanded over meeting with OPM 
Indonesian reprisals against OPM and villagers - 3000 flee 
Major clash between OPM factions 
OPM leader (Rumkorum) arrested near Rabaul 
Series of border clashes 
12,000 border crossers move into camps in PNG 
200 PNGDF/Police deploy to Bewani 
Acting Prime Minister Momis - PNG not to be used for 
terrorist activity 
State of Emergency - Port Moresby (Op Green Beret 85) 
Wingti seeks closer military ties with Indonesia 
Kiunga outstation established 
State of Emergency-Highlands/Lae (Op Green Beret 
87/Koolex) 
Signing Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship & 
Cooperation with Indonesia 
Signing Joint Declaration of Principles with Australia 
1988 
1988 6 Jun 
12 Sep 
3 Oct 
Nov 
22Nov 
26 Nov 
29 Nov 
1 Dec 
2Dec 
7 Dec 
1989 1 Jan 
15-17 Jan 
28 Jan 
6Feb 
24Feb 
6Mar 
14 Mar 
15 Mar 
16 Mar 
21 Mar 
30/31 Mar 
5 April 
6 Apr 
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Operation Apple Pie 
PNGDF unilaterally secure Lae Airport (Op Albatross) 
State of Emergency - Highlands (Op LOMET) 
Troops assist in security at Ok Tedi (Op Iron Foot) 
Applied Geology Assoc. delivers findings on Environment, 
Socio-Economic Public Health review, Bougainville - Ona 
walks out of meeting in disgust 
Theft of explosives - Pan gun a Mine magazine 
First pylon toppled/Police reinforcements deployed to 
Bougainville to protect the mine - Operation Tampara 
commences 
Explosives stolen from Limestone Mining Co. at Manetai 
Second pylon toppled at Pakia. 
Camp 6 (Pink Palace) at Loloho destroyed by fire 
Police Commissioner orders police to shoot to kill 
More police reinforcements deployed. 
Mathew Kove (Ona' s uncle) kidnapped 
Attacks on B CL property 
Curfew imposed on Bougainville (until 3 March) 
Troops march on Parliament in Port Moresby 
Demands - Kl O million; new economic order or secession 
Curfew relaxed to 2200-0500 
Police confront Momis over alleged threat to sack Tohian 
Bougainvillean woman raped and killed by Highlanders 
Kauona orders redskins to leave Bougainville by 17 March 
2 Highlanders killed at Aropa 
Clement Kavuna dies in police custody 
PNGDF deploy to Bougainville - Operation Blue Print 
PNGDF ultimatum, calling on Francis Ona to surrender 
2Lt S. Y andu & Pte M. Ramos Killed in Action 
(B ougainville) 
Apr 
12 Apr 
25 Apr 
5 May 
6May 
17 May 
18-22 May 
22May 
25 May 
14 June 
20 June 
26 Jun 
Jun 
29 Jun 
1 Jul 
3 Jul 
6 Jul 
12 Jul 
1 Aug 
4Aug 
14 Aug 
15 Aug 
17 Aug 
22 Aug 
6 Sep 
12 Sep 
10 Oct 
307 
State of Emergency - Port Moresby (Operation Southern 
Breeze) 
Government offers K200 million package of development 
PNGDF seek helicopters for medivac 
S76A Sikorsky arrives on Bougainville 
Private Buka killed on Bougainville 
Attacks on BCL workers on bus - mine closes 
Cabinet increases the powers of the security forces 
Mine employees, including an expatriate, shot 
2 pylons toppled 
Government declares 14 day truce 
Perpetua Serero dies 
BRA outlawed by the PNG government 
State of emergency (SOE) imposed 
Australia cautions its citizens against travel to Bougainville 
B Company mutinies on Bougainville 
Operation Nakmai Maimai - to clear the Port-Mine Access 
Road 
Premier Kabui and M. Laimo assaulted by police 
Battalion headquarters moves to Panguna 
Op Bull Dog - to clear the mine environs 
Australian helicopters arrive 
Operation Kisim Dog - to clear BRA from the Kongara 
SOE extended 2 months 
Peace talks - Koromira 
Soldiers accidentally kill another soldier 
All troops withdrawn to Panguna 
Pylon toppled 
John Bika killed/ Government issues reward for Ona and 
Kauona K200,000 
Colonel Nuia assumes command 
27 Oct 
11 Nov 
12 Nov 
29 Nov 
1990 11 Jan 
12 Jan 
17 Jan 
24 Jan 
Feb 
12 Feb 
14 Feb 
2Mar 
14 Mar 
16 Mar 
16 Mar 
15 May 
17 May 
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Peace ceremony - Breaking of the Spears 
Rebels declare Republic of Mekamui 
Pylon toppled 
3 police killed at Aropa 
BCL announces retrenchments and mine ceases production 
Cpl Karobata shoots mother and baby - manslaughter 
SOE extended for two months 
Kuveria Gaol attacked - five warders killed 
Australian government warns all Australians without 
essential business on Bougainville to leave 
BCL evacuates mine personnel 
Battle of Buka - 4 PNGDF killed 
St Valentine's Day massacre 
Ceasefire 
Tohian bar-b-coup 
Australian government advises all Australians to leave 
Bougainville 
Security forces leave Bougainville 
Port Moresby imposes an economic blockade 
Unilateral declaration of independence Republic of 
Mekamui 
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